Negotiating meaning and practice in the Zambezia agricultural development project, Mozambique. by Wrangham, Rachel
NEGOTIATING MEANING AND PRACTICE IN THE 
ZAMBÉZIA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT,
MOZAMBIQUE
Rachel Wrangham
A Thesis Submitted in Candidacy for the Degree o f Doctor o f  Philosophy 
London School o f Economics and Political Science
2004
UMI Number: U198712
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Disscrrlation Publishing
UMI U198712
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
I £ S
F
<^9 2 S 6
Abstract
In this thesis I look at the ways in which relationships were negotiated within the 
Zambézia Agricultural Development Project (ZADP) in Mozambique. Drawing on 
eighteen months of fieldwork spread over nearly three years, and using both 
‘development discourse’ literature and writings on clientelism, I examine interactions 
and interfaces from the level of the donor to the level of ‘beneficiary’ farmers. I show 
that the way the project worked was affected by different actors’ divergent 
understandings of key concepts, including ‘community’ and ‘development’ itself. The 
relationship between DFID (the project’s donor) and World Vision (the implementing 
agency) mirrored that between ZADP and its beneficiaries. Both were described as 
‘partnerships’, but they more closely resembled patron-client relationships.
Relationships and meanings were subject to constant renegotiation over the life of 
ZADP. In my field sites of Mutange and Mugaveia I show that villagers’ view of the 
project was shaped by their past experience of outsiders, while for project managers 
changes in policy discourses were more influential. I look at the practical implications 
of assumptions made when the project was designed. I argue that there were strongly 
divergent understandings of the relationship between project staff and beneficiaries; this 
was not recognised, and the misunderstanding had profound implications. The 
accusations made against the project, which surfaced at times of tension and were cast 
in terms of the occult, show both actual and potential beneficiaries asserting their 
agency over the project, in a realm in which project staff could not claim control.
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Chapter 1. Framing the Thesis
1.1 Introduction
I made my last visit to Zambézia in May 2003. I went as a consultant, as part of 
the Final Review of the Zambézia Agricultural Development Project, Phase II 
(henceforth ZADP).* I was already well acquainted with the project and province; only 
my role was unfamiliar. Our little team of three -  all white-skinned, all English- 
speaking -  met on the tarmac at the airport in Quelimane, the provincial capital (see 
Figure 1.2).^ A tiny plane had been chartered to fly us up to Gumé, so the usual six 
hour drive into the tea-growing highlands was compressed into a convenient and 
comfortable forty minutes. We were all excited at the prospect of a flight in a plane into 
which we barely fitted.
We took off over the rice machambas (fields) and followed the line of road and 
railway out of town. The single road leaving Quelimane mns straight as a mler for 
miles, banked up high above the plains, kinking only occasionally to avoid or to cross a 
river. A jumbled patchwork of unevenly shaped machambas, all at slightly different 
stages of harvest, lay below us, until the regadio (irrigation scheme) at Mucelo came in 
sight. Suddenly straight-edged fields were sharply delineated, with irrigation channels 
mnning exactly parallel to the road. The regadio was utterly distinct from surrounding 
machambas, instantly recognisable from the air. I strained my eyes to see if I could 
identify the remains of a similar scheme that I knew had once existed in Mutange, one 
of my two field sites, but there was nothing to be seen.
Away from the coconut groves of the coast, houses clustered on slightly higher 
ground, sheltered by mango and cashew trees and surrounded by acres of lower-lying 
rice paddy in the endless swamps. From this height, we could still pick out individual 
trees, the brightly coloured clothes of women working in the fields, the occasional 
cormgated roof brilliant in the sun. We curved northwards, away from the road, and 
higher. Less detail was visible as we climbed, and we could see that great swathes of
* I refer to ZADP (Phase II) as ‘ZADP’ throughout the thesis.
 ^Although consultants and reviewers of ZADP were generally white, and frequently British, more than 
ninety percent of ZADP staff were Mozambican. The small numbers of expatriate staff are highlighted in 
Figure 1.4. I discuss the question of staff backgrounds in more detail on page 69).
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the more arid inland land lay uncultivated. As we passed over Mocuba, where the 
Lugela and Licungo Rivers meet, we could just glimpse the wrecks of two bridges still 
partially straddling the stream. Neither had been destroyed by the war of the 1980s, 
during which many other Zambezian bridges were blown up, but by more recent 
flooding. Small boats plied back and forth beside their broken arches. The cement 
town (as the centre was known) looked much as it must have done when the Portuguese 
left, although the bamboo stalls and shacks that made up the market had entirely filled 
in some of the roads, subverting the neat grid system.
As we neared Gumé the landscape changed once more, and I started to search for 
landmarks that would show me where Mugaveia, my second field site, lay. But 
Mugaveia had no visually striking features -  nobody had tried out major new 
development schemes there, there were no colonial mission churches, and thus little to 
distinguish it from surrounding areas. During my fieldwork I had found Mugaveia’s 
particular characteristics slower to reveal themselves, connected as they were to 
political and social divisions, and to the split between the governing Frelimo party and 
the opposition Renamo.
When we reached Gumé, we came down slowly, circling the town to give 
warning of our landing. On the airstrip -  a long ribbon of grass with a thin path mnning 
down it -  two men were standing with their bicycles, watching us. They must move, 
they must know that we’ll crash into them if they stay there, I thought. But there they 
remained, apparently unaware of the speed or size of the plane, until just a few metres 
from the ground the pilot aborted the landing, and made a further circle round the town. 
By the time we returned, the men were gone.
Flying over the towns, villages, roads that I knew so well at ground level was yet 
another displacing experience for me to add to a long list of disconcerting shifts I had 
experienced during my fieldwork. Neatly dressed in clean pressed clothes, I was about 
to step down from the aeroplane in Gumé as unmffled as when I had set out from 
Quelimane -  fresh and ready to start work, not travel-stained, aching, and covered in a 
thin red dust from six hours on the road. From the air I could see so well and so 
differently the contrasts and compromises with which I had lived during my fieldwork -  
the new schemes, like the smart tarmac road and the Mucelo regadio which FAQ was 
now rehabilitating; the remnants of earlier good ideas now gone to seed, like the
11
invisible Mutange scheme, the broken bridges, and the roads of the neatly planned town 
now covered in buildings.
I found it strangely moving to be back in Zambézia again, in what felt like such 
different circumstances. On this occasion (May 2003), I was in the province for less 
than two weeks, collating the ‘lessons learned’ from ZADP for the donor, DFID 
(Department for International Development, UK).^ Like the little aircraft, we were to 
skim over the surface, discerning bigger patterns, undistracted by detail. In my 
fieldwork, which took place over a period of more than two years, it had been the detail 
that fascinated me, the intricate and place-specific complexities of the particular project, 
in a particular time and space. Flying over Zambézia in air-conditioned comfort, I 
found it suddenly easy to ignore the specificities of life in the province, to forget about 
the political differences that shaped relationships, to brush aside the history of 
colonialism, conflict, and ‘failed’ development schemes.
Indeed, back on the ground again, it was almost possible to forget that ZADP had 
ever existed. The project, which had started in 1998, was by May 2003 in its final 
month. Implemented by World Vision, a transnational NGO (non-governmental 
organisation) and funded by DFID, its aim had been to improve rural incomes and food 
security in three districts of Zambézia Province, Central Mozambique through a 
combination of agricultural research and extension, micro-credit and work on land 
tenure security (see Table 1.1)."^  But already by May 2003, just five months after the 
contracts of the técnicos (extension workers) had been terminated, there was little 
evidence left in the intervention areas we visited of what had once been a ‘flagship’ 
DFID project, visited and approved of by Clare Short, then Secretary of State for 
International Development. Local project facilitators told us that they were mocked by 
their neighbours -  ‘your patron has left you now’. Goats supplied to rotating credit 
schemes were the only easily visible evidence of project investment. Even here, 
facilitators' and beneficiaries were concerned about how long the schemes would 
continue to function, and about the survival of the animals themselves in the absence of 
veterinary care.
 ^See Whiteside (2003) for full details.
 ^For reasons explained in more detail on page 29, this thesis focuses on the agricultural component.
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Table 1.1 ZADP Goal and Purpose
Goal: Performance Indicators
To increase 
household food 
security for the 
poorest groups in 
Zambezia.
Poorest 25% obtain food for an extra 3 months o f the year from their production 
and from regular income generating activities by Project Year (PY) 4.
50% of the households in the poorest 25% of the population own luxury items 
which they considered were unobtainable before the start o f the project.
Purpose:
To increase farm 
production and 
income sources 
for the rural poor 
in three ZADP 
target Districts.
Production of three indicator staple crops over baseline figures increased by:
Crop
Rice
Cassava
Maize
Cowpea
Poorest 25%
15%
10%
10%
10%
Remaining 75%
50%
25%
40%
60%
By end o f project:
• Range of income generating activities increased by 50% by PY 4.
• Target communities marketing twice as much by PY 4 compared with a 
baseline measure.
• Admissions of malnourished under 5 year old children from ZADP target area 
to Namacurra and Nicoadala clinics declines by 50% by PY 4._______________
Source: ZADP Logical Framework (DFID 1998b)
Some villagers still had new varieties of rice, cassava and sweet potato introduced by 
ZADP, though others had lost them in floods or droughts. A small number could recall 
planting technologies that they had learned and adopted from técnicos, though even 
more could recall the technologies they had rejected. Bridges were universally praised 
in the small number of places where they had been built, but everywhere there were 
cries for further investment. Overall, we found little evidence of the £3.75 million that 
had been ploughed into the agricultural component of the project over the preceding 
five years.
My two colleagues, both older and more experienced than me, were profoundly 
perplexed by the project, and I was repeatedly called on to explain ‘why’ something had 
happened, and how ZADP had developed into its final form. After all, I knew the 
project well. I had visited it first as part of an annual DFID review in May 2000, then 
from November 2000 to June 2002 had been attached to it full time, under DFID’s 
APOS (Associate Professional Officer) scheme to do my PhD research,^ and had visited
 ^Under this scheme, now sadly defunct, I was provided with funding for a year’s preparatory study in 
Britain, then a year’s work experience-cum-research on a DFID-funded project overseas, and then a final 
year’s funding on my return.
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again in November-December 2002. The confusion and surprise of my two colleagues 
reminded me of my own bemusement at the outset of my involvement with ZADP, a 
project which seems to have puzzled and frustrated many who encountered it.
The findings of the Final Review did not come as a surprise to the people most 
intimately involved in the project. It had been evident from as early as 1999 that the 
agricultural component was seriously under-achieving, both in terms of original 
expectations and money spent (DFID 1999a, 1999b). Nor were the lessons and 
recommendations that we made a shock:
Take practical steps to keep administration and logistics simple
Be realistic about the difficulty of the task and the skills available
Be cautious about mixed objectives -  such as having a rapid and large-scale 
impact on poverty and developing sustainable capacity
Allow sufficient time before scaling up
Be careful when making assumptions about ‘community’ or ‘poverty’
Address market failure first where and when there is potential, and allow 
time to overcome teething problems
Check that there is enough to offer on the ‘extension menu’ before 
developing an agricultural extension system
Ground-breaking developments at provincial level also need national level 
support
Twice yearly donor reviews, with large teams of DFID Advisers, most with 
limited experience of rural Mozambique, can be counterproductive.
(Whiteside, Wrangham, and Gudz 2003: 5-7)
These were practical issues which had been raised time and again by DFID Advisers, 
the 2001 Mid-Term Review team, and many of the other consultants employed to 
advise the project. Broadly speaking, analysis focused on poor design and poor 
management.
As the thesis shows, design and management did undoubtedly both contribute to 
project problems. ZADP was designed and monitored by individuals who did not know 
Zambézia well, and who were responding to policy initiatives coming from London and 
Washington. The design was internally contradictory, and assumptions were ill 
thought-through. Though many problems could perhaps have been ‘managed out’, a 
combination of particular personnel, unclear ownership structures, lack of confidence in 
change-making, and an unwillingness to make tough decisions militated against this. 
But is this kind of analysis, focused entirely at the technical level, sufficient? I argue 
that it is not, and that it is necessary to look deeper, both at the assumptions and
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exclusions which defined the optic of the project and shaped project practice, and at the 
relationships within which the project was itself negotiated and developed. Although 
there were numerous practical problems with ZADP, which militated against its 
‘success’, I argue that a close analysis of this particular ‘site’ allows us to identify a 
number of different ‘narratives’ or ‘concepts’ of development. At no stage was the 
existence of these different concepts acknowledged. Thus, to develop Long’s (1992) 
battlefield analogy, neither the terms of battle, nor the nature of the different armies or 
alliances, was ever made clear. Instead, we can see fundamental clashes between 
different ways of seeing the world. These clashes did not necessarily cause the project’s 
‘failure’ (management issues were more immediate here), but they underlay many of the 
arguments about what the project should have done and how it should have acted.
Through a carefully grounded ethnography of aid of the type advocated by Crewe 
and Harrison (1998), I investigate how individuals, institutions and organisations with a 
wide range of agendas, ideas, interests and strategies negotiated over meaning and 
practice within the context of ZADP. Although personality and agency were frequently 
attributed to ZADP’, DFID’, and ‘World Vision’, I emphasise the fact that it is 
individuals and not organisations that have agency, although attention should always be 
paid to attribution practices. I look therefore at struggles over material resources and 
ideologies, and at how actors had the ability to resist each other in a myriad ways, while 
remaining caught within power and political structures that none controlled. Moving on 
from a literature that elaborates the differences between ‘project’ and ‘beneficiary’ 
priorities and perceptions,^ I look at the ways in which difference and similarity were 
asserted and manipulated. I argue that despite attempts to make it into a managed and 
manageable intervention, ZADP can usefully be seen as a site of constant and 
continuous conflict relating to a range of discourses, articulated in changing historical, 
social and institutional contexts.
The thesis is written from a perspective that draws on the substantial 
‘anthropology of development’ and ‘development anthropology’ literature, which I 
discuss in Sections 1.2 and 2.1. A study of a specific intervention, and not a ‘village 
study’, it looks first at the organisations involved in planning and implementing ZADP,
 ^A considerable literature gives evidence of a mismatch between beneficiaries’ and planners’ perceptions. 
See for example Chambers (1972, 1983, 1986, 1993, 1995, 1996), Crehan (1988), Dey (1982), Lentz 
(1988), Mosse (1994, 1995), Olivier de Sardan (1988), Richards (1991), and Tierney (1997).
15
and at how they conceptualised Zambézia. Attention to detail and historical context 
permits a nuanced understanding of the practices and strategies of actors involved in 
ZADP. Focusing on history, and on its (mis)understanding by development personnel, 
allows for a deeper appreciation of the ways in which different people responded to the 
ZADP intervention. This is considered in the second half of the thesis, where I look at 
how the project worked ‘on the ground’, and how it was understood by a range of local 
participants and observers.
Figure 1.2 M ap of Zambézia showing where ZADP operated
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1.2 Debating ‘Development’
‘Development’ is a slippery term. Accepted definitions vary widely, and the term 
remains highly contested and ambiguous. Carrying strongly subjective and judgemental 
overtones, ‘development’ and its derivatives have been used to refer to planned social 
change, to economic growth, to the outcome of social and economic change, to the 
intervention by one group in another’s affairs with the intention of bringing positive 
change, and most recently, to a discourse of domination of the ‘Third W orld’ by the 
‘First World’ (Cowen and Shenton 1996, Lewis forthcoming-a). Some of the debates 
about whether ‘development’ is inevitable or avoidable, value-laden or amoral, relate to 
this definitional confusion.
Here I am concerned less with the specifics of definition, and more with the ways 
in which definitions were used: I take the question of how, why and when ideas were 
shared as a subject for investigation. In particular I do not assume that the organisations 
with which I deal can be analysed as simple (individual) agents. In this way I attempt to 
go beyond Ferguson (1990). His influential study looked at the ways in which a 
specific kind of knowledge about Lesotho was produced, and what its effects were. He 
showed how a supposedly technical project actually extended bureaucratic state power, 
through a process he described as depoliticisation. However his arguments were 
weakened by the fact that he did not attempt to portray the diversity of personalities and 
ideas within the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency, nor 
did he unpick the processes by which the documents he analysed were created. 
Although he stated his intention to look both at the practice of ‘development’ and its 
effects, it was on the latter that his book focused. In this thesis I look inside the ‘black 
box’, at how outcomes were negotiated and produced.
Instead of emphasising the hegemonic power of development discourse (e.g. 
Escobar 1995, Sachs 1992), I follow Long and his Manchester School forebears in 
looking at how decisions and room for manoeuvre were negotiated between developer 
and beneficiary.^ My reading of Long puts an examination of the agency of individuals
 ^The work of certain Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and Manchester School writers such as Gluckman 
(1958), Mitchell (1956), Colson (1964, 1971) and Long (1968) was intimately concerned with processes 
of social and economic change that would now be called ‘development’. This literature was critically 
examined by Ferguson (1999). See also Arce (2001: 106-7) and Werbner (1984).
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-  both ‘beneficiaries’ (often called ‘local people’), and development workers -  
alongside a consideration of the structural constraints on their actions. By agency I 
mean the ‘knowledgeability, capability and social embeddedness associated with doing 
(and reflecting) that impact upon or shape one’s own and others’ actions and 
interpretations’ (Long 2001: 240).*
Though their capacity for action may be limited, local actors retain some freedom 
of manoeuvre. This is frequently conceptualised as ‘resistance’, which can be made 
manifest in a variety of different ways.^ Resistance is diverse and context-specific: it 
refers to a whole range of practices from withdrawal, covert opposition, and symbolic 
challenges, to outright rebellion. As Hilhorst put it, ‘local actors are not merely 
overcome by development: they interpret, bend and negotiate it through their agency’ 
(2001: 402).
However it is important not to romanticise the opportunities for alternatives, nor 
to be naïve in the celebration of diversity. ‘Development’ is inherently power-laden, 
and control of definitions and resources lies more in the hands of the powerful than the 
marginalised. One must pay close attention to social positioning, and to the power 
structures which open and shut off options. In this I draw on Feierman’s study of 
‘peasant intellectuals’ in Tanzania (1990), and look at the social positioning of actors. 
Feierman argued that ‘discourse does not float independently above the play of social 
forces, nor is it a mere instrument of social forces’ (1990:4) but that it is necessary to be 
aware of the social positioning of those who hold particular ideas:
‘Not all regularised improvisations are created equal; not all have an equal weight in 
shaping the language that will be in general use in the future. To explain the 
direction of change it is necessary to introduce power into the equation and explore 
the relationship between the characteristic of domination by ruling groups and the 
evolution of discourse’ (4).
A focus on the social positioning of individuals anchors my work in the Zambezian 
context.
I pay close attention to labelling practices: not only which labels are used, but 
who controls them. As Shore and Wright have written, ‘A key concern is “who has the
Agency is discussed further in section 2.1.
 ^A number of excellent studies of peasant resistance were carried out in Zambézia (e.g. Isaacman 1976, 
1996, Vail and White 1983). See also Ranger (1977), Taussig (1980), Comaroff (1985), Scott (1985, 
1990), Ong (1987), Comaroff and Comaroff (1991), van Walraven and Abbink (2003) and Allina-Pisano 
(2003).
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power to define”: dominant discourses work by setting up the terms of reference and by 
disallowing and marginalizing alternatives’ (1997: 18). Following Scott (1990, 1985), 
the “transcripts” of the weak may be hidden, but that does not mean they do not exist. 
Extending the argument, even when one discourse appears to be dominant, there are 
always parallel, residual or emerging alternatives: ‘transcripts’ which are not completely 
hidden, but which may be disallowed or marginalised. The relationship between such 
dominant and counter-discourses is dynamic, and meaning is constantly subject to 
renegotiation (Hilhorst 2001: 402). Vocabularies acquire new meanings through their 
use in different contexts, through ‘the intricate interplay and joint appropriation and 
transformation of different bodies of knowledge’ (Arce and Long 20(X)b: 24).
To demonstrate how I look at the ways in which ideas are shared and negotiated, 
and to introduce a second body of literature that underpins the thesis, I now briefly 
discuss the ways in which concepts of ‘development’ were contested. With Harrison 
(1995a), whose similarly multi-sited work on an aquaculture project took her from rural 
Zambia to the PAO offices in Rome, I argue that simple ‘them’ and ‘us’ dichotomies 
‘may oversimplify how some “local” people include themselves in particular forms of 
language and action’ (134). Ideas about what ‘development’ was and should be were 
not neatly split between ‘developers’ and ‘beneficiaries’. ‘Knowledges’ do not form 
discrete bounded systems; rather all kinds of knowledge -  ‘Western knowledge’ 
included -  are fragmented and contested (e.g. Nygren 1999, cf. Hobart 1993) The 
people I worked with in ZADP belonged to linked and overlapping worlds: 
‘contradictory discourses overlapped and discrepant meanings criss-crossed, [and] all 
knowledges were made up of diverse elements and combined within a world of multiple 
actors’ (Nygren 1999: 277). It follows that it is unwise to make strict typological 
distinctions between different groups, or to assume, for example, that ‘the poor’ will 
always have different perceptions from ‘the well-off.
For development (desenvolvimento) to exist, informants in Mutange and 
Mugaveia generally considered that three main things were necessary: outside help, 
material goods, and peace, which I now discuss in turn. While many técnicos 
informally agreed with much of this analysis, it did not fit well with an official
See, for example, the influential Voices o f the Poor consultation carried out for the World Development 
Report 2000/2001 (Narayan and Petesch 2002, Narayan et al. 2000a, Narayan et al. 2000b).
19
emphasis on replacing the provision of concrete goods with a move towards 
‘community participation’ and the facilitation of developmental processes.
First, development was linked to help from outsiders. Desenvolvimento was said 
to require the aid of outsiders, whether concession holders,^* government officials, or 
project workers. A Frelimo leader in Mutange said, of potential investor in the area:
‘We can’t resolve our poverty on our own. Maybe with those who have a little, if 
they can help us ... That’s how we think. We are too poor. It is only this way that 
we will also see development further ahead (yimos também o desenvolvimento para 
afrente).'
Some informants identified these connections with outsiders as themselves constituting 
development, and on several occasions I was told that ‘it shows that we have 
development that I can be sitting here like this, talking to a white woman’. I discuss the 
strategic nature of this acclamation and projection of dependence in Chapter 6.
Certain people contested the suggestion that ‘community participation’ (see page 
33), a cornerstone of the ZADP approach, might form part of ‘development’. A Frelimo 
leader from Namuinho, who had received project goats and had participated in various 
seed multiplication and research activities, said that he himself could see no 
‘development’ from project activities. For him construction was fundamental to 
‘development’, and he argued that the project should follow the example of the colonial 
Portuguese in prioritising it. In particular he emphasised that ‘development’ would 
never come about if people went on ‘helping’ to build things:
‘Helping like this is what doesn’t develop the country (ajudar é isso que nào 
desenvolve o pais). This is helping without getting anything. I can’t help all day 
without being paid. It’s hard -  I don’t buy anything, I haven’t farmed. At least if I 
pick up my hoe then there’s some return. But helping? It’s this kind of help that has 
made us fall down, to this day.’
He considered that ‘help’ was meant to come from outside, rather than from amongst
themselves. Thus, although ‘community participation’ was very important for project
designers and staff, it did not fit with villagers’ ideas: that development was what
‘outsiders’ should do for them. This issue is further discussed in Chapter 5.
I return to the question of strategic claims of dependence -  and the stress on inter­
personal relationships as a key aspect of the development process -  at several points in
' * Concessionaires held tracts of land granted to them by the government, for commercial exploitation. 
Land was also granted on concession in colonial times.
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the thesis. I argue that it can be usefully analysed through the lens of patron-client 
relationships. Although there is a substantial anthropological literature on the subject, it 
is now somewhat antiquated (e.g. Foster 1963, Boissevain 1966, W olf 1966, Scott 1972, 
Waterbury 1977, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980, 1984, Goodell 1985). Clientelism as an 
explanatory paradigm fell out of favour after the rise of Marxist analysis of rural 
societies, which emphasised the exploitative nature of relations previously analysed as 
patronage. However I suggest that this approach can be extremely helpful in analysing 
relationships between different actors involved in ZADP. Arguing that two 
organisations stood in relation to each other as patron and client, as I do in Chapter 2, or 
that the relationship between ZADP and its ‘beneficiaries’ can likewise be seen as a 
patronage relationship (Chapter 6) does not fall foul of class analysis, nor does it fly in 
the face of ‘discourse’ theory. Rather, it highlights the power-laden and strategic nature 
of the interface.
The literature generally suggests that patronage plays a mediating role in 
hierarchical societies, as a response to hostility and inequality. For Boissevain 
patronage is ‘the complex of relations between those who use their influence, social 
position or some other attribute to assist and protect others, and those whom they so 
help and protect’ (1966: 18). Both clients and patrons are said to benefit from the 
system. However, if the system is thought of as triadic and not dyadic (Foster 1963), 
that is to say that the patron is mediating for the client in a system such as bureaucratic 
hierarchy, the question of the degree to which the patron is working for himself and not 
only his client must be considered (Stein 1984: 31). It may be that the patron needs the 
client just as much as the client needs the patron. I consider this question both in the 
context of ZADP-beneficiary and ZADP-DFID relations
The second feature of ‘development’ was often, though not always, connected to 
these strategic claims of dependence. It was widely believed that for an area or an 
individual to be desenvolvido they needed to have things. A ‘developed’ person was 
one with plenty of solid, durable goods. An elderly man who had recently moved to 
Mutange described the area as ‘developed’, because a number of black people had tin 
roofs on their houses. For him this indicated development: ‘It is necessary to be rich to 
be developed, but if you are rich and you do not display your wealth -  you do not have 
a lot of food, you do not have a tin-roofed house -  then you are not developed.’ He
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emphasised the importance of material goods, specifically food and housing, in 
indicating the development of both individuals and areas.
The connection between desenvolvimento and machinery (agricultural machinery, 
vehicles, processing equipment) was made especially strongly in Mutange, in particular 
by those who had been involved with the agricultural cooperative of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. The Frelimo chefe de zona of Namuinho said ‘Real development needs 
machines -  I just can’t do enough by hand.’ Without machinery, and without the 
infrastructure to which they had been accustomed, many in Mutange felt themselves 
limited. Another Frelimo leader, who ran a small carpentry business in addition to his 
machambas (fields) said:
‘We lack many things. To buy clothes you have to go on foot to Namacurra, or 
Nicoadala. No shop. We have no machines to plough with. You have to cultivate 
by hand, and don’t produce enough. But with a tractor you can cultivate up to two 
hectares or more. And what we produce we have to take a long way on our heads.’
Those who had known the cooperative themselves tended to place the most emphasis on 
the need for machinery and equipment. Although there had been serious problems with 
the cooperative (see page 123 for more details), it was seen by many as marking the 
most ‘developed’ moment in Mutange’s history.
The connection between desenvolvimento, employment and transport was made 
equally strongly in Mutange and Mugaveia. A group of Renamo leaders from Mutange 
told me that ‘for us, desenvolvimento is having a factory, with people working, the 
railway working and people able to take their produce to Quelimane’. ‘There’s no way 
that we can develop here’ said a man in Mutange. ‘Everything is impeded because we 
don’t have a road. No transport comes here.’ The Renamo leaders agreed: 
‘Development here is a bit delayed because of the road and the bridges, because even if 
a person wants to develop, how can he, without a bridge?’ Likewise in Mugaveia the 
lack of a solid bridge was referred to again and again as the prime obstacle to 
development, with the absence of a mill, shop and hospital in second place.
The connection between material goods and ‘development’ was also made by 
many ZADP técnicos, though in a slightly different manner. For the técnicos, 
desenvolvimento was an unsettlingly abstract concept, and direct questions about its 
meaning tended to elicit confused responses. Técnicos preferred to describe activities, 
or ideal outcomes, or to tell me what desenvolvimento was not, rather than what it was.
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The most popular definition was a comparative one, with desenvolvimento contrasted to 
emergência, the emergency. In this context emergência was used to refer not so much 
to a period, as to a way of working that was characteristic of the war and immediate 
post-war years, when hand-outs and donations were provided to displaced people and 
returning refugees. Técnicos contrasted this way of working with the methods of 
desenvolvimento now preferred, which to them implied a credit or commercial 
relationship, in which inputs were loaned or sold (usually at subsidised prices). For 
them, therefore, desenvolvimento referred not only to the possession of material goods, 
but also to a particular means of acquiring them.
Finally, it was widely agreed that social cooperation and peace were necessary 
preconditions to development. ‘For there to be development, people have to help each 
other’ and, ‘If there’s no union at home, development is difficult’ were two things I 
heard in Mutange. Witchcraft was seen as the enemy of development; white people’s 
wealth was in part attributed to their ability to accumulate without sparking envy and 
therefore witchcraft. War was also antithetical to development, and many believed 
that rural districts had been ‘more developed’ {mais desenvolvidos) before the war. 
Although ZADP staff tended to focus on a rather higher level -  the need for national 
stability -  a concern with peace was one they shared.
This discussion has briefly demonstrated some of the ways in which ideas were 
shared and debated between different groups of actors involved in ZADP. Less 
powerful ‘beneficiaries’ were able, at times, to force changes in ZADP practices; 
although ‘development’ takes place within a context of extremely uneven power 
relations, local actors still retain significant levels of power in their relationship with 
‘developers’. ‘Development’ is not simply the exercise of irresistible power, but rather 
‘a complex process involving the working and reworking of knowledge in a changing 
and contested environment’ (Phillips and Edwards 2000: 49). Foucault was at pains to 
argue that all power is by its nature opposed and opposable, and that it consists of 
actions upon the actions of others, a definition that presupposes rather than annuls the 
capacity of those others as agents (Gordon 1991).
I discuss another referent of emergência on page 90. 
I discuss this further in Chapter 7.
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In this thesis, adopting and critiquing Long’s practice-based actor-oriented and 
‘interface’ approaches allows me to focus on the complexities of the ways in which 
discourses were negotiated and renegotiated, and on the messy world of conflicting 
perspectives and heated exchanges/^ Long’s approach is characterised by an interest in 
discontinuity and ambiguity, and in the ‘battlefields of knowledge’ he discerned 
between local actors and ‘developers’ (Long and Long 1992). At the ‘interfaces’, points 
of intersection between different fields of social organisation, discrepancies and 
discontinuities of power, knowledge, interest and value are revealed. As Long 
emphasised, ‘development’ is part of a continuous flow in social life and relations 
between actors, and cannot be separated from that flow (Long 2002). Interventions do 
not have the clean beginnings and ends that formal documents might suggest; they are 
understood in an already-existing context, and their effects continue past formal end- 
dates. Interface analysis looks at how interactions between interveners and intervened 
shape outcomes, and at how, over time, ‘the interface itself becomes an organised entity 
of interlocking relationships and intentionalities’ (2002: 7).
As I show in Chapter 2 ,1 move beyond the accounts of Ferguson (1990), Escobar 
(1995) and some contributors to Crush (1995b), who, by concentrating on the outcomes 
of ‘development’ at times seem to imply that it is all-powerful, top-down and singular. 
Looking at process and negotiation keeps questions of power and agency in view; I 
concur with Gardner and Lewis that ‘while it [development] may function 
hegemonically, it is also created and recreated by multiple agents, who often have very 
different understandings of their work’ (1997: 134).
An interesting and unusual feature of this ‘different understanding’ in Zambézia 
was the political interpretation given to development organisations and ‘development’ 
itself. As I discuss in more detail later (page 173), a positive attitude towards 
‘development’ was an important part of the self-definition of certain adherents of 
Frelimo, the ex-communist ruling party continuously in power since Independence, in 
particular of those who tended to be at the forefront of ZADP activities. Such people 
saw ‘development’ as somehow associated with themselves alone, and felt that their 
own openness to ‘development’ stood in stark contrast to what they saw as the closed 
minds of Rename members. Rename, now the opposition party, but once a guerrilla
Long’s ‘interface’ approach builds on the work o f Rhodes Livingstone Institute and Manchester School 
anthropologists in its conscious focus on actual practice (Arce 2001).
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movement supported in turn by Rhodesia and South Africa, was seen by Frelimo- 
supporting villagers to be backward-looking and primitive. Renamo adherents, 
accepting parts of this definition, rejected much ‘development’ as being too closely 
associated with their rivals, even when administered by self-consciously ‘neutral’ NGOs 
like World Vision.^^
‘Development’ thus proved to be important in the self-definition of some 
Zambézian beneficiaries, in a manner mirroring Pigg’s findings from Nepal. She 
showed how a once-extemal concept was locally appropriated and came to form part of 
the way in which people constructed their identity, independent of any individual 
‘development project’ or Western intervention (1992). The politicisation of 
development, in which Frelimo adherents were ‘development-identified’, while Renamo 
supporters were ‘development-denied’, is a theme to which I repeatedly return; it is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
Drawing on the insight that ‘the meaning development holds for people is specific 
to the historical context in which they experience it’, and that ‘innovations in 
development activities are received in a context already formed by previous activities’ 
(Pigg 1993: 49-52), this thesis repeatedly seeks to contextualise and historicise. 
Engaged as I was with ZADP over three tumultuous y e a r s , a n y  analysis that sought to 
present itself as timeless would be entirely exposed to the familiar criticisms made of 
the ‘ethnographic present’ (Fabian 1983, Hobart 1997). This thesis attempts to trace 
contingent and changing relationships between individuals and organisations which 
themselves are in a state of constant flux. In order to embed an understanding of what 
development ‘meant’ to those involved with -  or who had made the choice not to be 
involved with -  ZADP, my work also attempts to understand the ways in which people 
made livelihood choices, and what factors gave some a broader range of choices than 
others.
Observation would suggest that few Renamo supporters were involved in the more time-consuming or 
marginally economically beneficial ZADP activities, such as seed credit or demonstrations. However, a 
much greater number did accept rat-traps and livestock. It could thus be suggested that the economic 
benefits o f involvement in ZADP activities were of interest to Renamo adherents.
In the period 2000-2003 Zambézia suffered devastating floods. World Vision decentralised its offices 
to the provinces. ZADP changed managers and finally employed a rural sociologist. DFID (Central 
Africa) decentralised power to a new office in Maputo (DFID Mozambique), almost completely changed 
the advisory team, and subsequently took two years to write a new ‘Country Plan’. Corporately, DFID 
refined and redefined its mission and ways o f working, in the context of a rapidly changing global 
development agenda.
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1.3 The Setting
This research was carried out within a context framed by the organisations with 
which I worked, by geography, and by ‘development’ itself. There were no neat 
boundaries to my ethnography of aid, as there were important connections and linkages 
that stretched far beyond the locales of intervention into many institutions and countries. 
Even within the province of Zambézia, ‘development’ was a multi-sited activity, 
engaging a web of people spread over a large geographical area. During the course of 
my fieldwork I moved to and fro between different spheres, with a range of roles. 
Attending an expatriate birthday party (Figure 1.26) or having lunch with a group of 
expatriates in the Quelimane pizzeria was as much part of my research as sitting under a 
mango tree talking to someone from Mutange whose cassava machamba (field) was 
being destroyed by a goat provided by ZADP. That said, my fieldwork was largely 
concentrated in three places: Quelimane, Mutange and Mugaveia (see Figure 1.2, Figure 
1.10, Figure 1.11).
Quelimane, the provincial capital, was the site of the main ZADP office. Mutange 
was a small localidade^^ in Namacurra District, in Lower Zambézia. Mugaveia, in 
Gurué District in Upper Zambézia was about 350 km north of Quelimane (normally six 
hours’ drive). Mutange and Mugaveia were just two of the nineteen localidades in 
which ZADP operated, which were spread across Namacurra, Nicoadala and Gurué 
Districts (see Figure 1.2). While Namacurra and Nicoadala Districts were relatively 
similar in terms of ecology, climate, cropping patterns and language, Gurué District was 
substantially different. The decision to work in the two different regions was made by 
the Project Manager at the outset of my research, as he wished me to draw comparisons 
between the project intervention areas: it was expected that my work would help 2LADP 
understand the impact of project activities on those living within the project area, in 
particular the rural poor, and provide recommendations on how future activities could 
be modified to enhance project impact. The localidade of Mutange was chosen 
because it was the only Namacurra localidade easily accessible at the time when I 
started work (during the 2001 Zambézia floods). Mugaveia was chosen because it was
Zambézia province is divided into districts (distritos), each sub-divided into administrative posts 
(postos administrativos), made up of a number of localities (localidades). Each localidade comprised 
several cells (células).
See Appendix A for my terms of reference.
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seen as ‘representative’ of villages in Gurué District: neither mountain nor lowland 
plain; not too densely populated, but still sizeable.
ZADP, in its different guises, was the central location of my work, but I also 
looked at the broader movements, discourses and narratives that affected and shaped it. 
My choice of what Gatter termed ‘the crucial middle ground’ (1990: 12) where 
development projects are put into action was pragmatic. It reflected the fact that I was 
working within ZADP, and represented my attempt to put the situation to good use. 
The project itself formed an ideal location for the study of a variety of what Long 
(1989b) has called ‘development interfaces’, and relationships across such interfaces. 
ZADP formed what could be thought of as a supra-national space, intertwining with 
local and global fields in complex ways. Those who acted within this space belonged at 
the same time to other fields, which did not necessarily overlap. These actors included 
the DFID Advisers who designed and monitored the project; World Vision staff in 
Britain and Mozambique; ZADP staff both Mozambican and expatriate; national 
government staff; numerous consultants; and the men and women living within the 
project area. ZADP was perceived and understood differently by the various categories 
of actors. Not only did actors occupy different institutional spaces, they also occupied 
and moved between different geographical spaces. Studying such spaces calls for 
multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995). Here I describe each of the frames for ZADP 
in turn: the project itself, the geographical location, and the organisational context.
I worked in all parts of Mutange, a small localidade, though I concentrated most on the hamlet of 
Namuinho. In Mugaveia, I worked only in the northern part of the localidade, in the células o f Intuba 
and Nicoria, and occasionally in Inlixe and Inhape. When I refer to ‘Mugaveia’, I am thus referring only 
to the portion of the localidade in which we worked.
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The Zambézia Agricultural Development Project
ZADP was a large and complex project. It was implemented by World Vision- 
Mozambique, funded by DFID, and had a budget of £7.8 million (see Figure 1.3) spread 
over four years, later extended to five. It grew out of an earlier project (ZADP Phase I), 
which had provided tools, seeds and other agricultural inputs to farmers in the wake of 
the conflict. ZADP (I) had aimed to revive agriculture in the province by spreading new 
and old crop varieties through a research and extension programme (ODA and World 
Vision 1994). ZADP inherited staff and structure from this earlier project, but was 
itself much more elaborate. It had more than double the budget, and components 
dealing with land tenure and micro-credit were added to the agriculture work. The 
stated purpose of ZADP was to: ‘increase farm production and income sources for the 
rural poor in selected localidades in Gurué, Nicoadala and Namacurra districts’ (DFID 
1998b: 1). They were to ‘diversify smallholder food and income sources’, ‘develop 
community-based organisations’, ‘assist communities...to assert their legal rights over 
land’, and to ‘assist communities to move away from subsistence agriculture, and 
diversify their income sources by initiating savings and credit’ (DFID 1998b:l).
Figure 1.3 Original budgets for project components
Other
£1,341,200
Credit
£1,074,000
Land
£1,211,600
Agriculture
£4,125,900
Source: Derived from Project Memorandum (DFID 1998b, Annex 5)
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Within ZADP, the agricultural component was dominant. As Figure 1.3 shows, it 
was by far the most expensive, and its greater budget was reflected in a larger number 
of staff (see Figure 1.4). The fact that the Project Manager was an agronomist and the 
Deputy Project Manager doubled up as the agriculture component manager also 
contributed to its supremacy. Although in theory the project was an integrated one, in 
fact the three components were run separately. They were physically separated, based 
in buildings spread across Quelimane city. They were also each very different in nature. 
It was considered essential for the success of the micro-credit component that it should 
maintain an identity clearly distinct from World Vision, as World Vision was believed 
to be associated with hand-outs (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). The land tenure 
component was involved in institution-building between an NGO (ORAM)^® and a 
government department. By contrast, the agriculture component was focused on 
research and service delivery.
As also shown by Figure 1.4, my own ‘location’ as a Social Development APO 
within the project was as a member of the agriculture component. For this reason, and 
because neither the land tenure nor micro-credit components maintained on-going 
village-level programmes, I focused almost exclusively on the activities of the 
agriculture component. It should therefore be borne in mind throughout the thesis that 
my comments on ZADP pertain to the agriculture component, unless otherwise 
indicated.
ORAM, the Rural Association for Mutual Help, was one of Mozambique’s largest national NGOs, with 
a wide profile o f activities. In addition to working on land issues, it was involved in emergency responses 
to the 2001 Zambézia floods, and provided on-going support to the Association of Mutange Villagers.
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Figure 1.4 The Zambézia Agricultural Development Project
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Figure 1.5 The ZADP Agriculture Team, December 2001
Source: John Steel
The agricultural component was equivalent in scale to a substantial project in 
itself. Two extension supervisors managed a network of técnicos based in nineteen 
localidades spread across the three districts of Namacurra, Nicoadala and Gurué (see 
Figure 1.2). An agricultural research team, working closely with the field técnicos and 
supervisors, undertook both on-farm and on-station research, most notably into cassava 
disease. A livestock manager was appointed shortly before I arrived to manage a small 
team of livestock técnicos in coordination with the extension supervisors and field 
técnicos. The ‘social component’, of which I formed a part, was also nominally 
included within the agricultural component, and we shared office space with agriculture 
colleagues.^' Despite being the most junior members of staff, the técnicos were the 
lynchpin of all the extremely varied project activities in the localidades (see Table 1.2). 
Normally one técnico lived in each project localidade, where they worked in a
I do not discuss the social component in any detail, as it was only established in its final form towards 
the end o f my fieldwork.
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maximum of six células. Most of the técnicos were younger men, but the técnico for 
Mutange was a woman, Jacinta Lopes. Most were técnicos médios (middle-level 
technicians), meaning they had completed agricultural training equivalent to twelfth 
grade schooling. All were employed by ZADP, which meant that they had no job 
security after the project ended.
Table 1.2 Activities carried out by the agricultural component
Livestock Goat and duck restocking 
Chicken vaccination 
Training of para-vets
Agricultural extension Resident técnicos 
Farmer Field Schools 
Community Extension Workers 
Radio soap opera
Research Farmer Research Groups 
On-farm research 
On-station research
Collaboration with national research institutes 
International research with Natural Resources Institute
Associational
development
Establishment of farmer associations 
Community Development Committees 
Partnership with CLUSA
Post-harvest Improved granaries
Biological and chemical pest control methods 
Rat-trapping
Crop processing technologies 
Storage technologies
Plant provision and 
multiplication
Individual and group seed multiplication
Introduction of new seed and plant varieties
Tree seedling multiplication and distribution to
individuals and groups
Seed sale
Seed credit
Tools Ergonomics and improved tools 
Tool sale
Roads and Bridges Spot improvements on feeder roads and stream crossings 
Bridge construction
Partnerships Traders
Agricultural marketing companies 
Input suppliers 
Honey company
As Table 1.2 shows, the agriculture component carried out a huge range of 
activities, some sequentially, some simultaneously. Técnicos and Community 
Extension Workers (generally known as facilitators) worked together on many different 
schemes. For example. Farmer Field Schools (in which groups of farmers worked with 
a técnico to investigate solutions to agricultural problems identified by themselves) 
were abandoned after one season, before my fieldwork. The radio soap opera, which
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was intended to take extension messages to a far broader audience, only started in 2001 
(and was hugely popular). Seed provision underwent similar changes. At first seed was 
supplied in small quantities on credit, and repaid to a village-level ‘seed bank’; however 
repayment rates were low, and storage problems meant that by the following season 
there was little to lend. Attempts to encourage commercial seed sale proved 
unsuccessful, as sales volumes were so low, and by the time I was involved in the 
project, seed of certain varieties was being sold by técnicos. At the same time small 
amounts of improved planting material (in particular brown-streak resistant cassava and 
yellow-fleshed sweet potato) continued to be provided for free (see Chapter 6). Each 
year there was a programme of on-farm demonstrations (sowing rice in lines, bunding, 
fertiliser use, plant spacing, plant intercropping, new varieties and new crops such as 
paprika). Other demonstrations included the use of eucalyptus leaves and ash for seed 
storage, and the use of aluminium cones to protect granaries against rats. Many of these 
demonstrations were of questionable value, as pointed out by a consultant involved in 
an early DFID review (DFID 1999a). Some were extremely popular -  as discussed in 
Chapter 7 there was considerable jealousy of those who had been given rat traps, as part 
of a research project -  while others went unadopted, as they required unacceptably high 
levels of either financial or labour investment.
It was intended that most agricultural activities should involve ‘community 
participation’, so the Farmer Research Groups were meant to investigate problems 
prioritised by farmers, and bridge construction was meant to be done using materials 
provided by ‘the community’ (in order to increase the chances of ‘sustainability’). 
However as I discuss later, beneficiaries did not generally wish to work together, and 
disputed any attempt to get them to contribute to project activities; this meant, for 
example, that those who worked on bridge repair (Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.7) were paid 
for their labour.
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Figure 1.6 Bridge in Mucunha localidade, before rehabilitation by ZADP
Figure 1.7 Mucunha bridge after rehabilitation
Mucunha localidade is high in the mountains o f Gurué District. Prior to bridge 
rehabilitation by ZADP, vehicles had to stop more than 7 km from the centre of 
the localidade. Source; John Steel.
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Zambézia
Zambézia province was the setting for the project and source of its name/^ It was 
the location of most of my fieldwork. In this section I introduce both the province and 
my two field sites. In ‘Power of Development’ (1995b), Crush and his contributors 
make the point that brief ‘cameo’ descriptions of places are constitutive, and lead to the 
identification of particular ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ (see Mitchell 1995 for an analysis 
of the practical effects of description in Egypt). Mindful of this, the account I give here 
of Zambézia is a personal one, focused around the places where I worked. I give only 
the briefest of historical and political sketches; much more detail on these questions is 
woven into the argument of later chapters.
The available literature on Zambézia is patchy. The turbulent history of the 
region has attracted a number of eminent historians and political economists, among 
them Newitt, Isaacman, Vail, White and Ishemo.^^ Much of their work has used a 
combination of archival and oral sources, and as such has involved periods of fieldwork. 
However, with the exception of accounts written by colonial administrators like de 
Almeida (1948) or Lacerda (1929, 1934, 1939, 1944), there are few formal 
ethnographies. More recently Catholic missionaries have produced small monographs 
(e.g. Brentari n.d., Ciscato n.d.), and there are a growing number of academic theses 
dealing with the province (Pequenino 1995, Serra 1995, Bowen 2000b, Marzetti 2001).
The boundaries of ‘Zambézia’ have not been historically constant. The present-day province of 
Zambézia is not co-extensive with the ‘Zambesia’ of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. ‘Zambesia’ 
used to refer to both sides of the Zambezi river valley, extending as far inland as present-day Zambia. 
Several histories of ‘Zambézia’ (e.g. Isaacman 1972a, 1976, Newitt 1973b, 1973a, Vail and White 1977) 
deal almost exclusively with the Zambezi valley, and not with the parts of Zambézia in which I worked.
I discuss this literature in Chapter 3.
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Figure 1.8 Zambézia Province, showing transport routes
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Source: ZADP II Final Report (ZADP 2003)
Zambézia, one of the large central provinces of Mozambique, is known for its 
natural resources. It is bounded to the south by the river Zambezi and to the north by 
the rivers Ligonha and Lurio. To the west lies Malawi, and to the east is an Indian 
Ocean coastline stretching about four hundred kilometres (see Figure 1.8). Zambézia 
lies within the tropics and rainfall is generally plentiful. Soils are fertile, and the 
province is considered to have very high agricultural potential for a wide variety of 
crops (Debella et al. 2000: 12). In Lower Zambézia, the coastal plain, there are 
substantial coconut plantations, as well as rice, sugar cane and various vegetable crops. 
Upper Zambézia, which includes the Namuli massif, is at an altitude of 500 to 2,500 
metres, with land suitable for the cultivation of tea, coffee, potatoes, maize, beans and 
fruit trees. There are substantial forests (9.5 million hectares), from which large 
volumes of naturally grown tropical hardwoods are being harvested (Republica de 
Moçambique 2001: 3), and rich marine resources. The province is also said to possess
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significant mineral deposits, both in the form of coastal heavy sands, and mines 
producing semi-precious stones. Nearly twenty percent of Mozambique’s population 
live in Zambézia, in an area roughly half the size of Great Britain.^"^ Population density, 
though high for the country as a whole, is low, at 27.5 inhabitants per square kilometre 
(1997 census figures).
Although rich in resources, Zambézia is a poor province. There are many reasons 
for this. An important one is the war, which from about 1978 to 1992 devastated large 
parts of the country. Initially there were two explanatory frameworks for the war. It 
was either blamed on Frelimo’s revolutionary socialist agenda (Hoile 1994), or viewed 
as a war of external destabilisation, an attempt first by Rhodesia then South Africa to 
undermine a frontline state (e.g. Fauvet 1984, Morgan 1990). As I discuss later 
(Chapter 3), scholars have now attempted to combine the best of both perspectives. In 
Zambézia the war caused enormous damage to infrastructure, and destroyed the 
province’s entire processing capacity for sugar and cashew.^^ In 1989 a journalist wrote
‘Once the source of over 50 per cent of Mozambique’s hard currency exports and 
bountiful crops of sugar, tea, copra, and coconuts, the province is now a major drain on 
the national economy. One-third of its 3 million people have lost their homes or 
livelihood to the war and now depend on international aid to survive.’ (Maier 1989: 14).
Contemporary observers of the war in Zambézia (e.g. Finnegan 1992, Nordstrom 1997) 
focused almost exclusively on the brutality of attacks on people and property, and the 
results of such destruction remained eminently visible during my fieldwork. Mills lay 
in ruins, factories stripped and idle. Rural shops were virtually non-existent, and 
farmers continued to have grave difficulties selling their surpluses. However copra 
concessions (in the south) and tea plantations (in the highlands) were gradually being 
re-established, and were slowly employing more labour.
The area of the province is 105,008 km (Republica de Moçambique 2001: 1). The 1997 census 
showed Zambézia to have a population of 2,891,809, out of a national population of 15,278,334.
Although official accounts attributed this to Renamo (e.g. Hall and Young 1997: 159), informants in 
Zambézia blamed government troops. In a similar manner, traders to whom Wilson spoke in 1991 said 
that much of their property was actually damaged by their own employees and dependents under the 
cover of Renamo destruction (Wilson 1991c: 16).
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Figure 1.9 Tea estates in Gurué
The mountains o f the Gurué highlands, with tea estates on the lower slopes, and the roof of 
a tea factory in the foreground. Many estates became overgrown during the war years, and 
were gradually returning to productivity over the course of my fieldwork (Barbara Johnson)
Zambézia’s recovery from wartime destruction has been slowed by a lack of 
investment. It would appear that opposition-supporting provinces, like Zambézia, have 
received relatively low proportions of state investment (see statistics in the UNDP 
National Human Development Reports (2000: Table 16, 2002: Table 23)).“^  These 
statistics seem to show that Zambézia and Nampula, populous provinces with 
substantial numbers of Renamo voters, received by far the least state investment in 1998 
and 1999. Although these figures should be treated with great caution, as much 
government expenditure occurs off-budget, they would appear to give some support to 
beliefs widely held in Zambézia: that the Frelimo government intentionally starves the 
province of resources. Many in Zambézia felt that the Renamo-supporting provinces in 
the centre and north of the country received less than those to the south. This was 
thought both to stem from, and to exacerbate the north-south divide.
In both the 1994 and 1999 multi-party elections, Zambezians voted overwhelmingly for Renamo, the 
opposition party. In 1999 Renamo received 59 percent o f the vote in the legislative elections, and 
Dhlakama, party leader, won 70 percent in the presidential ballot (for a more detailed breakdown of 
voting patterns in Zambézia see Table 5.1, page 90).
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ODA (Official Development Assistance) levels by province were also highly 
variable. Although members of the donor and development community alleged that the 
provinces with the most attractive beaches tended to get the highest levels of investment, 
statistics from the 2000 and 2001 Mozambique Human Development Reports do not 
bear this out (UNDP 2000, Table 15, UNDP 2002, Table 22). Once again, great caution 
is needed in interpreting these statistics, as donors are often slow to report their 
spending.
A lack of investment in regional transport, which is agonisingly slow and 
expensive, has further slowed economic recovery. Figure 1.8 shows the limited extent 
of the road network in the province. During my fieldwork travel remained difficult 
because many roads had not been rehabilitated nor bridges fully rebuilt. The lack of a 
bridge over the Zambezi at Caia made long-distance road haulage expensive and slow, 
and poor quality roads in Nampula province inhibited the easy carriage of goods 
southwards from the port of Nacala.
Zambézia’s development indicators remain extremely poor. The 2002 National 
Human Development Report reported that Zambézia had the lowest Human 
Development Index (HDI) in the country (UNDP 2002: Tables 9-10).^^ The 1997 
census gave life expectancy at birth as just 37 years in Zambézia, compared with 58.3 
years in Maputo city. The same census put the mortality rate during the first 5 years of 
life at 306.2 per thousand, and the rural illiteracy rate at 74.6 percent.
As I have already noted, and as Figure 1.2 shows, ZADP did not operate in all 
parts of Zambézia province. Rather, its intervention area was fragmented and spread 
across the province. My own work took place only in the regions where ZADP 
operated, and was divided between three key sites. My main ‘home’, with cats, books, 
electricity and telephone was in Quelimane City, the provincial capital near the coast. 
This was where World Vision’s provincial headquarters were located, and was the base 
from which ZADP operated. Most of the project’s senior staff lived in Quelimane and
The figures in the 2001 National Human Development Report sparked heated debate when they were 
first published. They showed rapid and increasing differentiation between southern Mozambique and the 
rest o f the country, with Zambézia’s HDI rising from 0.176 in 1996 to 0.182 in 1999, falling to 0.168 in 
2000. This fall can largely be attributed to the erosion in real GDP per capita, from US$ 103 in 1996, to 
just US$ 78 in 2000.
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made short trips to ‘the field’ (o campd)}^ Quelimane is a sizeable city with a 
population of over half a million. There was a substantial ‘development’ presence in 
the city at the time of my fieldwork. Danida, Finnida, and the EU all had personnel 
seconded to government departments. ActionAid, Landmine Survivors Network, Save 
the Children (UK), and Heifer Project International also maintained provincial offices, 
as well as a number of Mozambican NGOs. World Vision was by far the largest NGO 
operating in the province; in January 2003 (after over half of ZADP’s staff of more than 
a hundred had finished their contracts) there were still roughly five hundred employees 
(of a national total of about 980) on the provincial payroll.
In addition to my home in Quelimane I maintained bases in the two localidades in 
which I did the bulk of my research, one in Lower Zambézia (Mutange, see Figure 1.10), 
the other in Upper Zambézia (Mugaveia, see Figure 1.11). The two localidades differed 
in many important respects, but also shared certain characteristics. Both were some 
distance from a trunk road. Mutange was reached along a relatively well-maintained 
dirt road, with bridges and aqueducts built by ZADP in 1999, and lay about thirteen 
kilometres from the main N1 national north-south route. The célula of Intuba in 
Mugaveia, which was where we worked and lived, lay some seventeen kilometres from 
the secondary road connecting Gurué City and Nauela (Alto Molocué). An ill- 
maintained track led to the célula crossing a rickety and dangerous bridge over which 
few traders and health workers were willing to risk taking their vehicles.^^
The similarities between the two localidades ended here. Linguistically, 
culturally, ecologically and historically they were distinct. Mutange, for example, was a 
small localidade, with a population of just 4261; Mugaveia was a great deal larger, with 
a population of 9718 (1997 census figures). Yet Mutange was much better known 
within the province, as the site of a famous aldeia comunal (communal village) and 
agricultural cooperative that operated in the early days of Independence (see page 114 
for more details). Former members of the agricultural cooperative established the 
Association of Mutange Villagers after the end of the war, which received substantial 
financial and material help both from ORAM and the DDADR (District Directorate of 
Agriculture and Rural Development) during the course of my fieldwork.
^ The Farming Systems Specialist and one Extension Supervisor lived in Gurué City. The other 
Extension Supervisor maintained a base in Namacurra town, but spent much of his time in Quelimane.
It was replaced by ZADP after the end of my fieldwork. Before the war, an alternative road to Nauela 
ran through Intuba, but the destruction of bridges had made it impassable.
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Geography and cropping patterns were distinct. Mutange, lying in a swampy area, 
was much more food-insecure. It was liable to flooding, and substantially dependent on 
cassava and rice. Cashew had been an important cash crop in the past, but many trees 
were diseased, and yields were low. Both cropping patterns and geography were far 
more diverse in highland Mugaveia, where river valleys were used for dry rice, early 
crops of maize, beans and vegetables, and the main food crop was maize. Beans, 
particularly the green bean (phaseolus vulgaris), were an important cash crop in 
Mugaveia, and owning land appropriate for this crop was a key determinant of wealth.
Linguistically and culturally the two localidades fell on opposite sides of the 
‘dividing line’ between what is widely described as the ‘patrilineal’ south and 
‘matrilineal’ north of the country. However the divide is far from clear, and Zambézia 
province is internally divided between more patrilineal (and virilocal) areas (like 
Mutange), and more matrilineal (and uxorilocal) areas (like Mugaveia).^® In Mutange 
the most commonly used language was Echuabo, and 30.6 percent of Zambezians spoke 
Echuabo as their mother tongue (1997 census figures). In Mugaveia people generally 
used Elomwé, the mother tongue of 41.8 percent of Zambézia’s population (1997 
census figures). The north of the province, of which Mugaveia forms part, is populated 
by the group often referred to as the ‘Makua-Lomwé’. This is less a fixed ethnic 
identity than a convenient agglomerative term for more than six million people spread 
through the northern and north-central provinces, who speak similar languages. A 
number of studies of these groups have been done in Nampula Province, most 
importantly by Geffray (1985a, 1985b, 2000) and Medeiros (1985, 1995). Within 
Gurué District people identify themselves as Lomwé, or Elomwé speakers. This sub­
group, also known as Anguru, Nguru, or Alomwe, has received relatively little attention 
from scholars.^^
I return to the subject of kinship and inheritance in more detail on page 90. See also Dias (1965).
Most studies of this group are from Malawi. Work from the colonial period (e.g. Hetherwick 1931, 
Colson and Gluckman 1951, Tew 1950) was largely concerned with social structures, traditions, and the 
meaning of the name ‘Angimi’. Later studies looked more at migration (e.g. White 1987, Boeder 1984), 
again within the Malawian context. It has been suggested that the terms Anguru and Lomwé have 
derogatory connotations associated with snake-eating, menial labour and savagery (Chirwa 1994: 527, 
Alpers 1974: 44).
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Figure 1.10 Map of Namacurra District and northern parts of Nicoadala District
Source: ZADP files
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Figure 1.11 Map of Gurué District
•
Source: ZADP files
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However for the purposes of this thesis the key location of difference lay in their 
recent divergent historical experiences, as they related to relationships with outsiders, 
the state, investors and ‘development’. I mentioned earlier that in the late 1970s-early 
1980s Mutange was the site of a regionally famous agricultural cooperative and 
communal village, which had brought substantial investment. After the war ended, 
UNICEF worked in Mutange, building the main EP 1 (lower primary) school, 
rehabilitating the health post and carrying out agricultural extension. After UNICEF 
withdrew, ZADP invested relatively heavily in Mutange, with a research sub-station and 
a small nursery in addition to the project’s usual activities. ZADP also paid for the 
rehabilitation of the access road, and for improvements to the main well. Perhaps even 
more important, the land tenure component, along with ORAM (a national NGO 
concerned with land rights, see footnote 20) and SPGC (Provincial Cadastral Service) 
was very active in the localidade in 1999-2000, and the ‘community’ was issued with a 
certificate for its land in 2000. In addition, another World Vision programme 
implemented with the District Directorate of Health undertook vaccination campaigns in 
the localidade. In Mutange, a pattern of intervention by relatively benign outsiders was 
well established by the time ZADP started to operate, and many of its first activities 
followed on easily from these interventions.^'
In Mugaveia, by contrast, such a pattern had not been established prior to the 
arrival of ZADP, the first NGO-funded project to operate in the lo c a l id a d e As later 
chapters describe, staff faced great suspicion in the early years, suspicion that had only 
partly diminished by the time of my own research. It was not easy for me to negotiate 
permission to start work in Mugaveia. Eventually it was agreed that we would be 
accompanied by village leaders, as otherwise people would be too frightened of an 
unaccompanied, unintroduced white woman wandering around alone (see page 62 for 
more details). Even this did not prevent rumours about child-stealing and murder 
arising, rumours which I discuss in Chapter 7.
See page 90 ff. for accounts of less benign outsiders from the colonial period.
A primary school had been constructed by INDER, the government-run Institute o f Rural Development, 
in the late 1990s.
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Figure 1.12 Scattered houses in Mugaveia
Figure 1.13 Houses and fields near our house in Mugaveia
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Figure 1.14 Kitchen hut belonging to Tio Daniel’s family
Figure 1.15 Kitchen hut, with Lita’s house in the background
Both pictures show the same kitchen hut. The top picture was taken in the wet season, and 
when the maize and sorghum were high. The lower picture was taken in the dry season
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Figure 1.16 Steeply sloping field planted with cassava
Steeply sloping field planted with cassava, typical of 
Mugaveia. Banana trees are visible in the background.
Figure 1.17 Group from Mugaveia
Maize is growing in the background, with sweet potato on canteiros 
in the foreground
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Figure 1.18 Fields in Mutange
Cassava plants growing on ridges (canteiros), with coconut and cashew trees in the distance
Figure 1.19 Meeting in Mutange
Meeting in M utange, at which we presented a brief report o f our findings. The (Frelimo) 
District Director o f Agriculture is on the extreme left, followed by the (Frelimo) localidade 
President, and Jacinta, the ZADP técnico. Our house is just visible in the top right hand 
corner
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Figure 1.20 Group of women in Mutange
Figure 1.21 Group in Naminane, Mutange
Jacinta, the técnico, is at the centre. Houses in Mutange were usually mud and pole 
constructions, thatched with grass, and surrounded by a wide area of clean-swept 
sandy earth. Mango and coconut trees are visible (Barbara Johnson)
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Institutional Context
The third locus within which my fieldwork took place was an institutional setting 
broader than that of ZADP. As implementing and funding agencies respectively, World 
Vision and DFID had considerable influence on the shape of the project, and I introduce 
the two organisations here (I return to them in Chapter 2). I also explain my own 
relationship with both in more detail.
World Vision is a Christian relief and development organisation. It was founded 
in 1950 by an American serviceman in response to the plight of war orphans in Korea. 
His words ‘Let my heart be broken by the things that break the heart of God’ formed for 
many years the ideological core of the organisation (Whaites 1999: 411). Relying 
mostly on private donors who ‘sponsor’ a child, the organisation now works in around a 
hundred countries worldwide. Child sponsorship money is used to fund Area 
Development Programmes (ADPs), twelve- to fifteen-year programmes which work for 
‘holistic and transformational development’ in limited geographical areas, generally 
building infrastructure, paying the school fees of sponsored children, and supporting 
income-generating activities. World Vision is a controversial NGO, and one which few 
who work in development are able to approach without prejudice. Reactions to it are 
strongly polarised, and this basic fact needs to be borne in mind throughout the thesis.
Although World Vision was originally a highly centralised organisation, from the 
1970s it began to decentralise, a partnership structure was formed, and significant 
ideological changes followed. Whilst retaining a strong Christian ethos, the 
partnership moved away from a narrow evangelical position towards a more radical and 
ecumenical attitude (Whaites 1999: 414-7). .A flexible partnership allowed for 
considerable diversity; however all offices continued to sign up to the agreed ‘core 
values’:
‘We are Christian
We are committed to the poor
We value people
We are stewards
We are partners
We are responsive’
In 1996 Smillie judged World Vision to have devolved more than most other ‘transnational aid 
agencies’, reducing its headquarters staff from almost 500 in 1989 to less than 150 in 1994 (1996: 103). 
The Board, with significant power, is made up of representatives from World Vision operations 
worldwide.
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and a joint partnership mission statement:
‘World Vision is an international partnership of Christians whose mission is to 
follow our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ in working with the poor and oppressed to 
promote human transformation, seek justice and bear witness to the good news of  
the Kingdom of God.’^^
Although all offices agree to these central statements, I found that in practice there 
were significant differences in terms of ethos and focus on Christian witness, even 
within the single Mozambique office. Projects had different policies on Christian 
teaching, depending on their funding source.^^ As the Country Director explained:
‘In the UK, Australia, Germany, for example there are a large number of donors 
who aren’t Christians per se, so we do have to be sensitive to that even in the ADPs.
Whereas in the USA and Canada the reverse is true, if we don’t do Christian 
activities they’re very upset and they’ll withdraw their support!’
Still greater divergence from World Vision’s central Christian ethic could be seen in
donor-funded projects, such as ZADP, where the use of funds for proselytising purposes
was strictly forbidden. Some senior ZADP staff, appointed on contract, did not fully
sympathise with World Vision’s Christian perspective, to the extent that the
Mozambique Country Director said, somewhat despairingly, that she had heard that
certain ZADP staff referred to themselves as ‘the non-Christian arm of World Vision-
Mozambique’.
A wide internal diversity of policies on Christian activities was just one of the 
atypical features of the World Vision-Mozambique office. Set up in 1984 during the 
war, it had always been funded almost exclusively by institutional donors. Child 
sponsorship was initially illegal in Mozambique, and so World Vision was unable to 
rely on its usual sources of funding, or to work in its usual ways. Instead of undertaking 
its familiar small-scale Area Development Programmes (ADPs), it became involved in 
huge emergency interventions in Tete, Manica, Sofala, Nampula and Zambézia 
provinces. From 1992-1996 the organisation spent more than US$ 150 million on 
refugee resettlement programmes (World Vision Mozambique 1996), and was involved 
in the repatriation of two million refugees. From 1996 the programme reduced in size.
www.wvi.org (accessed January 2003).
The World Vision-US webpage (www.worldvision.org) includes a long section on how sponsored 
children learn about Jesus and a motivational section entitled ‘Changing Lives through Faith, Hope and 
Love’. By contrast, little emphasis has been given to Christianity by World Vision-UK. This is in large 
part due to an undertaking given when the office opened in 1979 not to fundraise in churches for fifteen 
years, which gave the organisation a largely secular support base (Whaites 1999: 416).
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and with the relaxation of restrictions on child sponsorship, ADPs started in several 
provinces. However institutional donors continued to provide an uncharacteristically 
large proportion of World Vision-Mozambique’s budget (see Figure 1.22). This meant 
that the ADPs, World Vision’s usual way of working, made up just a small proportion 
of projects, with the remainder responding to donor priorities. At the time of my 
fieldwork there seemed little prospect of moving away from what was for World Vision 
a highly uncharacteristic dependence on institutional (rather than private) donors.
Figure 1.22 World Vision budget by donor, Financial Year 2001
FY01 Budget by Donor ($19,800,000)
AusAID
USAID
S p o n so r
Private
13%
Source: Mimeo of PowerPoint presentation. W orld Vision-Mozambique
World Vision-Mozambique has proved an especially controversial country office. 
This was partly due to Hanlon’s polemic book 'Mozambique -  Who Calls the Shots?' 
(1991), a vituperative critique of NGO activity in the country, which accused NGOs of 
undermining the government by setting up parallel systems (I discuss his argument in 
more detail in Chapter 2). It was also due to the size and visibility of the organisation. 
The name Visao Mundial (World Vision) was recognised wherever I went in 
Mozambique, and it was an organisation on which most had an opinion. Though the 
scale of its programmes had gradually been reduced, it remained Mozambique’s largest 
NGO, and was still perceived as being extraordinarily rich. Typical comments from 
staff of donors or other NGOs were ‘Every other vehicle in Zambézia belongs to World 
Vision’, or ‘World Vision has more resources than the provincial government in
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Zambézia’. It was popularly seen as dominated by expatriates, despite a long-standing 
record of promoting and training national staff (Wilson 1991a: 8, Cosgrave et al. 2001: 
103). It was also believed to be strongly -  even virulently -  Christian, and one 
Mozambican scientist I spoke to had refused a contract with the organisation because of 
the intrusion into her personal beliefs she felt at interview.
While the institutional persona of World Vision seen by outsiders was monolithic, 
traditional, foreign-dominated and Protestant, this does not describe the ‘World Vision’ 
I came to know. I found an organisation that was far more fragmented, far more 
uncertain than the one described by Hanlon, or the one whose wealth and cars were 
ridiculed in bars and cafés. The World Vision I knew was characterised more by poor 
internal communication than by a strong common vision, Christian or otherwise. 
Divisions and differences between projects were seen as more significant than anything 
that was shared.
Indeed, as a member of ZADP I actually had very little to do with ‘World Vision’ 
-  that is, if I leave aside my regular tussles with the Accounts Department, the 
circuitous processes of Human Resources, and the endless problems in getting vehicles 
into the workshop and then extricating them from it. My lack of connection with a 
larger ‘World Vision’ was partly because I, like several other senior staff members and 
the entire complement of técnicos, only occasionally attended twice-weekly devoçôes 
(devotions), at which staff announcements were made. I am not myself a committed 
Christian, and so avoided both prayer meetings and bible study groups. The 
fragmentation of the organisation into projects funded by different donors, with 
strikingly different policies, also contributed to the sense that ‘World Vision’ did not 
really exist as an organisation. And, from the vantage point of ZADP, these two factors 
were then amplified by a sense of ‘not really belonging to World Vision’ which I 
discuss in Chapter 2. As I will explain, ZADP’s relative independence from World 
Vision was encouraged by all involved. The donor, DFID, wished to distance itself 
both from World Vision’s Christian ethic, and its history of service delivery. World 
Vision struggled to find a way of finding a home for ZADP in a structure within which 
it did not fit. ZADP management chose to define ZADP as ‘different’ from other World 
Vision projects. The fragmented reality thus differed significantly from a popular 
perception of a singular institutional persona.
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The second institution with substantial control over ZADP was ODA/DFID. The 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) funded activities in Zambézia through 
NGOs from the late 1980s. From about 1995 calls came for the greater integration of 
NGO and government programmes and policies (BDDCA 1995: 7), echoing Hanlon’s 
concerns about parallel systems. By 1998 DFID documents spoke of ‘the need for 
partnership between the Government of Mozambique and NGOs in delivery of support 
services and the desirability of inclusion of NGO activities within the investment 
envelope’ (DFID 1998b: 6). The changes in policy which accompanied and followed 
the metamorphosis of ODA into DFID are described in Chapter 2. Here I will only 
point out that new policies did not immediately usher in new staffing structures. Until 
2001 ZADP continued to be overseen from the Harare regional base, even though a 
‘Rural Livelihoods Field Manager’ had worked in Maputo from 1999.
My personal connection to DFID remained important, although it was dormant for 
much of my fieldwork. The fact that DFID rathei; than World Vision/ZADP was my 
employer gave me an essential freedom of manoeuvre. It also gave me a privileged 
level of access to DFID commentary on ZADP, Zambézia and Mozambique, not 
available to other ZADP and World Vision staff. After the DFID office was 
decentralised to Maputo in mid-2001, I used to visit the office whenever I was in 
Maputo, and was in reasonably close touch with the Social Development Adviser (my 
DFID line manager). I attended several workshops and planning meetings in Maputo, 
occasions which I found increasingly frustrating as I came to know Zambézia better. As 
the only fieldworker, the only British employee based outside Maputo, and by far the 
most junior British member of the office, my observations and experience proved 
peripheral. I did not manage to find an effective voice within the office as a whole, 
despite interesting conversations with individuals. This was partly because of the 
ideological struggles going on within the office during my time in Mozambique, 
described in Chapter 2, and partly because the nature of my work, with its emphasis on 
detail and difference, did not meld well with DFID’s generalising approaches. Thus 
within neither World Vision nor DFID did I have a voice, although both organisations
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shaped my research and both received my periodic reports.^^
I have here looked in some detail at the three defining locations of my fieldwork: 
the project itself; the province; and the institutions involved. My fieldwork was 
displaced, in that it was more defined by a nexus than by a geographical location. It 
took place at all levels of the project, from rural villages, through project meetings and 
offices, to the Maputo offices of DFID and World Vision. I had good access to DFID 
files, meetings and personnel, while my day-to-day location within the project meant 
that I developed close personal and working relationships with ZADP colleagues. I was 
‘in’ each organisation, but not ‘o f  it.
1.4 Methods: Ethnography of a Development Encounter
In the descriptions of ZADP, World Vision and DFID in section 1.2, I started to 
sketch some of the important methodological issues for my research, focussing on the 
nature of my engagement with ZADP. As I described, my attachment to ZADP was 
arranged by DFID, and DFID was my employer.
In Mutange and Mugaveia, my two village locations, my fieldwork was carried 
out with the help of research assistants. ZADP employed two assistants for me, who I 
interviewed and chose in January 2001. Both were around my age, had ninth grade 
schooling, and had been out of formal education for many years. Arcanjo de Jesus is an 
ebullient person, the leader of a theatre group for the deaf. Although his theatre group 
had done contract work for development projects, he had not himself previously worked 
for one. Bom in Nicoadala, he is an Echuabo speaker, and worked with me in Mutange. 
Rita Paula Madeira, who worked with me in Mugaveia, had worked for World Vision 
on a USAID-funded agriculture project, as a marketing extension worker. She came 
from né District, and spoke Elomwé. After a long period of illness, Rita died of 
tuberculosis in April 2003.
In Mutange and Mugaveia we mostly worked through relatively formal interviews. 
These were arranged in advance, and were carried out in Echuabo or Elomwé, unless 
the informant was very fluent in Portuguese.
I produced brief quarterly progress reports, which were incorporated into ZADP Quarterly Reports. 
My final report (Wrangham 2002), which should have given a detailed account of my findings, was far 
sketchier than intended, as it had to be completely rewritten after the laptop on which it was saved was 
stolen. As a member of the final evaluation team (referred to at the beginning of the chapter), I had a 
further chance to air my opinions.
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Figure 1.23 Rita and I with the two Mugaveia leaders who accompanied us
I made the decision that I would not learn either of the vernacular languages very early 
on in my fieldwork, as I had learnt Portuguese from scratch in the summer of 2000,^^ 
and considered that attempting to learn three languages was unrealistic. Over the course 
of the year I acquired extremely basic skills in both Echuabo and Elomwé, but was 
always primarily reliant on either Rita or Arcanjo. Most interviews were tape-recorded 
and later transcribed into Portuguese. We also carried out a livelihoods survey, 
described in more detail below.
Our pattern of work varied according to the season. I divided my time about 
equally between work in the localidades and work in ZADP offices (see Appendix B: 
Interview Details). In my case study villages I lived with a research assistant and 
interacted on a daily basis with the project técnicos, village leaders, my neighbours and 
informants. Most days would be spent on a combination of interviews and more 
informal conversations; I also attended extension meetings organised by técnicos, or the 
village executive council (conselho executivo).
I had six weeks o f one-to-one tuition, which meant that my Portuguese was fluent, though by no means 
perfect, when I first arrived.
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Figure 1.24 Arcanjo cycling in Mutange
rm
Cycling was much the easiest way of moving around Mutange, although 
deep sand and single log bridges got the better o f me several times. In 
M ugaveia we cycled much less, as we didn’t have bicycles for the two 
men who worked with us, and many hills were far too steep for cycling.
In Mutange I lived with Arcanjo, my Echuabo-speaking research assistant, in the 
very centre of the localidade, in a house originally built for the UNICEF técnico. It was 
at the end of the road, between the market and the main primary school. As the 
localidade was small it was possible to bicycle all around it, and we got to know the 
narrow winding paths crossing the swamps and weaving between fields and cashew 
groves well. We were also soon known to most localidade residents, as all the main 
paths and roads led straight past our house. This greatly eased our work.
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Figure 1.25 Daniel Namuteca and his granddaughter
In Mugaveia we followed a different pattern. My Elomwé-speaking research 
assistant Rita was frequently ill, which meant that planned work was often disrupted or 
interrupted. In Mugaveia we lived not in a house of our own, but with the family of 
Daniel Namuteca, an ex-shop keeper. He had an impressive house on the road between 
Nicoria and Intuba. Tio Daniel (Uncle Daniel), as we called him, had worked in a local 
Portuguese-owned shop prior to Independence. When the owner of the shop left in 
1975 he divided the remaining goods between the senior employees, and only Tio 
Daniel managed to keep control of his stock and capital. He bought a vehicle, and 
gradually accumulated enough to build a substantial house and shop of his own. A solid 
construction, it survived the war, and although the shop no longer operated (owing to 
Tio Daniel’s failing sight) it was there that we lived.
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Figure 1.26 Social life in Quelimane
My research encompassed social occasions in Quelimane, as well as village-based fieldwork.
The second half of my work was carried out amongst the ‘developers’. When I 
was not in the villages I worked in the project offices, and attended project meetings and 
evaluations. I occasionally went to DFID meetings and workshops away from 
Zambézia, on subjects like performance assessment, poverty evaluation, and social 
development in Africa. I felt out of place more often than not. My position was 
permanently liminal. I was never a técnico, a full member of project staff, a World 
Vision or a DFID employee. I had a level of privileged access to all these different 
networks, but I belonged to none.
With my ZADP colleagues I relied mostly on participant observation, a method 
that was more useful to me here than it was in the villages, as I had a real participant 
role. I attended project meetings as an engaged staff member, helped to run workshops, 
wrote reports and talked to colleagues about the way things were working out. 
Frequently participation triumphed over observation: notes from some later meetings 
are less than complete, as it is very difficult to be fully engaged in debates as well as 
recording them faithfully. Within ZADP, unlike World Vision or DFID (page 54), I did 
find myself a voice, and my opinions were listened to. As will become clear, this was
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because I was working on subjects that were important to staff, but which had not been 
formally recognised before I joined the project. I carried out formal tape-recorded 
interviews with colleagues only at the very end of my research, and on my return visit in 
December 2002. Most of the time I just listened to what people said and noted it down 
in my diary or jottings on meetings. Long conversations with colleagues on the bumpy 
drives to and from Gurué proved useful: over five or six hours you have plenty of time 
to discuss things from many different angles. There were a couple of people, who 
tended to be the more reflective, on whose opinions I rely a good deal. As well as 
Agostinho and Jacinta, who were the técnicos in Mugaveia and Mutange, I quote 
Rodrigues on several occasions. He was a livestock técnico in Gurué, and a man who 
was very interested in discussing new ideas and reflecting on the nature of social life. 
We used to talk for hours, sitting in the Gurué guesthouse. Estevao, who worked in 
Vehiua (Gurué district), is also cited several times, for the same reason.
In neither project nor village setting was I able to avoid attributions of position 
and status. In Mutange and Mugaveia I was known as a member of World Vision staff; 
as I discuss in Chapter 6, no distinction was made between World Vision and ZADP. 
The técnicos generally saw me as a member of ZADP senior staff. Although I had no 
implementation responsibilities in the project I nevertheless helped to organise various 
short training sessions for them, and my ‘status’ was clearly that of senior staff member, 
with the accompanying regalia of car, house, driver, assistants. Amongst the other 
senior staff I was something of an anomaly, reporting to no one, and with only my own 
independent work to manage.
My plural status, although marginalizing me in one sense, provided me with a 
unique opportunity to work as a participant-observer in a number of different realms. 
My own position, perceptions, status (real or attributed) are at the forefront of my 
analysis (cf. Tsing 1993), as I concur with Phillips that ‘the “facts” about the project are 
not “out there” waiting to be discovered, but are constituted through a series of specific 
encounters’ (2(X)0: 58). Chapter 7 deals with an incident that focused on me, and on 
attributions of responsibility and power over which I had no conscious control.
As would be expected in a politically divided post-conflict context, my village- 
level fieldwork was not entirely straightforward. However the difficulties I experienced 
were not, as I had originally anticipated, due to my known connection with World
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Vision. Before starting fieldwork I had been concerned that my relationship with an 
organisation known as a distributor of resources might fundamentally alter the ways in 
which people interacted with me. Although I was indeed associated with World Vision, 
I soon realised that, even had I studiously avoided any such identification, I would still 
have retained a strong attributed status, informed by previous encounters with ‘people 
like me’. In Mutange and Mugaveia that classification was so wide-ranging and 
undiscriminating, in temporal and social terms, that it included Portuguese (male) 
colonial government officials or overseers, socialist era coopérantes, Frelimo party 
members, state officials and development workers. Given the history of the area, which 
I discuss in Chapter 3 , 1 suggest that my connection with World Vision and ZADP was 
thus not as important as might have been expected. In any case, as time went by my 
association with ZADP became less important. People found other ways of identifying 
me. My behaviour was sufficiently different from that of other senior project staff, 
whose visits to the field were of short duration and who almost never stayed overnight, 
for distinctions to be easily made.
This is not to suggest that my association with ZADP had no influence on those to 
whom I talked. Some informants took the opportunity of a conversation with me to put 
forward their own priorities, contesting ZADP allocation of resources. Others were 
fearful of contact, either because they were concerned about jeopardising their 
relationship with the project or because of the potential risks of contact with outsiders (I 
discuss this further in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6). My experience here paralleled that of 
Marzetti in her survey work in Morrumbala district in 1997:
‘Those who had been refugees in Malawi or deslocados (internally war-displaced 
people) exaggerated the numbers of family members and lent children to each other 
in case any benefits were to be given out on a per-person basis following the system 
of aid agencies. Those who had been fugitives or lived with Renamo did the 
opposite. They gave very small numbers in each family or false names as they 
thought that they were likely to get taxed or forced to work. “/  only declared part o f  
my family on that first visit, so if  you returned in the night to collect those people at 
least some o f us would remain here to be seeds fo r  the future”' (Marzetti 2001: 53-4, 
emphasis in original).
For Marzetti the crucial distinction related to wartime experience: ex-refugees saw the 
encounter as potentially lucrative, ex-fugitives saw it as potentially dangerous. In my 
own work, which took place four to five years later, and in a different part of the 
province, I did not find wartime experience so significant. Rather, as I discuss in 
Chapter 6, party political allegiance was more important. The people who entered into a
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relationship with ZADP tended to be Frelimo supporters, while those who did not trust 
it were more often associated with Renamo.
I thus had to be constantly aware that I was being used strategically by informants 
to further their own ends, which were often obscure to me. As Phillips and Edwards put 
it, ‘people enter the arena and utilise the encounter for their own purposes’ (2000: 59). 
This was something that I was not alone in noting; the President of Mutange told me 
that any ‘outsiders’, Mozambican or foreign, were understood with reference to past 
experiences:
‘He told me that my presence in front of the population always made people think of 
the wartime coopérantes, who would come and bring stuff. He gave various 
examples of this, and the ways in which the local population attempt to take 
advantage of outsiders. He said that whenever a brigada (work team) comes to visit 
the villagers complain about lack of seeds and things. But that nobody had 
complained to him locally about it, and that to his amazement it is still possible to 
buy rice in tins in the market -  this after a harvest that was reputed to be disastrous.’
(Entry in my fieldwork diary from January 2002)
The President’s comments were particularly apt, not only because he pointed out that
villagers attempted to make the best of all encounters with all outsiders, but because he
also highlighted the success of their endeavours. In this case the complaints about lack
of food and lack of seed were so taken to heart that one visiting team refused to accept a
meal from those they perceived -  incorrectly, but in accordance with the image
projected -  as hungry.
These were not my only problems in my fieldwork. In Mugaveia a seemingly 
endless series of meetings with different leaders had to be gone through, followed by 
plenary meetings in the two células in which we wished to work, and then yet further 
negotiations with leaders. Eventually it was agreed that we would have to work 
accompanied by well-known leaders, as otherwise people would be too scared to talk to 
us. A Renamo mambo and a Frelimo secretario (medium-level leaders) were therefore 
assigned to work with us. At first I hoped that this would be a temporary arrangement, 
but in the end one or other of them accompanied us on most days.^^ Though far from 
ideal, it proved practical. However it did not prevent us from sometimes finding house 
after house empty, after having made careful appointments.
After a few months we agreed to pay a small salary to these two men: MT 10,000 for each day they 
worked with us. The payment was equivalent to a day’s wage for a ganho-ganho (casual) farm labourer, 
and was intended to compensate for time lost.
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The tactic of working with known leaders (who would usually wander off during 
our conversations, which they found repetitive), did not entirely quell people’s fears. 
On one occasion we had been having a particularly interesting conversation about 
history and change to a very talkative and enthusiastic man from Mugaveia. Feeling, 
after an hour or so, that we shouldn’t outstay our welcome, I suggested that we should 
continue the conversation another time. He refused outright. I was surprised, and asked 
why. It’s the same with friends, he said: if you have a conversation with somebody, and 
then later they want to go back and talk about the same things again, you wonder what 
they’re up to. Other concerns included a suspicion that time was being wasted 
unprofitably, while some feared that they or their families might later be arrested or 
forced into work (see Chapter 3). A few were afraid of more sinister things, as Gray 
found in much earlier research:
‘Local people reacted with extreme wariness to the arrival of a group of students 
with notebooks and pencils. Later they explained that in colonial times such a visit 
from outsiders meant that the next day someone would be arrested. Strangers would 
come and make conversation about the harvest and cash crop prices. Then the talk 
would turn to gossip about the local régulai^ and the administrator. Afterwards, the 
newcomers disappeared behind a tree and wrote it all down. They were from the 
PIDE’^ ‘ (Gray 1981: 13).
Informants often asked what would come of the answers they had given, saying 
‘we are always being registered, but nothing ever comes of it {estamos sempre inscritos, 
mas depots nada acontecey. Such sentiments were repeatedly expressed during the 
survey we carried out in Mutange in August 2001, and in Mugaveia in August- 
November 2001."^  ^ While in the hamlet of Namuinho (Mutange) all 147 households 
were surveyed, a substantial number of people in Intuba (Mugaveia) refused to 
participate in the survey, either choosing to be out at prearranged times, or disappearing 
into the fields when the interviewers approached. I have mentioned some of the 
concerns people had about censuses and surveys above; in Mugaveia the survey was 
described to me as a recenseamento, a census, even though we had taken pains to
Colonial leader, now used to refer to a ‘traditional’ Renamo-supporting leader.
Colonial-era secret police.
There were more than twice as many houses in Intuba (Mugaveia) as in Namuinho (Mutange), and I 
employed a temporary research assistant to help with data collection there. However Rita’s illness meant 
it was impossible to complete the survey in August. Data collection continued until November, as the 
survey proved a good way of identifying informants.
We surveyed 252 households in Intuba, Mugaveia. The leaders that we worked with reckoned that we 
had visited all households in ‘Intuba’, o f which about twenty-five percent refused to be surveyed. This 
estimate does not match the 1997 survey figures, which show that there were 676 households in ‘Intuba’. 
The difference is probably due to different identification of boundaries (see section 5.2).
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explain that that was not what it was."^ Censuses have historically been contested in 
Zambézia. In 1878 there was a widespread uprising (known as the Makuta Revolt) over 
government plans to take a census in preparation for levying mussoco, a poll tax. The 
Massingiri Rising of 1883 may also have been sparked by rumours of an impending 
census (Newitt 1973b: 282, Vail and White 1977: 12-17).
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis begins with an analysis of the complex and disputed relationships 
between DFID, World Vision and ZADP. I discuss the theoretical problems associated 
with attempting to differentiate between structural and individual explanations, and 
suggest that it can be helpful to analyse relationships between donors and recipients as 
patron-client relations. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are historical, and explicitly contrast 
the ZADP view of the past with accounts both from Zambézians and secondary 
historical literature. In Chapter 3 I focus on how organisations and individuals external 
to the area, but with some kind of connection to the state, have operated in rural 
Zambézia, and consider how these past experiences affected potential beneficiaries’ 
opinions of ZADP. Chapter 4 looks more generally at the ways in which ‘development’ 
has been denied and debated over the last hundred years, and argues that the denial of 
history, though far from unique to ZADP, had important consequences.
Chapters 5 to 7 deal in detail with material from my two field sites, Mutange and 
Mugaveia. In Chapter 5 I look at the implications of imputing ‘community’ in rural 
Zambézia. I consider what ‘community’ was believed, by donor and ZADP staff, to 
mean. I then show that assumptions about unity and cohesion resulted in the exclusion 
of many potential beneficiaries, and undermined the possibility for ‘community 
participation’. Chapter 6 then considers how ZADP was understood in my field sites, 
and argues that it, like DFID in Chapter 2, was perceived as a patron. This was not an 
interpretation understood or liked by ZADP staff, but it provided the basis for the 
exchange relationship which beneficiaries developed with the project. Chapter 7 then 
looks at what happened when things went wrong and the project was accused of occult 
practices. These accusations related to the perceived morality and immorality of 
accumulation and unequal distribution, and provided a way for beneficiaries, both actual 
and potential, to assert some control over the project. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.
^  Unofficial censuses are illegal in Mozambique; only surveys are permitted.
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Chapter 2. World Vision, ZADP and DFID: Negotiating Relationships
I came to work for ZADP by a roundabout route. DFID had first assigned me to 
work on a planned project in Zambia: a huge NGO-implemented livelihoods project, 
which was to last eight years and cost £30 million. At the very last minute, senior DFID 
staff in London pulled the plug on the project, and I was left without a place to go. 
ZADP was the suggested alternative. Although I knew little about the project, next to 
nothing about the country, and not much about World Vision, I jumped at the 
opportunity. It was by this point the April of my first PhD year, and I needed something 
fixed.
The first book I read on Mozambique was Joseph Hanlon’s Who Calls the Shots? 
(1991). It seemed a good choice, as it dealt directly with the role of NGOs in 
Mozambique, and World Vision was mentioned several times in the index. I was 
shocked by what I read. Hanlon’s book was a polemic against the excessive influence 
of foreign organisations on domestic Mozambican affairs, and he singled out World 
Vision and Care for particular criticism. Although Care came in for the most sustained 
and blistering critique. World Vision was described as a right-wing anti-communist 
Christian organisation, controversial during the 1980s for linking aid to evangelism, and 
for connections to repressive South American regimes (51). Hanlon observed that 
World Vision was one of the very first foreign NGOs permitted to operate in 
Mozambique, and alleged that in ordinary circumstances World Vision would have 
been refused permission to operate."^^ However large parts of the country were in the 
grip of famine, and the government had little choice in the matter: rejecting World 
Vision would have meant losing desperately needed food aid. It would also have 
offended USAID and US Congress, and would have played into the hands of those 
alleging the Marxist suppression of religion (51)."^ ^
Hanlon’s argument was that the presence of NGOs in Mozambique was 
profoundly pernicious. His book v/as filled with examples of them ‘doing their own
This was because of its anti-communist stance (unnamed staff were said to have suggested that Renamo 
might be a better government for Mozambique than Frelimo), and because the government did not 
approve of food distribution by foreign church-related organisations.
At the time Renamo enjoyed some support amongst a certain group of US politicians, who saw its 
guerrilla forces as ‘freedom fighters’ against a communist state.
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thing’, without government coordination, often because of a misguided desire to ‘get 
things done’, and without consideration of the longer-term consequences of their actions. 
He believed that even progressive NGOs undermined the Mozambican government, by 
attracting funding away from it. In the case of organisations like World Vision and 
Care, Hanlon was far from convinced that the effects of their actions were unwitting. 
He observed that such NGOs displaced the state from its usual functions. By setting up 
parallel systems they were acting in a neo-imperialist fashion and undermining national 
sovereignty.
Yet it was clear that, much though Hanlon disliked NGOs, the real target of his 
criticism was ‘key donors’ whose ‘number one g o a l... is to use aid to break, weaken, or 
bypass the state’ (1991: 249). For him NGOs were just pawns in a much larger political 
battle:
‘Donor governments with clear political goals have played on [the] mix of arrogance 
and humanitarianism that characterises so many aid workers. Such donor agencies 
have encouraged aid workers to reject the Mozambican line, to construct parallel 
structures, and to help individuals at whatever cost to the Mozambican system as a 
whole. In practice, then, well-meaning aid workers have often become pawns in a 
much more complex battle for political and financial control, and in attempts to 
weaken the Mozambican government’ (Hanlon 1991: 81).
Reading this before I had even visited Mozambique, I found my mind filling with 
questions. Even leaving aside questions about the ‘correct’ role of the state, or the 
details of state substitution,"^^ were things really so simple? Was it appropriate to 
characterise the relationship between NGO and donor as one of simple domination? 
What about the internal diversity and questioning that I knew inevitably existed within 
any organisation? Ten years after Hanlon, what differences might I find, ideally placed 
as I would be, between donor and NGO?
This chapter attempts to answer these questions, taking as its central focus the 
one-week workshop which concluded the Mid-Term Review of early 2001. Starting 
just a few weeks after I had arrived in Zambézia, the Review had three parts. First, a 
Participatory Impact Assessment (FIA) was carried out by a team of consultants and 
project staff (Cavane et al. 2001). Then an independent review team, chosen and 
contracted by the ZADP Project Manager, reviewed all project activities in detail (Bias 
et al. 2001). Finally, in March 2001 a substantial team of DFID Advisers came and
These questions are progressively dealt with from Chapter 3 onwards.
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spent a week considering the findings (DFID 2001)/^ At the end of the week a plenary 
meeting was held, from which I quote at length. Mason, the DFID team leader, 
presented DFID’s findings and ‘recommendations’, which were then discussed. 
Between forty and fifty people attended, including all senior ZADP staff, the 
independent review team, the lead FIA consultant, members of the district and 
provincial departments of agriculture, and staff from other ‘partner’ NGOs and 
organisations. The Mid-Term Review was the only occasion during the life of ZADP 
when so many people were brought together in this way.
The Review was not positive. Mason noted that:
‘ZADP has not been a spectacular success to date... The project has gone through 
and repeated some of the mistakes that others have already encountered... These 
mistakes have been repeated both in strategy and management, so both are at fault’.
The words he used to describe ZADP were ‘top-down, handout, prescriptive and
effectively a patronage system in the way that it operates’. Individuals in both ZADP
and World Vision-Mozambique were severely criticised for poor management and
strategy.
In this chapter my focus is not on the largely negative findings of the Review. 
Instead I concentrate on the relationships between DFID, World Vision, and ZADP in 
an attempt to break down some of Hanlon’s generalisations and to investigate his claims 
that donors used NGOs for their own political purposes. Far from characterising NGOs 
and donors as powerful and purposive institutions, I focus on fragmentation and conflict. 
I show that not only did the approaches of the different organisations shift significantly 
during the life of the project, but there was also a striking plurality of approaches within 
each organisation. Although conunonalities of interest have been assumed, both within 
organisations and between donors and implementing NGOs, I follow Elwert and 
Bierschenk in arguing that ‘the history and result of a project can be best understood 
through detailed analysis of the (hidden) struggles between the different interest groups 
involved’ (1988: 102). It is not possible to identify singular or stable organisational
The DFID team (an Economic Adviser, Rural Livelihoods Field Manager (later Adviser), Social 
Development Adviser, Senior Rural Livelihoods Adviser, Senior Enterprise Development Adviser and 
Chief Rural Livelihoods Adviser) was entirely British, with only one Portuguese speaker. They were 
accompanied by a Mozambican member of the Mozambique EU Delegation.
All unreferenced quotations in this chapter come from the bilingual meeting that concluded the 
weeklong workshop. Speakers made their primary statement in the language they considered appropriate 
to the discussion.
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‘points of view’, even though the actors involved frequently assumed and asserted just 
such stability and singularity.^^
The manipulation of concepts by actors involved in ZADP was not static. As 
Gardner observed in her discussion of the ‘Plantation Rehabilitation Project’, long-term 
projects often out-last their founding concepts, and risk being labelled ‘out-of-date’ or 
‘old-fashioned’ as a result (Gardner 1997: 138). This certainly happened with ZADP, 
despite valiant attempts to change with the times. ZADP adopted new concepts, 
analytical tools and priorities as and when its donor wanted, and in response to 
perceived trends in international development thinking.
At the same time all actors, both organisational and individual, found themselves 
‘room for manoeuvre so that they might pursue their own “projects’” (Long 1992: 36), 
at least for as long as ZADP lasted. As Long wrote, ‘all actors (agents) exercise some 
kind of “power”, even those in highly subordinated positions’ (1989a: 223).^^ However 
actors do not adopt new concepts at the same rate, or with equal levels of enthusiasm; 
Gardner’s (1997) account is a revealing analysis of how novel policies and practices 
threatened and privileged different actors in a particular project situation. Whilst the 
chapter supports many of Gardner’s observations, the ZADP context was substantially 
different to the Plantation Rehabilitation Project: the chapter shows how individuals 
were able to negotiate their way around changing fashions, minimising constraints on 
their activities.
These policy changes were, crucially, negotiated by individuals, and running 
through the chapter is a discussion of the relative importance of individual agency and 
structural constraints. I acknowledge the agency of project staff in managing 
relationships, but also seek to identify the limits to this agency. Shifting DFID policies 
led to the re-interpretation of many aspects of the project, including the nature of the 
appropriate relationship between northern NGO and northern donor. These changes had 
significant implications for project implementation.
Both World Vision and DFID employees made general statements about each others’ employers -  
‘DFID thinks...’ or ‘World Vision policy is . . .’. Such comments were not made of the individual’s own 
employer, because of a greater awareness of competing currents and ‘counter-tendencies’.
Long follows Giddens (1984: 16) who argues that ‘all forms of dependence offer some resources 
whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors’, but points out that the 
dependent rarely choose the situations they encounter.
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2.1 Structure and Agency
In considering the changing nature of the relationships between World Vision, 
DFID and ZADP, this chapter is concerned with the balance between ‘structural’ 
explanations, and explanations which rely more on individual agency. Such a 
distinction is, of course, primarily of analytical use; my informants did not make such 
distinctions. ZADP was designed, implemented and monitored by individuals, each 
with his/her own point of view, and to some extent outcomes depended on personalities 
and individual abilities. At the same time individuals were constrained by the changing 
policies of their employing organisations and the ‘development’ agenda; they thus 
operated within a structural framework as well.
Personalities were of considerable importance in the negotiation of relationships 
between individual World Vision, ZADP and DFID employees. In 2LADP, the two 
Project Managers, Barnes and Cope, were both British and somewhat older than other 
employees. Both had ties to DFID before joining World Vision. Bames had known 
Mason, the Harare-based DFID Natural Resources Adviser, in Nepal, where he had 
worked soon after leaving university. The personal relationship between Bames and 
Mason was important in the early years of the project, when it helped to allay DFID 
suspicions of World Vision.^^ Bam es’ career had involved unusually long postings 
(five to seven years) in countries he grew to know well. He was most interested in the 
details of the agricultural work, but by the time I knew him his days were occupied by 
administration. Cope, the second Project Manager, had previously worked as an ODA 
Technical Cooperation Officer, and was the ZADP Farming Systems Specialist prior to 
becoming Project Manager. Taking over from Bames in October 2001, six months after 
the Mid-Term Review and when the project was in its final stages, he took an 
administrative and managerial approach, leaving the detail of components to their 
managers. All other ZADP agriculture staff were Mozambican. Six of the eight senior 
staff were from Southem Mozambique,^^ whilst the entire complement of técnicos were 
from either Zambézia or Nampula provinces (see page 243 for further discussion).
Prior to the approval of ZADP, DFID accused World Vision of ‘institutional apartheid’ because of poor 
conununications between ZADP (I) and a USAID-funded agriculture programme. The fact that Mason 
had previously known Barnes helped heal this rift; as Barnes put it, I knew Keith Mason from Nepal, I 
worked with him there. They knew me. They were less suspicious of me than anyone else.’
Some of this number worked for ZADP for only part of my fieldwork. The ‘social component’, of 
which I was informally a part, was staffed by two Zambézians and two expatriates.
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The two key DFID Advisers were strikingly different characters, with strikingly 
different experience. Mason, who had been in charge of project design, was already 
past retirement age when I knew him. He had many years’ experience working as an 
agronomist all over the world, although he did not speak Portuguese. On his visits to 
Quelimane he always used to try and visit the local market, keen to take back local 
produce (ideally prawns) to his family in Harare. Jackson, who took over as lead 
Adviser in 2001, was at first Mason’s subordinate, and a ‘Field Manager’ rather than an 
Adviser. Her appointment in Mozambique was her first job with DFID. She had been a 
cooperante^^ (foreign worker for a Mozambican ministry) in the 1980s, and had a 
strong personal commitment to Mozambique. Her experience was not very highly 
valued by her DFID colleagues, and she and another ex-cooperante often found 
themselves isolated within the organisation.
The significance of personal attributes and personal connections such as these is 
one of the concerns of Long and his Wageningen collaborators. Building on the work 
of earlier Manchester School and Rhodes-Livingstone Institute writers, they have taken 
individual actors as their central focus. The actor-oriented perspective ‘entails 
recognising the “multiple realities” and diverse social practices of various actors’ (Long 
1992:5). Actors are viewed as agents, all capable of exerting some kind of power, even 
when in subordinate positions (Long 1989b: 223), and many of the writings of the 
Wageningen School attest to the ability of actors to manipulate and at times subvert the 
intentions of ‘developers’. This is an approach which puts the strategies adopted by 
individuals and groups at the very centre of the analysis. It views intervention as ‘a 
socially constructed and negotiated process, not simply the execution of an already 
specified plan of action with expected outcomes ... not simply a top-down process’ 
(Long 1989b: 241). Strategic groups and hidden struggles are thus at the centre of 
analysis. Critical commentators have however pointed out that while details may be 
debated, the constraining field for manoeuvre is still determined beyond the sphere of 
influence of local actors. New policy agendas and new funding streams define the 
spaces where contestation can occur. Only certain ‘needs’ can be comprehended, even 
by ‘participatory’ projects (Mosse 2001: 29). Looking solely at the strategies of 
individuals thus risks not taking account of key structural considerations.
Coopérantes were often seen by more recently arrived development workers as old-style socialists, 
nostalgic for the country’s communist period.
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The influence of personalities and individual agency must therefore not be 
overstated. Whilst changing personnel did affect ZADP, so did new organisational 
priorities, the economic situation, and the international development agenda. Changes 
in DFID policy were particularly influential in shaping the implementation climate for 
ZADP. Thus discussions of the evolving relationship between DFID, World Vision and 
ZADP need to take account of both structural and action-based explanations; as Booth 
noted, ‘there are limits to the productive pursuit of either on its own’ (1994: 27).
Although much of what happened within ZADP initially seems well-explained by 
a consideration of individual decisions, personalities and relationships, an analysis that 
looks solely at the individual risks dismissing the wider historical and social forms of 
rationality which inform actors’ deeds. Ferguson (1990) is a key exponent of an 
approach that focuses on these social and historical forms of rationality in explaining 
development outcomes. He argues that ‘development’ has structural properties, and that 
as a result, individuals may find themselves unintentionally serving the interests of a 
development ‘machine’:
‘The thoughts and actions of “development” bureaucrats are powerfully shaped by 
the world of acceptable statements and utterances within which they live; and what 
they do and do not do is a product not only of the interests of various nations, classes, 
or international agencies, but also, and at the same time, of a working out of this 
complex structure of knowledge... Seeing a “development” project as the simple 
projection of the “interest” of a subject (the World Bank, Canada, Capital, 
Imperialism) ignores the non- and counter-intentionality of structural production...
One must entertain the possibility that the “development” apparatus in Lesotho may 
do what it does, not at the bidding of some knowing and powerful subject who is 
making it all happen, but behind the backs or against the wills of even the most 
powerful actors’ (18).
In a Foucauldian argument, Ferguson sees actors as embedded in particular forms of 
power/knowledge. Given that the ‘real’ intention of development is very different from 
the felt intentions of individuals, it is not surprising that time and again development 
projects ‘fail’. Nor should it then be unexpected to find that a large proportion of 
projects are designed as ‘solutions’ to earlier development ‘failures’ (Crush 1995a).
Ferguson’s structural arguments, though persuasive, have significant weaknesses. 
Most notably, the agency of individuals is substantially denied. By writing of 
‘anonymous constellations of control’, and ‘authorless “strategies’” (1990: 20), he 
neither gives a sufficient account of the ability of individuals to carry out their own 
strategies and projects within or through a ‘Project’ (cf. Long 1989b, Arce, Villarreal, 
and de Vries 1994, Grillo and Stirrat 1997, Arce and Long 2000a), nor of the
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responsibility of development bureaucrats for development ‘failures’ (cf. Grindle and 
Thomas 1991, Haas 1992). He therefore omits to note the potential ability of less 
powerful actors to manipulate interventions for their own ends, whilst also absolving 
those who might have been in a position to bring about a different outcome (de Vries 
1992). His arguments also run the risk of being development-centric, attributing 
excessive power to the development project. Not enough is made of the fact that 
projects are always locally embedded, and understood within a local context (see 
Chapter 4).
In this chapter I attempt a combination of the stronger features of both Long and 
Ferguson’s approaches, arguing that the ‘discourse of development’, the changing 
policy constraints of DFID and the international development community provided the 
constraining over-arching structure within which individuals involved with ZADP were 
then able to make choices.
2.2 Relationships in the Mid-Term Review: Ownership, Advice and Control
An approach to ZADP that attempts to combine both structural and actor-centred 
forms of explanation must identify the different actors, both individual and institutional, 
that were involved in the project. It is far from simple to characterise either ‘World 
Vision’ or DFID’. Both are international organisations with many thousands of staff 
spread across the globe. Although diverse and ever-changing, making the imputation of 
a singular personality inaccurate, I am at times forced to refer to them as singular 
entities. Yet I emphasise again that both organisations were in a constant state of flux, 
reacting to both internal and external pressures, and dependent on particular individual 
post-holders. I discuss internal contestation and change in section 2.3.
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Figure 2.1 World Vision organisational structure
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PL 480, Title 11 foodstuffs. The money generated was used to 
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run by World Vision and other organisations.
□ Key people for ZADP
‘World Vision’ refers to World Vision-Mozambique, which had its central office 
in Maputo/^ At the time of my fieldwork key individuals for ZADP were Hobson, the 
Country Director, and Lloyd, the Deputy Director of Agriculture. Neither was involved 
with ZADP at outset, but from late 1999 Lloyd allocated about one day a week to 
project matters. In 2000-2002 World Vision-Mozambique was largely funded by 
USAID (Figure 1.22), and the Maputo office (Figure 2.1) was structured to serve 
USAID projects. ZADP did not fit in easily, and there were a series of budgetary 
disputes between World Vision and DFID over what should and should not be paid for. 
DFID did not understand that the administration fee of fourteen percent that World 
Vision-Mozambique usually took from projects covered only the most basic
55 Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 adopt a different usage, explained later.
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administrative functions: human resources and accounting. All other services (e.g. 
office space, computer network access, travel planning, policy advice) were paid for 
directly by projects. ZADP contributed to only some of these services. From World 
Vision’s point of view, ZADP was thus a free rider, while DFID felt that ZADP was not 
being given appropriate support. In addition to these organisational misunderstandings, 
several key staff were not in full agreement with the Christian values that form the core 
of World Vision’s institutional identity and global mission (see above, page 50), and 
problems arose when World Vision-UK tried to recruit committed Christians for 
international positions.*’^
Figure 2.2 Relationships between DFID Advisers in ZADP (pre-June 2001)
Natural
Resources
Social
Development
Enterprise
DevelopmentEconomics Administration
ses Marcus Smith Head of DFID-CA
A1 Keith Mason Mark Jones
A2 Rebecca
Jackson
Adviser Neil Holmes M anager of 
Mozambique 
Programme
Key;
ses
A l, A2
Line M anagement Relationship 
Senior e iv il Service 
Seniority Ranking
Although in charge of organising reviews, M ason did not 
manage any of his advisory colleagues other than Jackson, and 
he could not insist on a unified line.
56 DFID Advisers were keen that ZADP should be run by professionals, and that selection for posts 
should solely on the basis o f merit, not faith. They took particular exception to advertisements requiring 
applicants for the post o f Rural Sociologist to be in sympathy with World V ision’s core values and 
Christian principles when the criteria seemed to be causing recruitment delays.
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‘DFID’ refers to the Advisers within DFID who designed and monitored ZADP -  
a small number of people within a large and diverse organisation. Until mid-2001 the 
senior Advisers responsible for ZADP were based in Harare. Their profile was 
international rather than local: with the exception of the more junior Maputo-based 
Field Manager they did not speak Portuguese, and were also responsible for projects 
and programmes in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. DFID was at that time divided 
into different departments, each staffed by Advisers. Natural Resources, Social 
Development and Economic Advisers all contributed to project design, and as I discuss 
below (page 87), their analyses were by no means always the same.
During the Mid-Term Review, DFID Advisers spoke and wrote as if ZADP was 
jointly ‘owned’ by itself and World Vision, and as if the relationship between the two 
organisations was a ‘partnership’:
‘There are clear tensions between DFID, Mozambique and World Vision which 
appear to reflect a lack of a shared understanding of what the project hopes to 
achieve, with particular reference to sustainability. This tension arises 
notwithstanding the shared ownership of the logframe during appraisal and design’ 
(DH D 2001).
‘The Project Memorandum ... is joint owned by DFID and World Vision. Those 
two organisations are co-owners. But although there’s co-ownership, I don’t think 
there’s a shared vision... and where there is no shared vision trust becomes much 
reduced’ (Smith -  Chief Rural Livelihoods Adviser).
‘You helped design this framework, you knew what we were looking for, you 
accepted the management role’ (Mason).
‘If we put terms of reference together [for a new credit consultancy] we are going to 
have to jointly agree those at some stage -  this is a partnership project’ (Jones -  
Enterprise Development Adviser).
Although concepts of ‘ownership’ and (less) ‘partnership’ had been mobilised before, 
they had previously been used in a different way. Earlier discussions of ‘ownership’ 
had focused on relationships between the project and district government or ‘local 
people’ (discussed further in section 5.4), or on ‘ownership’ of activities by 
implementing staff. Reports are vague about whose ‘ownership’ was meant to be 
encouraged, with ‘ownership’ itself apparently viewed as a normatively ‘good thing’:
DFID is understandably concerned to ensure the quality and quantity of project 
outputs. The review team felt that this can best be done through improving the sense 
o f ownership of the project team, of MAP^  ^and of World Vision. It is especially 
important to improve the sense o f ownership o f ideas among the local staff who 
form the front line of contact with farmers and who may take the ideas forward into
Ministério de Agricultura e Pescas, later transformed into MADER, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development.
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other Mozambican institutions after the project has finished.’ (DFID 1999b: 19, my 
italics)
These are confused aims. If World Vision, the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
project team, and the técnicos all ‘owned’ the project, then who should be accountable 
to whom (c.f. Stirrat and Henkel 1997: 75-6)? Definitions of ‘ownership’ and 
‘partnership’ were never established in ZADP, although this should not be surprising 
since ‘these are by and large political, not analytical, concepts. They are normative 
statements signalling certain qualities in relations between organisations involved in aid 
and in the processes of decision-making about foreign aid’ (Jerve 2002: 390). In ZADP 
the deployment of these concepts had certain clear advantages. ‘Partnership’ 
emphasised commonality and equality, and highlighted the fact that each institution 
brought with it different and valuable skills and resources. By talking of ‘partnership’, 
the legitimacy of both organisations was boosted: DFID gained credibility from an on- 
the-ground project, while World Vision gained prestige from its connection with a 
reputable donor. It was also expected that improving a ‘sense of ownership’ of all 
‘partners’ would lead to a better project. However, as the remainder of the chapter 
demonstrates, it is difficult to find examples of World Vision, ZADP or DFID staff 
behaving in a way that would have allowed ‘joint ownership’ to become a reality. I first 
discuss the very few occasions on which DFID Advisers confined themselves to giving 
‘advice’ alone, before looking at more controlling patterns of behaviour.
Advice
On several occasions during the Review, Advisers pointed out that their role was 
indeed to ‘advise’, and that their recommendations did not have the binding power of 
instructions. Mason said:
‘I think the ZADP team here must take their own view of the recommendations of 
the independent review team...not all of which we ... agree with. But we do not 
intend on this occasion to interfere with the detailed programmes, because we 
believe it is within the ability of the ZADP team to make their own correct strategic 
decisions.’
[To the land component] ‘A few suggestions; these are not recommendations, 
neither are they instructions... We have decided that for some time now the land 
component has really been setting its own pace and going at its own speed... I 
would say, set the targets that you’re happy with.’
At first it would appear that Mason was expressing the DFID team’s confidence in the 
ability of ZADP staff to make their own ‘correct’ decisions. (What was considered
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‘correct’ was of course determined by the contemporary DFID policy environment.) 
However what was actually happening was rather more complex and contradictory.
In the example given above, the land tenure component was explicitly granted 
freedom to make its own choices (‘set the targets that you’re happy with’). This was 
possible because the component was believed to be tightly managed, and more 
significantly, because of the perceived congruence between DFID’s evolving policy 
aims and those of the component itself. As I discuss below (page 88 ff.), over the two 
years prior to the Mid-Term Review DFID had started to move away from the model of 
service delivery to poor people through INGOs, of which ZADP was a clear example. 
Instead it prioritised support to the Mozambican state, first through SWAps (Sector- 
wide Approaches), and later through Direct Budget Support. ZADP thus came under 
increasing pressure to increase its collaboration with provincial and district departments, 
and to think about wider policy issues. As a policy-oriented component, dedicated to 
small-scale institutional change within the Provincial Cadastral Service (SPGC), and 
explicitly forging links between ORAM (a Mozambican NGO) and SPGC, the land 
tenure component fitted neatly into the ‘new’ DFID policy environment. This 
congruence meant that the component could be given leeway to do as it wanted, as it 
was already doing the right thing. The component was praised for ‘looking outside the 
rigidity of the logframe’ (Mason) and exploring new and innovative activities.
The agriculture component did not match evolving DFID policy in the same way. 
While the land component fitted ever more closely into the ‘new DFID’, the agricultural 
component appeared increasingly outdated. When ZADP was first designed, debates 
centred around the most appropriate way to deliver services (participatory, empowering, 
bottom-up, process not blueprint, local not expert knowledge), but over the life of the 
project the entire nature of the debate altered. INGOs such as World Vision should, it 
was argued, be confining themselves to development education, emergency work, and 
capacity building for southern NGOs, while service delivery -  no matter how well mn, 
no matter the number of people reached -  was passé. The agriculture component, 
though set up for service-delivery, was now expected to be ‘linking with governments
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and elsewhere’ to find ‘long-term institutional owners’ for activities, in the words of 
Smith, the London-based Chief Rural Livelihoods Adviser.^^
The agricultural component thus came under pressure to strengthen its interactions 
with MADER (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) at all levels, in the 
interest of sustainability. ZADP management maintained that they collaborated in 
every way possible with District-level government agriculture staff, who were 
welcomed at ZADP training sessions and meetings, and provided with offices, office 
supplies and transport. They felt that they did all that could be expected in coordinating 
with a poorly-resourced and poorly-trained government in their day-to-day work. DFID 
Advisers disagreed. Although recognising ZADP efforts to improve coordination 
(DFID 1999a, DFID 2000d), they repeatedly raised the question of ‘better coordination 
with government’, and in particular, of ‘feeding into national policy initiatives’. They 
attempted, both by negotiation and instruction, to persuade members of the agriculture 
component to ‘forge links with Proagri’ ( S m i t h ) . I n  response, ZADP staff made 
considerable efforts to work even more closely with government systems. In 2000, 
project activities were, with considerable difficulty, entered on the ‘Provincial Budget 
and Activity Plan’ of the Provincial Department of Agriculture. The project also put 
together a bid for first the Namacurra and then the Nicoadala Agricultural Extension 
Outsourcing contracts. This took time and brought few rewards.^^
By the time of the Review, DFID Advisers viewed the agricultural component as 
problematic. Independent from government from the outset and focused on service 
delivery, it was criticised not praised for experimentation:
‘[The agricultural] component has a history of exploring numerous approaches. Just 
to verify this I would like to give you a quote from the review in 1999: “Evidence is 
emerging that this component is beginning to dissipate its energies on an increasing 
number of interesting but resource-demanding activities, without a clear 
understanding of their potential impact or the strategy.’” (Mason)
Ironically, the first draft design of ZADP, written by World Vision employees and rejected by DFID, 
had included a specific output which required linking with government. ‘A flexible management 
structure developed which responds to community needs and seeks to transfer responsibility for project 
activities to participating communities and the [Ministry of Agriculture] by the end of the project’ (World 
Vision International - Mozambique 1997). This did not feature in the final Project Memorandum.
Proagri was a sector-wide financing mechanism (a SWAp), not a policy initiative. The meaning of 
‘forging links’ in this context was unclear.
^  The Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and Rural Development was unwilling to enter ZADP 
activities into the PAAO for budgetary reasons, and the experiment was not repeated. The outsourcing 
contract was repeatedly delayed, and eventually awarded -  to a consultancy company -  in 2003.
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By this point, some of the Advisers who knew ZADP best had already given up hope of 
being able to change the project’s direction. For them, the component no longer fitted 
into DFID’s strategic plan in Mozambique, and therefore reducing the amount of 
advisory time conunitted to it was a priority. They were willing to let the project 
determine its own direction for the 18-24 months that remained.
In the context of ZADP, DFID Advisers can be said to have restricted their role to 
an advisory one in only two situations: when the outcome of an intervention was of less 
importance than the minimisation of their workload; and when they could be confident 
that their aims were congruent with those of the recipients of advice. In other instances, 
as I now go on to show, they adopted a more controlling attitude.
Control
A second deep-rooted strand of language and behaviour ran through the Mid- 
Term Review. Advisers frequently spoke as if DFID had the control, power, and right 
to determine the direction of ZADP. This form of address predominated in earlier 
DFID review reports (DFID 1999a, 1999b, 2000c, 2000b), which tended to be filled 
with detailed -  though at times contradictory -  instructions to ZADP staff. The reasons 
for this pattern of behaviour, which ran directly against the ‘ownership’ and 
‘partnership’ rhetoric I emphasised earlier (page 75), can be sought in the design of the 
project, and in patterns of behaviour that developed in the project’s early years. The 
design process, which was strongly led by DFID, meant that World Vision was 
distanced from ZADP from an early stage. A stronger relationship than would 
otherwise be expected therefore developed between senior ZADP staff and Advisers, 
with World Vision left out of the loop. While this had some advantages (both for 
ZADP and DFID), it eventually led to great dissatisfaction on the part of all parties, and 
to allegations of project ‘failure’.
Evidence of controlling behaviour was visible at many stages of the Mid-Term 
Review. DFID Advisers appeared to have a shaky grasp of the difference between 
recommendations and orders. For example, a report detailing plans for the Mid-Term 
Review, noted that DFID would ‘discuss the findings of the Independent Review and 
determine the course of the project beyond that date’ (DFID 1999a). 
‘Recommendations’ made orally during the Review meeting were listed as ‘action
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points’ in the report (DFID 2001), and action on them was indeed expected. Even in the 
final oral presentation it was hard to detect a negotiating tone. This was especially 
noteworthy in Mason’s comments on the (failing) micro-credit component:
‘They will attempt to recover the bad loans and maintain the successful banks and 
attempt to move them forward... DFID will commission an independent consultant 
to design a new component... We would expect a newly designed credit component 
to go out to competitive tender.. . ’
Mason’s lack of qualms in giving extremely strong ‘advice’ was evident again later in 
the morning. A question had been put by Valoi, Deputy Project Manager, about the 
project’s target groups. He asked whether diversification away from the ‘poorest of the 
poor’ was permissible.^^ Mason responded:
‘DFID’s mandate is to eliminate poverty. We have out there in Zambézia some of 
the poorest rural people in the world. I don’t really think that you can start saying 
“look this is very difficult, we’d like to work in the richer communities.” I can’t 
remember what the proportions are within your three wealth ranking groups, but 
your success will be measured in how successfully you affect the lives of the people 
in the two lowest groups. Nobody said it was going to be an easy task. But you 
helped design this framework, you knew what we were looking for, you accepted 
the management role, so I wish you luck.’
Mason argued that as co-owners and co-designers of the project, ZADP staff knew from 
the outset what kinds of outcomes DFID was looking for, and that it was therefore 
impossible to contemplate any changes to what had been originally agreed. A rustle of 
concern from his colleagues indicated that they did not entirely agree with his response, 
and the Social Development Adviser stood up to speak to the assembled group: ‘I just 
wanted to add something to what [my colleague] has said.’ To which Mason responded:
‘Don’t soften... don’t sugar-coat the pill!’
That Mason should have said this, perfectly audibly, in front of the assembled company 
of project. World Vision and government staff is quite remarkable. It was clearly an 
off-the-cuff remark, and must have been made with no consideration of listeners.^^ The 
implication of Mason’s comment was that his previous response had potentially binding 
power, and he did not wish the ‘pill’ of his tough advice to be ‘sweetened’ by a more
This question had been comprehensively discussed in reviews in 1999 and it had been agreed that the 
project should revise its target group to the ‘economically active poor’.
 ^Mason did not speak Portuguese; the comment was made in English, and was not translated. This 
meant that only about a third of the audience would have understood it.
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soft-hearted colleague. His ‘advice’ had the tone of instructions of an employer to an 
employee, of client to contractor,^^
When questioned about a way of behaving which was seriously at odds with their 
‘ownership’ rhetoric, DFID Advisers had a simple explanation of what was going on. 
Serious management failings in ZADP were not being dealt with by World Vision, and
they were therefore forced to step in to fill the holes caused by institutional and
managerial weaknesses. This explanation was given by Jackson, who became involved 
with the project less than a year after it started. She noted pathologies in the 
relationship as soon as she arrived:
‘My impression was that the relationship wasn’t a very healthy one. I think it had to 
do with the individuals involved. DFID appeared in my view at the time to be 
micromanaging, looking in great detail at details of the project, which I didn’t think 
was appropriate. But it’s not that those individuals micromanage every project 
everywhere. It was something to do with the way in which the project was set up
and managed that made people step in to fill a perceived gap in management. So in
a sense they were responding to a lack of management and direction, rather than 
trying to change the direction.’
Faced with the fact that one of their biggest projects^"^ was apparently in difficulties,
DFID Advisers became involved in operational decision-making that should have been
the preserve of project staff and World Vision management.
But the situation was more complex. It is not sufficient to say merely that World 
Vision ‘failed’ to manage the project effectively; it is necessary to consider why they 
managed it in the way they did. To do this requires an understanding of the project’s 
early years, and of the relationships that were built up and broken down between DFID 
and World Vision, World Vision and ZADP, and ZADP and DFID.
The original proposal for ZADP, a project to follow on from the ODA-funded 
ZADP (I), was drafted by Jane Green and Steve Barnes (ZADP (I) Project Manager and 
Project Manager to be), and presented to ODA Advisers in March 1997 (World Vision 
International - Mozambique 1997). It was summarily rejected. A new proposal, far 
more elaborate than the first, was then put together by ODA/DFID Advisers, in Barnes’ 
phrase ‘cherry-picking from the original proposal’, with additional inputs from
By demanding a continued focus on the poorest, he was also holding ZADP staff to priorities that were 
no longer fully current in DFID thinking, and it was this concentration on the poorest, rather than the 
newer focus on poverty in general, that provoked concern amongst his colleagues (see section 2.3).
^  The grant to World Vision for ZADP was the biggest one DFID made that year (George Foulkes, cited 
in Tancock 1999: 31).
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contracted consultants. This rejection and redesign meant that right from the outset 
ZADP was seen as ‘DFID’s project’ by many World Vision staff, as reflected in a 2002 
conversation with Hobson (Country Director, and not herself involved in the design):
‘ZADP, to my knowledge, was very much designed by DFID consultants who 
advised World Vision on what the project should be. This has had a negative impact 
over the lifetime of the project as World Vision has very much seen it as a DFID 
project. It was set up almost as if we were just a contractor of DFID. The overall 
strategic structure of World Vision, a 90 country partnership, didn’t integrate well 
with ZADP, because it was designed by DFID.’
Within World Vision, ZADP remained strongly identified with DFID.
From the start. World Vision-Mozambique found ZADP an anomalous project. 
For example, it was to collaborate closely with the Mozambican government, even 
though this was not at the time common practice for World Vision projects. Steve 
Barnes said:
‘DFID pushed ZADP into working very closely with government, something that 
NGOs in general aren’t comfortable with. And USAID policy at that time was not 
to work with g o v e r n m e n t . S o  this caused some internal friction within World 
Vision... We were singing different tunes, depending on what each donor wanted. I 
happened to agree with DFID in all those things, I wanted to work that way; so it 
wasn’t a problem for me.’
Although Barnes approved of the policy, the distinctive way of working served to 
isolate ZADP, an isolation confirmed by the decision of the then World Vision Country 
Director to allow ZADP to be managed and run fairly independently.^^ The decision to 
devolve an unusual amount of responsibility to the Project Manager, coupled with the 
Project Manager’s own fierce desire to maintain project independence, then meant that 
ZADP remained outside World Vision’s formal structures, and World Vision played a 
minor part in determining its direction and activities. This suited Barnes, the first 
Project Manager, a contract rather than a career employee of World Vision, who was 
believed by some World Vision staff to feel a greater allegiance to DFID than to his 
own employers (see above, page 69). As the final project review commented:
This is an extremely strong statement, which needs to be interpreted within the context of donor-funded 
projects in World Vision. Within the organisation the two large agriculture projects, one funded by 
USAID, the other by DFID, were regularly caricatured. One feature of the caricature was that the DFID- 
funded project worked with government, and hence with difficult characters such as Albano (page 84), 
while the USAID project worked independently from government at a district and localidade level.
As a legacy of an earlier staffing structure, the ZADP Project Manager reported directly to the World 
Vision Country Director, rather than to the Agricultural Director. Initially ZADP made no financial 
contributions to the World Vision Agricultural policy team, which as a result allocated no time to the 
project (see footnote 77 for further details). This increased ZADP’s isolation still further.
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‘During the first three years, World Vision International’s ‘ownership’ of ZADP ... 
was weak and corporate management provided little strategic leadership to the 
project. The Project Manager chose to keep a distance between ZADP and the rest 
of WVI, tending to report direct to DFID, and as a result was left relatively isolated 
when things became difficult’ (Whiteside, Wrangham, and Gudz 2003).
Operational independence, originally granted on a pragmatic basis to make project
implementation more straightforward, reinforced a sense of isolation that had emerged
during design, and ZADP became progressively distanced from World Vision-
Mozambique.
At the same time, DFID Advisers became involved in making detailed comments 
on operational matters. They were asked to approve the selection of the expatriate 
component managers. The first annual DFID review included a comprehensive analysis 
of project operations, undertaken by a team of Advisers supported by consultants (DFID 
1999a). Even at this very early stage the agriculture component came in for severe 
censure. The review team argued agricultural activities were ‘unlikely to meet targets in 
any significant way’ (DFID 1999a: 7), and made extremely detailed criticisms of the 
practice and justification of the Farmer Field Schools (at that time the main extension 
method). Concrete suggestions about ways in which these problems could be 
overcome were put forward: there should be closer coordination between research and 
extension; a Rural Sociologist should be recruited forthwith; and a broader range of 
extension methods should be used.
The involvement of DFID Advisers in detailed decision-making strengthened the 
feeling amongst both project staff and other World Vision employees that ZADP was 
‘DFID’s project’. Advisers were both well aware of this and concerned by it (DFID 
1999b: 19), but initially made no significant modifications to their interactions with 
ZADP. Neither the number of reviews, nor their scale, nor their level of detail was 
reduced, even though it was noted that ‘donor micromanagement can risk undermining 
[any] sense of ownership, giving the team the sensation that they are working for the 
donor rather than developing their ‘own’ project’ (First Draft of DFID 1999b).
The reasons for an absence of behavioural change by Advisers may have been 
connected to a belief that the problem was one of interpretation, and did not stem from
The report questioned the advisability of the improvement package presented, the usefulness of the 
‘School’ as an extension technique, the likely overall benefits in terms of number of farmers involved and 
area improved, the incremental value derived from adoption, and the extent to which technologies 
promoted were answering constraints faced by poor farmers (particularly labour).
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their own actions. The same DFID report observed that what were intended as 
‘recommendations’ were sometimes ‘interpreted as orders, instead of points for debate 
and agreement’ (DFID 1999b: 19). Advisers located the problem with the person doing 
the interpreting (ZADP staff), not the person issuing the ‘recommendation’ (themselves). 
This absolved them from amending or correcting their approach. They adduced other 
evidence in support of their argument, pointing to project management’s habit of 
referring large numbers of minor but uncomfortable decisions to DFID.^^ For Jackson it 
was just an easy way out of difficult situations: I can understand why individuals take 
that position, it’s easier. And DFID can handle that, being the big villain.’
The interpretation made by many World Vision and ZADP staff was quite 
different. Within World Vision, DFID was seen as a difficult and demanding donor, 
endlessly reviewing and revising, never satisfied. According to Barnes, the pattern of 
interaction was set not only by the design process, but also by a serious and early 
recruitment disagreement. World Vision had found a candidate they considered ideal to 
manage the project in Gurué, whom Barnes introduced to a visiting DFID team in April 
1998 (just before ZADP was finally approved). To his amazement, members of the 
team were apoplectic:
‘They went berserk, saying this hasn’t been agreed etc. etc. I was flabbergasted, I 
hadn’t realised it was a sensitive issue. They said that they wouldn’t fund the 
project unless the District-level operations were run by the Mozambican District 
Director of Agriculture, and they therefore wanted Albano [the Director] to manage 
Gurué. They said that if we didn’t do this, then funding might go to Action Aid. It 
wasn’t very nice. By this time I had heard that Albano had a drink problem and put 
that to them. They said that you have made him an alcoholic, you pushed him into it.
That’s what [an Adviser] told me.’^^
As a result of this experience the ZADP Project Manager began referring decisions to 
DFID because of the potentially disastrous consequences of not doing so; the distinction 
between orders and advice was further blurred.
This is not to suggest that DFID Advisers did not, on occasion, make serious 
attempts to improve World Vision ‘ownership’ of the project. In 1999, a review headed 
by Jackson (Mason’s subordinate, who did not at the time have the same personal
In 2001, the Project Manager sought DFID guidance on the disposal of assets, specifically whether they 
could be sold to staff. Jackson noted that World Vision already had a policy on the matter, and 
questioned why such operational details should be referred to the donor.
The case of Albano was peculiar, because he was not himself pushing for control of the project. In fact, 
what he wanted from DFID was funding for further study, which was not forthcoming. A most unwilling 
and difficult collaborator for ZADP, he remained as Gurué District Director of Agriculture until 2000, 
when he finally obtained a scholarship from another source.
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relationship with Barnes as Mason had), agreed that Lloyd, Deputy Director of 
Agriculture, should allocate fifteen to twenty percent of her time to the project. This 
was to ‘make sure lessons learned by ZADP are shared with other World Vision 
projects in Mozambique, and vice versa’ (DFID 1999b: 23).^° In the same review it was 
also suggested that the ZADP team should revise the project logframe to something 
more in line with their perceptions of the project’s actual objectives. However in the 
meeting held the following February to follow up on these recommendations (DFID 
2000b), not only was Mason absent, but Barnes too was on sick leave in Britain. The 
absence of these key individuals meant that suggested changes were never fully 
implemented. Mason continued to insist on measuring ZADP progress against the 
original logframe, while Lloyd’s allocated time was substantially devoted to 
management.
This suggests that, whilst ZADP management had a tendency to do as they were 
told, the word of more senior Advisers tended to be given more weight. Yet DFID 
instructions were not always obeyed. On some occasions when DFID advice was 
unwelcome, ZADP management tended to offer no active opposition, but instead 
quietly ignored it. This can be seen as covert resistance within what I will go on to 
argue was a patron-client relationship. For example, a DFID review report advised that 
a plan to train para-vets should not be carried out until the sustainability of the service 
they provided could be assured. ZADP went ahead with the training nonetheless. 
Likewise, in the final Mid-Term Review meeting DFID ‘recommended’ that Promiza, 
the failing micro-credit institution, should be closed down. Taking advantage of a two 
month delay in the production of DFID’s formal report, Promiza staff lobbied fiercely 
for World Vision funding for a new pilot product, and Karela (a new microfinance 
institution to replace Promiza) was bom. In neither case was ZADP’s decision without 
problems: as I noted at the very start of the thesis (page 12), the absence of veterinary 
care was already causing difficulties just five months after the project ended its field 
activities. The point is not that the decisions taken were wise; it is that they were taken 
covertly, and as such, attest to the fact that ZADP managers felt that they were going 
against instructions, not advice.
This was later revised to ‘sorting out policy issues and lobbying national institutions (especially 
MADER) where necessary in order to ensure institutional sustainability of ZADP interventions’ (DFID 
2000c; 14).
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In this section I have looked at the ways in which ZADP, World Vision and DFID 
staff related to each other, and at how the relationships were described by different 
actors at different times. While policy shifts did lead to significant changes in 
relationships, I have also shown that the structural relationship between actors, built up 
through a pattern of historical interactions, was important. In the next section I look in 
more detail at these policy changes, and show that their contested nature always left 
spaces for dissenting voices and counter-hegemonic practices.
2.3 Change and Contestation
The last section sketched in outline some of the changes in the international 
development agenda that impinged on ZADP. Here I discuss these changes in more 
detail. I look at the ways in which new policies were challenged and disputed, and also 
at the way in which their ultimate result was the sidelining of ZADP by DFID. ZADP 
was already marginal to World Vision, and so the result was that the project was left 
with no institutional champion.
ZADP was designed at a historically specific moment, by individuals engaged in 
understanding, shaping and contesting DFID policy. It was designed in the immediate 
aftermath of the transformation of ODA into DFID, and was approved shortly after the 
first White Paper was issued in November 1997 (DFID 1997). Advisers were at the 
time still in the process of interpreting and understanding what was perceived as a new 
and very different departmental agenda. In the Project Memorandum (DFID 1998b) 
they were careful to tie the new project closely to the priorities they believed the White 
Paper and the new DFID to have:
‘The project fits well with the White Paper’s poverty elimination aim through 
assisting poor people to establish sustainable livelihoods. The project specifically 
targets the poorest 25% of the population, many of whom are widows. Poor and 
vulnerable groups will benefit from better access to credit, surplus crops for sale, 
diversified income and food sources, and greater security of tenure’ (5).
‘DFID policy is to help the “poorest of the poor”.’ (Annex 2: 9)
Yet despite these clear statements, the focus on the ‘poorest of the poor’ was not 
universally supported, and there was no clear agreement on the best way of bringing 
about ‘poverty elimination’ in rural Zambézia. There were significant divisions 
between the different Advisory streams and an evaluation of ODA programmes in
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Mozambique at the time mentioned ‘unresolved tension’ between Economic and Social 
Development Advisers (Shepherd 1999 (2003): 21). This tension was not confined to 
Mozambique, and was due to a changing balance of power between different sectoral 
groups (cf. Gardner 1997: 145). Starting as a marginal group with a tiny handful of 
staff, the Social Development Department became much more powerful in the late 
1990s. ZADP was designed and approved when the influence of the Social 
Development Advisers within DFID was arguably at its zenith,^^ and their analysis had 
started to challenge, though not displace, that of the Economic Advisers (see Gardner 
and Lewis (2000) for a discussion of changes in DFID at the time).
In the Zambézian context, disagreement centred on the nature of economic growth 
and how best to foster it. Social Development Advisers wished to concentrate support 
on poorer and female-headed households, and so initiated a shift away from 
interventions centred on Contact Farmers (‘advanced peasants’) towards groups for food 
production. By contrast. Economic Advisers noted the relative strength of the private 
commercial sector compared to smallholders, and believed that the key to economic 
development lay in out-grower schemes and cash cropping (Duffield 1998, Shepherd 
1999 (2003)). In ZADP the result was a design that embodied these ‘unresolved 
tensions’, proposing the support both of cash cropping and female-headed households, 
and failing to deal with the implicit contradictions between the two aims. Although I do 
not deal with the implications of these inconsistencies here, I return to the subject in 
Chapter 4, where I show that they were not resolved during implementation, and led to a 
confused approach both to targeting, and to poverty alleviation more generally (see page 
156).
Although the focus on the ‘poorest of the poor’ was perceived by (some of) the 
authors of the Project Memorandum to be at the centre of DFID policy, it did not remain 
high on the agenda for long. Almost as soon as the ink was dry the policy environment 
shifted, and it continued to change at speed. Vereker, ex-Permanent Secretary, 
characterised the transformation as A to D ’: Aid to Development, Agency to 
Department, Administration to Delivery (2002). From 1997, DFID began to define a 
new role for itself.
See work by Rosalind Eyben (2000, 2003a), first Chief Social Development Adviser, for an insider’s 
view of the changes.
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From late 2000 to June 2001, as part of DFID’s global expansion and institutional 
restructuring, the Mozambique programme was ‘decentralised’, and a new Maputo 
office with delegated financial responsibility was established. Few of the new Advisers 
based in Maputo had any knowledge of ZADP, which was described to me by one of 
them as a ‘traditional’ project, of the kind ‘we don’t now do’, doing ‘dodgy capacity 
building in government’. Although ZADP staff did not realise it at the time, the Mid- 
Term Review (March 2001) marked DFID’s disengagement from ZADP. 
Disengagement was by no means total, as later tense negotiations over the micro-credit 
component showed, but the project was no longer a DFID priority. New Advisers had 
neither personal nor career ties to the project or its staff. The Head of Office told me:
‘I don’t think that ZADP has fallen off my agenda, I don’t think it was ever on my 
agenda, certainly not on my work plan... To be blunt I decided I had enough to do 
with taking the programme forward without getting involved with projects that were 
going to die anyway. So I think I made a fairly conscious decision not to get 
involved.’
DFID’s agenda in Mozambique changed in three important ways. First, owing to 
what Patrick Anderson, the DFID Head of Office, described as ‘disappointment, which 
had been emerging since the early to mid-90s with the whole project model’, DFID was 
forced to reconsider its role in development. Anderson believed that disappointment 
with the fact that projects were not delivering hoped-for changes led DFID to question 
where it should be ‘adding value’:
‘The fundamental question was, are we just a big NGO? Is it our job to change 
people’s lives directly, which is what leads to programmes like ZADP? Or is it our 
job to try change the systems that leave people poor, both at the international and the 
national level?’
For him, the answer was clear: DFID should work at the policy level, and should move 
away from service delivery and direct poverty reduction:
I think there’s been a recognition, which I strongly share, that it’s not DFID’s role 
to deliver development. It’s DFID’s role to help deliver the conditions within which 
development can happen, but it’s not our role, in my view, to create outcomes 
ourselves... That’s been a fundamental move in DFID’s thinking: that we’re not 
responsible for poverty reduction. Mozambique has got to be responsible for its 
poverty reduction.^^ We re here to help, but our job is to try and work ourselves out 
of a job.’
As a result of this change, DFID began to focus on what was called ‘up-stream’ work.
This was echoed by Shepherd (1999 (2003): 4), who wrote ‘In this context DFID believes that there is 
no need to ensure that DFID’s support directly benefits poor people, and that this could never be 
accurately measured anyway’.
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This involved an increased emphasis on the role of the state and the need for 
policy reform. According to Jackson (Rural Livelihoods Adviser), ZADP had been 
designed at a time when it was still considered justifiable for an NGO to be providing 
services, but that did not last:
‘ZADP was caught at a changing period when the role of the state was becoming 
stronger, ZADP (I) was set up at time when donors had little confidence in the state, 
so it was acceptable for an NGO to fund extension or research, the impact in the 
field would justify it. By the time of ZADP [II], they were struggling with the fact 
that we had a much stronger state, that Proagri was coming along, that DFID was 
much more statist and was pushing World Vision/ZADP to work in a way they 
weren’t particularly comfortable with, with, through and inside state structures.’
By contrast, what Jackson termed the ‘new model of how change operates’, involved ‘a
combination of working at top levels on policy dialogue, backed up with budget support,
and supporting advocacy of civil society to work with the state.’ As she pointed out, the
role of INGOs in the ‘new model’ was not clear.
A move away from support to INGOs was the second major change in DFID 
practice in Mozambique. INGOs were already unpopular in DFID; Clare Short attacked 
them as ‘unelected and economically illiterate whingers’ (The Economist 2002: 39). 
She questioned their legitimacy, asking whether it was right that unaccountable special- 
interest groups should wield so much power or control such enormous budgets. She 
was by no means the first to raise these concerns; enthusiasm for NGOs has always 
been matched by criticism and concern. To some extent this stems from generalisation: 
the very category NGO’ includes an enormous variety of different associations, ranging 
from relief agencies and public service contractors to grassroots development 
organisations and advocacy groups. Clark (1995: 593) emphasised the lack of 
uniformity amongst NGOs:
‘NGOs may keep their distance from the state and run their projects parallel to those 
of the state; in some countries NGOs effectively play an oppositional role; while 
elsewhere NGOs seek to represent the voice of the weak and help them organize in 
their communities to achieve a more powerful voice in the making of decisions and 
the allocating of resources’.
Within this diversity of functions and practices, NGOs may occupy multiple positions,
for example both challenging government and providing services with and through it.
This diversity should be recalled when attempting to understand both how 
working through NGOs came to be advocated by ideologically disparate groups, as 
happened in the 1980s, and how they subsequently came to be disparaged by an equally
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diverse group of observers. Support for NGOs in development came from radical 
campaigners, bilateral donors and multilateral organisations; as Farrington and 
Bebbington put, it, ‘Many roads lead to NGOs’ (1993: 1). Much interest was generated 
by disappointment with the past performance of the state, and both those proposing 
popular participation and empowerment, and those in favour of the privatisation of 
development, thought NGOs offered a possible way past that disappointment.
By the time of my fieldwork in 2000-2002, the ‘NGO decade’ of the 1980s and 
early 1990s (Bratton 1989: 569) seemed well and truly past. As Fisher predicted, 
NGOs, now so widely praised, can anticipate becoming victims of the current 
unrealistic expectations and being abandoned as rapidly and as widely as they have been 
embraced’ (1997: 443, see also Hellinger 1987). Criticisms of NGOs focused on their 
less-than-claimed efficiency and effectiveness, on the unintended consequences of their 
actions, and the changes brought by their popularity with donors. DFID proved to be a 
particularly swift deserter of once-popular INGOs, and the growing coldness towards 
them and the insistence that they work in ‘new ways’ had serious effects on 
relationships and activities in ZADP.
The third significant change related both to the move away from INGOs, and to 
DFID’s increased focus on policy-level work. The emphasis on government 
strengthening meant, in the words of the same adviser, that DFID would ‘no longer 
have a focus on concrete outputs. Our entire focus is now on changing processes, not 
on outputs, which are down the line. It’s no longer possible to justify a programme on 
the basis of the number of people it helps directly.’ This meant that ‘the poorest of the 
poor’, although so clearly defined as the primary target in significant parts of the Project 
Memorandum, were no longer at the top of DFID’s agenda. Holmes (DFID Economic 
Adviser) was able to say in 2002,
‘I don’t know if I know what the focus on the poorest of the poor was before. Were 
we really seriously ... [trying to focus on them]? Sometimes things get sold on 
labels and justifications that may sound attractive and catch the mood of the 
moment... ’
Four years on, in a changed policy environment -  in which the Economic Advisers had 
recovered some of their lost influence -  Holmes could deny a previously important 
imperative. The focus on the ‘poorest of the poor’ had been replaced by a more general 
-  and abstract -  concern with ‘poverty’. Yet these institutional, organisational and
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policy changes did not go uncontested. DFID was at no time a singular and unified 
organisation, with Advisers all in agreement. Differences between the advisory streams 
remained of considerable importance, and even everyday decisions were internally 
disputed.^^
A clear example of this came in discussions about Direct Budget Support. 
Although the DFID-Mozambique office at the end of 2002 was officially strongly in 
favour of it, an anonymous Adviser was quoted in The Economist as saying that it 
involved ‘putting your money into a very leaky bucket’(2002: 39). Another Adviser, 
also cautious about the policy, pointed out that even this analysis was naïve, as it did not 
take account of where the ‘leak’ was going: ‘They seem not to understand that the 
“leak” is going exactly into the pockets of people who are building up an ever-stronger 
power base’.^ "^
ZADP staff were also damning about DFID’s focus on purely national-level 
institutions and policies. The new Advisory team based in Maputo were, with few 
exceptions, considered to be completely out of touch with the realities of non-Maputo 
Mozambique. A member of ZADP staff said of a DFID Adviser that ‘the feeling was 
that [X] was not on the planet of Zambézia’. Mozambican staff members found it 
difficult to believe that DFID was really planning to withdraw most of its support from 
projects like ZADP, in favour of interventions like Proagri and Direct Budget Support. 
Most were sure that little would reach the areas where they had been working, and that 
the change was effectively the withdrawal of resources.
ZADP was thus a project located in a ‘space’ between two organisations for 
which it was not a high priority. It could perhaps have been protected by the contractual 
relationship between them; instead, arguments over the contract itself neatly illustrate 
how supposedly formal structures were in fact negotiated, manipulated and reshaped by 
individuals. ZADP was officially funded under a contractual relationship between 
World Vision-UK and DFID-UK.^^ However in practice important relationships and
This was shown by the incident discussed on page 80. When Mason answered a question about 
targeting policy in a manner that allowed no room for manoeuvre and was strongly directive, two other 
advisers stood up in quick succession to give entirely different responses.
Hanlon (2002a) went further to argue that donors were directly supporting the ‘predatory elite’.
‘Notes of Agreement’ were exchanged after the project was approved by the London-based Projects 
Evaluation Committee. World Vision-UK was contracted by DFID-UK to implement ZADP, with the
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lines of responsibility were neither defined by nor limited to the contractual relationship. 
I had considerable difficulty finding the formal ‘Notes of Agreement’: neither World 
Vision-UK nor World Vision-Mozambique were able to find their copies. That did not 
prevent people from both DFID and World Vision referring to contracts that they had 
neither written nor read. Advisers suggested that World Vision might have ‘broken its 
contract’ first when a new Project Manager was (internally) appointed without reference 
to DFID, and again when it was said that Lloyd had provided less support than had been 
contracted for (see page 85). However the Letter of Agreement between DFID and 
World Vision (17 April 1998) actually left the relationship extremely vague. World 
Vision was to account properly for its grant, allow DFID to monitor the project, not 
change the project purpose without permission, and write appropriate reports. No 
mention was made of any DFID right to comment on the selection of staff. Thus, 
although the relationship was described as contractual, in which each side supposedly 
had formal rights and responsibilities, in fact it was much more fluid and negotiable; the 
remaining sections of this chapter discuss the nature of that negotiability.
2.4 Defining Relationships
Relationships between DFID, World Vision and ZADP were under constant 
renegotiation over the course of the project’s life, shaped by historical patterns of 
behaviour, and institutional and individual responses to such behaviour. As I have 
already indicated, the relationship between World Vision and DFID was frail from the 
start: early decisions about design and structure meant that ZADP was always 
peripheral to World Vision-Mozambique.^^ It was this relationship that DFID Advisers 
attempted to describe as a ‘partnership’ at the time of the Mid-Term review. Yet there 
was little incentive for World Vision-Mozambique to put money and time into trying to 
attract more DFID funding by playing DFID’s game and acting as DFID’s ‘partner’. It 
was clear to me from my first visit in 2000 that there would not be a ZADP HP, and 
World Vision had effective ways of positioning itself to receive ongoing and substantial 
support for its other projects from different donors. The relationship between DFID and 
ZADP was thus of much greater importance. I now discuss how this relationship might
understanding that they would subcontract this responsibility to World Vision-Mozambique (an 
‘independent’ country office, though fully dependent on donor and support office funding).
The microfinance component became an exception as a result o f sustained lobbying following the Mid- 
Term Review. When funding for ZADP ran out in 2003, World Vision found additional finance.
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be characterised in a way that recognises its changing character, and acknowledges the 
hierarchical relation between DFID and ZADP
It is evident from the previous sections that ZADP was never a ‘partner’ for DFID. 
Structurally it is difficult to see how, as a time-limited project supported by a sole 
funder, it could ever have been. It is also clear that the relationship was constantly 
contested and negotiated, with individuals and groups manoeuvring at times for control, 
at times to avoid responsibility. I have shown that the design process militated against 
both ‘partnership’ and joint ‘ownership’, and that relationships became more rather than 
less hierarchical during project implementation. Actions and rhetoric remained 
contradictory. So what is a more appropriate model for understanding the relationship 
between project and donor? I now suggest that some of the complexity and 
contradictory behaviour can be satisfactorily accounted for by seeing the link between 
ZADP and DFID (not World Vision and DFID) as a patron-client relationship.
Patron-Client Relationships
In some respects it can be argued that the two organisations stood in relation to 
each other as patron to client, in the classic anthropological formulation. As I 
mentioned in Chapter 1, there was a period when rural relationships were widely 
analysed in terms of patron-client relations (see page 21). Eisenstadt and Roniger list 
the most important analytical characteristics of a patron-client relationship (1980: 49- 
50). They tend to involve the simultaneous exchange of different kinds of resources. 
From the patron these may be instrumental, economic or political -  funds, in the case of 
DFID. From the client they involve promises of solidarity or loyalty: ZADP’s 
compliance with DFID norms and changing DFID policies. The exchange is usually a 
‘package deal’, in which different kinds of resources are exchanged, and involves long­
term obligations. Relations are informal, not fully legal or contractual, but tightly 
binding nonetheless. This was certainly the case here, where the relationship went far 
beyond the contractual (see page 92). Patron-client relationships are usually entered 
into voluntarily, and can be abandoned. They tend to be vertical and may indeed 
undermine horizontal organisation and solidarity. The relationship between ZADP and 
DFID was certainly vertical, and the close relationship with DFID did make relations 
between ZADP and other World Vision agriculture projects somewhat difficult.
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Crucially, patron-client relationships are also based on strong elements of inequality and 
differences in power, self-evidently the case here.
There were many occasions on which ZADP staff behaved as if they were DFID 
clients. They were deeply conscious of their dependence on the whim of a single much 
more powerful institution, and attempts were constantly made to placate the 
potentially restless donor. DFID ‘recommendations’ were frequently taken to be 
commands. As discussed from page 79, DFID recommendations often resembled 
orders, but even on occasions when the wording was less strong, ZADP staff did not 
feel able to oppose DFID advice. Recognising this as a problem, the UK-based World 
Vision project officer urged the project to ‘have a position, otherwise we get taken 
down a route by the donor... Don’t let DFID’s view enter a vacuum’. Yet staff found it 
hard to break patterns of behaviour established during the design process and as a result 
of early conflicts (see page 84). In 2001 Cope (Second Project Manager) acknowledged 
that the project had not been sufficiently clear in its dealings with DFID:
‘I think management should have said look, these are new terms. If we’re rewriting 
the thing, let’s rewrite it now. But some people don’t like that kind of confrontation, 
though I think it was needed. Otherwise you’ll be walked upon, you’ll be blowing 
in the wind like a rag doll, and I feel that to some extent this is how the project has 
gone.’
Although ZADP staff did at times offer some covert resistance to DFID demands, for 
example by quietly ignoring them (page 85), in general they made great efforts to adapt 
the project to DFID’s changing policy frameworks, spending substantial amounts of 
time on activities which had not originally been planned (see page 78). In this way it 
can be argued that ZADP acted as DFID’s client, providing praise, acclaim and even 
outputs far in excess of what was contractually required.
If it is accepted that ZADP often took on the role of client, did DFID espouse the 
role of patron? How might that be reconciled with the rhetoric of ‘ownership’ and 
‘partnership’ adopted during the Mid-Term Review? The evidence here is more mixed. 
DFID Advisers habitually required ZADP staff to do things that were not contractually 
specified. New activities were required, while some of those planned were cancelled. 
ZADP found itself responsible for two kinds of outcomes, both ‘hard’ service provision
World Vision-UK provided two percent of the project budget, but this was for World Vision- 
Mozambique’s internal administration. DFID refused to agree that World Vision should take an 
administrative fee of fourteen percent of the project budget, and it was agreed that DFID should pay 
twelve percent and World Vision-UK would make up the difference.
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(numbers of goats provided, tonnes of seed sold), and ‘soft’ processes (increasing the 
degree of local/government ‘ownership’, sustainability, participation). Many different 
agendas were sequentially foisted upon ZADP -  working with the poorest of the poor, 
working to mitigate the effects of HIV/AIDS, working with the government to 
strengthen policy. Although not all of these agendas were pursued with vigour, ZADP 
management did not actively oppose them. The demands were not stable, but shifted 
with DFID policy. By making these demands, DFID behaved like a capricious patron. 
ZADP appeared to be saddled with a debt that could never be paid. The ‘currency’ of 
the debt was never established, and as a result it could never be worked off.
The argument that DFID acted as patron to a client-like ZADP can thus account 
for a number of otherwise inconsistent patterns. But it might be faulted on two counts. 
First, the explanation would be unacceptable to many of those involved, who would 
certainly deny the identification of themselves as either patrons or clients. Second, the 
implication that organisations (rather than individuals) are capable of patron-like and 
client-like behaviour verges on implying that organisations have personality and agency 
(c.f. Douglas 1986). This is not something I wish to suggest. DFID and ZADP were 
composed of individuals who used their agency to act within the context of the structure 
provided by the organisations of which they were part. Although there were 
undoubtedly hierarchical personal relationships between the various people concerned, I 
am not suggesting that any DFID Adviser acted as patron to any ZADP staff member. 
Rather, the structural manner in which the two organisations related had features 
strongly reminiscent of the patron-client relationships which have been more usually 
described between individuals.
In Chapter 6 I look at another relationship with similarities to this: that between 
ZADP staff and project beneficiaries. There too I argue that the relationship can be well 
described as one between patron and client, but in that case the relationship was 
reaffirmed and reinvented through gift exchange. The gift is relevant here as well, 
although the relationship was too tightly regulated for gift exchange to be a fully 
appropriate analogy. The fact that the relationship between DFID and ZADP was based 
on gift-giving (funding), with no formally accepted means of reciprocation, accentuated 
rather than weakened differences. As Stirrat and Henkel put it, ‘Gifts, like charity, do
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not lead easily to identification, but, rather, to a reaffirmation of difference’ (Stirrat and 
Henkel 1997: 80).
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that Hanlon’s suggestion that NGOs simply operate as the 
‘pawns’ of donors (1991: 81) was, at the time of my fieldwork in 2000-2002, simplistic. 
Instead relationships were constantly renegotiated by individuals over the course of the 
project’s life, within the bounds of changing structural constraints. Actors operated 
within the bounds of what I have characterised as a patron-client relationship, itself 
under negotiation.
Although I have argued that it is helpful to see the overall relationship between 
DFID and ZADP as a patron-client relationship, as this highlights structuring power 
inequalities, many interactions took place on a different basis. DFID Advisers by no 
means always agreed with each other. ZADP staff did not always follow Advisers’ 
instructions. This provides an interesting contrast to Gardner’s work on the ‘Plantation 
Rehabilitation Project’, in which she described organisational and personnel-related 
changes as following on from ideological shifts (1997). Although shifts in DFID policy 
and the international development agenda were important for ZADP, such changes took 
effect within the context of ongoing relationships.
The analogy of a patron-client relationship has proved most useful in attempting 
to characterise the bond between donor and NGO. The relationship was more than a 
purely contractual one, for its scope was undefined, and there were no sanctions for 
misbehaviour. ZADP staff did not always comply with the instmctions of DFID 
Advisers (page 85), and Advisers did not flinch from redefining the scope of ZADP 
activities. Yet nor was it a ‘partnership’. The power relations between the two 
organisations, which stemmed from the subordinate and financially dependent position 
of ZADP, meant that they could not stand as equals, although the inequality was never 
such as to entirely limit ZADP freedom of action.
‘No matter the degree to which a common identity is asserted, there is still an 
asymmetry between givers and receivers, and he who pays the piper not only calls 
the tune but attempts to make sure it is performed. Old identities re-emerge; older 
lines of differentiation reassert themselves’ (Stirrat and Henkel 1997: 75-76).
The fact that DFID paid ZADP served to reinforce and perpetuate difference:
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To an extent this conclusion backs up Ferguson’s argument, referred to earlier, 
that what goes on in development projects like ZADP may involve a ‘non- and counter- 
intentionality’, and that much of what happens goes on ‘behind the backs or against the 
wills of even the most powerful actors’ (Ferguson 1990: 18). That is a reasonable 
description of some of what went on under ZADP. Individual actors negotiated 
relationships with each other on the basis of imperfect knowledge, and in response to 
imperatives that were often obscure to those with whom they were interacting. Thus, 
for example, although conunentary and criticism about the project tended to be focused 
on (not) achieving planned outcomes, or (not) responding to the needs of the target 
population, in fact actors’ objectives were more closely connected to DFID priorities 
(either as employer or patron) than to the needs of the target population (c.f. Clay and 
Schaffer 1984: 10-12). The complexity of managing multiple imperatives over time 
thus led to the appearance of ‘development’ ‘acting behind backs’, even though the 
‘anonymous constellations of control’ (Ferguson 1990: 20) were the product of the 
decisions of many individual actors. Returning to Long, although the eventual outcome 
of multiple contestations may appear to be authorless, a intervention is nevertheless ‘an 
ongoing transformational process in which different actor interests and struggles are 
located’ (1992: 9). In the next chapter I therefore start to look at the specific context of 
ZADP, to embed it historically and politically, and to understand how other groups of 
more ‘local’ actors negotiated their relationships with the project.
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Chapter 3. Change and Continuity: Patterns of External Intervention in Rural 
Zambézia
Development projects are frequently designed with little consideration for their 
historical or political context (Ferguson 1990, Mitchell 1991); ZADP was no exception. 
This chapter first shows that the planners of ZADP took little account of what had gone 
before when they designed the project, and considers the implications of a selective 
approach to history. It then demonstrates that, for my informants, the past experience 
ignored by ZADP designers was of key importance in shaping their understandings of 
the project. Using a range of secondary sources and interview material, I examine how 
individuals and organisations defined as external to ‘local’ processes acted and were 
understood in Zambézia over the last century, focusing on the historical resonances of 
external involvement in agriculture. This involves considering the degree of 
resemblance my informants identified between colonial-era forced cultivation of rice 
and cotton, socialist agricultural cooperatives, and post-war ‘development’ interventions.
The historiography of Zambézia is unusual, as historians of the region have, since 
the late 1970s, made innovative use of a mixture of archival sources and oral 
testimony.^* Although I did not myself undertake archival research, due to lack of time 
in Maputo, I followed their lead by adopting a combination of my own: bringing 
together their secondary material (partly based on oral testimony) with information from 
interviews I conducted myself. Doing this, I found to my surprise that my informants 
gave very different accounts of the past to those recounted to an earlier generation of 
historians. I came to realise that this was principally due to the changed context in 
which I was carrying out my research.
This is not the place for a lengthy rehearsal of the strengths and weaknesses of 
oral testimony as history;^^ however as Jessica Schafer observed in her study of ex- 
Renamo militants in Manica Province (2001), an uncritical use of such testimony can 
result in underestimating the significance of the context in which information is 
collected. How things are remembered and retold depends crucially on the context of
See for example, Isaacman (1969, 1972a, 1976, 1996), Newitt (1969, 1973b), Vail and White (1980), 
and CEA (1981a, 1981b).
See Thompson (1978), Miller (1980), Vansina (1985), Tonkin (1992), Slim (1993), White et. al. (2002).
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the retelling. In the Mozambique of my 2001-2002 fieldwork, certain characteristics of 
the past seemed more or less interesting to people, and as a result the emphasis given to 
violence, wealth, employment and suffering differed from that in earlier accounts. 
Much of the oral material collected in the late 1970s, which highlighted colonial 
oppression and suffering, was taken at face value, and not subjected to the cautious 
critique that should be expected of historians.^^ More recent work suggests that such 
caution would have been well-advised. José Negrâo recounted a fieldwork visit to an 
informant who had already been interviewed by two famous historians, and whose 
account of the 1950s had been quoted and requoted. Asking again about the same 
period, Negrâo was astonished to hear a diametrically opposed version of events. He 
asked the man why he had altered his account so dramatically from the one given in the 
late 1970s, and was told ‘that was the time of Frelimo, and now is the time of Renamo’ 
(1995: 39). The implication was that different stories were appropriate to different 
times. Nostalgia also has a part to play here, and it is not uncommon for populations 
released from periods of authoritarian rule (post-Soviet, post-apartheid) to feel, 
ironically, some nostalgia for old certainties (Verdery 1996, James forthcoming).
Of course, my own data is no ‘cleaner’ than that of previous generations. The 
accounts I heard of the past were equally partial, fragmentary, and particular, filtered 
through my ears and often those of Rita and Arcanjo. As is always the case, what I was 
told reflected what informants wanted me to hear, and what they felt it was safe for me 
to know. This no more undermines the data presented here than it undermines all oral 
historical endeavour; however it is important to keep in mind the context of my research, 
both temporally, and as part of a ‘development’ project.
I begin by outlining how Zambézian history was written about -  or not written 
about -  in the Project Memorandum, followed by a brief chronological outline of the 
main events in Zambézian history from the early nineteenth century onwards. 
Thereafter the chapter proceeds thematically, as I examine the main concepts informants 
used when talking about powerful organisations and individuals with connections to the 
colonial or independent state in the past: exploitation, violence, patronage, and help. In 
the final section I look at the different labels applied to ZADP, focussing mostly on the
*°Most historians who worked on Mozambique in the late 1970s and early 1980s are now seen to have 
taken insufficient account of the context of their work. See for example work from the Centro de Estudos 
Africanos (CEA) (1981c, 1981b, 1982), First (1983), Head (1980), Isaacman (1977b, 1980, 1982, 1985), 
Manghezi (1981) and Vail and White (1978a, 1980, 1983).
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project as exploiter, and consider the impact of past experiences on potential 
participants’ understandings of ZADP.
3.1 Ignoring History: Analysing the Project Memorandum
History was entirely absent from the ZADP Project Memorandum. There was 
neither any serious contextualisation of the planned project, nor any attempt at historical 
analysis. In a document of 132 pages, there were just seventeen references to a non­
project-related past (notations from DFID 1998b). Twelve mentioned the war,^* 
concentrating on the tremendous destruction it wrought:
‘The 16 years of civil war effectively destroyed most of the previous community 
structures through out-migration to avoid the conflict and removal of traditional 
social hierarchies and relationships. Following the Peace Accord in 1992 many 
people returned to their home areas to find almost complete destruction of housing, 
physical infrastructure and services’ (Annex 1:1).
Only twice was even passing mention made of Independence or the colonial period:
‘Little investment in education by the Portuguese administration followed by 16 
years of civil war has resulted in a poorly educated rural population with little ability 
to further its development. The dislocation of families during the civil war has 
resulted in communities that lack cohesion and, to some extent, trust’ (11).
‘The rural economy of Zambezia Province is still recovering from the devastating 
civil war that ended in 1992. This effectively destroyed much of the market 
infrastructure. A large proportion of the rural population was displaced. The 
network of rural stores (cantinas) was largely destroyed. Before independence these 
had formed the hub of the rural economy, selling inputs, providing credit and buying 
and storing produce’ (Annex 6: 2).
Even in these two cases the problems described -  lack of education and infrastructure -  
were related to the war. Other comparisons were made between what was implied to 
have been a static pre-war past, and a post-war present:
‘The customary [land tenure] systems of the various matrilineal and patrilineal 
ethnic groups in Zambezia vary and have anyway changed as a result of the 
enormous destabilisation and movements caused by the war’ (Annex 1: 3).
‘Before the war there existed a network of shops in the villages at which farmers 
could exchange produce for household goods and farm equipment and inputs. These 
were all destroyed leaving the community without outlets for their products or 
places to buy household goods’ (Annex 2: 10).
‘...the informal credit systems that used to exist outside the family and immediate 
neighbourhood broke down as a result of the mass displacement of people during the 
civil war’ (Annex 6: 4).
The other five dealt with the Land Tenure component. Three were brief references to the 1979 Land 
Law. Another noted that land tenure regimes were widely variable according to factors ‘including 
population density, kinship organization, inheritance patterns (matrilineal or patrilineal), land quality, 
markets, and historical experience’ (Annex 3: 2). The final reference merely noted that many land 
applications followed the peace agreement of 1992 and the elections of 1994 (Annex 8:1).
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This shallow historical awareness had three main implications for the design of 
ZADP. First, the significance of the Renamo-Frelimo war was misunderstood. Writers 
of the Project Memorandum saw the war as the source and location of economic and 
social change. The ‘disruption’ caused by fifteen years of conflict and displacement 
was believed to be the main ‘problem’ for smallholder farmers, the primary cause of 
rural poverty, and the cause of ‘community destruction’. They ignored the disruptive 
effect of plantation-style colonial forced labour. By blaming problems on ‘the war’, 
they were also able to package and distance conflict, in particular political conflict. 
Second, the designers of ZADP did not consider how potential beneficiaries might 
perceive external organisations or individuals. Nor did they take account of the 
resonances outside interference in family agriculture might be expected to have in an 
area where agricultural produce had been ruthlessly expropriated for decades. Third, 
the long-standing diversity of rural livelihoods was not appreciated. The complex 
relationships of economic interdependence between rural and urban areas which 
stretched back several generations and structured the ways in which people understood 
their lives and history were ignored. I now look briefly at each of these points in turn.
The implications of describing the war as if it were a discrete and singular event, 
uniquely destructive, but from which Mozambique was in successful convalescence, 
were profound. The quotations above show that the war was held solely responsible for 
the destruction of infrastructure, in particular the transport system and the rural 
marketing network, and for the disruption of ‘subsistence’ agriculture.^^ It was blamed 
for the destruction of ‘most of the previous community structures’, communities which 
lacked cohesion ‘and to some extent trust’, and for changes in ‘customary systems’. In 
support of this argument, later sections of the chapter do indeed provide ample evidence 
of the destructiveness of the Renamo-Frelimo war and the wholesale migration of the 
rural population that it caused. However, change was not initiated by the war; nor was 
it the single instance of violence in recent Zambézian history. Rather, agricultural 
practices, land ownership and livelihoods had been adapting in response to changing 
circumstances for many generations. For example. Independence brought fundamental 
alterations in people’s lives -  the end of regular employment for many, the closing of 
almost all rural shops, and the establishment of communal villages and agricultural 
cooperatives in some areas. The entire twentieth century was a time of turmoil, as
I discuss what was meant by ‘subsistence’ agriculture in Chapter 4.
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variable labour and tax demands led to new patterns of livelihoods. The nineteenth 
century was likewise a period of intense dislocation, characterised by sixty years of 
slaving, famine, migration, and a changing political landscape. The suggestion in the 
Project Memorandum that ‘the war’ was somehow responsible for all Zambezia’s 
problems not only failed to do justice to the depth, profundity and long-standing nature 
of livelihood flexibility in Zambezia, it also implied that there was a recent stable 
situation to ‘go back to’, and that what had been ‘destroyed’ could be ‘mended’.
Furthermore, and at a rather different level, a focus on a ‘war’ which had ‘ended’ 
allowed ongoing conflicts to be discounted. By confining conflict, division and 
destruction to the war, designers absolved themselves from the responsibility of 
analysing ongoing divisions and contestations, and instead emphasised post-war gains 
and achievements.^^ Such divisions as existed were labelled ‘political’, and were 
considered to lie outside the remit of a development project. However, as I will show, it 
is simplistic to see the war as either a starting or ending point. The ethnic, regional, 
social and economic divisions that fed the war have not ended, but instead now find 
their reflection in the two political parties, Renamo and Frelimo. Thus, although the 
power of the war to explain changes in livelihoods, agricultural practices and 
community structures was greatly exaggerated, ironically its influence on the creation of 
a bipolar party division in contemporary rural Zambézian life went unacknowledged.
Following Englund (2002: 13-14), a useful parallel can be drawn with the war of 
liberation in Zimbabwe. Early studies had suggested that there was a close 
correspondence between the goals of the rural population and the guerrillas fighting for 
Independence. Lan (1985) noted a cosmological unity of purpose, with guerrillas 
enlisting the help of spirit mediums in their attempts to reclaim land, while Ranger 
(1985) emphasised the importance of class struggle. But following Kriger’s influential 
book (1992) it was realised that there was wide variation in terms of aspirations, and 
that the war had at times been used to settle old, local, scores, which had little to do with 
overall national objectives. Later work has paid much greater attention to local 
variation (Bhebe and Ranger 1995, Moore 1995).
I take up the question of representations of Mozambique in Chapter 4, where I contrast the ‘positive’ 
view of a country that has successfully left behind war, and has moved towards growth and democracy 
with the help of international donors, with the simultaneous assertion of Mozambique’s desperate poverty 
and need for continuing support.
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Second, despite strong evidence that it was an issue, the designers of ZADP did 
not attempt to analyse how ZADP, as a project involving individuals and resources from 
outside the region, might be (misjunderstood.^"^ I look at the different ways in which 
successive generations of Portuguese prazo-holders, concessionaires and administrators 
expropriated both produce and labour from rural Zambezia, and at how these patterns 
continued after Independence. In an argument taken up later in the thesis, I suggest that 
ZADP was seen not as a new sort of organisation, but as one intimately connected to 
‘the state’, and for many indistinguishable from it. Although I would not wish to imply 
that ZADP was doomed to ‘failure’ as a result of the actions of its predecessors, the fact 
that they were not taken into account during the design process meant that it was much 
more likely that project staff would not develop a sophisticated analysis of who would 
be willing and able to participate in activities, and why.
Finally, by ignoring the tumultuous history of war, famine, slavery and forced 
labour in Zambezia, project designers repeated the errors of many analysts before them. 
They were far from alone in their inability to recognise the intimate historical links 
between rural and urban areas, between household agriculture and wage labour: the 
identical mistake had been made by Frelimo in its early years. As O’Laughlin pointed 
out, the ‘agrarian question’ in Mozambique has long been seen in a misleadingly 
dualistic light, owing to a misunderstanding of the nature of rural livelihoods and of the 
historical processes that formed them (O'Laughlin 1996). This misperception led 
designers of ZADP to write: ‘Communities need help in moving away from subsistence 
agriculture’ (DFID 1998b: 1); and ‘the majority of farmers, who are currently dependent 
on subsistence agriculture, [will be enabled] to move into the wider economy by 
improving household food security, increasing incomes and helping households 
accumulate assets which can be sold during lean times’ (DFID 1998b: 5). The 
questions this raises are taken up in Chapter 4, where I show that rural Zambézians have 
been involved in selling their crops and buying consumer goods and inputs for many 
decades, and that at least since the early twentieth century they have therefore been part 
of a ‘wider economy’.
One of the FRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) exercises undertaken in Mugaveia as part o f project 
planning had to be abandoned, as villagers’ suspicions were raised by the drawing of a village map. They 
accused the team of planning to steal and occupy their land (ZADP 1997). Earlier still, an internal CD A 
strategy review of 1995 had raised concerns that ‘given the history of forced labour and coercion in 
Zambezia, donors and NGOs need to adopt a cautious approach to the promotion of community groups’ 
(BDDCA 1995: 7).
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3.2 Historical Outline
The Portuguese arrived near the mouth of the Zambezi River in the sixteenth 
century, and from the mid-seventeenth century the crown granted prazos (crown estates) 
to Portuguese settlers along rivers and trade routes.^^ In return for an annual sum the 
leaseholder had the right to exploit the prazo, and collect taxes from the local 
population. The intention was to encourage the development of a large and loyal settler 
community. To begin with, the prazo-holders did live within a social milieu that 
remained outside African society, and maintained a strong commitment to King and 
nation (Isaacman and Isaacman 1975: 8). But, as time went on, local alliances became 
more important than a relationship with Lisbon, and during the eighteenth century the 
prazos became a part of an African political landscape, their success contingent on 
accommodation with surrounding African chiefs and polities. Prazo-holders, 
increasingly of mixed race, relied on personal relationships with indigenous leaders for 
their legitimacy. Portuguese influence on the Zambezi delta area during this period was 
thus very limited: their rule had little impact on either social institutions or modes of 
production, and both highlands (including Gurué) and hinterland (including Namacurra) 
remained beyond their control.
From the eighteenth century the prazo-holders, now increasingly Afro-Portuguese, 
and with substantial slave armies (achikunda), began to penetrate further into the 
interior, in search of gold and ivory. There were as yet no fundamental changes in the 
traditional economy -  plantation labour was not imposed, no crops that could be grown 
for export had been found, prazo-holders remained dependent on tribute in kind, and the 
free Africans (colonos) remained able to evade even this tax by migrating (Newitt 1969: 
76). The prazo-holdQf s power depended mainly on his slave retinue, slaves at the time 
being best described as clients who chose to attach themselves to a protector, who 
would offer them the opportunity to enrich themselves. This form of voluntary 
enslavement pre-dated the prazos', during crises it had long been common for a man to 
choose to enslave himself and his family to a member of the royal family or a wealthy 
commoner, and this practice was transferred to the pmzo-holders (Isaacman 1972b: 
450).
This section is based on Newitt (1995), Isaacman (1969, 1972a, 1975, 1983), Ishemo (1995), Hedges 
(1999), and Serra (2000).
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After a century of relative political stability, the early nineteenth century saw the 
fragmentation of the area to the north of the Zambezi into ‘secondary states’ which later 
became the focus of indigenous opposition to Portuguese rule. Newitt (1988) argued 
that this fragmentation was due to the devastating drought and famine of the 1820s and 
1830s, which in turn fed the fast-expanding international slave trade. As social 
dislocation and turmoil spread through the region, many of the smaller prazos declined 
and power became concentrated into the hands of the already powerful, either Afro- 
Portuguese, Nguni, or Swahili warlords. Thousands of achikunda ex-slaves were left 
unattached. Some joined predatory bands, or the retinues of the leaders of the 
secondary states. Many others were captured and sold by these same leaders. Newitt 
noted that ‘the slave trade introduced violence on an unprecedented scale into the 
Zambezi world, violence within the Portuguese community itself, and increasing 
violence between the Portuguese and neighbouring tribes’ (Newitt 1969: 78-9). 
Drought, followed by the growth of slave trading, also meant that centuries-old trade 
routes were disrupted, and led to a fundamental realignment of the economy (Newitt 
2002).
The international trade in slaves remained an important part of the Zambézian 
economy through the nineteenth century, despite an official ban from 1836. It began to 
decline somewhat from the 1880s,^^ and a profitable trade in locally grown oilseeds 
started to develop in the region (Negrâo 1995: 44). This marked the beginning of what 
was to become a significant trade in agricultural commodities. International companies 
opened offices in Quelimane, and the production of sesame, peanut and copra increased 
rapidly, with mral families reacting swiftly -  and apparently without coercion -  to 
demand. The trade was highly flexible, with shops often based in former aringas 
(military posts in the prazos), which were at strategic and accessible points. Itinerant 
merchants travelled to producers, and as a result the oilseed boom proved a major 
impetus in extending the European presence into the interior. In the words of Vail and
At the high end of estimates Isaacman and Isaacman calculated that during the nineteenth century over 
a million people were exported from Zambezia, Sofala and Nampula (1983), and James Stewart (quoted 
in Vail and White 1977: 5) estimated that half the population of Lower Zambezia had been exported to 
Brazil by 1860. At the lower end, Vail and White suggested that by 1846 at least 300,000 slaves, mostly 
men and boys, had been taken from the Zambezi prazos and surrounding areas (1980: 22), while Newitt 
(1988: 15) quoted Gerhard Liesegang’s calculation that 102,900 slaves were taken from Quelimane 
between 1800 and 1829. Many more died before reaching the coast: Livingstone wrote that for each 
slave who reached the trading ports a further four died (quoted in Vail and White 1980: 30).
However in inland areas, away from water transport, older patterns of ivory and slave commerce 
continued throughout the nineteenth century (White 1987).
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White, ‘the long-suppressed potential of African agriculture had been released’ (Vail 
and White 1980: 42).
This period also saw the beginnings of plantation agriculture in the region, and 
sisal, sugar and copra plantations were established.^^ Companies such as the Boror 
Company were attracted by easy access to land and favourable ecological conditions. In 
addition, at the end of the 1890s three measures changed the shape of the Zambézian 
economy and gave the new companies exceptional privileges, most notably in the 
control of labour. First, administrative structures were reformed. In most regions the 
prazos were reorganised and redefined as concessions, with the aim of creating 
modernising agents and encouraging investment. As with the original prazos, the 
government hoped that awarding concessions to responsible individuals or chartered 
companies would encourage Europeans to settle in the interior and develop the 
agricultural sector. The companies were given tax-raising powers and the duty to 
develop their areas. Second, a new Labour Code was introduced in 1899. All men aged 
between fourteen and sixty were legally obliged to work, while significant tax demands 
meant that men started to spend a considerable period of each year labouring on the 
newly established plantations (Vail and White 1980: 131-137). Third, progressive 
restrictions were imposed on itinerant trading, suppressing the newly-established free 
trade in oil seeds and sacrificing the interests of family agriculture to those of the new 
plantation companies.
The result of these developments was that over a short period labour demands 
increased dramatically. At the end of the nineteenth century eight days of waged labour 
sufficed to pay the annual hut tax; by 1919 that had increased to 180 days (Negrâo 1995: 
56). At the same time the terms of trade for smallholder family production worsened 
sharply, as concession holders were able to deny access to free traders, and force 
farmers to sell at low prices. The development goals of the Portuguese government 
were not achieved: ‘what emerged was a speculative, exploitative and generally 
inefficient tribute system, rather than a modem agricultural sector which could serve as 
a catalyst for change’ (Isaacman 1972a: 163). The former prazos, now concessions, 
effectively became private labour pools from which the companies, by direct force or 
indirect manipulation of the economy, could compel the labour they required.
Highland tea plantations were established from the 1930s.
They were not renamed, and although differently defined, were still called prazos until the 1930s.
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Responses to the new demands, and to the new relationship between company and 
resident population, varied across the province. In the long-occupied delta regions 
south and west of Quelimane, the companies were seen as heirs to the relationship 
between prazo-holder and African cultivator, patron and client, first established in the 
late seventeenth century (Vail and White 1983: 891). There was thus a measure of 
legitimacy in their increasing demands, and in some cases the companies were seen as 
protectors from a new enemy: the state (Vail and White 1980: 175, 365). However in 
the newly ‘pacified’ areas to the north and east, the companies were seen as an invading 
army, and met first by armed resistance and later, flight. This was the case in much of 
what later became Namacurra and Gurué Districts. That said, although flight, or the 
possibility of flight, to some extent limited the demands which the companies could 
make (Vail and White 1980: 166-7), as the century went on men found themselves 
required to work more and more days, and found employment less and less easy to 
avoid as increasing numbers of plantations and companies required workers. Workers 
were required not only on the relatively long-established sugar, coconut and sisal 
plantations of Lower Zambezia, but also on the tea estates that began to be established 
in highland Gurué in the 1930s. Anyone who did not work satisfactorily or attempted to 
avoid work was beaten, and could be made to do unpaid labour on roads or bridges 
(known as trabalhar muacuante or chibalo). Some were even deported.^^
From the 1930s pressures became even more intense in some regions, as women’s 
labour began to be expropriated too. Although exempt from the compulsory 
employment that took men away from the villages for six months of each year, in many 
areas women were required to grow a stipulated acreage of food or cash crops (rice, 
cotton, cassava), to be sold at a fixed price to a Portuguese concessionaire. The highly 
exploitative nature of compulsory cotton cultivation, the purpose of which was to 
provide sufficient cotton for Portuguese manufacturers in the métropole, has been the 
subject of detailed historical e n q u i r y . T h e s e  forced cropping schemes, along with 
forced labour on the plantations, were abolished in 1961, following investigation by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO).
^  Export slavery continued into the twentieth century under the title o f contract labour to Sao Tomé (Vail 
and White 1980: 166).
See for example Isaacman (1992, 1995, 1996) and Pitcher (1993, 1995). Vail (1978b) wrote about the 
rice and cassava schemes.
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However, even as early as the 1950s, people across Zambezia had come to depend 
on regular wages, not only to pay their taxes and buy the clothes they were required to 
wear, but also to buy part of their food. Consequently many adult men continued to 
work six-month contracts after compulsion was abolished in 1961. The desire for 
consumer goods (sewing machines, cloth, bicycles, radios, manufactured tools) was by 
that time strongly established, making a cash income necessary. Livelihoods were 
highly diversified, with most families farming small plots of land, selling excess food 
crops and cash crops, and drawing a cash income from employment. A further 
incentive to stay in work was that after 1961 remuneration improved, as recruiters were 
obliged to compete for labour. They also began to distribute articles such as blankets, 
trousers, shirts, mugs, cutlery, cigarettes or fish to their employees (Cross 1992/4: 152).
The years leading up to Independence were good ones in the province. The war 
between nationalist Frelimo and the Portuguese was not fought in Zambezia, and the 
years from 1960 to 1975 were prosperous ones for the region. Wages were higher than 
ever before and there was a world boom in commodity prices (Marzetti 2001: 48). It 
was Independence that brought sharp and unwelcome changes. The precipitous flight of 
most Portuguese settlers led to the collapse of both the plantation companies and the 
rural marketing network. Frelimo, from 1977 a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party at the 
head of a one-party state, embarked on a development strategy which did little for most 
rural Zambézians. It proved extremely difficult to establish the agricultural 
cooperatives that Frelimo hoped would revolutionise family production, and the 
formation of the communal villages (aldeias comunais) was even more problematic.^^
Crucially for the later history of the province, Frelimo found it difficult to 
establish a strong presence in Zambezia after 1975. This was in part a legacy of the war 
for Independence, which had leapfrogged over the province leaving it largely untouched. 
It was also due to the fact that Frelimo’s policies were antithetical to the interests of 
most rural Zambézians. Frelimo’s development strategy took no account of the intimate 
links between rural and urban areas, or between wage labour and family farming, and as 
a result policies were promulgated which acted against the interests of many of those 
who lived in rural areas, but whose lives had been bound up with the wider economy for
On Frelimo’s rural development policies see amongst others, Bowen (2000a), Roesch (1988), Mosca 
(1999: 116-40) and Munslow (1980, 1984). On agricultural cooperatives, see Harris (1980) and 
Guilherme Pereira (1980). On communal villages see Araujo (1988), Borges Coelho (1993) and Casal 
(1996).
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many decades.^^ Frelimo’s concentrated focus on the state and cooperative sector led to 
the family sector being ignored: ‘the peasantry was largely left to fend for itself in an 
ever-growing parallel economy’ (Wuyts 1996: 728). From 1977-83 about ninety 
percent of total agricultural investment went to state farms, two percent to cooperatives, 
and virtually nothing was invested in household production (Mackintosh and Wuyts 
1988: 145). As Vail and White perceptively pointed out in the last chapter of their book, 
completed in 1978, there was at that time ‘a real danger that Frelimo officials, that new 
class of bureaucrats, [might] become the latest heirs of the senhores\ a group that had 
been criticised as early as 1806, as people ‘who prevented all development by their 
inability to do the job themselves and their refusal to permit others to get anything done’ 
(1980: 403).
Opposition to Frelimo arose early in Zambezia, with two groups, Africa Livre and 
Wotcha Weka, active in different localised parts of the province from the late 1970s 
(Bowen 2000b: 77). Renamo, initially an unnamed guerrilla group funded by the 
Rhodesian secret service, built on this early opposition when it started to operate in 
Zambezia in the early 1980s. Unlike in other provinces, it had considerable military 
success. At different times Renamo controlled half the District capitals, and in 1987 
eighty percent of the province was beyond government control (Legrand 1993: 98). 
Although significant numbers lived in Renamo ‘tax areas’ (to use Gersony’s (1988) 
classification), much of the countryside was abandoned for many years, and people fled 
across the border, to towns, to camps for the dislocated, or to the mountains.^"^ Almost
1.4 million Zambézians, half the provincial population, were displaced at some point 
during the war, either within the country or to Malawi (Bowen 2000b: 13). For many 
the war years were ones of constant flight.
Peace was restored in Zambezia after the signing of the Peace Accords between 
Renamo and Frelimo in 1992. By this point Frelimo had abandoned Marxism-Leninism 
and the one-party state, and with the 1994 elections the country became a multi-party 
democracy. People started to return to their villages and re-establish more settled lives. 
Much of the province’s infrastructure had been damaged: roads and bridges were in
See Bowen (2000a) for an account of the impact of these policies in southern Mozambique.
Gersony distinguished between tax, control and destruction areas (Gersony 1988: 10-20); residents of 
‘tax areas’ were treated most leniently.
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ruins, many factories had been destroyed, and the plantations were overgrown and 
untended.
Despite some investment, employment opportunities remained very limited in the 
decade following the war. This meant that the particular pattern of diversified 
livelihoods to which people had been accustomed prior to Independence proved 
impossible to re-establish. Politically, the situation remained tense. Renamo won an 
overwhelming majority in Zambezia both in 1994 and 1999, but the centralised system 
of majoritarian government meant that Frelimo appointed the provincial governor. It 
can therefore be said that for many in the localidades where ZADP worked, the 
transition to multi-party rule meant little, as Frelimo’s hold on power continued (a point 
considered in detail in Chapter 5). This then was the context in which ZADP started to 
operate.
3.3 Understanding ‘Outsiders’
I now look at how the involvement and interference of organisations and 
individuals external to Zambezia shaped contemporary rural Zambézian society. I 
describe the various different organisations and schemes which operated in the 
localidades of Mutange and Mugaveia over the course of the twentieth century, and 
consider how they were perceived. I argue that people’s experiences with these 
organisations and individuals, generally operating either within or hand-in-hand with 
the state, affected their understandings of ZADP.
NGOs like World Vision have a very short history in Mozambique (see Chapter 
2). Prior to their arrival, in the mid-1980s, associational life was tightly controlled, first 
by the colonial and then the post-colonial state. The Portuguese followed corporatist 
principles, controlling the forms of representation permitted to business, labour, farm 
and other interest groups (Sogge 1997: 42). These bodies were used to publicise and 
promote state policies, and were in turn rewarded for their loyalty by state protection 
and patronage. Frelimo adopted this pattern, though with a different ideology, creating 
singular associations (for example of women (OMM) and youth (OJM)), subject to state 
control. Dynamising Groups, although ostensibly a forum for popular participation, 
were also intended to promote state policies (Kanji, Braga, and Mitullah 2002: 5). The 
state has therefore long been closely linked to associational life.
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Many informants characterised intervention by external organisations or 
individuals as exploitative and violent. Forced labour on plantations succeeded a period 
of slave trading, and a range of socialist schemes of ‘improvement’ were followed by 
war. Yet at the same time the patrôes (patrons) of the colonial period were recalled 
with great nostalgia, and prosperity and resources were seen as deriving from 
connections with external institutions. ZADP, with its fleets of white land rovers, its 
close collaboration with District and Provincial Departments of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, its credit schemes, its group activities and its ‘white’ personnel, was seen 
by many as the heir to colonial and post-colonial schemes, with all their advantages and 
disadvantages.
The ‘outsiders’ to whom I have referred were thus a particular group, comprising 
powerful individuals and organisations generally associated with the state. Many of 
them were referred to in villages as azungu (Elomwé, sing, muzungu), brancos, or white 
people. It should be noted that the skin colour of individuals designated brancos or 
azungu was by no means always pink; the term also had economic and class 
connotations.^^ This perceived connection between these outsiders and the state was of 
key importance, because, as I show in Chapter 6, ZADP was widely mis-recognised, 
and believed to be part of the state, and hence Frelimo. This mis-recognition had 
crucial consequences in shaping the ways in which potential participants in project 
activities conceptualised their actual or potential relationship with ZADP.
Exploitation, Violence and Flight
The themes of violence, exploitation and flight recur time and again in accounts of 
the last century of Zambézian history, in discussions of slavery, forced labour, forced 
cropping, early socialism and war. Although some useful analytical distinctions can be 
drawn between the three themes, they were intimately connected.
Memories of labour on the plantations (and railways, factories, mines and roads) 
were often characterised by exploitation and violence, as has been thoroughly
The branco label was applied not only to the colonial Portuguese, and to development and government 
workers of all skin colours. I also heard it applied to wealthier traders, and to others who had done well 
for themselves. The eldest son of Tio Daniel, our host in Mugaveia, was said to have been killed by a 
cousin who was jealous of him, realising that ‘he would have become ‘white’ Qiavia-de ser branco)'. See 
Bowen (2000b) for a discussion of further referents of the term.
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documented in research conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. Many interviews I 
conducted myself also attested to the hardships of plantation labour and compulsory 
recruitment. Men recalled being ‘captured’ to go and work, even when they were still 
very young. Many remembered colonial officials coming to schools to see if any of the 
boys had hairs in their armpits. If they had, then they were taken away to start work. If 
someone was caught evading work, not only would they be beaten, they might be taken 
to do the hardest work of all {trabalhar muacuante, page 107), for no pay. Occasionally 
women were made to do this work as well, and were not even allowed to care for their 
children. As an elderly informant from Mugaveia recalled being told:
‘When the road was built between Gurué and Nauela I was a tiny child. My parents 
were both taken to work on the road, and as I was a baby I was taken too. Rather 
than letting the mother carry the baby, the cipaios^^ ordered a hole to be dug and the 
child left in it while the mother worked.’
Yet although many informants recalled plantation labour as sporadically violent 
and generally exploitative, the sense of intense misery so vividly conveyed by earlier 
research was absent. The bitterest memories of suffering I heard dealt with forced rice 
cropping by women in Mutange. From 1941 women there were required to cultivate a 
specified acreage of rice, and sell their crop at a fixed low price to Sr. Cardoso, a 
Portuguese concessionaire memorable for his cruelty. This period was remembered as 
one of great suffering:
‘Working on the rice machambas wasn’t good work, but as it was obligatory people 
accepted it. The white only paid fifty Escudos for a sack of rice. This work was 
very coercive iforgadd), because the portions of land were large. If a person didn’t 
finish they were beaten until they had finished the machamba. If you produced 
fifteen sacks of rice from this rice machamba, then five sacks were for you, and ten 
for Cardoso. We had to use the money they received to pay taxes, and buy our 
clothes.’
This was deeply exploitative, as the prices offered to African farmers were substantially 
below those paid to white producers, and those who did not work well enough were 
punished. One woman recalled that each person had to produce six sacks of rice from a 
single oil-tin of seed. Another remembered that people had their hands beaten with the 
palmitoria (a wooden paddle with holes in it) if they didn’t work. Harvest was tightly
Notable examples include the work of teams from the Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA 1981a, CEA 
1981c, CEA 1981b), Isaacman (1980), Vail and White (1980), Manghezi (1981) and First (1983). 
Sensitivity is needed in the interpretation of this research (see page 90).
Colonial police.
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controlled, and at this the hungriest time of year, they were forbidden from harvesting 
their crops without permission: ‘People were starving at that time, when the rice was 
already ready in the fields. If you were going to steal it, you had to go right into the 
middle to eat it. And if you were caught with rice in your mortar, you were in trouble.’
Personal abuses, particularly against women, were remembered in both 
localidades. Informants said that when Cardoso came to visit he had to be provided 
with a chicken, spirits, and a woman for sex -  and if the woman refused, then all 
members of the household would be beaten. Sexual violence against women was also 
recalled in Mugaveia. One elderly widow I knew there was picked out, when young, to 
be ‘married’ to a white man in Gurué city. At that time she was ‘fat’, wore beads on her 
arms and legs, and was seen as very attractive. She was taken away against her will, 
despite already being married herself, and it was only because her nephew worked 
within the city administration that she was released. Isaacman suggests that such tales 
of atrocities committed by administrators and overseers took on a life of their own, 
creating a sense of terror ‘which became deeply ingrained in the collective 
consciousness of the peasants and which helped to create the feelings of despair and 
powerlessness among at least a portion of the rural population’ (Isaacman 1992: 502).
The only alternative to the exploitation and violence of forced labour and forced 
cropping was flight. An early wave of migration to Nyasaland from the highland 
regions around Gurué was sparked by a combination of famine, the pressures of 
‘pacification’ and demands for porters during the First World War (Vail and White 
1980: 171, 219, Gann 2001: 139-40).^^ Some settled permanently, while other young 
men went seasonally as ‘hoeing boys’ on the lowest wages, doing the rough work taken 
by no one else (Palmer 1986: 111). Although Vail characterised Nyasaland at this time 
as ‘an island of atrocious working conditions and wretched wages in a region 
characterised by poor working conditions and low pay’ (1983: 50), conditions were 
often still better than those on the Portuguese plantations. I knew several men in 
Mugaveia who had either migrated to Nyasaland themselves, or remembered their 
fathers going to work on the Tcholo tea plantations of Mulanje. At that time those who 
went to Nyasaland were either those who had not paid their taxes, and thus had to flee, 
or those who had finished a contract at home and did not want to be forced into work
An estimated 100,000 Lomwé had entered Nyasaland by 1920, and by 1945 the Lomwé population was 
said to number 380,000 (Palmer 1986: 106, Chirwa 1994: 528).
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again soon. One elderly man remembered that people used to go to buy clothes in 
Nyasaland, before they were widely available in Portuguese East Africa.
From Mutange cross-border migration was much less conunon, owing to distance. 
However when the Boror Company was first established, its impositions -  coming on 
top of drought -  were so great as to lead some to flee to Nyasaland in search of refuge 
(Vail and White 1980: 118-120). From the lands of the Boror Company, people could 
more easily move to government-controlled lands where exploitation was less. But in 
all cases migration was a process, not an event, and in 1912-13 there was a counter­
migration back into the Boror Company prazos as government labour demands for 
road-building and construction of the Quelimane to Mocuba railway grew. There was 
also a very small amount of labour migration to the South African mines. Though 
considered particularly tough work, and hard to get (it involved a lot of travel), the 
salary was higher, and the job offered the chance to bring goods back.
In 1961 both forced cropping and compulsory labour were abolished, and in 
Mutange the ‘time of Cardoso’ came to an end. The land Cardoso had used passed first 
into the hands of the general population. Soon after Independence it was taken over by 
a socialist agricultural cooperative that quickly became famous within Zambezia. It is 
perhaps ironic that the two large-scale agricultural enterprises Mutange has seen should 
have used the same land. Ironic, because one of the ways in which the socialist 
cooperative -  intended to put the means of production into the hands of the producers -  
was in fact remembered, was for its similarity with Sr. Cardoso’s work, not its 
difference. Although the resources that were channelled to Mutange through the 
cooperative were much appreciated, for many people both it and the aldeia comunal 
(communal village, founded at the same time) were a ‘trick’, and they felt themselves to 
have been cheated and exploited once again. As Marshall and Roesch put it, based on 
work with a ‘Green Zones’ (peri-urban) cooperative in Nampula, membership of the 
cooperative came to seem ‘an onerous and not altogether sensible political obligation 
towards the state’ (1993: 249).
The recollections of one of the younger Frelimo leaders in Mutange were typical. 
He had been a cooperative member himself when young, and remembered the time 
when so much grew on the cooperative fields that people came from as far away as 
Quelimane to help with the harvest. But he also remembered the problems:
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‘People felt that they worked in vain at the aldeia.^  There was a lot of production at 
that time, but the people who harvested weren’t given it. There was a warehouse, 
then it was collected by car, and then the money was put in the bank. It was looked 
after by the cooperative, and it was that money that was used to buy the stuff that 
was sold in the shop. But people didn’t receive much money. The aldeia wasn’t a 
good way to work {nao era boa forma), and people don’t want to work in that way 
any more. They want to work for themselves, and then sell what they have for their 
salt or clothes or children’s education.’
These sentiments were repeated time and again, by supporters of both Renamo and
Frelimo. Two elderly women even told me that things were better at the time of
Cardoso, than at the time of the aldeia. Aida Ismael said:
‘We worked without knowing the objective of the work, and we worked like 
prisoners. I entered the cooperative with the expectation of getting something that 
would benefit me. In fact I just worked for three years, and then the war began. I 
learned nothing in the cooperative, people just sold the produce and took the
money.’*®®
Exploitation was remembered as just as much a feature of the cooperative as the 
plantations and forced cropping, although the violence which had characterised the 
colonial period was absent.
It should be noted that Mutange was most unusual in Zambezia in having been the 
site of so developed a cooperative and aldeia. Although both also existed in Mugaveia 
they were on a far smaller scale, and the aldeia comunal was only formed later, in
response to Renamo attacks. Later chapters show that Mutange’s history was
significant in shaping expectations of ZADP (see page 207 for further discussion of this 
point).
The war between Frelimo and Renamo, which we have seen described in the 
Project Memorandum as a singular, catastrophically violent and disruptive break, can 
thus be seen to have followed what was in fact only a very brief period when violence 
and migration were not part of everyday life. The calm and settled nature of the 
immediate post-Independence period and the period since 1994 is indeed more 
noteworthy. In Zambezia the absence of violence, exploitation and mass migration is 
more surprising than their presence. Although the destruction and disturbance of the 
war should not be understated, its visceral reminders in the form of stripped factories.
Aldeia and cooperative were formally separate, and belonging to one did not imply membership of the 
other. However, as in this case, many informants referred to them interchangeably.
*®® Although these accounts had a wide currency, former leaders explained that the only people who were 
not paid were those who did not work the required number of days. One man said: ‘The cooperative was 
like work; if you come today and not tomorrow, will your boss pay you?’
*®* I knew just one person who had joined the rudimentary agricultural cooperative, which was situated on 
the far side of the localidade.
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shot-out shops, and collapsed bridges must not be allowed to trick us into granting it a 
special explanatory status. It should instead be set into a much longer context of 
violence and flight (see Newitt’s comment on the impact of the slave trade, quoted on 
page 105).
In both Mutange and Mugaveia a specific moment was identified as the ‘start’ of 
the war. The war reached (atingiu) Mutange on 23rd October 1984, when the grain 
store of the agricultural cooperative was burnt to the ground. Soon afterwards the 
aldeia comunal was razed. In Mugaveia the ‘bandits’ made several raids before the 
village was completely abandoned, returning each time to carry off more goods, and to 
kill targeted individuals (see footnote 121). From both localidades most people were 
able to flee. From Mutange, many went first to the swamps, and then later to a number 
of different camps and settlements. Some were abducted by Renamo guerrillas, and 
those who survived spent several years working as slaves for their captors. A former 
Renamo soldier recalled that these people wore clothes of tree bark and did not even 
have salt. From Mugaveia most fled first to the mountains, where they lived in constant 
terror of being found by soldiers from either side. Later they dispersed widely, with 
some moving to government-controlled Gurué, or the camp of Invacula; many others 
remained in the mountains, and some chose to settle in Renamo-controlled areas around 
Nauela.
Accounts of the war in Mozambique had prepared me to hear graphic tales of 
trauma and suffering (see, amongst others, Gersony 1988, Magaia 1989, Minter 1989a, 
Finnegan 1992, Nordstrom 1997). However this was not my experience. With Bowen 
(2000b: 99), I found there was a strong emphasis on forgetting and leaving the past 
behind one. The war was recalled as a time of economic suffering, characterised by ‘the 
violence of loss and destitution (2000b: 20). A family I knew in Mugaveia described 
spending the war years near Milevane (Nauela): for five years they could do nothing -  
they produced just a little, to eat; they found mushrooms, and used saljema^^^ instead of 
salt. The materiality of suffering was frequently recalled.
Constant movement, fear and flight were other characteristics of the war years. A 
neighbour from Mugaveia described how the war pursued him:
A salt substitute, the ash from maize husks.
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‘I was still at work in the tea estates when the war began. My employers gave me 
holiday, so I came back home. But it seemed like I had brought the war back with 
me on my back, and when it became more intense we fled to the bush. First we only 
went as far as the machamba, because there was food there. But then the war came 
up to my house -  they burnt their way all the way from the Church of Christ to my 
house. Then my neighbour was captured, and so we fled further. Then food ran 
short. In the end we went to Invacula, where we stayed until the end of the war.’
There were no safe places to which to flee. From the point at which the war was
deemed to have ‘arrived’, Mutange and Mugaveia were emptied of their population.
For most people flight and movement, fear and deprivation became a permanent
condition throughout the war.
Violence, exploitation and flight thus characterised the experiences of many in 
twentieth-century Zambezia, and, as Sogge showed more generally for Mozambique, 
were particularly connected with obligatory forms of joint activity such as compulsory 
labour, agricultural cooperatives, life in the aldeias comunais (Sogge 1997: 46). I now 
turn to the implications of these experiences for projects working in rural areas, and to 
some of the links my informants made between their previous interactions with 
outsiders and the activities of ZADP.
The connection made between ZADP activities and previous experiences 
frequently centred on exploitation. Many villagers were concerned about becoming 
involved with an outside organisation that claimed to be there to ‘help’ (ajudar), when 
previous experiences with what looked like similar schemes had been so bad. When 
ZADP técnicos tried to introduce seed credit in Mutange, many thought back to their 
experiences with Cardoso. One couple told me that they had initially been concerned 
that the ‘credit’ was like that provided by Sr. Cardoso, but with time had realised that it 
was different: ‘World Vision does not take rice away, they give it to the producers, and 
if the person wants to eat it then they can. At first people refused the rice, thinking of 
the time of Cardoso, but in the end they liked it.’
The parallel between seed credit and Cardoso’s activities was widely drawn, 
although some emphasised a continuing similarity. For example, ‘Cardoso would bring 
seed in a kerosene tin, and after the harvest he would take away the same amount of rice 
that he had left. He did what World Vision now does.’ Parallels were also drawn 
between work on the Farmer Field Schools (page 32), and compulsory rice-cropping. A 
group from another Namacurra localidade once told me that the Farmer Field Schools 
run by ZADP técnicos were actually worse than the colonial schemes: ‘In colonial times
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the people would just come and measure the land, then give them the seeds, and then 
collect the harvest. As it is now, if people work on the Farmer Field School they don’t 
have time to work on their own fields.’
Similar concerns can be discerned in interpretations of the goat restocking 
programme. Goat restocking involved providing a small number of goats on credit; the 
offspring were then to be passed on to a secondary group within the village, and the 
intention was that, in time, all should have access to livestock. When the programme 
started, many were greatly suspicious. In Chapter 7 I discuss the widespread fear that 
that children would be demanded as a delayed payment for the goats, a fear that was 
strong enough to dissuade many from accepting them in the early years. Even those 
who did accept them were concerned about the potential for exploitation, and thought 
that the animals might at some time be taken from them. As one of the livestock 
técnicos said:
‘People misunderstood the goat programme. They thought that the project would be 
exploitation (pensaram que fosse uma exploraçào) and that they would have to look 
after the animals which would later be taken away. This meant that people didn’t 
think too about the future, and were not so careful with the animals.
Project activities were also affected by a much broader concern, which derived 
from experiences in the socialist cooperatives. Even in places like Mugaveia, where 
there was never a very active cooperative, people had heard so much about their evils 
that they were determined never to join one. It was widely recognised by NGO staff in 
Zambezia that it was disastrous ever to mention the word ‘cooperative’ in the villages, 
because potential participants instantly lost interest. In Mutange, where many had 
had first hand experience both of working together in the cooperative, and living 
together in the aldeia, the lesson that communal working led to disaster had been firmly 
learnt. In an attempt to side-step the issue, NGOs tended to talk about ‘groups’ and 
‘associations’. Even so, some informants still thought that the activities they did with 
ZADP staff were very similar to the work that Frelimo made people do when they first 
took power. One man in Mutange said
Concerns about who the animals actually belonged to meant that recipients tended to be afraid of 
reporting sale or slaughter. The same técnico said that this was because they thought that either World 
Vision or the government might do something to them, if they admitted to having eaten, sold or killed 
their goats, and so preferred to blame the animal’s disappearance on illness.
CLUSA, the Cooperative League of the USA, was known only by its acronym as a result.
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‘They [Frelimo cooperative leaders] made people work using the same methods that 
the project uses now. And when the project comes along with the same methods 
people say no; to do this again would be trickery.’
I was told that not only did the effort put into building the aldeia and cooperative come
to nothing, it also meant that Mutange became a visible and vulnerable target when the
war began: ‘the war came to Mutange before even Namacurra town’. The
implications of this were explained by the village President:
‘When the war started, they attacked us first. As we were all living close together 
and working together (eramos associados) it was easy. Afterwards people began to 
see: this was the way we made a mistake. Other people managed to flee, while we 
didn’t. Now a villager will think a thousand times before joining a group {agora a 
camponês vai pensar 1000 vezes antes de associar)'.
Concerns about working together constantly affected the choices people made about
becoming involved in group-based agricultural work organised by ZADP técnicos, and
limited the ‘community-building’ work that ZADP was able to do (see Chapter 5).
The fear of exploitation made villagers extra-suspicious of any alterations to 
ZADP activities. Seed policy was one example. For a number of years técnicos 
provided villagers with seed on credit. As credit was often not repaid, and there was 
also a desire to stimulate a market in seed, it was then decided that seed should be sold 
at a subsidised price. This raised storms of complaint, with many villagers thinking that 
the change was a ploy on the part of the individual técnico to take their money. There 
were accusations of cheating and deception, of disappointed expectations and false 
promises, drawing on people’s bitterness about many years of exploitation. Leaders in 
both localidades had long litanies of complaints about recent deceptions practised upon 
them by different organisations. A group of Mugaveia village leaders described what 
had happened to them:
‘They say that you can’t deceive a leper by giving him shoes, and perhaps that’s 
what happened here. A contractor came and asked the community to open a whole 
new road, and said that he would pay. People worked a lot, beyond the bridge -  but 
to this day he has never paid anyone anything. Then we were cheated again, we 
were told to make fired bricks for the hospital and that then they would bring zinc 
sheeting for the roof. Neither sheeting nor money have they brought. They 
deceived us. With the school we did the same thing -  we fired the bricks and they 
haven’t paid us though they had promised to. We used the bricks we had made for 
the hospital, so as not to lose them. Here we are always being misled -  perhaps we 
have bad luck.’
Renamo tended to target infrastructure, particularly infrastructure put in by, or associated with, the 
independent Frelimo government (See Finnegan 1989 for an account of ‘meticulous psychotic 
destruction’ in Morrumbala).
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Villagers had had these experiences with a range of different agencies, all of 
which were locally identified with ‘government’. It meant that most were unwilling to 
do any preparatory work before they were completely certain that promised inputs 
would be delivered. This led to problems for the ZADP goat restocking programme, as 
project mles said that nobody might receive a goat who had not constmcted a corral. 
But many were highly reluctant to invest in a corral for goats which might never turn up. 
They expected the ‘government’ to deceive them, and every time it happened, it 
strengthened a view that this was indeed what government did (cf. Arce and Long 1992).
Prosperity, Patrôes and Presents
The last section looked in some detail at the problems associated with the 
activities of traders, plantation owners, officials and NGO workers in Zambezia. I 
showed how exploitation, violence, and flight, though by no means exclusively 
associated with strangers, were often connected to relationships with external 
organisations and individuals. I now consider the ways in which these organisations 
and individuals were at times also connected with positive changes and were linked 
with prosperous times. Once again I consider the implications of this linkage for ZADP.
Many of my informants recalled the colonial period with nostalgia, not with the 
fear and bitterness reported by earlier historians (see page 99). In a context of present- 
day hardship and lack of access to cash, informants often recollected (or recalled 
hearing) that, although plantation work had been hard, it had given access to things like 
bicycles and radios, which at the time had been cheap. Many older people in Mutange 
said that life in the past had been easy, when compared with the difficulties they now 
faced. The equipment and food given to employees, particularly after 1961 (see page 
108), were recalled with great nostalgia. Ex-plantation workers remembered that the 
dried fish they were given to eat was sufficient to share with many family members, and 
that each new contract brought a new supply of basic goods. Even those who gave 
accounts of sometimes violent ‘capture’ for work nevertheless recollected that as a 
result of the work they were forced to do they had cash, and thus access to consumer 
goods.
I had expected that Frelimo supporters would be least likely to recall the colonial 
period in this manner, as they tended to be critical of the colonial regime. But in fact
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many of them remembered the advantages of having regular employment, something 
not widely available since Independence. The Frelimo-supporting Mutange President 
spoke for many other party officials when he labelled the Boror Company as 
occasionally racist, but the provider of many services that had since become unavailable. 
It was common to hear people of all political persuasions talking about the better 
discipline and better social control of the pre-Independence period, as well as 
endlessly recalling the fixed prices at which produce was sold, and for which goods 
could be bought.
Informants related individuals’ prosperity in the colonial period not merely to the 
era, but also to the relationships which people (mainly men) were able to develop with 
particular outsiders and organisations. I frequently heard older men talking 
nostalgically about their former patron (patrao, pi. patrôes). In both Mutange and 
Mugaveia patrôes always came from outside the localidade, and were spoken of in 
connection with help and prosperity. According to men who by their own reckoning 
had done well in colonial times, the key thing was to have a white patrao. Sometimes 
patrôes took their employees to work far away. Lucas, a middle-aged man from 
Mutange, got a job as a domestic servant for a white man, who then took him to Beira, 
which was where he was living at Independence. Jordao Estevao’s stepfather was taken 
by his white employer to Beira and then Maputo, from whence he was able to move on 
to lucrative jobs in South Africa. For people from Mutange, plantation employers were 
not identified as patrôes, probably because the village tended to furnish casual and not 
permanent labourers to the plantations. This interpretation is bom out by evidence from 
the President of Mutange, bom at Naciaia,^^^ who described a very different relationship 
between the Boror Company and Naciaia residents. Men from Naciaia tended to have 
permanent work at the sisal factory or plantation: ‘all those whose fathers worked at 
Naciaia had the right to be educated at a Boror school. That time was better -  we didn’t 
have many problems. Boror brought everything -  anything that a worker wanted Boror 
would make available, and would later discount from your salary’. As only a very few 
men from Mutange had permanent jobs, Boror was not seen as a patrao. However José
Individuals from both political parties, in both Mutange and Mugaveia, particularly bewailed the 
banning of poison ordeals as a way of dealing with witchcraft.
Naciaia was the location of the large sisal plantations which employed many men from Mutange on six 
month contracts; see Figure 4.3.
121
Ferreira, a Portuguese cattle rancher who had occupied a substantial parcel of land in 
Mutange, was identified as a patrao, particularly by those he had employed.
In Mugaveia men who had had permanent jobs on the tea plantations talked about 
how their patrao, a white company employee or owner, had identified and singled them 
out, and then given them increasingly responsible and better-paid jobs. Some worked as 
factory guards or capitôes (managers of work teams), others as carpenters or 
blacksmiths. All of these were year-round jobs, and the individuals who held them 
accumulated money, skills and tools, which later enabled some of them to set up on 
their own. A small number of men were thus able to start their own little businesses 
back in Mugaveia, particularly working as blacksmith, carpenters, or tailors. Another 
group became agricultores, larger-scale farmers with employees, a classification that 
gave exemption from compulsory labour; they sold their produce direct to the tea 
companies.
In this way some individual Portuguese from the colonial period were 
remembered with nostalgia, as benevolent providers of employment and generous 
givers of help. It was said that shop-keepers would often give a little paper screw of 
sugar to a customer as a present, and that lifts in vehicles were easily obtained. The 
shop-keepers based in Mugaveia (there were three small shops or cantinas in the 
localidade) were recalled by all informants in a positive fashion. They were not 
involved in forced recruitment, but employed quite a number of local men in their shops, 
in a workshop, and on a small out-grower tea estate in Nicoria. They helped build 
bridges, providing a tractor and eucalyptus trunks, and maintained them. This suggests 
that the patron-client relationship which Vail and White suggested had long been 
established between prazo-holder and local population in the long-settled delta and 
riverine regions (see page 107) had, over the course of the twentieth century, become 
extended to the relationship between individual white employer and employee.
When people talked to me about the ‘good patrôes" of the past they often 
followed up their recollections with a lament about contemporary difficulties. After 
telling me how the shopkeepers had built and repaired the Mugaveia bridges, informants 
would bemoan the contemporary lack of a stable bridge. When people from Mutange 
told me about their problems with a contemporary concessionaire, Gil Fonseca, they 
were quick to emphasise that they had no objection to the occupation and utilisation of
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what had been José Ferreira’s cattle-ranching land (page 121). Indeed, it was 
considered justifiable and welcome that Fonseca should do so. Their concern was that 
he should confine himself to his own land, and fulfil his expected obligation to employ 
them.^^^ I saw this focus on the virtues and responsibility of these earlier patrôes as a 
way of constructing and presenting a view of the ‘ideal patrao' for me -  and by 
extension World Vision -  to follow.
The third way in which outsiders were recalled was as direct providers of 
resources. I do not discuss this in detail here, as it is the central concern of Chapter 6. 
It dated from the provision of inputs to the socialist cooperatives, and food aid to 
displaced people during the war years. The emphasis on resources can be seen in the 
account of the Mutange agricultural cooperative, given to me by a group of members of 
the Associaçâo das Camponeses de Mutange (Association of Mutange Villagers^^):
‘In 1977 the Law of Aldeias said that aldeias must be formed so we created one in 
Mutange. A tractor from Mecanagro"® tilled 75 hectares, for which we paid 30 
Esc/hectare. We also received seed. The 1978-79 rice harvest was huge. People 
came from Quelimane and other places to help with it. Half o f the rice went to 
members, and we also sold 85 sacks and used the money to buy merchandise for the 
shop and to start a carpentry. We received two sewing machines...
In 1980-81 we received a motor pump from the government, and were told to reduce 
the area we sowed to 50 hectares, because otherwise we always needed help with the 
harvest... We had a motor pump and tractor, and there was a car that belonged to the 
aldeia...
There were plans. The plan of the Italians was to open 500 hectares of rice and to 
send five tractors and three motor pumps. They were going to put in a railway line 
to Mutange, and the late Henriques [Cooperative President] was to go to Italy, but 
this was not possible due to the war.’
Both cooperative and the aldeia were strongly associated with the provision of material 
goods. The cooperative was associated in people’s minds with physical inputs: a tractor, 
seed, the irrigation system. The same was true of World Vision, which was known to 
many during the war years as the provider of seeds, tools, and hospital treatment; the 
implications of these memories are discussed in Chapter 6.
*08 Gil Fonseca attempted to lay claim a far broader area, comprising the entire localidade of Mutange. 
His claims were considered illegitimate, and with the help of ORAM and the ZADP Land Tenure 
component, were successfully repelled. See de Wit (2002: 14-20) and Norfolk and Soberano (2000:41). 
*°^The Associaçâo was supported by ORAM, and in 2001 it received a heavily subsidised tractor on 
‘credit’. Few repayments were made during my fieldwork, although the tractor did continue to work. An 
ORAM official 1 spoke to in December 2002 said that despite huge arrears ORAM had no plans to 
repossess the tractor.
 ^' Scheme for the loan of agricultural machinery.
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter started by demonstrating that an understanding of the history of rural 
Zambézia was absent from ZADP design, and argued that as a result, both too much and 
too little explanatory power was granted to the war. Blaming the war years for all 
livelihood ‘disruption’ was, as I have shown, unjustifiable. However a closer 
concentration on the complexities of past and present conflict would have shown that 
the war solidified previously latent political and economic conflicts, which are now 
primarily expressed through membership of the two political parties.
The designers of ZADP demonstrated little awareness of the resonances that the 
involvement of a project with clear similarities to earlier interventions would have for 
residents of the target area. However memories of these interventions strongly affected 
the ways in which potential beneficiaries conceptualised and interacted with ZADP. 
Whether ZADP was linked in people’s minds to the state, to Frelimo, to colonial 
plantations or forced cropping, the connection was to powerful and unpredictable forces, 
over which they had little control. As Pijnenburg put it, ‘decades of (often brutal) 
colonial rule, top-down socialist policies, civil war, and now political strife do affect 
trust and confidence within communities and between them and external agencies’ 
(2002: 199). The relationship between potential and actual participants and ZADP is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
The next chapter shows that ignoring history led to the agricultural component of 
ZADP being designed with inappropriate aims and objectives, and with an apolitical 
grasp of the reasons for rural poverty. Assumptions about the nature of the 
‘peasantry’ were then coupled with a lack of knowledge about rural society and the 
history of the region, with the result that, as Isaacman put it, development practitioners 
and researchers have focused ‘on the future -  or rather a set of imagined futures in 
which the relevance of the past is often understated or ignored’ (Isaacman 1997: 758). I 
I now look at how livelihoods, poverty and ‘rural development’ were constructed in 
ZADP, and how this compared with the complex ways in which people made their 
living.
*** I use the contested term ‘peasant’ throughout the thesis. As the next chapter shows, the term had wide 
currency during the period of Mozambican socialism. My use of the term does not imply a lack of rural 
differentiation, or that country folk relied completely on agriculture. See Leeds (1977), Shahin (1982) 
and Hill (1986: 8-15) for further discussion of definitional issues.
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Chapter 4. Rural ^Development’ and Zambézian Livelihoods
A l. Mozambique remains one of the world’s 
poorest countries. Over 90% of Mozambicans 
(14m) live on less than $1 per day, the World 
Bank’s measure of absolute poverty.
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A2. But good progress is being made. Macro- 
economic management is sound and the 
economy is growing at about 8%. The 
Government of Mozambique is committed to 
reducing poverty. It is allocating extra 
resources to health and education, and progress 
is being made, from a low base, towards the 
International Development Targets. Democracy 
is functioning, though fragile, but there are large 
areas of the country where Government cannot 
provide services. The police and judicial 
systems need strengthening. The Government 
promotes a constructive and open relationship 
with the donors.
(DFID 1998a)
i. Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in 
the world. Achieving and sustaining a real 
reduction in absolute poverty will not be easy:
the ol' i ('Inr- w-'il ',\:t i s  oru; ('Î I'''s'
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c  >  i  i  i  s  I  \ I s .  External aid, which 
funds half of government expenditure, will 
continue to be needed over the medium to long 
term. HIV/AIDS and growing crime and 
corruption compound the development 
challenge.
ii. Yet there are many reasons to be optimistic 
about Mozambique’s future. That it has just 
celebrated eleven years of peace after a 1 icr
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remarkable achievement, and one of which 
Mozambicans are justly proud. Despite some 
setbacks, the democratic system continues to 
develop, and preparations are underway for the 
country’s third multi-party general elections in 
2004. Striking also has been Mozambique’s 
success in maintaining macroeconomic stability, 
and in attracting new foreign investment, which 
has resulted in high growth in recent years.
(DHD 2003)
The paragraphs quoted above^*^ open the Executive Summaries of the 1998 DFID 
Country Strategy Paper, and the 2003 draft of the replacement Country Assistance Plan. 
Although separated by five years, two Secretaries of State, and several self- 
proclaimed ‘new approaches’ (Chapter 2), the similarity of the cameo descriptions of 
Mozambique is remarkable. Stylised and stereotyping, they can be seen as 
‘development texts’ of the kind analysed by Crush and his contributors (Crush 1995b). 
As such, one of their functions is the construction of a particular kind of field for
Colours in the quoted text mark similar sections.112
Clare Short was Secretary of State for International Development from May 1997 until May 2003, for 
the entire effective life of ZADP. She was replaced by Baroness Amos, who was in turn replaced by 
Hilary Benn in October 2003.
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‘development’.' Like the ZADP Project Memorandum, they place a heavy explicatory 
burden on the war, and on the changes it caused.
Although details and emphasis differ, the first paragraph of both documents is 
devoted to establishing Mozambique’s extreme poverty. ‘One of the poorest countries 
in the world’, it is identified as a nation with a ruined infrastructure, weak institutions, 
and poor services, damaged by war and wracked by continuing destabilisation in the 
form of crime, HIV/AIDS and corruption. Much as in the ZADP Project 
Memorandum (Chapter 3), the role of the war in creating and sustaining poverty is 
emphasised. These and other reports observe that the country is near the bottom of the 
UNDP Human Development Index, is one of the most highly indebted countries 
(Hanlon 2000: 890), and also one of the most aid-dependent (Plank 1993, van Diesen 
1999); see Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Comparative statistics on ODA levels
HDI Rank
Total ODA (net 
disbursements) 
$US 
2002
ODA per capita, 
(net disburse­
ments) $US 
2002
(ODA) received (net 
disbursements) (as % 
of GDP)
1990 2002
111 Indonesia 1,308.10 6 1.5 0.8
112 Viet Nam 1,276.80 15.9 2.9 3.6
146 Uganda 637.9 25.5 15.5 11
170 Ethiopia 1,306.70 18.9 11.8 21.6
171 Mozambique 2,057.60 111 40.7 57.2
Source; Compiled from www.undp.org
In an almost ‘Looking Glass’ fashion, the second paragraph then turns this picture 
of woe and suffering on its head. Mozambique is not only immiserated, poor and 
vulnerable: it is simultaneously successful. There are ‘many reasons to be optimistic’. 
There is ‘good progress’, sound macro-economic management, a ‘constructive and open 
relationship with the donors’. Again, this analysis is not confined to these reports: 
donors frequently identify the country as an international ‘success story’ (see for 
example Stern 2002, IRIN 2002, cf. Lundin 2000). Mozambique has been held up to
114 Although I focus on just these two texts, they are far from atypical, and similar analysis can be found 
at the outset o f reports from organisations as diverse as Skillshare and SIDA.
Crime, HIV/AIDS and corruption might be seen as serious problems, but this representation 
downgrades them to background risks. In the case of corruption, Hanlon argues that donors see the 
country as one where corruption is ‘not institutionalised’, rather than as the criminal state he perceives 
(2002a: 2).
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the world as a ‘successful reformer’: not only have two general elections been held 
peacefully, but the economy has grown substantially and normality has returned to 
people’s lives. A World Bank report on development effectiveness approvingly noted 
the reforms implemented (financial liberalisation, exchange rate reform, trade 
liberalisation, privatisation), and detailed the growth that was believed to have derived 
from the changes:
‘After growing just 0.1 percent on average over the previous decade, GDP grew at 
an average of 8.4 percent annually from 1993 through 2001.
Inflation, which had averaged 53.3 percent annually between 1993 and 1996, fell to 
an average of 3.3 percent in 1997-99.
Social indicators also improved in this better environment: the gross primary 
admission rate rose from 57 percent in 1995 to over 100 percent in 2000, while the 
repetition rate fell somewhat from 26 percent in 1995 to 23 percent in 2000.
Private investment, crowded in by the better policies, helped to spur this growth.
For example direct foreign investment grew some 500 percent between 1992 and 
2001 .
Export growth improved dramatically, from -6.8 percent (1980-90) to 15.1 percent 
(1990-00).
Agricultural growth was revitalized, accelerating from 1.3 percent annually (1985- 
92) to 9.8 percent annually (1993-01).’
(Stem 2002: 39)
Why has this peculiar representation of Mozambique, simultaneously negative 
(extraordinarily poor), and positive (equally extraordinary levels of growth) had such 
lasting currency? The question parallels that asked by Ferguson (1990) of the World 
Bank’s approach to Lesotho. Although I earlier criticised Ferguson’s failure to look at 
the processes by which the ‘anti-politics machine’ actually works (Chapter 2), his 
analysis of ways of writing is nonetheless instructive. He found that World Bank 
descriptions of Lesotho bore little resemblance to either the academic literature or his 
own observations. But as he remarked:
‘One would be mistaken, however, to suppose that the paragraph cited...is simply an 
error, the sign of gross ignorance or incompetent scholarship... It must be 
recognised that what is being done here is not some sort of staggeringly bad 
scholarship, but something else entirely... What is needed is not so much a 
correction or setting straight of the discourse of the “development” industry. . . a s  a 
way of accounting for it, and of showing what it does’ (Ferguson 1990: 28).
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Ferguson showed how, when deprived of its history, geography and politics, Lesotho 
was constituted as a ‘less developed country’, an appropriate target for technical 
development interventions. In a similar manner, Mitchell demonstrated how 
descriptions of Egypt as a narrow valley, surrounded by desert, and crowded with 
rapidly multiplying inhabitants indicated not only the problem but also the solution 
(1995). Since the problem was defined in terms of nature and human reproduction, 
solutions were in the realm of improved resource management and technology. This 
kind of analysis also allowed the role of the development organisation to be ignored, 
and ‘development discourse’ constituted as an objective intelligence. Both these 
examples support Wood’s contention: ‘If a peasant has a problem behaving like the 
label, then he has a problem of access to the treatment -  but the treatment itself has been 
authoritatively established with the help of the label’ (Wood 1985b: 23). Following 
Ferguson, my task here is similarly to explain what descriptions -  here of Mozambique 
in general, but later in the chapter of specific features of Zambézia -  ‘do’. How do they 
function? And what is it that makes them so robust?
First, poverty has taken on a special status within the international discourse of 
development (Rahnema 1992). In Mozambique, as in other countries, poverty and 
poverty reduction have become central donor concerns. As McGregor rather 
disconcertingly phrased it, ‘poverty is the life-blood of the development industry’ 
(McGregor 2000: 2). Internationally donors have moved to commit themselves to 
eliminating poverty, rather than fostering g r o w t h . T h e  intense focus on ‘poverty’ has 
had particular effects in Mozambique, where it is a relatively new phenomenon. The 
poverty of Mozambique preoccupied neither the Portuguese colonial government nor 
Frelimo socialists. The Portuguese considered the ‘province’ backward, and in need of 
investment; the socialists considered it to have been systematically under-developed, in 
the interest of the métropole. For neither was ‘poverty’ the central issue. It was only in 
the late 1980s, with the growing involvement of the IFIs (International Financial 
Institutions) and NGOs, that ‘poverty’ began to be seen as the key problem. 
Mozambique became defined as the world’s poorest nation, and therefore in urgent need 
of donors’ aid.
Donors such as DFID have explicitly committed themselves to the Millennium Development Goals, 
and thus aim to reduce ‘poverty’ by fifty percent by 2015. DFID is also bound by a parliamentary act 
which restricts the use of aid to poverty reduction.
Second, Mozambique’s high growth rates -  from a desperately low base -  have 
been cited as evidence that donor interventions and new donor-advised policies have 
worked. ‘Success’ legitimises intervention. During the 1990s Mozambique was 
defined as a Good Performer, a Satisfactory Reformer, and lauded as such.^^^ As a 
BBC journalist, quoted in Christie and Hanlon (2001: 83) put it,
‘Mozambique is the darling of the international aid community. There is incredible 
sympathy for a country that has done everything right. Mozambique had become a 
beacon of hope in Africa.’
Donors need such ‘beacons of hope’ to justify their activities back home, and, as I argue 
later, the need to maintain optimism can lead to uncomfortable realities being ignored. 
Needing positive examples, donors have fixed on Mozambique (like Uganda) as a 
favourite example of ‘where aid works’. Establishing the desperate poverty of 
Mozambique thus establishes the right for donors to be involved in the country, while 
describing it as a ‘success story’ validates aid itself.
Third, defining the periods of war and colonialism as ‘pre-development’ means 
that they do not have to be taken into account. Change is asserted at the expense of 
continuity, and no attempt at historical analysis is made. Instead particular ‘break 
points’ are identified: Independence, and the end of the war. An ‘ideology of the blank 
page’ allows interveners to ignore the complexities and specificities of local 
circumstances, and impose externally-designed and externally-mandated interventions, 
from state farms to ‘community development’ initiatives (cf. Crewe and Harrison 1998). 
It also raises the question of what ‘counts’ as ‘development’, and underlines the ways in 
which, as definitions have changed, so the existence of earlier attempts at ‘development’ 
has been denied.
These three factors help to explain why seemingly contradictory descriptions of 
Mozambique remain powerful: intervention is validated, its scope is defined, and a 
justification for disregarding history is provided. This underlines Ferguson’s point that 
there are reasons for what might otherwise appear to be ‘staggeringly bad scholarship’. 
It is also useful, in the context of ZADP, to consider what the implications and 
consequences of not thinking straight were. ZADP staff, after all, were in the end
In a recent speech at the London School of Economics ( ‘The development challenge in crisis states’, 4 
March 2004), Hilary Benn referred twice to Mozambique. He first described it as a country that had in 
just five years reduced poverty from 70 percent to 55 percent and doubled the number of children in 
school, and later as an example of ‘how countries can move out of crisis to provide basic security and 
begin to raise the living standards of the poorest people’.
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saddled with a project which was riddled with design and conceptual contradictions 
(Chapter 2), but they were nonetheless faced with the necessity of doing something.
I therefore look now at how a lack of historical awareness shaped the ZADP 
analysis of livelihoods and poverty, and consider how it affected decisions about 
appropriate activities. First I consider twentieth century debates about ‘development’ in 
Mozambique. Although definitions of ‘development’ have been sequentially rejected, I 
demonstrate that economic change brought substantial alterations to Zambézian 
livelihoods over the century. I then look briefly at different patterns of livelihoods in 
Mutange and Mugaveia, before discussing the ZADP approach to livelihoods and 
poverty. The chapter shows that failing to take previous ‘development’ policies 
seriously led ZADP to adopt confused and inappropriate approaches towards rural 
development.
4.1 Debating ^Development’ in Colonial Mozambique
Debates about ‘development’ are not new in Mozambique. Interventions in rural 
Zambézia have been made in the name of ‘development’ for at least a century. 
However, as Chapter 3 demonstrated, private sector, government, and NGO actors have 
often emphasised the novelty of their actions while failing to investigate how they 
connected with earlier initiatives. From the beginning of the twentieth century, certain 
aspects of Portuguese colonial policy were, for a range of internationally-influenced 
reasons, couched in terms of ‘development’. Although under Salazar’s Estado Novo 
(New State, 1928-62) Mozambique’s economy was run for the benefit of the métropole 
rather than the colony, investment in the country was nonetheless considerable, and at 
Independence, Mozambique was one of the most industrialised countries in Africa 
(Englund 2002: 5, Hanlon 1984: 100). Following Clarence-Smith (1985a), it is thus 
incorrect to suggest that when the Portuguese left ‘the new government was faced with 
what approached a development Year Zero’ (Tancock 1999: 7). By looking at how 
ideas about ‘development’ influenced colonial and post-colonial policy, I now show that 
far from being novel, ‘development’ was already a well-worn concept when ZADP was 
defined as an innovative first-generation post-war ‘development project’. Deep 
disagreements characterised debates over the nature, ‘meaning’ and objectives of 
development, and how it might best be brought about. Although dominant approaches 
can be discerned, contestations and counter-currents should not be ignored. As Chapter
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2 demonstrated for DFID policy, ‘hegemony is never finished, never complete; there is 
always an ongoing process of contestation and negotiation’ (Ferguson 1994: 135).
Desenvolvimento, ‘development’, has a long but largely unacknowledged history 
in Mozambique. Occupied by one of the weakest colonising powers, from the late- 
nineteenth to mid-twentieth century Mozambique operated as a migrant labour reserve 
from which surrounding countries drew. As this section elaborates, the Mozambican 
economy depended on ‘primitive’ labour exports (mostly from Southern Mozambique, 
to the South African mines) for many years after surrounding countries had moved 
beyond this to develop industries of their own. International migrant labour remained a 
key revenue source for the Portuguese right up until Independence, while compulsory 
labour, which kept wages artificially low, provided the basis for the plantation economy 
of central Mozambique described in the last chapter. A key focus of debate has since 
been over whether or not the economic activity generated by these policies constituted 
real ‘development’.
Debates about ‘development’ first assumed importance in the late nineteenth 
century. Portugal was at that time coming under significant international pressure both 
to demonstrate her occupation of her colonies, and to prove that she had abolished 
slavery. The ‘Scramble for Africa’ meant that the Portuguese needed to exploit labour 
in order to protect their claim to the country, yet at the same time needed to prove -  in 
order to calm humanitarian anti-slavery critics -  that they were not exploitative. There 
were heated arguments about what constituted slavery, whether Portugal could be 
trusted to run her African colonies, and how abusive her ‘native policy’ really was 
(Allina 1997: 12-16). Both at this time and when the Portuguese were again on the 
defensive in the 1920s the circle was to some extent squared by a rhetoric of 
desenvolvimento. It was claimed that they ‘sought to attract the indigenous people and 
transform them into a useful element of civilization’ (Cayolla (1926: 24), quoted in 
Allina (1997: 16)), and did indeed invest in railways, plantations, and productive 
indigenous agriculture (de Vasconcelos (1926: 3-5), quoted in Allina (1997: 16)).
Though Portuguese policies from the 1890s to 1930s were -  partly for the reasons 
given above -  often phrased in terms of ‘development’, the aims and targets of such 
‘development’ were contested. From the 1890s until Salazar’s accession, disagreement 
about whose interests should predominate characterised debate about economic and
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social change in the country. It was by no means clear to policy-makers of the time that 
the interests of rural Mozambicans should be put first. ‘Development’ of the métropole, 
and of the interests of private companies themselves, were usually prioritised in the 
context of a virtually bankrupt colonial state. A key nexus of debate concerned the 
appropriate balance between a short-term need for income (most easily generated by the 
sale of labour domestically and internationally), and the longer-term development of 
industries and enterprises within the colony itself. Interest groups including British 
chartered companies, the mine-owners of the Transvaal, northern plantation-owners, 
and Portuguese manufacturers favoured the former priority. They were keen to secure 
access to continued and substantial supplies of cheap labour. The system whereby the 
mining companies recruited labour south of the Save River, with deferred salaries paid 
by the colonial government, was one that was extremely lucrative both for the 
Portuguese and the gold mining companies. In the central and northern areas the 
chartered companies and plantation owners, usually backed by British capital, relied for 
their profits on a steady flow of cheap labour. Both groups therefore opposed the 
establishment of Mozambican industries which would have competed with them for the 
workforce.
Yet to suggest that the Portuguese state had no sense of responsibility for the well­
being of the ‘natives’ would be wrong. A group known as the ‘Generation of ’95’, 
Portuguese soldiers and administrators so called because of their participation in the 
important military campaigns of 1894-95 in southern Mozambique, was particularly 
influential. Members of this group agreed that a spirit of realism was necessary in 
Portugal’s relations with its colony. They argued that agricultural development should 
provide the basis of Mozambique’s economic growth, rather than the constant and 
draining export of labour (Smith 1991: 499-500). They also believed that the ‘subject 
peoples’ of Mozambique should be provided with improved social services. As da 
Costa (a member of the group) wrote, ‘the domination of a superior race over savage 
countries is only legitimate when it is accompanied by real benefits’ (Estudo sobre a 
Administraçâo Civil das Nossas Possessoes Africanas, Lisbon, 1903, p i 87-91, quoted 
in Smith 1991:501).
The ‘Generation of ’95’ initially had little success in gaining political support for 
their ideas, and it was not until the 1920s that it was finally agreed that a measure of
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administrative decentralisation should be granted to Mozambique. The first head of the 
decentralised government, Brito Camacho, had ideas about development in line with 
those of the ‘Generation of ’95’ (Smith 1991: 513). He called for the full participation 
of Africans in the evolution of the colony, and wished to establish three or four large 
agricultural and industrial establishments in the south of the country, to reduce 
migration to the South African mines. However his radical plans aroused the staunch 
opposition of the interest groups already mentioned. They proved more powerful than 
he, and he was soon recalled. Joao Belo, who became colonial minister after 1926, was 
the last of this generation of reformers. While acknowledging the importance of the 
colony’s relations with South Africa, he nevertheless believed that Portugal had a duty 
to ‘improve the material, moral and social conditions of the local population’ (Belo 
1927: 274, my translation). To this end, he authorised money for development projects 
in southern Mozambique: factories for sugar production and distillation; a scheme to 
attract Portuguese immigrants; and credit for those wishing to initiate agricultural 
projects in the south (Smith 1991: 520).
This group of reformers, although wishing to foster economic development in the 
country, and keen to improve services, were not liberal, and were still willing to defend 
the practice of forced labour. The difficulties of making ‘lazy, indolent, inactive 
Africans’ work hard enough to develop the colonies preoccupied Freire de Andrade 
(then General Director of the Colonies), writing in 1914 (Freire de Andrade (1914: 3), 
quoted in Allina (1997: 15)). As well as forcing the ‘natives’ to work harder, a number 
of technical projects were proposed. Some operated in Zambézia, with the intention of 
bringing new science to the ‘natives’. G r i l o ,  a state-appointed agronomist, wrote that 
‘the black does not know how to farm’ and that ‘the native does not possess agricultural 
knowledge to allow him to work better. To prepare him for a less imperfect way of 
using the soil he will only be able to acquire it through the systematic repetition of 
cultural or technological techniques under the guidance of trained personnel’ (1929: 83, 
88). Grilo argued strongly for rational planning, and investment in native agriculture.
I would thus argue, with Smith, that prior to Salazar’s accession some Portuguese 
official thinking envisaged the development and growth of colonies such as
*** The desire to apply science to the solution of rural problems continued through the socialist period. A 
technocratic approach to issues of broader socio-economic significance is still current (see Ferguson 1990 
for a comparative example). ZADP can to some extent be seen as heir to these earlier projects.
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Mozambique (1974: 653). Debates about what "desenvolvimento" meant were ongoing, 
and as a result some reports, including one dealing with the reform of the prazo system, 
were couched in terms of the desenvolvimento of both native and European agriculture 
(Alvares 1916). However this thinking did not go unopposed, and the power of groups 
including the British chartered companies. South African mine-owners, northern 
plantation-owners, and Portuguese manufacturers, led to the ‘corruption, 
mismanagement and manipulation of the colonies to the advantage of disparate interest 
groups’ (Smith 1974: 653) well into the 1920s.
This brief emphasis on domestic ‘development’ did not long survive Salazar’s 
accession. Under his rule it was taken as given that the colonies were there for the 
benefit of the métropole. The rigorous economic logic that had balanced the domestic 
books was applied to the colonies: extreme austerity on all forms of spending, and 
rigorous central control. The prazos of Zambézia were taken under state control, the 
charter of the Niassa Company was ended, and it was made clear that the charter of the 
Mozambique Company would not be renewed. Strict limits were put on investment by 
foreigners. A new labour code was promulgated, and with the 1930 Colonial Act, 
which remained official dogma for almost 30 years, Salazar ‘regularized and 
rationalised the exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of the mother country... The 
restrictions placed on growth ensured that they would remain underdeveloped...[which] 
meant that the Portuguese colonies would continue to depend on a primitive 
exploitation of African labour long after more sophisticated forms had been developed 
elsewhere’ (Smith 1974: 667).
Under Salazar’s Estado Novo immigration from Portugal was e n c o u r a g e d . T h e  
Portuguese government supported European settler farms and foreign-owned 
plantations with subsidies and an ensured labour supply, promoting them to the 
detriment of African agriculture. Poor peasants were prevented from making an 
independent living from agriculture by being forced to undertake migratory labour or 
grow compulsory crops, and the capital accumulation of the better-off was tightly 
controlled (Bowen 2000a: 1-4). As described in Chapter 3, the central region became a 
plantation economy worked by migrant labour producing copra, sisal, cotton, tea and 
sugar for export, subsidised by forced labour. From the point of view of the métropole.
From 1930 to 1960, the white population of Mozambique rose from 18,000 to 85,000 (Minter 1994: 
14).
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Salazar’s policies were successful: by the 1940s the colonies supplied all of Portugal’s 
cotton needs, and four-fifths of this came from central and northern Mozambique 
(Clarence-Smith 1985b: 150).
In the 1950s and 1960s there was some reconsideration of agrarian policies, and 
development planning was introduced (Galli 1987: 35). Although expansionary 
economic and trade policies were primarily intended to stimulate Portuguese 
immigration, specialised African commodity producers were actively supported in a few 
areas, including upper Zambézia. Some richer individuals in Alto Molocué district (see 
Figure 1.2, page 16) managed to become agricultores, a status which exempted them 
from compulsory work (see Mackintosh and Dolny (1982), Mackintosh (1983-85, 1987); 
also page 122) and allowed them to employ labour. But only from the 1970s was 
significant investment made in indigenous agriculture. This was partly an attempt to 
‘buy’ the loyalty of those who were starting to support the independence movement, as 
well as the result of the late colonial policy of economic development.
I have shown here that a commitment to economic ‘development’, sometimes for 
the sole benefit of the métropole, sometimes more broadly defined, was behind much 
colonial policy. Yet in the years since Independence, this colonial ‘development’ -  
which profoundly affected the lives of rural Zambézians -  has not been recognised or 
labelled as such. Instead it was defined as surplus extraction, under-development, or 
exploitation. It is not only present-day ‘developers’ who have apparently discounted 
this earlier history of economic growth and development. Frelimo socialists did the 
same thing, for rather different reasons. As the rest of the chapter makes clear, the 
people at whom ‘poverty-alleviating development’ is now being targeted are precisely 
those who were in the past drawn into the nexus of the capitalist economy through their 
involvement in waged labour. When this earlier ‘development’ collapsed, and the 
sectors in which they had once been employed ceased to function, many returned to 
small-scale farming and petty employment, and as such became the target for a new 
wave of rural ‘development’ interventions.
The most significant legacy of this policy is the vast Cahora Bassa dam (Isaacman 2002, Isaacman and 
Sneddon 2000).
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4.2 The Colonial Legacy
During the colonial era forms of economic change were initiated that transformed 
Zambézian lives and livelihoods. In exploring these changes further, I show that 
dualistic approaches, which unduly emphasise the distinctness of the rural from the 
urban, have long characterised analyses of rural livelihoods in Mozambique. Such 
approaches, repeated by groups and organisations as dissimilar as socialist Frelimo 
planners and reformers from the World Bank, derive from a weak grasp of historical 
context, and fail to engage with patterns of livelihoods created by a hundred years of 
exploitation, economic change, violence and ‘development’. In the case of ZADP, the 
result was that a project was designed with the intention of fostering a process that was 
already decades old, amongst people whose ways of life had already been radically 
altered by the colonial plantation economy, socialist planning, and war (c.f. Ferguson 
1990).
As described in Chapter 3, Zambézian livelihoods were greatly altered by the 
development of the plantation economy from the late nineteenth century, and by 
Salazar’s attempts to make the colony pay its own way. From the 1930s, men from 
both Mutange and Mugaveia went to work on plantations for six months of each year. 
From Mugaveia men worked on the tea estates. Many, particularly before 1961, were 
‘captured’ and forced to work, mostly at low-skilled pruning and weeding work. Others 
took the initiative themselves; these voluntary workers were considered more stable, 
and were often chosen for jobs in the tea factories (Cross 1992/4: 139). Men moved 
between compulsory and volunteer contracts. Thus some informants from Mugaveia 
spoke of working in the tea estates in terms of progression: starting off with pruning and 
picking work, then progressing to work as guards, supervisors (capitôes), or inside the 
factories. Quite a few became carpenters or blacksmiths -  these were year-round jobs -  
and accumulated money, skills and tools that later allowed them to set up on their own. 
To work for himself, a man needed to have a registered occupation. This could be as an 
agricultor (larger-scale farmer) like Nikomo Mwala or Jolio Campa in M u g a v e i a . A s  
an agricultor Nikomo was exempt from compulsory labour, had his own employees, 
and sold his produce to a tea company. Tio Daniel and Jolio Campa managed to get 
traders’ licences, and would cycle to Niassa province and bring back dried fish to sell.
Before the war, Tio Daniel (our host) and Jolio Campa were the two ‘big men’ of Intuba. Sr. Jolio was 
an agricultor, with a hillside of pineapple plants. When the Renamo ‘bandits’ came during the war, they 
sought for both men. They found and killed Jolio; Daniel escaped as he was in Quelimane.
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Figure 4.1 Workers on tea plantations in the 1920s
From Rufino (1929)
Figure 4.2 W orkers on tea plantations at the time of ZADP
From project files
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Men from Mutange were likewise made to work on plantations. Most of the older 
men I knew from Mutange had worked on the Naciaia sisal plantations, run by the 
Boror Company. One of the least popular crops, sisal grew in hot, shadeless plains, and 
was painful to handle. Vail and White found that work was considered so hard that 
labourers were only recruited with the intervention of administration police (1983: 895). 
While work on the Naciaia sisal plantations was most common, some men worked in 
factories, on the railways or the roads. Unlike in Mugaveia, where a considerable 
number of men had permanent work rather than just the compulsory six-month 
contracts, in Mutange this was unusual. Elda Essalamo’s father worked on the railway 
line in Nicoadala District and he had a permanent job, which was considered 
advantageous at the time. The permanent jobs tended to be skilled, for example 
blacksmithing or machine operator work. One man had worked as a stonemason, and 
his salary was six times that of a field worker at Naciaia. There was also a very small 
amount of labour migration to South Africa. Mine work was remembered as being 
especially tough. Men would travel south in secret, either via Inhambane Province, or 
Malawi. They would receive a higher salary than was available locally, giving the 
possibility of bringing back prized goods, often sewing machines.
From the 1940s, women from Mutange were required to grow rice for a 
Portuguese concessionaire, and to sell a high proportion of their crop at a fixed low 
price (see page 112). Female informants told me that they were left with no time to 
grow rice for themselves. This led to modifications in farming patterns. More labour- 
intensive crops like sorghum and millet became less widely grown, while maize and 
cassava (‘the lazy man’s food’ (von Oppen 1991)), though significantly less nutritious, 
became more widespread. Families had to buy maize flour or (their own) rice at prices 
that were often several times greater than they themselves had received (cf. Negrâo 
1995: 86, on Chinde District). Options were less constrained in Mugaveia. Women 
devoted themselves largely to family farming, and many sold small surpluses, generally 
of maize. Men’s incomes could thus be devoted to consumer goods or productive 
purchases (tools, inputs etc.), unlike in Mutange where a substantial proportion of 
income was spent on food.
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Figure 4.3 Sisal plantation at Naciaia
The Boror Company sisal plantations at Naciaia (from Rufmo 1929)
Across the province a combination of forced labour, taxation and forced 
cultivation drew producers inexorably into the cash economy. Even in areas where 
there was no forced cultivation, demand still grew for the cash to buy expensive but 
labour-saving goods, such as manufactured tools, metal cooking pans and cloth. 
However the high price of these items required greater participation in the cash 
economy. Agriculture became increasingly wage-dependent (cf. van den Berg 1987 for 
Southern Mozambique). As a result, even after 1961, when employment was no longer 
compulsory, many still presented themselves for work voluntarily. This was 
particularly common in upper Zambézia, as working conditions on the tea estates were 
less onerous than those in the sisal plantations and factories, which started to mechanise 
at this time.
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It was all but impossible to escape these changes. Even those who attempted to 
avoid the demands of the Portuguese state found themselves drawn into the nexus of 
labour markets and the cash economy, as the very terms of their resistance (mainly 
involving seeking work elsewhere) were defined by options determined by the colonial 
regime (O'Laughlin 2002: 16). Gestures of resistance often bound people even more 
tightly into capitalist relations of production. Working conditions might have been 
slightly less harsh on the Tcholo tea plantations of Mulanje in Nyasaland (see page 113), 
but at root a man was fleeing from one form of exploitative labour to another. When 
people sabotaged production (for example by boiling cotton seed so that it would not 
germinate (Isaacman 1996)), all they could hope was that their land would be 
reclassified for another form of exploitation.
These multiple pressures shaped rural livelihoods in a way seldom recognised by 
later planners and commentators. Central planners of the socialist era did not take 
account of the extent to which rural dwellers had become engaged with the market 
during colonial times. At Independence, Frelimo defined its agrarian policy in terms of 
‘development’, drawing the distinction from the colonial period I noted in section 4.2, 
and defining its post-colonial project as novel. It was stated that ‘building the 
foundations of Socialism demands radical transformation in the social relations in our 
country and the development of our economy’ (Frelimo, Central Committee Report, 
Third Congress of Frelimo, 1977, p 35 quoted in Pitcher 1998: 124). For rural areas 
‘radical transformation’ was to involve the eventual elimination of the peasantry, who 
would henceforth work either on state farms or cooperatives. It would be funded by 
rapid industrialisation and the development of a modem sector. In the short term, 
planners prioritised modernisation and industrialisation. They saw rural areas as 
populated by a homogeneous peasantry, outside and independent from a modernising 
state sector (O'Laughlin 1996, O'Laughlin 2000). Believing that the peasantry survived 
in a world somehow unconnected to the market, they therefore concentrated their efforts 
and resources primarily on urban areas. In the mistaken belief that peasants did not 
participate in the money economy, Frelimo planners thought that they would be able to 
survive without cash, while investment was channelled towards priority sectors 
(Hermele 1988). There was little recognition that the peasantry might suffer if goods 
became unavailable in local markets as a result of economic policy failures (Wuyts 
2001: 5).
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What investment in agriculture there was, was concentrated on state farms and the 
cooperative sector. The aldeias comunais (communal villages) into which the rural 
population was encouraged to move were intended to allow the better delivery of 
essential services, such as clean water, health and education. Seasonal migrant labour 
was considered pernicious; instead the nationalised plantations and settler farms were 
converted into state farms, which it was envisaged would be mechanised, and which 
would employ a smaller number of full-time workers. Other peasants were intended to 
work on producer cooperatives where productivity would be increased by 
mechanisation.
Later writers, including those whose political sympathies lay with the Frelimo 
socialists, have condemned these policies (e.g. Munslow 1984, O'Laughlin 1996, Wuyts 
2001). Bowen’s critique of Frelimo’s early policies, which draws on ethnographic work 
carried out over more than ten years, is stark:
‘It ... sanctioned policies that were antithetical to peasant farming. By 
concentrating investment in public-sector enterprises that aimed for an extremely 
high growth rate, Frelimo’s socialist development strategy of rapid accumulation 
resulted in a shortage of goods in the countryside and unfavourable terms of trade 
for the peasantry. According to Frelimo, poor peasants were to be wage workers on 
poorly run state farms or join underfinanced cooperatives. Middle peasants were to 
renounce their own status by handing over their cattle, ploughs, tractors, and other 
resources to cooperatives. In essence, Frelimo's agricultural strategy completely 
negated what independence meant to the peasantry' (Bowen 2000a: 2, my 
emphasis).
Far from providing peasants, whether well-off or poor, with new and better options, 
Frelimo’s policies left peasants in an even worse position. Wuyts (2001: 4) suggests 
that Frelimo mistakenly saw the Mozambican peasantry as ‘uncaptured’, to use Hyden’s 
terminology (1980). Seeing accumulation by Portuguese settlers as having relied on the 
exploitation of the peasantry, Frelimo sought to break such links. But in fact ‘unifying 
capitalist class relations cut across divisions between town and country, between 
peasant and workers, between settlers and Mozambican farmers’ (O'Laughlin 1996: 3). 
The policies of concentrating investment on state farms, focusing first on the cities and 
restricting private markets all had the effect of reinforcing regional divides, creating 
hinterlands that were impoverished and open to Renamo assault (1996: 31).
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Figure 4.4 Destroyed cashew factory in Namacurra
g
The destruction of the cashew factory in Namacurra was absolute, and cashew liberalisation policies 
imposed by the W orld Bank make it extremely unlikely that it will be rehabilitated. The factory 
continued to work under Frelimo, and the walls were still covered in exhortatory murals in 2001. On the 
far right, still clearly visible, Xiconhoca (see Harrison 1999: 540), the ‘enemy o f the people’ can be seen 
corrupting youth, while in the middle another figure holds a plaque with daily production targets.
A dualistic understanding of livelihoods was by no means confined to socialist 
planners. Indeed Wuyts (2001: 1) has argued that there are important underlying 
similarities between the ways in which the peasantry was perceived during the period of 
central planning and that of liberal reforms. From both viewpoints the peasantry 
appeared more or less homogeneous. Both took an ahistorical perspective, sharing ‘a 
view that the character of the peasantry could be captured in a simple image -  a model 
view -  without much need for understanding the historical process and the path 
dependency of outcomes’ (1). Both thus shared a ‘blank slate’ approach. However 
Wuyts also argued that there was one crucial difference between the two approaches. 
Under central planning the peasantry were seen as subsistence producers, a perspective 
that did not recognise the fact that peasants depended on the market for both food and 
inputs. During the period of economic reforms they have been labelled as smallholder 
producers, a view that ignores long-standing links between household agriculture and
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off-farm employment. But during both periods most rural dwellers in Central 
Mozambique derived their livelihoods from at least two sources. They have been 
substantial agricultural producers, producing both for their own consumption and for the 
market, while at the same time engaging in a variety of off-farm income-generating 
activities.
Over the course of the twentieth century intimate links were built up between 
rural and urban areas, and between household agriculture and wage labour. As 
O’Laughlin pointed out, the ‘agrarian question’ in Mozambique has long been seen in a 
misleadingly dualistic light, owing to a misunderstanding of the nature of rural 
livelihoods and of the historical processes that formed them (O'Laughlin 1996). In 
section 4.4 I will show how ZADP also fell into the trap of viewing Zambézian 
livelihoods in a dualistic manner, but I first look briefly at patterns of livelihoods that 
existed in Mutange and Mugaveia at the time of my fieldwork.
4.3 Contemporary Livelihood Diversity in Mutange and Mugaveia
A discussion of rural livelihoods in Mutange and Mugaveia must start by 
emphasising the contemporary lack of material goods held by families and individuals. 
The possessions that families and individuals owned, or aspired to own, were doors, 
chairs, stools, knives, basic agricultural tools, pots and pans, radios, bicycles and metal 
roof sheeting. Not a single resident of either localidade had a vehicle, cattle, or 
powered agricultural machinery of any type.^^^ When I first visited Mutange on a damp 
day in May 2000, this material poverty was borne in on me with particular clarity. I 
was accompanying a DFID review team on a rural visit; the rain was coming down in 
steady sheets and the Landrover growled steadily forward on the soggy dirt road. It was 
lunchtime, and we ate our sandwiches as we jolted along. When my colleagues threw 
their empty soft drink cans out of the window I was hard pressed to conceal my 
disapproval. I did not realise that these cans were prized, and that they would be picked 
up by the first passer-by. I had no idea just how few material possessions people living
The head teacher at Nicoria school (Mugaveia) had an old and unreliable motorcycle, but he was not 
local. Tio Daniel had owned a vehicle before the war, which he had bought from a fleeing settler, but had 
no way of replacing it after it was burnt. Cattle had always been the property o f settler farmers or 
plantation companies, not smallholders. Similarly, agricultural machinery had always been owned by 
individuals external to Mutange or Mugaveia.
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in Mutange had, and therefore had not imagined how the uses to which a hard-to-come- 
by empty can might be put/^^
Mutange was the less food-secure of the two localidades. 2000-2001 had been a 
dry year, and rice production had been lower than normal. 2001-2002, the agricultural 
year of my fieldwork, saw dangerous flooding in many parts of lower Zambézia. 
Although Mutange was far less seriously affected than other regions, the rice crop was 
again much reduced, and a substantial proportion of cassava rotted in the ground. The 
second season crops of beans (mostly cowpea and pigeon pea, vigna unguiculata and 
cajanus cajan) and sweet potato were successful, and the hungry season of December 
2001 to March 2002 was no more severe than usual (see the comments made by the 
village President, page 62).
Although agriculture was an important activity for all households in Mutange 
(including the técnico, the health worker and teachers), almost nobody relied on it alone. 
Of 147 survey respondents in Namuinho, only three women claimed no non-agricultural 
activities. Castinha Nemes and Elda José were extremely elderly neighbours, dependent 
even for much of their food on Castinha’s successful adult sons. Odete Lemeia was a 
very newly divorced young woman, who was living with two tiny children in a house 
belonging to her uncle. Six months later, when I went back to talk to her again, I found 
that she had moved, marrying a man with a small trading business. A complete lack of 
non-agricultural activities was thus either temporary, or related to extreme old age and 
infirmity.
Although there was a reasonable range of off-farm activities in Mutange, many 
were still related to agriculture. The most common was the distillation of catxaço (107 
households), using sugar cane grown by the family. 76 households acquired money 
from ganho-ganho (casual labour) on other people’s machambas, while 33 earned 
money from carpentry or sawing planks. A number of men migrated temporarily to 
urban areas in search of work, often seeking construction jobs in Quelimane. Petty 
trade was carried out by some. This might just involve the sale of single cigarettes from 
the house, but a few men owned small stalls in the market-place beside our house, 
selling a much wider range of goods bought from Quelimane or Nicoadala. Petty trade.
The main use of empty cans was as measures: small quantities of grain and beans were universally 
sold by volume (uma lata de leite, a condensed milk tin, umafanta, a soft drinks can, uma castel, a beer 
can). They were also used to make lamps, and, more occasionally, drinking vessels.
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catxaço distillation and carpentry were male activities, while ganho-ganho, which 
might be paid in produce, goods or money, was usually carried out by women. No one 
in Mutange depended on any kind of regular remittances from family members working 
away from home.^^"^
To give a more vivid picture of the ways in which people made their living I now 
provide brief sketches of the lives of four informants from Mutange. Henriques 
Francisco became a friend in the early days of fieldwork. In his forties, he was a minor 
Frelimo official {chefe da zona). He was amongst the best-educated men in the village, 
with fourth grade schooling (the highest grade available locally when he was a child). 
He came from a family of carpenters. His father had worked six-month contracts on the 
sisal plantations of Naciaia, but between contracts divided his time between farming and 
sawing planks, which he would sell locally. His older brother also became a carpenter 
at a young age, while he (as the only other son) was given an education. He left school 
when he was about twelve, just after Independence, and began to work in his older 
brother’s carpentry workshop. When the aldeia and agricultural cooperative were set 
up, he joined neither, though he did work in the aldeia-o'wnQd carpentry. When the war 
came, he fled, like almost everyone else. At one point his wife was captured by 
Renamo, along with his mother, sister and baby son. He never expected to see them 
again, but they turned up, a year and a half later, at the refugee camp. He was unable to 
continue his carpentry work as a refugee because there was no wood. Nor did he have 
land. ‘Whoever had money did business’, he said, but for himself he relied on 
government-supplied food, and on casual work on other people’s fields.
When we knew him, Henriques had two wives, Julia and Helena, each of whom 
had a house in Namuinho. His main home was with his first wife, Julia, to whom he 
had been married for many years. They had four children. Henriques’ carpentry 
workshop and his pigs were at their shared homestead, though Henriques determined 
how any money earned from either was used. The land for both homestead and 
machambas came from his family, as was customary, and was rich in valuable tree 
crops (mangoes, oranges, tangerines and cashew), as inherited land often was. Helena 
also had four children, but two were from a previous relationship. The machambas she 
farmed came from neither her family nor his, but were ones she and Henriques had
The exceptions to this were two women whose husbands who had left Mutange in search of work and 
married again. These men generally brought gifts and money when they visited their first wives.
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cleared and occupied. Similarly, the land where the house stood had been purchased 
(by Henriques), and was not family land. She had few trees, and the bananas and 
papaya she grew were sufficient only for family consumption. Although Henriques had 
experimented with ZADP activities, joining the Farmer Field School in 1999, he soon 
dropped out, deciding that the benefits were not worth the time taken. Considered one 
of the richest people in Mutange, with six pigs, he nevertheless did not have a bicycle; 
nor did he regularly eat either fish or meat. He did own a radio, kept at Julia’s house. 
At the end of one conversation he asked us about what he should do with his money, 
because he had been saving, and now had close to MT 1,000,000 (about US$ 50) -  ‘so 
much money that it makes me tremble’, he said. He was concerned not to parade his 
wealth (hence his relatively restricted diet), so as not to attract the scrutiny of the 
envious, who might suspect him of using droga (sorcery) to get rich, or might ensorcell 
him themselves (see Chapter 7 for further discussion).
The life of Arminda Sambique was very different from that of Henriques. An 
elderly woman, once widowed and once divorced, she lived alone in a tiny house in 
Mapiazua, which her son had helped to build. He lived nearby, and her grandchildren 
were in and out all the time. As with Castinha Nemes and Elda José (page 144), 
maintaining good relations with this son was important; widows without adult sons 
were in a very vulnerable position, and were frequently forced to return to their natal 
families (see footnote 151, page 180 for more details). Although Arminda was old, she 
still had her own machamba, where she grew rice and cassava, and a second season 
crop of cowpea and sweet potato. She had no livestock and considered herself too old 
to care for anything other than chickens, of which at the time we interviewed her she 
had none. All had recently died, in one of the periodic epidemics that destroyed flocks. 
She earned a little cash each year by selling early rice -  collecting a small amount prior 
to the main harvest, winnowing it, and selling it in the market by the tin. Otherwise she 
was dependent on her children.
Ricardo Bove, a young married man, was at home with his family when we went 
to see him. It was most unusual to find both husband and wife at home on a working 
day, but he explained that it was because one of his children was ill. Ricardo had a 
troubled family history. His father had died when he was very small (he worked at the 
Quelimane port, and died because of envy: ‘people considered him rich’). During the
146
war Ricardo had lived with an uncle, because his mother had been captured by Renamo, 
with whom she spent many years. After she was freed, she married again, and when she 
moved to Mutange with her new husband, he moved with them. However he did not 
get on at all well with his step-father, and for that reason he married when he was still 
young, and left home. This did not solve his family problems, and about three years 
before we spoke to him he had been forced to leave his good land (on which we met 
him) and move away. Thinking that the problems were over, he later returned, but they 
had recurred. Shortly before we met him his mother had accused him of being a 
murderer who wished to kill his own sister. He thought this was because he had started 
to do well: he bought an oil drum (used for distilling catxaço), which cost him MT 
150,000, and a bicycle. He had earned the money by sawing logs in the bush near 
Nicoadala, and bringing them back to Mutange for sale to carpenters. His wife had 
machambas, but he said that the sale of planks and catxaço was much more profitable. 
However as he sat cuddling his child he wondered about what was happening to his 
family, and whether the child’s illness was connected to family envy: ‘We don’t know 
how to explain the disease. And our income has gone down -  we are frightened of 
progressing now’.
Nunes Alberto, unmarried at 19, did not yet have his own household. Although 
he lived in his own house, he still ate with his mother and younger brothers. He left 
school after fifth grade, and started to work on his own. Although he had his own 
machambas of rice and cassava, he earned most of his money from making catxaço. To 
do this he chopped sugar cane finely, and left it in a big drum. After three or four days 
he would distil it, and take it to Nicoadala on the bicycle he shared with his brother. 
Nunes would take two jerry-cans (plastic flagons originally used for cooking oil), which 
he would hope to sell for MT 60-75,000, in measures (tins, again) costing MT 2,500. 
Although the price for which catxaço was sold in Nicoadala was the same as in 
Mutange, the advantage of going to Nicoadala was speed of sale (he could sell out in an 
hour, meaning he could go and return within a day, without needing to eat), and ease of 
buying goods. He used the money he earned to buy food and clothes, and things to sell 
in Mutange: cigarettes, salt, fuel. His machamba provided most of his food, but he also 
bought cassava and maize flour during the hungry season.
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The cases of these four informants illustrate some of the ways in which people in 
Mutange made a living, and some of the factors promoting economic differentiation. 
None of the four had a regular salary or formal employment, but depended on a 
reasonably diverse range of income sources, many of which were linked to the wider 
economy. While in the past all men had been forced to work for plantations or other 
large companies, during my fieldwork men found it extremely difficult to get paid work 
of any sort. Instead they tended to spend a substantial proportion of their time on non­
farm activities, such as brewing, petty trade, or carpentry. Brewing and petty trade 
required no particular manual skills, but carpentry did, and as the case of Henriques 
Francisco demonstrated, such skills were often passed on preferentially to family 
members. The capital for brewing and petty trade was often derived from the sale of 
rice, but despite this, manual arable agriculture was not seen as a viable way of 
accumulating wealth (see the comments made by a Frelimo leader on page 22). By 
contrast, agriculture was women’s main activity, and they did most of the work on 
family m a c h a m b a s Men would participate in land clearance, and would help with 
activities such as sowing and weeding, but the main responsibility lay with women. 
Much of what was produced was for family consumption, but practically everyone sold 
a little of what they grew, either polished and in small quantities, like Arminda, or 
unpolished by the sack. Options for single women were far more constrained than those 
for single men.
In Mugaveia the situation was somewhat different, although livelihoods had 
undergone much the same process of change as in Mutange, and reliance on agriculture 
as a central income source had steadily increased since Independence. Agriculture in 
Mugaveia was more varied than in Mutange. In the rainy season virtually every 
household would plant maize and sorghum {sorghum bicolor). Those with suitable land 
would plant beans (mostly green beans (phaseolus vulgaris) and highland rice. They 
would also have a cassava machamba, generally intercropped with cowpea. Many grew 
peanuts and squash. Second season crops included more beans (including bambarra 
nuts and pigeon pea), and sweet potato. This range of crops meant that in most years 
Mugaveia was much more food secure than Mutange, and when I started my fieldwork I 
was repeatedly assured by informants that ‘nobody from Mugaveia ever goes hungry’.
Mechanised agriculture (for example the ploughing done by the tractor provided by ORAM to the 
Association of Mutange Villagers) was the sole preserve of men.
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In fact, 2001-2002 was a disastrous agricultural year, with maize production at a small 
fraction of its usual level. Cassava production, the usual mainstay, was hit too, and at 
the start of 2002 there was an unprecedented exodus to Nampula province, where men 
and women did ganho-ganho (casual labour) in return for sacks of dried cassava which 
they brought back to sustain their families.
Informants said that agricultural production in Mugaveia was reasonable, and for 
those with the fertile land appropriate for growing green beans, it could be very 
lucrative. One variety of green beans, that had been introduced to the area by ZADP 
(known as maixa, speckled), sold for over MT 4,000/kilo at the start of the 2001 buying 
season, four times the price of maize. Most of those who had bicycles and radios had 
bought them with the proceeds of their bean machambas. Access to good land for 
beans was critical to success. Not only was such land limited, it was also at a 
considerable distance; at the busiest times of the year, many would choose to sleep up at 
their machamba, rather than walk many kilometres each day. Those with the best land 
had inherited it from family members who had claimed it in the past, which meant that 
those with an agricultor (see page 122) amongst their forebears were advantaged.
Non-agricultural activities were less prevalent in Mugaveia than Mutange, despite 
experience gained working for the tea companies. A lack of wood seriously limited 
options for men with carpentry skills, while the prevalence of cheap second-hand 
clothes meant that there was no market for hand-made clothes. There was relatively 
little petty trade: although many young men sold salt and cigarettes from their homes, 
there was no daily market. Catxaço distillation was not prevalent (sugar cane was less 
widely grown), and alcohol was produced solely for a local market. However quite a 
number of men undertook small-scale trading of eggs and chickens to Gurué; an egg 
purchased for MT 500 in Mugaveia would sell for MT 1,500 in Gurué. Likewise 
longer-term and longer-distance ganho-ganho migration was fairly commonplace 
amongst younger men.
Agricultural work was divided more equally between men and women in 
Mugaveia than in Mutange. Most men would spend a substantial portion of each day 
working on their machambas alongside their wives. However they and not their wives 
would be responsible for selling the produce, and they tended to take responsibility for 
more valuable crops like beans and peanuts. Produce was usually sold in Mugaveia,
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either to visiting traders (of whom there were several in 2001, competing for the scarce 
harvest), or to young men from the area who had acquired enough capital to trade.
The trading undertaken by members of our host family in Mugaveia was on a 
larger scale, and did not take place within Mugaveia. Tio Daniel, former shopkeeper 
and car owner, had in the past bought produce at his shop, and sold it in Gurué or 
Nauela. However by the time I knew him he had given up: in 1999 a local bridge had 
collapsed, and several tonnes of maize he had bought had subsequently spoiled owing to 
damp. In 2000, a trader had used his shop as a buying post, but had failed to return to 
collect the maize he purchased, which remained stored in the old shop.^^^ However his 
youngest daughter’s husband continued to make his living from trade. Lita Namuteca 
lived in a small house about twenty yards from the old shop where we stayed. Her 
husband, a trader from Nauela, where Lita had been at school, visited between his 
trading trips, which would take him as far as Xai-Xai, in Gaza Province, Southern 
Mozambique. On one trip in March 2001, he bought 1000 kg of green beans from 
Carmona, a large Sunday market near Nauela at MT 5,000 /kg. He then paid MT 1.5 
million for transport to Nampula, where he sold the beans on for MT 8,000 /kg.^^^
Trade on this scale and to this distance was extremely unusual in Mugaveia. It 
was significant that Lita’s husband was from Nauela, an important regional trading 
centre, and had been trading since childhood. Much more common was the attempt by 
Beto, another son-in-law, to make money on a smaller scale, by selling mats. In April 
2001, using money from the wages we paid him for cooking for us, Beto bought 
seventeen mats in Mugaveia at MT 10,000 each, which he intended to sell in his natal 
town of Molumbo (Milange District) for MT 25,000 apiece. Out of a gross profit of 
MT 255,000 he needed to pay for transport, and to find a way of getting the mats from 
his house to the main road. It appeared that he had counted on his connection with us to 
transport the mats to Gurué town, but owing to some probably mistaken moral qualms, I 
ruled this out. Unwilling to eat into his potential profit, Beto waited until he was able to 
get a lift for his mats as far as Gurué, with the trader who returned to collect the maize.
Maize prices in 2000 were extremely low, and it was apparently not worth the trader’s while to return. 
However in August 2001, long after Tio Daniel had stopped expecting him to return, but after steep 
shortage-induced price rises, he did come to collect his maize.
In April 2002, this man suffered a catastrophic loss when his brother stole his entire working capital, 
and fled with it to Maputo. To make matters worse, Tio Daniel had also invested in the business. Such 
losses are fairly common, according to Bowen (2000b).
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Beto himself followed in October. Assuming his other transport calculations were 
correct, and that he sold the mats at the price he hoped, he made around MT 165,000 
over four months.
Raul Muanavola was a little older than Beto, and was one of the better-off men in 
Mugaveia. Bom in Intuba in 1963, he studied up to fourth grade, living with his brother 
who worked on one of the tea estates. When the time came for him to start work, he 
apprenticed himself to a tailor working for Tio Daniel, as he thought that the work on 
the tea estates was hard. He later became one of Tio Daniel’s five employees. During 
the war years he moved to Gurué town, where he was able to set up a small business, 
using money accumulated from tailoring. He lived there, selling second-hand clothes 
and capulanas (sarongs) in the general market, until 2000, when he returned to 
Mugaveia at the urgent request of friends, who wished him to work in the area: ‘we 
need people like you to help develop the area’. In Mugaveia he continued with his 
second-hand clothes business, but also set up a carpentry and started to farm. His 
carpentry workshop was larger than most, but was plagued by the same problem: a lack 
of wood. It had to be carried from Vehuia (a neighbouring localidade), which was 
costly. He sold the furniture he made in Gurué and Nauela. His farming was successful, 
and in 2001-2002 he had sizeable machambas of rice, beans, pineapple, maize and 
cassava, worked not only by him and his wife, but also by several ganho-ganho 
labourers (paid from profits from clothes and carpentry). Raul also kept goats, which he 
had bought from someone who had received them from ZADP. Like most of the better- 
off, he was not involved in ZADP activities -  I have my own projects’, he said.
Juliao Mauinto and Maria Naquele were a married couple; Juliao, at 45, was old 
enough to have worked on the tea plantations before Independence, first as a domestic 
servant and then, after Independence, on the plantations. At that time Maria stayed in 
Intuba and worked on her machambas -  smaller machambas than today, because her 
husband was not there to help. Juliao worked on the tea plantations until the war started, 
and they fled. They spent the war years in the bush with Renamo. After their return to 
Mugaveia, they both devoted themselves to farming: ‘nowadays the machamba is big, 
and we sell crops to buy clothes’. In addition Juliao mended shoes. This was profitable, 
but was seasonal, because people did not get their shoes mended when they are short of 
money.
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Timitôrio Sergio was one of the young men who had tried leaving the localidade 
in search of work. In 2001 he walked to Malema (in Nampula province) and then 
caught the train to Cuamba (Niassa). He went with a group of friends, because his 
family was very short of material goods at home. They went from house to house 
looking for work. It was not difficult to find piece-work on maize or cotton machambas, 
or building ridges in machambas. At the end of six months he was able to buy a bicycle. 
All the time he was away he could send nothing to his family, because there was no one 
he could trust to take it. When he eventually returned to Mugaveia he brought plates 
and clothes, as well as the bicycle. But when the time came to go back, he chose not to 
go. He said that the family had suffered a lot as a result of him not working on the 
family machamba, and so intended to finish preparing the machambas and would then 
consider what to do next. That year they were planting particularly large machambas, 
having chosen to kill a pig, which they then shared with those who worked with 
them.^^*
Amelia Nalalaca was an elderly woman living alone, on the hillside below our 
house. Her first husband had died, and she had married again, becoming the second 
wife of a man who worked as a cashier for one of the tea companies. They separated in 
2000, at her instigation: her church said that polygamy was wrong, and she wanted to be 
sound {so) when she died. She never had children, and so lived alone. Her house was 
built when she was still married, using money her husband sent. Though it was still 
fairly solid, she was concerned about how she would maintain it, as she had no one to 
turn to: ‘When a woman gets old, they are said to be a witch (feiticeira), and nobody 
will come or let their child come near me, they think I will eat them.’ In the past she 
had ‘borrowed’ children to help her, but that was no longer possible.
These examples show that people in Mugaveia were managing to ‘get by’ through 
a variety of activities and strategies. Yet I still heard constant complaints about how 
difficult life was, and how much men wanted full-time work. A very small number had 
managed to obtain such work, often through family connections. Timitorio Sergio 
commented wryly that ‘if you don’t have a chicken to take to work, you’ll lose your 
job’, a point of view shared by many. Yet in a good agricultural year, people in 
Mugaveia were able to produce an abundance of crops, with substantial surpluses for
The pig had come from his wife’s aunt; they borrowed two animals, and when they reproduced were 
allowed to keep some of the offspring.
152
sale. For the men who used energies once devoted to plantation labour to grow valuable 
food crops (mostly beans and peanuts), a high priority was the reestablishment of a 
reliable marketing network, which would prevent them starting the new agricultural 
year with produce lying unsold and uneaten in their granaries. In the absence of 
formal employment, they at least wanted to be able to market their crops.
As this section has shown, in both localidades economic shifts connected with 
Independence and the war had led to substantial changes in livelihood patterns as formal 
work became hard to find. Whilst those who would once have had formal employment 
on the plantations were increasingly seeking work in the informal sector, families 
continued to maintain diversified strategies. All but the most elderly sold a portion of 
their crop, even if that meant they later had to buy food. Connections between rural and 
urban areas, although different from colonial days, were still very evident. There was 
also significant stratification, with some families managing to accumulate even in the 
difficult 2001-2002 agricultural year. Differentiation between households existed, 
although it was often carefully concealed for fear of destructive envy, as explained by 
Ricardo Bove and Henriques Francisco, and explored further in Chapter 7.
Connections and access proved to be important drivers of differentiation. This 
meant that some people were able to get lifts in government or project vehicles, were 
able to get their fields ploughed by the ORAM tractor (in Mutange), or had family 
connections that would allow them to travel cheaply. Ability to access resources was 
not necessarily connected to wealth; Castinha Nemes and Elda José (mentioned on page 
144) had very few possessions and little strength to work, but were able to draw on 
Castinha’s son’s support. In Mutange, access to inherited land provided some 
households with valuable tree crops, whilst in Mugaveia access to fertile land 
appropriate for growing beans was important. Connections also affected people’s 
ability to manage misfortune, as in the case of Odete Lemeia, who, as I discussed on 
page 144, married again very shortly after her divorce. As the daughter of a middle- 
ranking Frelimo leader, she was able to marry again quickly. Likewise, although 
Newcastle disease would strike chicken flocks at random, some were quickly able to 
start rebuilding their flocks with the help of friends and relatives (generally through
During the year of my fieldwork, the agricultural year 2000-2001, there was such scarcity that there 
were unprecedented levels of theft from granaries.
153
loans, as in the case of Timitorio Sergio), whilst for others recovery was a much more 
lengthy process.
4.4 Approaches to Rural Development and Poverty in ZADP
In the last two sections I looked in some detail at changing patterns of rural 
livelihoods in Zambézia from the colonial period to the present day, emphasising their 
continuing and ever-changing diversity. As I argued at the start of Chapter 3, the 
designers of ZADP took little notice of this diversity, largely ignoring historical patterns 
of rural Zambézian livelihoods. They demonstrated little awareness of the long­
standing factors affecting Zambézian livelihoods. The enormous upheavals of war, 
famine, slavery and forced labour that coloured nineteenth and twentieth century 
Zambézian history and created the diverse livelihoods characteristic of the province 
were not mentioned, whilst the impact of the war of the 1980s was exaggerated. I now 
build on my discussion of changing livelihoods to look at some of the problems with the 
ways in which Zambézia was imagined by the designers of ZADP. In particular I focus 
on the question of what rural poverty was, and how different commentators thought it 
might be combated.
First, it was assumed that ‘subsistence agriculture’ was the natural and historic 
pattern for the province. ‘Subsistence agriculture’ has two distinct meanings: 
production for own consumption, and making a bare living (Barker 1989: 61). The 
Project Memorandum did not specify which definition it intended. Although self- 
sufficiency agriculture was indeed conunon amongst the rural population at the time of 
project design, it was a ‘recent and unstable phenomenon’ (Marzetti 2001: 20). Project 
designers, apparently unaware of this instability, ignored the complex historical patterns 
of interaction and intermingling of family production and wage labour, of production 
for consumption and production for the market, and stated that ZADP should facilitate 
and promote an allegedly novel process of diversifying incomes away from 
‘subsistence’ agriculture:
‘The Project will diversify small-bolder food and income sources’ (DFID 1998b: 1).
‘Phase II will build on these successes [of ZADP (I)] enabling the majority of 
farmers, who are currently dependent on subsistence agriculture, to move into the 
wider economy by improving household food security, increasing incomes and 
helping households accumulate assets which can be sold during lean times’ (5:1, 5).
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The design of ZADP implied that such diversification was unprecedented. But as 
I have shown, income diversification had deep roots in Zambézia, where for many years 
most families had depended on a combination of family farming and wage labour. 
During the 1940s and 1950s, over 85 percent of available Zambézian men worked on 
the plantations (Hanlon 1984: 19). A minimum of six months of annual waged 
employment was compulsory for all non-Portuguese and non-assimilados^^^^ and taxes 
had also to be paid. Not paying attention to historical patterns of livelihoods meant that 
ZADP was designed with the intention of fostering a process that was already decades 
old, amongst people whose way of life had already been transformed by the colonial 
plantation economy, a brief period of socialist planning, and war. As Sogge put it, 
(1997: 46) ‘“Tradition” is a highly relative matter where social upheaval and attempts at 
social engineering have been the order of the day for decades’.
Second, although some inequalities were recognised, project designers assumed 
that Zambézian rural society was largely undifferentiated. As a result, they connected 
poverty solely to household lifecycles. Although it was observed that ‘the family or 
small-holder sector is not homogeneous but diverse’ (DFID 1998b, Annex 1: 2), the 
only differences identified related to gender and wealth. Other factors, such as 
education, background or family, were not considered. Households were classified into 
more or less poor, and male- and female-headed. An apolitical analysis of poverty was 
developed through Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) work, which fed into project 
design (ZADP 1997). It focused on wealth and activities, and not the relationships that 
allowed for the production and reproduction of wealth. According to this analysis, 
widows and female-headed households were the poorest of the poor (defined as the 
bottom 25 per cent); they were labour-poor, and therefore cultivated small plots of less 
fertile land. They were able to do fewer off-farm activities, as they lacked both labour 
and cash. They therefore suffered a long hungry season, owing to low production, and 
were forced to sell their labour in order to feed themselves. This in turn reduced the 
labour left for agriculture, trapping them in a cycle of low production (DFID 1998b, 
Annex 2: 9). This representation of poverty assumed a relatively undifferentiated 
society and that being ‘poor’ was connected to life-cycle events. As poverty and 
vulnerability were associated with the ability to mobilise labour and cultivate land, the 
age and gender of the household head were of central importance. It was implied that.
Assimilados, the assimilated, were considered ‘civilised’ and granted different legal status.
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although richer and poorer people might exist side by side in rural society, no intrinsic 
relations of power or exploitation connected them (Duffield 1998). Even gender -  
though visible -  was detached from its social and political context.
ZADP interventions were designed to take account of this imagined context, 
where ‘subsistence’ agriculture was the norm, and society undifferentiated. They also 
reflected the sectoral divisions in DFID discussed in Chapter 2 (page 87). A close 
reading of the Project Memorandum shows that ZADP had twin aims: to promote 
simple economic growth, and to alleviate the position of the very poorest (defined by 
the project). These aims were potentially contradictory, and reflected the context of 
design. ZADP was the successor to ZADP (I), a rehabilitation project planned and 
implemented in the middle 1990s, and later criticised for ‘lacking a social dimension’ 
and failing to counter the propensity of liberal reform to promote economic 
differentiation (Duffield 1998: 11).^^  ^ ZADP aimed to do more than simply improve 
livelihoods and increase incomes, because wealth differentials were defined as 
problematic. Differentiation was not to be encouraged: ‘the project should ensure that 
all disadvantaged groups benefit and that a widening of social and economic 
differentiation and increase in food insecurity is avoided’ (DFID 1998b, Annex 1: 2). 
Concerns about the poorest of the poor and the dangers of differentiation were 
expressed by then-influential Social Development Advisers. The continued focus on 
income generation, cash crops and economic diversification was in line with the 
analysis of the Renewable Natural Resources Department, and the Economics 
Department. The suggestion that project-led economic or social differentiation was 
unacceptable led to conceptual and practical troubles for a project designed to support 
income diversification and income generation.
However, for ZADP to operate, a path had to be negotiated through these implicit 
contradictions. This was done by adopting a number of -  again conflicting -  models of 
poverty reduction. The approach to poverty reduction taken was determined by the 
analysis of poverty upon which it was premised; as that analysis was somewhat 
confused, approaches to poverty reduction were likewise compromised. Two different
PRA is discussed further in Chapter 5.
Although framed in terms of poverty reduction, ZADP (I) did not initially have the institutional and 
social dimensions that became dominant in the design of ZADP (Winch, Diogo, and Pijnenburg 1996).
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approaches can be discerned both in the Project Memorandum, and in subsequent 
activities.
First, it was suggested that the ‘poorest’ should be targeted directly. This was to 
be done mainly by a focus on women, and by establishing targets for women’s 
participation in activities:
‘Restricting credit to small amounts and for short periods will be less attractive to 
wealthier farmers who want credit to finance longer term projects... As the poorest 
of the poor as defined by the wealth ranking exercises are women, targeting women 
is also likely to target the poorest of the poor. Thus the aim of the credit programme 
is for membership of 70% of village banks to be composed only of women.
Similarly half the FRG’^^  members must be women. Tree seedlings and cashew nut 
improvement is likely to be more attractive to female headed households as they are 
more dependent on these crops for food, firewood and cash than wealthier farmers. 
Establishing trading and crop processing centres in villages will be of particular 
value to single women as they will both have a market for the small quantities they 
produce and be able to save labour by having their crops processed mechanically.’
(DFID 1998b: Annex 2).
The argument that targeting women would automatically target the poorest was repeated 
at regular intervals through the Project Memorandum. ‘The project specifically targets 
the poorest 25% of the population, many of whom are widows’ (5); ‘To ensure poorer 
farmers are targeted by the programme, the groups will be divided into subgroups for 
men and women’ (Annex 2); ‘The ‘repaid’ goats will be specifically targeted at widows 
and poorer families’ (Annex 2).
The desire to work directly with the very poorest was put into action in the early 
years of the project. Goats were provided to widows, elderly women, and other female 
heads of household. But there were immediate problems. Goats were not easily 
managed by the labour-poor. They were vulnerable to neglect, and an extremely high 
death rate among animals provided to widows meant that activities soon had to be 
rethought. Moreover, providing valuable inputs like goats solely to the poorest groups 
proved socially divisive. As early as November 1999 a DFID review report remarked 
that ‘it should not be assumed that targeting project outputs (e.g. goats) directly at the 
poorest is necessarily the best way to reach them’ (Draft of DFID 1999b).
This marked a move away from the direct targeting of the ‘poorest of the poor’, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, to a more abstract concern with ‘poverty’. The same report 
remarked that
Farmer Research Group.
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‘It was generally agreed that there was a mismatch between the project outputs, 
which mostly relate to improvements in agricultural productivity, and the project 
target group of the 'poorest of the poor'. The project team felt that most project 
outputs by their nature could not be expected to reach the very poorest individuals, 
who are the elderly and disabled -  often barely economically active and depending 
on social safety nets -  and that there is little scope for major changes in the nature of 
project outputs at this stage’ (DFID 1999b).
The mismatch between the nature of the activities being undertaken and the abilities and
capacities of the intended target group was recognised. The activities undertaken were
not immediately accessible to the labour-poor. Nor was it easy to square the circle of
promoting financial sustainability whilst simultaneously targeting inputs on a group
with extremely restricted access to cash:
‘The design of the project makes it difficult to focus on the stated target group; most 
agricultural interventions are aimed at the majority of poor but economically active 
peasants rather than the ‘poorest 25%’. There are tensions between objectives of 
financial sustainability and reaching the poorest (for example, cost-recovery pricing 
for tree seedlings produced in project nurseries)’ (DFID 1999b).
A serious clash between the overall goal of ZADP, which was ‘to increase household 
food security for the poorest groups in Zambézia’, and the simultaneous identification 
of ZADP as an agricultural development project was recognised in a draft report:
‘The successful implementation of most of its component production and marketing 
activities would be undermined if they were specifically targeted at the vulnerable 
poorest 25% of the households’ (draft of DFID 1999b).
This fundamental contradiction meant that ‘the log frame provides a major problem in 
determining an effective project strategy or guide to implementation’(draft of DFID 
1999b).
At this stage, the project was informally refocused around the generally poor (the 
‘economically active poor’ in project parlance). However the move away from the 
‘poorest of the poor’ was never formalised, nor was it completely agreed. Reviews 
continued to assert that ‘it is important for the project to demonstrate how more 
disadvantaged groups, such as households headed by women, are able to benefit from 
project activities and whether the project is narrowing or widening inequalities at 
community level’ (DFID 2000c); and ‘despite attempts to target the poor they remain 
under-represented in extension activities and wealthier farmers continue to capture the 
benefits of group working’ (DFID 2001). The move away from working with the 
poorest of the poor was to some extent a pragmatic one, and the ideological concern for 
the poorest remained.
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The second approach taken to poverty reduction was trickle-down. It was argued 
that the poor would work on the land of the better-off, who would require greater 
supplies of waged labour as they expanded their cropping area and productivity rose due 
to project interventions (DFID 1998b: 6). The move away from the direct targeting of 
the poorest towards a focus on the slightly better-off also assumed a trickle-down effect. 
However this was never directly investigated, despite the concerns of reviewers:
‘the unspoken assumptions of 'trickle-down' which underlie many project 
components also need examining. If the immediate beneficiary of a goat is a 
wealthy male, how likely is it that the offspring will eventually reach the poor, and 
through what mechanisms?’ (DFID 1999b)
Running alongside these two parallel approaches was a third assumption. This 
was that, although the Mozambican state was weak, owing to a lack of resources, it 
nevertheless ultimately retained responsibility for service delivery in the area of 
agriculture (DFID 1998b: 10). The exact limits of state responsibility for agricultural 
service delivery were under negotiation throughout the life of the project, but the basic 
assumption did not change. Indeed, it was strengthened, as the development of the 
centrally-designed PARPA (the Mozambique Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan, PRSP), 
and the move to SWAps and Direct Budget Support by donors demonstrated. The 
desire to engender government ‘ownership’ of project activities to ensure their 
‘sustainability’ is another example of this.
4.5 Conclusion
I started this chapter with a discussion of the ways in which Mozambique has 
been simultaneously constructed as a desperately poor country, and a highly promising 
one, and what the implications of such a construction might be. Building on the insights 
of the last chapter, I showed that one of the functions of descriptions of the kind quoted 
at the outset was to dispose of history, rendering irrelevant any earlier periods of 
economic growth or ‘development’, however defined. I went on to argue that this was 
deeply unsatisfactory. Not only were there debates about the meaning of ‘development’ 
from as early as the end of the nineteenth century, but the economic policies followed 
by the various Portuguese colonial governments also had profound effects on the lives 
of rural Zambezians.
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That Portuguese economic policies had an effect on rural livelihoods is 
indisputable; but can such policies in any way be described as ‘development’? And 
what are the connections between this earlier period of capitalist growth, industry and 
waged employment, and contemporary rural development projects, designed to alleviate 
poverty? These questions have been much debated. Rapley (1996) has shown, for 
example, that economic theories on ‘development’ tend to deal with exactly these 
subjects -  capitalist growth, industrialisation, employment -  while conversely many 
‘rural development projects’ do not address these issues at all. But in Zambézia, as 
Ferguson also found in Lesotho (1990), the connection between the later rural 
development projects and earlier Portuguese economic policies is a direct and often 
personal one: the same group of individuals has been affected by all the different 
policies and schemes I have described here -  the plantation economy, socialist 
cooperatives, and now projects like ZADP. In addition, both rural livelihoods today and 
people’s expectations about what livelihoods should be, are shaped by previous 
experience. The lack of acknowledgement of that previous experience, and the failure 
to set the current situation in a broader contextual understanding of changing patterns of 
livelihood, are at the root of the weaknesses in the dualistic models described. Yet, 
although weak, dualistic descriptions have had long currency, and constant repetition 
adds to their strength.
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Chapter 5. Ascribing ‘Community’
Over thirty years ago Hirschman observed that development ‘depend[s] upon a set 
of more or less naïve, unproven and simplifying assumptions’ (Hirschman (1967) 
quoted in Watts (2001: 287)). I look here at the implications of one such assumption in 
the context of ZADP: that ‘communities’ exist and can be worked with. I show that 
even when their daily experience revealed that there were no simple ‘communities’ 
Zambézia, ZADP staff continued to deploy the concept. This happened because the 
rhetoric of ‘community’ was intimately tied up with discourses of ‘participation’ and 
‘sustainability’. It was possible because ‘community’ is an imprecise term, and its 
fuzziness ensured its continued usefulness. I furthermore argue that the definition of 
‘community’ espoused by ZADP with the encouragement of its donor was one that 
delineated and determined the project’s ‘failure’. Given the destruction which designers 
believed the war had wrought (see page 101), it was their aspiration that ZADP should 
bring ‘community’ into being again. ZADP later accepted responsibility for its ‘failure’ 
to do so. Part of the purpose of the chapter is thus to argue that the project set itself an 
illusory and hence impossible task.
This chapter, in common with the past two, takes the Project Memorandum as its 
starting point. In Chapter 3 I looked at how a selective understanding of history led to 
an untenable emphasis on the war as a source of change, and to a weak grasp of the 
complex ways in which external interveners were perceived. In Chapter 4 I then 
broadened a discussion of project understandings of livelihoods and poverty to look at 
how discourses of novelty and innovation again allowed the past to be ignored. Here I 
move closer to project implementation, to look at how the ideological construct of 
‘community’, and other supporting principles, affected the project’s operation. I argue 
that the particular set of definitions of ‘community’ adopted by ZADP led to two 
significant implementational outcomes. The first was the unintended and largely 
unnoticed exclusion of a significant number of potential participants: those who 
associated themselves with Renamo. The second was that the problems with the 2ADP 
definition of ‘community’ in the end undermined the possibilities for both ‘community 
participation’ and institutional ‘sustainability’, themselves key project priorities.
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I look first at the variety of references ‘community’ had when used by ZADP staff 
and reviewers. It was used to refer to people residing in a specific place; to cohesive 
social values, and to new forms of mutual organisation. In each case there were 
inconsistencies in definition, and the picture was complicated. Although I then turn to 
look at certain features of social life in Mugaveia and Mutange in some detail, this 
chapter is less about self-perception of a ‘community’ -  ‘communities’ as ‘worlds of 
meaning in the minds of their members’ (Cohen 1985: 20) -  than about the implications 
of attributing ‘community’ to others. I am writing about ‘community’ as imposed from 
outside by ZADP. That this should have happened is not unusual; as Nelson points out 
‘community is a concept often used by state and other organisations, rather than the 
people themselves, and it carries connotations of consensus and “needs” determined 
within parameters set by outsiders’ (1995: 15). Although this outsider-determined 
aspect is not widely acknowledged, the ascription of community is nevertheless 
commonplace.
Defined, thus, by outsiders, ‘community’ turned out to be, to use the Comaroffs’ 
phrasing, ‘...known primarily by its absence, its elusiveness, its incompleteness, from 
the traces left by struggles conducted in its name. More aspiration than achievement, it 
retreats before the scrutinizing gaze’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 330). In fact the 
Comaroffs were here writing not about ‘community’, but about ‘civil society’; the point 
is however equally valid for both concepts. ‘Civil society’ and ‘social capital’ might 
well have been used in the same way as ‘community’ in ZADP -  both were fashionable 
phrases and concepts in Mozambique during my fieldwork -  but the rhetoric of 
‘community’ as an even more malleable and polysémie concept was never displaced.
5.1 Unpicking Abstractions: Referents of ‘Community’ in ZADP
‘Community has never been a word of lexical precision’ wrote Cohen (2002: 165), 
and, as is the case for all similar terms in social science, a simple and satisfactory 
definition has indeed been impossible to agree. For decades scholars have pointed to 
the inherent difficulties of definition (Hillery 1955, Stacey 1969: 134, Guijt and Shah 
1998b), and for a time futile attempts at such definition consigned the field of 
conununity studies to ‘an abyss of theoretical sterility’ (Cohen 1985: 38). The term has 
been used to refer both to the thick social relations between individuals living in 
geographical proximity (Amit 2002b:4), as well as to Anderson’s (1983/1991)
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‘imagined’ or ‘affective’ relationships, decoupled from geographical location. Many 
authors have now decided there is little mileage in scholarly definition (see 
contributions to Amit 2002a), and have turned their attention instead to descriptions of 
the word’s everyday use (Cohen 2002: 165).
For in popular discourse the term has persisted, a ‘warmly persuasive word’ 
(Williams 1976: 66), which ‘evokes images of meeting people’s real needs and 
widespread participation at the grassroots level, thus creating a normative sense of “a 
good thing’” (Guijt and Shah 1998b: 7-8). Its resilience to critique should not surprise 
us: its very ambiguity ensures survival. Terms like ‘conununity’ ‘persist in usage 
because they evoke a thick assortment of meanings, presumptions and images... 
Invocations of community thus pivot on a constant tension between impulses towards or 
experiences of sociality and platitudes of classificatory fellowship’ (Amit and Rapport 
2002: 14).
In the context of ZADP design, ‘conununities’ were mentioned in the first three 
paragraphs of the Project Memorandum, in conjunction with each project component:
1.1 ...The Project will diversify small-holder food and income sources and develop 
community based organisations which will eventually be capable of initiating and 
managing their own development programmes.
1.2 ...The project will assist communities in all three districts to assert their legal 
rights over land they have traditionally used, now threatened by applications for 
concessions by large scale interests.
1.3 The project will assist communities to move away from subsistence 
agriculture, and diversify their income sources by initiating savings and credit...
(DFID 1998b: 1, my italics)
The term continued to be liberally and loosely used through DFID review reports, 
emphasising the continued importance the donor attributed to the term.
‘Conununity’ was invoked by ZADP staff in a number of different ways. By the 
time I worked out that the word was most frequently used in an affirmative 
motherhood-and-apple-pie sense, I found that I too had adopted the sloppy usage and 
un-thought-through assumptions that went along with it. I heard myself talking about 
‘my work with communities’, caught myself failing to ask what people meant when 
they said that a new activity had been ‘prioritised by the community’. Like my 
colleagues I found the word to be a useful cover-all, with what I now realise to be
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considerable power given by its comfortable ambiguity. In everyday usage it had three 
main references.
First and most commonly, it referred to a place, either a localidade (population 
4,000-15,000), a célula (population 800-4,000), or some smaller division of a célula. 
‘O nosso trabalho com a comunidade' meant no more than ‘our work in the village’, 
and comunidade was the usual Portuguese translation of ‘village’. B y  extension, it 
also referred to the population of the célulaAocalidade. It was assumed that there was 
one and only one identifiable ‘community’ in any given location, and that social, 
administrative and resource boundaries were coterminous (cf. Cleaver 2001: 44). This 
recalls the error made by Frelimo policy-makers in the 1970s, who assumed that the 
peasantry was homogenous and independent, when in fact it was characterised by 
fractures and segmentation (Wuyts (2001); see also page 140).
Second, ‘community’ implied internal cohesiveness, shared interests and 
homogeneity. Ideas about representation and leadership drew on this assumption of 
cohesion. Designers of ZADP took for granted that through the mediation of legitimate 
‘community leaders’, ‘communities’ would be able to organise themselves, pay for the 
services of Community Extension Workers (later facilitators, see page 191), and work 
in groups (DFID 1998b). Técnicos would frequently say that a particular person had 
been ‘chosen by the community’ for a job. The implication was that ‘the community’ 
was a unified body capable of decision-making, and at times even of thought (Douglas 
1986).
The implications of this homogenising vision can be seen most clearly in the PRA 
activities carried out before ZADP started, briefly described in section 4.4. In 1997, a 
series of four to five day PRA exercises were carried out in a number of ZADP 
localidades by a mixed team of senior staff, técnicos, and government workers. 
Designed and implemented with a great deal of dedication, the exercises included 
historical timelines, mapping, Venn diagramming (of significant institutions), household 
budgeting, seasonal calendars, food calendars, gender division of tasks, daily timetables, 
pie charts of income sources, prioritisation of ‘general’ problems (transport, hospitals.
Village translates as aldeia; however in Zambézia this word was only used to refer to aldeias 
comunais, communal villages.
The World Vision country director once described to me a process (not connected with ZADP) that 
she said ‘makes the community think, and make decisions, and prioritise’. See also page 90.
164
unemployment etc.), prioritisation of agricultural problems, and the development of 
possible solutions to agricultural problems. An immense amount of data was collected, 
although only a small proportion was analysed in the report produced (ZADP 1997).
Figure 5.1 Participatory Im pact Assessment, 2001
É
Women ‘prioritising needs’, many o f which ZADP was 
unable to satisfy.
As many before me have observed, participatory approaches rely on a notion of 
‘community’ (e.g. Crewe and Harrison (1998); Guijt and Shah (1998a), Cooke and 
Kothari (2001). PRA, used extensively during the ZADP design process, naïvely 
privileges the collective or ‘community’ level, allowing insufficient attention to be paid 
to social differentiation or class, and inappropriately imbuing ‘communities’ with 
agency (Francis 2001: 79). PRA techniques are biased towards seeing ‘communities’ 
as consensual and harmonious’ (Mohan 2001: 159). Green goes further, pointing out 
that ‘as collective agency is critical to community development, participatory
165
interventions are primarily concerned with the construction of the right sort of 
knowledge as a precondition of its achievement ’ (2000: 71).
As I discussed in the last chapter, project designers assumed that Zambézian rural 
society was economically undifferentiated. Although definitions of wealth groups were 
elicited in the PRAs, no sustained consideration was given to why certain people were 
poor and others rich. There was no analysis of who participated in the PRA exercises, 
and it was supposed that those present spoke for the entire community. It was also 
assumed that the group present would suggest and prioritise activities that were suitable 
for the poorest twenty five percent of this otherwise undifferentiated ‘community’. 
(Singular) ‘community’ maps were produced, and prioritisation of needs and problems 
was done by gender-divided groups. The assumption of homogeneity made in these 
PRAs was deeply instilled into project staff. When I asked the Project Anthropologist, 
himself a Zambézian, to whom he was referring when he wrote about ‘community- 
prioritised bridges’, his answer focused on sameness and shared interests:
‘It was all the community because our PRAs were developed openly... There were 
women, men and youth... If I look at tables made during PRAs in 1997 and 1998, 
there are many needs presented by conununities, not by one person in the 
community, but by the community. I was there and I witnessed it.’ (E-mail,
28.11.02)
PRA smoothed over conflicts and political difference. Some social and wealth 
stratification was acknowledged by ZADP, but an underlying commonality of interest 
was still assumed (Li 1996), and processes of enrichment and impoverishment were not 
considered. Although the lived experience of técnicos showed them that the 
relationships between rich and poor were not power-free, and that ‘communities’ were 
constituted on the basis of divisions as much if not more than of consensual harmony 
(Nuijten 1992), this understanding was not reflected in ‘participatory’ work.
A third way in which ‘community’ was used was in connection with eroded social 
norms, and their replacement with ‘new’ NGO-mediated social forms. Whilst the 
existence of ‘community’ was affirmed and indeed taken for granted in the planning and 
implementation of numerous project activities, project design was nevertheless based on 
the belief that ‘community’ had been drastically eroded and weakened during the war 
years. The Project Memorandum was explicit: the war was blamed for the destruction
166
of ‘most of the previous community structures’, ‘communities that lack cohesion and, to 
some extent, trust’, and changes in the ‘customary systems of the various matrilineal 
and patrilineal groups’ (DFID 1998b, Annex 1:1, 11, 3). The 2001 DFID review report 
commented that ‘it is perhaps too soon to expect attributable impact given the difficult 
environment in which the project operates and where community cohesion is still fragile 
and community awareness weak’ (DFID 2001), and in 2002 the World Vision country 
director echoed these sentiments:
‘[when the project began] there was no social cohesion... Those people were 
displaced, many if not all of them. They were either returning from the capital city 
or from another country, and that had enormous impacts on the social structure, and 
the lack of trust.’
Following on from this, ‘community’ was used to describe the institutions that the 
designers of ZADP hoped would fill the void believed to have been created by wartime 
dislocation. It was intended that the space left by the destruction of ‘community’ would 
be filled by organisations such as ‘community-run development committees’, which 
would in an egalitarian manner appropriate increased levels of collective production and 
testify to growing ‘social cohesion’. This was important; as a reviewer of DFID policy 
in Mozambique wrote, ‘in relation to the social dimension, a measure of a project’s 
success is how far it strengthens and contributes to the re-emergence of social cohesion. 
This is especially the case with regard to new forms of collective organisation and 
reciprocity’ (Duffield 1998: 28). For a brief period (at the time of the Mid-Term 
Review described in Chapter 2) this was referred to as ‘building social capital’ (Bias et 
al. 2001, DFID 2001), but in the context of ZADP the new vocabulary was not adopted.
ZADP staff thus used the term ‘community’ to refer to three distinct things: 
geographical area; cohesive social relations; and what was perceived as the replacement 
of ‘traditional’ institutions and ties with new, more meaningful and less hidebound ones. 
These were of course not interchangeable meanings; rather they delineated the edges of 
a field labelled ‘community’ by the project, and provided a way of discussing -  and 
sometimes of avoiding discussion of -  these themes.
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5.2 Seeking ‘Community’ in Mutange and Mugaveia
I now consider what the three referents of ‘community’, as used by ZADP staff, 
meant in my field sites. It will come as no surprise that understandings of place, forms 
of leadership, sociability and mutual behaviour bore little resemblance to those the last 
section showed that ZADP designers assumed existed. As Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
have already demonstrated, the history of Zambézia in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries involved displacement, violence and labour expropriation. Independence 
brought positive changes to very few of those who lived in Mutange and Mugaveia, 
with only a handful of people benefiting from the imposition of aldeias comunais and 
agricultural cooperatives. The fighting between Renamo and Frelimo forces, which led 
to the abandonment of both localidades for many years during the war, fed on ethnic, 
regional and local discontent. Though the war had been over for a decade by the start of 
my fieldwork, the sources of conflict had not vanished.
After I had been working in the villages for some time, I came to realise that the 
word ‘community’, comunidade, was seldom used unless I prompted it. The words 
more commonly used to group people were povo (populace) or populaçâo (population). 
Povo was the term used by the older generation of Frelimo supporters: a word which 
had strong currency during Frelimo’s socialist period. Populaçâo was a more neutral 
term used by everyone to refer, in the most general manner, to the people living around 
and about. Comunidade was seldom used, with two exceptions. First, it referred to the 
congregation of a church, particularly when they got together to do something. The 
widow living below us in Mugaveia had her roof repaired by ‘a comunidade da Igreja 
Uniao Baptista' (the Baptist Union congregation), and ‘a comunidade catolica' 
(Catholic congregation) cleared the roads of overgrowth when the padres visited at 
Easter. Second, the word was used by those most enrolled in the project, in particular 
facilitators,^^^ to refer to the population of the célula or localidade. For example, if I 
asked who had chosen someone for a particular position of project responsibility the 
answer was almost always ‘a comunidade'.
Facilitators were ZADP’s local collaborators. I describe them in detail on page 90.
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Defîning Place
As discussed above, in general ZADP parlance ‘community’ was used loosely to 
refer to the population of an administratively-defined célula or localidade. It was 
assumed that these boundaries were locally recognised and legitimate, and that the 
people living within a célulaAocalidade identified themselves as belonging to a group. 
In Intuba (Mugaveia) this was not the case. In my survey just 153 of 252 respondents 
said that they lived in ‘Intuba’. The others identified themselves as coming from places 
that neither state nor project recognised -  Nicatxaca, Naminhoso, Mucuipi, Nwola, 
Mualaworipa, Murapani, Murapa, Erequele. These hamlets were of varying size and 
status, ranging from a cluster of houses little bigger than a homestead, to a substantial 
area with its own party leaders and churches. In Mutange the situation was rather 
different, as ZADP staff mis-recognised what were officially hamlets (Mapiazua, 
Namuinho A, Namuinho B, locally referred to as bairros), and termed them células, 
thus going against governmental classification, but matching locally recognised 
boundaries.
If we accept the obvious point that administrative classifications are not 
automatically legitimate, then the question is what these boundaries did mean. In both 
Mutange and Mugaveia the localidades were old regedorias, territories ascribed to the 
régulos who formed the bottom level of the Portuguese colonial administration, and 
who controlled the population living within their areas of influence. Frelimo did away 
with many of the trappings of colonialism at Independence, but administrative 
boundaries did not change, though the régulos lost their position. This meant that while 
disputes about the exact position of the boundary between localidades were conunon, 
the existence of the boundary was undisputed, and considered to be ancient.
A sense of place shaped interactions within each localidade. Physically the two 
places were very different. Mutange, a small localidade with a more clustered 
population, had a centro (centre) where the market, health post, improved school, and 
técnico’s house were concentrated, and where we lived. Marking the end of the road 
and at the intersection of many paths, it stood on the site of the former aldeia comunal
People would frequently refer to ‘the old Portuguese maps’ as if they were a source of legitimate 
knowledge and power. However as Kloeck-Jenson pointed out, these maps generally dated only from the 
1960s, and were produced with the aim of segmenting populations, not carefully marking recognised 
boundaries (1998: 455).
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and cooperative shop. The reputation of the local health worker brought patients from 
many miles around, and Jacinta’s house was often a centre of project-related activity. 
Half-way through my fieldwork a building for the localidade Executive Council was 
constructed opposite our house, and Frelimo leaders congregated there. There were 
always plenty of people hanging around at the centro, mending bicycles, drinking 
catxaço, conversing or just passing by. On Thursday and Saturday nights a disco 
operated in one of the larger huts, with music from a stereo system run off a car battery.
Mugaveia had no such centre. The localidade was far larger, so large that I never 
visited great swathes of it (see footnote 19). The population was correspondingly 
greater and, unlike that of Mutange, thinly spread. Family compounds were separated 
by hundreds of yards, often perched on the top of ridges, or on the sides of hills. There 
was no daily market anywhere near where I lived in Mugaveia, there were just two sites 
where people congregated to sell things after church on Thursdays and Sundays. People 
lived far more separate lives in Mugaveia than in Mutange, and it was not uncommon 
for those living in the same localidade not to know each other by more than sight or 
parentage.
Localidades were not islands, but were connected to regional, national and global 
networks. Over the course of the twentieth century people became bound to the global 
capitalist economy through compulsory labour expropriation and migration (O’Laughlin 
(2000), see also Chapter 4). In my experience, people in Mutange and Mugaveia had 
many links with friends, relatives, traders and employers living and working away from 
the immediate localidade. Earning and spending money was something that took 
people outside the localidade. As discussed in section 4.3, a number of young men 
were involved in petty trading, taking chickens, eggs, catxaço and furniture for sale in 
district capitals, and bringing back cigarettes, salt, soap, and other low-value goods. 
From Mutange men would travel either to Nicoadala or Namacurra towns (both district 
capitals), and much more occasionally to Quelimane. These links were strong, and 
there was a regular traffic of bicycles and pedestrians. From Mugaveia men would visit 
either Nauela (in Alto Molocué district) or Gurué. It was not unusual for men with 
bicycles to travel more than 100 km to sell a tin (25 kg) of grain. The localidade of 
Mugaveia was isolated, and many (including most women) had not visited Gurué town 
for several years. Few were employed on the tea estates at the time of my fieldwork;
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their workforces had been in decline since Independence. However if anything this 
increased the value of hard-won linkages with outsiders, and the importance of patrons 
external to the localidade (I discuss the project as patron in Chapter 6).
Although the ZADP definition of ‘conununity’ envisaged place as unproblematic, 
in actual fact boundaries were fluid, negotiated and contested. Although geography and 
geographical location shaped social interaction, scales were variable, both with 
networks stretching far beyond the reach of either localidade, and interactions at times 
limited to within much smaller hamlets.
Cohesion or Division?
Both for ZADP staff, and for people from the two localidades, place -  although 
differently delineated and imagined -  was important in creating a sense of belonging. 
What though of the internal cohesion and legitimate representation which ‘community’ 
had implied for the designers and implementers of ZADP? These did not find a simple 
reflection in Mutange or Mugaveia. As is the case the world over, numerous divisions, 
differences and subsets could be discerned in both localidades. Within each 
‘community’, as defined by the project, there were political divisions, social and 
economic differentiation, religious differences, and power struggles. Having looked 
briefly at economic differentiation in the last chapter, I now focus on the most notable 
and fundamental of the divisions: political difference between Renamo and Frelimo.
It should be borne in mind throughout my discussions here that I was far from a 
neutral figure in the two localidades. As a presumed employee of World Vision, 
travelling in a World Vision vehicle, I was assumed to have close links with the 
government, state and party. My sympathies were thus perceived to lie with Frelimo. It 
was not possible for me entirely to dispel these beliefs, which were deep-rooted. 
However, as recounted on page 6 2 ,1 made attempts from the very start to consult with 
leaders from both political parties, and frequently returned to talk to them. In Mugaveia, 
where we were forced to work with a Frelimo secretario and a Renamo mambo, I built 
up good personal relationships with Renamo members and leaders. Nevertheless, I 
should repeat that the ways people related to me throughout my research were coloured 
by the assumptions they made about me; never was this more the case than in political 
discussions.
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A brief introduction to the recent national-level history of Frelimo and Renamo 
has already been given (pages 108 ff.), but some comments on the ways in which both 
movements/parties have been written about over the last thirty years are appropriate. In 
power ever since Independence in 1975, Frelimo initially escaped serious criticism, as 
ideologically committed scholars were wary of disparaging party efforts (see for 
example Munslow 1983, Wield 1983, Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, Hanlon 1984). As 
the war worsened through the 1980s, it gradually became clear that what had started out 
as externally-supported destabilisation had developed many of the characteristics of 
civil war, and analysts sought explanations for what had gone wrong (Geffray and 
Pederson 1986, 1991, Clarence-Smith 1989, O'Laughlin 1992). With the 1992 Peace 
Accords Mozambique’s period of single-party socialist rule came to an end, and the 
international community was intensively involved in the establishment of multi-party 
democracy. Multi-party rule has so far not loosened Frelimo’s grip on power. Until 
2003 (i.e. after the end of my fieldwork) Frelimo remained in control of all elected 
bodies, although some concessions to Renamo have been exacted in the interest of 
creating and maintaining multi-party democratic rule (Manning 2002). In recent 
years the increasingly intimate relationship between the Frelimo leadership and 
international donors has drawn criticism even from former supporters of the party (e.g. 
Hanlon 2001, 2002a, 2002b), but commentary has remained focused at the level of 
national politics.
The history of writing on Renamo is very different. At first authors struggled to 
understand the organisation, programme and operation of the m o v e m e n t , a n d  much 
emphasis was placed on its brutality and lack of political programme (e.g. Magaia 1989, 
Derluguian 1989). While scholars of Frelimo were initially most unwilling to criticise 
the party, scholars of Renamo were even more unwilling to admit any legitimacy to a 
movement they conceived of as utterly vicious. Yet from 1994 the analytical 
environment gradually changed. Scholars, journalists and development workers have 
marvelled at the transformation of Renamo from vicious guerrilla movement to
On 19*** November 2003, Renamo contested the municipal elections and won control of four 
municipalities. This was the hrst time in independent Mozambique that any elected body was not 
controlled by Frelimo. However as this happened after my fieldwork was complete, and Renamo did not 
win any of the four Zambézian municipalities, further discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis.
The only book-length study of Renamo of which I am aware remains Vines (1991), much revised in 
1996. Other significant writers on Renamo include Darch (1989), Taju (1989), Minter (1989b), Young 
(1990), Morgan (1990), Roesch (1990); Hall (1990), Nilsson (1993a, 1993b) Cahen (1998) and Manning 
(2002).
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minimally effective political party, capable of competing in national and municipal 
elections (e.g. Harrison 2000, Schafer 2001, Manning 2002, Carbone 2003).
In rural Zambézia, Renamo dominates elections, and won more than double the 
Frelimo vote in 1994 and 1999 in both Mutange and Mugaveia (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1.1999 Legislative and presidential election results
Legislative Elections (%) Presidential Elections (%)
Frelimo Renamo Chissano Dhlakama
Mugaveia 30 61 29 71
Mutange 24 54 31 69
Zambézia average 26 59 30 70
Compiled from CD-ROM issued by CENE
Yet despite its local popularity, I often heard accusations of backwardness, primitivism, 
and obscurantismo (obscurantism) made against its supporters by village notables, 
traders, project facilitators and técnicos, who tended to vote for Frelimo. As is the case 
across Mozambique, there was a widespread prejudice against Renamo amongst the 
better-educated, who saw it as a party with no clear aims and objectives, supported by 
backward and illiterate rural dwellers. Such people tended to categorise Renamo 
supporters as ‘very confused’ (muito confuse), complicated (complicado), closed 
(fechado), and with unclear heads {com cabeças escuras). Project problems were often 
attributed to Renamo people causing trouble, and in Mugaveia they were even blamed 
for persistent rumours about child-stealing, murder and organ theft (see Chapter 7).
By contrast, Frelimo adherents in the two localidades tended to identify 
themselves with modernity and, crucially, with ‘development’. In this they took on the 
modernising rhetoric of the party at a national level, which dated from the early days of 
Independence (for a discussion of this see Hall and Young 1997: 90-4). Members self­
consciously contrasted their own ‘open’ {aberto) minds with the ‘closed’ minds of 
Renamo members. The secretario of Inlixe (Mugaveia) made the point that he, unlike 
Renamo people, understood and welcomed ‘development’:
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‘He said that he understands our work because he knows what development means.
He knows this because there have been many meetings, meetings with government 
and NGOs and others who talk about development. However those from Renamo 
have a less clear idea (concepçâo reduzida) because of having spent so long at war.
To this day many do not manage to travel far, and understand everything wrong 
(percebem tudo mal) and for this reason they don’t understand what development 
is.’ (Rita’s field diary, 28.03.01)
It is important to realise that this labelling went beyond the simple caricature of 
one party by another. For many years Renamo cultivated its links with ‘traditional 
leaders’ (régulos, mambos, mwenes), and in both Mugaveia and Mutange ‘traditional 
leaders’ supported Renamo. By contrast, Frelimo divested régulos of their powers, 
discouraged religious practice, and outlawed traditional ceremonies such as rain-making. 
In the area of ‘development’ and modernity, although it was Frelimo that claimed 
‘development’ as part of its self-image, Renamo leaders did occasionally dispute the 
party political identification. In Mutange one Renamo leader specifically said that ‘we 
are all together for the development of Mozambique, parties have nothing to do with it’. 
In Mugaveia, whilst Renamo members distanced themselves from accusations of child- 
stealing, witchcraft, and undermining project activities, they did not identify themselves 
as pro-development.
On an everyday level, deep political divisions characterised both localidades. 
Each household had a political affiliation, and -  as both parties had substantial local 
representation -  a preferred local leader.*"^* Although the localidade President was 
ostensibly in charge of all residents, he was not deemed legitimate by Renamo members, 
who asserted the equal right of the régulo to be considered as a neutral leader of all. It 
was thus impossible to identify any single person who was ever considered to be a 
leader of the whole ‘community’, and it can therefore be argued that there was no single 
‘community leader’. N o r  were ‘village committees’ formed at the behest of the 
government and/or NGOs deemed any more legitimate. The health, education and land 
committees -  which were being set up during my fieldwork but had not started to 
function -  had circumscribed roles and were strongly associated with Frelimo in any
For comparative examples from Nampula province (where the same division generally applies) see 
Geffray (1986), Dinerman (1994, 1998), and Pitcher (1998).
Political leaders were by far the most significant. Church leaders, though respected, had circumscribed 
authority, usually adjudicating within their congregations on what were known as assuntos socials 
( ‘social subjects’): family problems such as adultery, violence, or illegitimate pregnancy. There were 
many different religious sects, further fragmenting authority. Perhaps surprisingly, I knew no one who 
was both a political and a church leader.
ZADP recognised community leaders, but what this implied for a singular ‘community’ was not 
considered.
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case. Legitimacy was furthermore dependent on context. Whilst the knowledge of the 
Renamo-supporting régulo and elders was accepted and valued in the context of a 
boundary dispute between Mutange and a neighbouring localidade, in other 
circumstances no Frelimo member accepted the authority of a Renamo leader. Nor 
would a Renamo member necessarily agree to do what a Frelimo official told him.
Party organisation was broadly similar in the two localidades. The President was 
appointed externally, by officials at the level of the Administrative Post or District. 
Both Presidents were staunch Frelimo supporters, identifying and identified with the 
party. The Frelimo structure then followed the form of the Dynamising Groups set up 
in the 1970s, with a hierarchy of secretario (secretary), chef es da zona (zone chief), and 
chefe de dez casas (head of ten households), all of whom did the bidding of the 
President. Renamo followed a similar pattern. The régulo, also known as mwene in 
Mugaveia, was aided by a group of mambos, chefes de murudha, and samassuas. The 
Mutange régulo was the very man who had been deposed in 1975 (he died at the end of 
my fieldwork), while the Mugaveia incumbent was the nephew of the late régulo. 
Other Renamo leaders were often family members of colonial leaders.
Although the structure of the two political parties may have been similar in the 
two localidades, their everyday presence and role was not the same. Political divisions 
were more tangible in Mugaveia than Mutange. In Mugaveia Renamo and Frelimo both 
held twice-weekly ‘problem-resolving’ sessions, when a number of senior members and 
leaders would congregate at their respective meeting places and try to resolve issues 
brought to them. I was never able to attend one of these meetings -  they were seen as 
‘political’, and thus not appropriate for me to investigate -  but I was told that they 
mostly dealt with ‘social problems’. These were often similar to those taken to church 
leaders (see footnote 141). Wider problems between neighbours were dealt with here, 
including land disputes and the like. These meetings were also used to announce 
marriages: when a couple wished to marry they would go and inform the leaders of the 
party they adhered to, and the marriage would be considered official. In another 
example of the parties getting involved in many aspects of people’s lives, one elderly 
lady told me that she was involved in preparing young girls for their initiation rites, held
Inheritance of office in Mugaveia was by mother’s brother’s son, as with land inheritance.
Church weddings were still considered ‘better’, but were often delayed until many years after the 
couple had started to co-habit.
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under the aegis of Renamo. I later found that Frelimo-sponsored initiation rites were 
held, as well as others organised by churches.
In Mutange the situation was more fluid and less formal. There were no regular 
‘problem-resolving’ sessions held by either party, and people did not work through the 
formal hierarchies when they found themselves in difficulties. Political persuasion, 
family allegiance, geographical proximity and the reputation of individual leaders 
affected people’s choice of where to take their problems. Though members of both 
parties would carefully describe the formal stmctures to me, and explain how problems 
should be referred first to the lowest level (the chefe de murudha for Renamo or the 
chefe de dez casas for Frelimo), in actual fact complainants tended to ignore structures, 
taking their problem to the leader they trusted most and who lived nearby. In some 
cases that would mean crossing célula or even localidade boundaries.
The significance of the difference between my two sites should not be overstated, 
as it was largely the result of context-specific factors. Personalities were influential. In 
Mugaveia, for example, the régulo was well-respected and unchallenged.*"^^ By contrast, 
in Mutange Renamo was poorly organised and inactive, partly because the old régulo 
(who died towards the end of my fieldwork) was ill and half-paralysed. Tomé 
Mutange,*"*^ the younger brother who eventually took his place, had a poor reputation 
and was frequently drunk. Abflio Catorze, a descendent of a samassua (deputy régulo), 
was in many ways the more important Renamo figurehead, coupling inherited 
legitimacy with energy and talent. However there was considerable rivalry between the 
Mutange family and Abflio Catorze, and they seldom met. Moreover experiences at the 
time of the aldeia comunal and the agricultural cooperative had given Mutange residents 
a firmer understanding of the post-colonial state, and a share of the resources it could 
command. For that reason Renamo was always significantly less popular in Mutange 
than in other surrounding Namacurra localidades.
In neither localidade was a distinction drawn between the ‘state’ and Frelimo. 
This was a legacy of the one-party state, and persisted a decade after the formal
There was a ‘secondary régulo\ with a similar status to Abflio Catorze, in a part of Mugaveia in which 
I did not work.
It was conunon for the régulo and localidade to share the same name, but this did not necessarily 
imply long-standing legitimacy. In Mutange both localidade and family had changed names within living 
memory.
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establishment of multi-party democracy. Even at district level, state and party were 
intimately intertwined, and the linkage was still stronger in the localidades. Promotion 
within the government was said to be dependent on membership of Frelimo. It was 
certainly the case that government vehicles were used in Frelimo electoral campaigning, 
and civil servants used their official visits to localidades to lobby for the party (see 
Figure 6.1).^ "^  ^ A localidade-\Qwo[ perception that state and party were identical, was 
thus strengthened not weakened by experience and observation. As noted, all 
localidade Presidents were Frelimo members. Some, as in Mutange, were salaried, 
chosen by the District Administration from the cadre of civil servants. In Mugaveia the 
President had been a loyal Frelimo supporter since 1975 and was promoted from 
(unpaid) party secretario to (unpaid) localidade President in 2000, when the previous 
incumbent abandoned his post.
Likewise all district and provincial structures, including the District Directorates 
of Agriculture and Rural Development (DDADR), with which ZADP collaborated and 
to which it provided substantial resources, were linked to Frelimo. ZADP provided the 
District Directors of Agriculture with vehicles, which were used for project activities, 
such as carrying staff and goats, and for government agricultural activities, for example 
transporting the donativos distributed after the 2001 floods. They were also used for 
party work, including electoral campaigning. Although ZADP technical and financial 
support to the DDADRs was conceived of by designers as politically neutral support to 
the state, in both Mutange and Mugaveia it was seen as support to Frelimo.
Both localidades were thus politically divided. As the election data (Table 5.1) 
shows, in both -  as in Zambézia as a whole -  Renamo was a great deal more popular 
than Frelimo. The strength of political feeling and the identification of state structures 
with Frelimo led to the almost complete boycott of state and state-identified activities 
by Renamo leaders and members in Mutange and Mugaveia, a tactic apparently used at 
all levels of the party. As Manning has written of national politics, ‘Renamo seeks to 
gain outside the formal system what it cannot win through formal competition, and 
Frelimo takes refuge in overly legalistic interpretations of the formal rules that 
maximise its own ability to control procedures’ (2002: 215).
See Chapter 6 for a discussion of how this affected ZADP. White land rovers, ZADP’s vehicle of 
choice, were associated with government, as were the motorbikes ridden by the técnicos. Other vehicles 
rarely visited either village; I can count on one hand the number of times I saw a trader’s truck in either 
localidade.
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I found for myself that it was unusual to find any Renamo members at meetings 
called by the localidade President, or held on localidade premises (see page 189). 
Rank-and-file Frelimo members identified the localidade premises as ‘theirs’. In 
Mugaveia the old Frelimo office had collapsed, and the localidade offices -  supposedly 
designated for non-partisan activities -  were openly used for party events. In Mutange, 
Frelimo members took for granted that the new Executive Council building would be 
available for party activities, and were taken aback when the (civil servant) President 
announced that it would be reserved for state activities. In actual fact Frelimo party 
meetings were indeed held there, reemphasising the state-party overlap.
Mutange and Mugaveia were thus characterised by political divisions. This did 
not match the cohesion which ZADP designers had seen as characteristic. I pursue this 
further later in the chapter, while in Chapter 8 I consider Manning’s (2002) argument 
that NGOs and donors have had a role in perpetuating the political divisions I have 
described, both at local and at national level. By providing formal recognition to 
President, secretdrios and régulos, projects like ZADP might be seen to have merely 
acted pragmatically in recognising divisions not allowed for by a majoritarian system, 
or to have provided options for negotiation outside formal political institutions, thus 
running the risk of undermining Mozambique’s fledgling democracy.
Destruction or Reconfiguration?
Turning then to the destruction of ‘community’ as perceived by ZADP designers 
(page 166), what did the situation look like in Mugaveia and Mutange? First, linkages 
between families and individuals, though much altered during the war years, were never 
really ruptured (Bowen 2000b: 109 ff.). Indeed, the war offered opportunities to some 
people who were able to acquire new skills and profit from uncertainties. Displacement, 
though in itself an act of violence, did not ‘destroy’ ‘community’; rather the networks of 
differently-negotiated linkages and alliances were reshaped. With the ending of the war, 
and the return of many (though not all) to the lands from which they had been displaced, 
yet another reconfiguration took place, and new patterns of sociability and ways of 
living together developed.
148 Not everyone ‘returned’ after the war (Bowen 2000b: 109-110), but my fieldwork took place amongst 
those who had resettled.
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Far from there being substantial evidence of ‘destruction’, in both localidades 
family and non-family-based forms of social behaviour, mutuality and commonality 
were important. In Mutange, Arminda Sambique, a very elderly lady now living alone 
(page 146), told me that her initiation cohort had been very important to her:
‘I still remember who they were: there were four of them. After the ceremony we 
were all friends -  samuari, meaning initiation friends. We insult each other, because 
we left our bad souls at the same time. We left our bad habits. We are great friends, 
and whenever one of them sees me she gives me something to eat, and we do not get 
angry with each other. The insults are teases. You help each other when you are ill, 
attend each others’ family funerals.’
The same, she said, had been true for men. Initiation rites in Mutange and Mugaveia
ceased around Independence both for men and women. It was said that younger men
and (to a lesser extent) women would nowadays keep in touch with ex-classmates, but
the relationship was not comparable with the bond between members of an initiation
cohort. Although female initiation rites had restarted in Mugaveia under the aegis of
churches and parties, it was said that they were simplified, and that the bonds between
the initiation cohort were less strong.
Family ties were different in the two localidades. In Mugaveia residence was 
uxorilocal,^^^ while in Mutange a wife would leave her paternal home on marriage and 
move to her husband’s land.^^° Two-generation compounds, each containing three or 
four households in close proximity, and at a considerable distance from other 
compounds, were the norm in Mugaveia. Everyday help (collecting water, pounding 
maize) between such households was frequent, but when enmity developed it usually 
resulted in at least one family having to move away. In Mutange family members did 
not live in particularly close proximity. It was said that in the past a married son would 
have lived near his father, but my observations showed that this was now unusual. In 
Mutange, a woman was vulnerable at divorce or following the death of her husband: she 
could be sent back to her parents or her brothers with none of the conjugal assets. Such
A prospective husband would generally build a home some thirty or forty yards from the house of his 
wife’s parents. The couple would live there for several years, farming land granted to them by the wife’s 
parents, before moving away to form a compound of their own.
This description is o f ‘ideal types’, and there were many exceptions. In Mutange couples frequently 
lived at a considerable distance from both families, and in a few cases an ‘outsider’ husband had chosen 
to move to his wife’s village. Likewise in Mugaveia, some women moved to join their husbands, 
particularly if the husband was well-off. Thus the wife of Tio Daniel had moved from her natal home in 
Alto Molocué on marriage, because her husband was well established in Mugaveia. Two of their 
daughters lived alongside them, but the third had followed her trader husband to Nampula.
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women lived in the most makeshift of houses, little more than tents made of woven 
grass.
There were a number of forms of intra-community help in both localidades. 
Primary responsibility for care for the sick or elderly was considered to rest with family 
members. In Mugaveia Daniel Namuteca was jointly responsible for the care of his 
elderly mother. She lived with a daughter, but Daniel contributed money and food, and 
the two granddaughters helped with pounding her flour and collecting water. In 
Mutange, Castinha Nemes and Elda José (page 144) lived side by side, both supported 
by Castinha’s successful sons.
It was only when there was no kin to give help that there was any form of broader 
‘community support’. This came not through the political parties, nor through any 
traditional structures, but through the church of which the needy person was a member. 
Such help was sporadic, and hard-won. In Mugaveia one church elder, an aged widow, 
said that the congregation had helped with her machamba the previous year. She had 
reciprocated by feeding the helpers with xima (porridge) and cassava. A leader of the 
Baptist church in Mutange recounted how members of his church had helped two 
elderly women to build a house, and had worked the machambas of a very ill man (who 
later died). But not all those who felt they deserved support were given it. One young 
woman in Mutange, unable to walk because of childhood polio, said bitterly that her 
church -  the Church of the Twelve Apostles -  had insisted on payment if they were to 
help with her machamba, and though they were paid (by a suitor) the work was never 
finished. Another man, a trader who had temporarily fallen on hard times, recounted 
that when he asked his church for help to bury his child they refused, and as a result he 
abandoned religion. In neither of these cases were the individuals truly destitute, and 
they were in fact able to call on kin. It should be observed that in all cases some form 
of reciprocity was expected and given, either in the form of money or food. 
Reciprocation might be a mere token, but it was still expected.
Treatment of widows was a serious problem throughout Lower Zambézia, in cities as well as rural 
areas. Jacinta, the Mutange técnico, was forced to leave her marital home in Quelimane after the death of 
her husband, even though she had a child by him. Childless women were in a particularly precarious 
position, as were those widowed when their children were still young, or who had only daughters. In 
Mutange widows with fully-grown sons, who were themselves elderly, were fairly well cared for.
This point is taken up in the next chapter; gifts are never free.
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These accounts of hard-won aid reflected a general pattern in which people 
seldom chose to work together and in which mutual help (ajuda mutua) was said to be 
much reduced. Livestock loaning was the only form of mutual help I regularly came 
across, Timitorio Sergio's experience was typical (page 152). The borrower would 
take a breeding pair, and after reproduction would return the original pair and keep 
some or all of the offspring, depending on the agreement made. As would be 
expected, such loans were never transacted between strangers, but rather between close 
friends or trusted family members.
Nor did such transactions actually involve co-operative labour. The infrequency 
with which people worked together was one reason why ZADP staff and designers 
asserted that communities were ‘weakened’. However Cross’s study of the Gurue tea 
plantations (Cross 1992/4) suggested a different reason for the change, unconnected 
with inter-personal bonds. He argued that during the 1940s and 1950s, when demands 
for male labour from the plantations were at their height, it was very difficult for women 
left at home to mobilise sufficient labour to get their crops sown and harvested on time 
(cf. Moore 1992). Increased labour demands meant that the village social and economic 
base was transformed. Consequently two forms of mutual help came into regular use: 
namuri (communal help on a field in return for drink and food) and omore (working by 
turn on each other’s fields, but with no payment). Ganho-ganho (casual labour) also 
became more common, and better-off labourers would regularly send a portion of their 
salaries to their wives, to employ ganho-ganho labour (Cross 1992/4: 149).*^  ^ If we 
follow Cross, a reduction in mutual help need not automatically imply a reduction in 
trust or mutuality between neighbours: it could just be that the economic need for a 
particular pattern of behaviour has passed, and that relationships have consequently 
been reconfigured. This is a clear case where the wider processes of labour migration 
and consequent gender imbalances described in Chapter 3 had an impact at the local 
level.
That said, informants did talk in terms of a lack of trust when discussing the 
declining frequency of mutual help. On one occasion we arrived at the house of an old
There were many different names for this process; see (Pequenino 2000).
The sense that loans should be transacted between those who knew each other affected the attempts of 
the agriculture component at credit provision: credit is a social and hierarchical relationship, and as the 
next chapter discusses in more detail, as such was not entered into lightly.
A slightly different division is made in CEA (1982: 26).
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lady in Mugaveia to find that she was out, working on a relative’s machamba, in return 
for oteca, a beer brewed from sorghum. This corresponds to namuri above, but in 
Mugaveia was called ntltaro or olimiha, and only happened when sorghum was 
available. The woman told us that such mutual help now happened only between 
those who knew each other well, because of the possibilities for witchcraft that inviting 
strangers onto your machamba opened up. She said that it was well known that you 
could put a lot of effort into your machamba in some years for no gain. Beto (the CCM 
técnico) confirmed this, saying that there was a belief that your work could be ‘stolen’ 
from you, so that all the effort you put into your own machamba was transformed and 
came out in production on someone else’s land.^^^
It was not just ZADP that had a strong discourse about people not wishing to 
work together: this was also what informants said about themselves. When técnicos or 
consultants asked why group work was so difficult, people would frequently just say 
that ‘we don’t like to work together’. I heard several explanations of why this was. 
Some harked back to their experiences with agricultural cooperatives, where the many 
had worked for the few. Others agreed with one of the Frelimo leaders in Mutange who 
argued that they were not resistant to group work per se, but that they had to see the 
benefits of it:
‘It’s not that we don’t want an association ... but to cultivate as an association -  if 
all in the association work manually, nobody benefits at all. This paprika that we 
grew a little of, if it had just been mine and I’d sold it, then perhaps I’d have got 
something. But as it was collective, and the machamba was small, could there really 
have been enough for all of us? The reason why it’s hard for us to work together is 
because it’s manual work. By hand you’ll never get far.’
The implication was that people would only work together for particular ends that they 
judged to be worthwhile, and where working in a group would bring significant benefits.
This judgement was perhaps borne out by the experiences of other projects in less 
marginal areas of Zambézia which focused on collective marketing, and where the 
groups became progressively stronger as the benefits of membership were felt.^^^ But 
to set against this were the comments of Henriques Francisco, another Frelimo leader in
Sorghum was not grown in quantity, as it was considered too time-consuming to prepare xima from it. 
A small amount was cultivated for brewing, either for ntltaro, or for traditional ceremonies.
I deal with this and related ‘zombie’ beliefs in Chapter 7.
This also happened to a marketing group in Mugaveia, set up to improve farmers’ power to negotiate 
with traders. This was highly valued, and even in the absence of project workers, group members met 
regularly. The lack of marketable surpluses in Mutange meant that a similar endeavour there was 
unsuccessful.
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Mutange whose livelihood I discussed on page 145. Again, he did not couch his 
explanation in terms of ‘community’ strength or weakness, but in terms of the envy that 
thrives in situations of great poverty:
‘Many people know that for the whites to have a life, it isn’t because of droga 
(sorcery). In their land all are rich. There can be no envy if everyone can eat each 
day. There is no cause for envy. Our problem is that there is too much poverty here.
The white, when it is between whites, when he doesn’t have something asks another.
And the person helps him. Here, instead of asking, the person will start to work 
against the person who has something.
Henriques perceived working together as modem and desirable, but impossible in
contemporary poverty-stricken Mutange. This provides an interesting glimpse of the
ways in which ‘poverty’ was locally perceived -  as something that was in itself capable
of countering the very strategies that ZADP saw as the means of reducing it. For this
leader it was poverty itself that meant that the schemes of community cooperation, on
which ZADP hung its hopes of long-term sustainable poverty reduction, were
impossible, as these were the very conditions in which mistmst and hence witchcraft
could thrive.
5.3 Unpicking Implications: Homogeneity and Exclusion
The last section looked at how the three ways in which ‘community’ was 
conceptualised by ZADP were reflected in my field sites. I showed that ‘place’ was far 
more complicated than had originally been envisaged, and that different locations and 
linkages were significant in different contexts. By looking at political division, I 
questioned the notion of cohesion, and by considering how relationships have been 
reconfigured over time, I demonstrated that a vision of ‘community destruction’ was 
simplistic. The abstract concept of ‘community’, as expressed in project documents and 
used by project staff, was strikingly different from the more complex ways in which 
mutuality, belonging and leadership were negotiated in Mugaveia and Mutange.
However, this does not imply that there was an impermeable barrier between 
different forms of understanding. The great majority of my colleagues, in particular the 
técnicos, were only too well aware of the ‘real’ situation in the villages, in particular of 
the existence of deep political divisions, co-existing with numerous small-scale forms of 
mutual behaviour. They knew that they neither worked with nor heard from everyone, 
and that the places where they worked were politically divided. An awareness of
Chapter 7 looks in detail at the relationship between envy and witchcraft.
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division is shown by the fact that staff knew that their activities did not encompass all 
groups in rural society. The project vet attributed this to poverty:
‘We never hear from the most disgraced (mais desgraçadas). They never speak in 
front of us. They are inhibited. So the ones who are interested in the programme 
talk the most. And the message that we capture, we say means that “the community 
wants this”.’
Lloyd, a member of World Vision’s agriculture department, gave a different analysis in 
a conversation about land registration:
‘Who IS the conununity? That’s my question. Who comes forward is not 
necessarily the community. The people who come forward in participatory 
consultations may just be the régulo and the régula’s mates... Who comes forward 
is not necessarily who the community is.’
Likewise Rodrigues, a livestock técnico, emphasised the fact that the project tended to 
attribute the opinions of the most articulate to the entire ‘community’:
‘When we say that someone is ‘chosen by the community’ we mean that they are 
chosen by people who represent the community, and as it’s not easy to have all the 
community of a célula, we take the opinion of the people who come to the 
meeting... Normally, we don’t have ... any real idea of what would happen if we 
really had the whole conununity there... It’s hard to get the general thought of the 
célula (a pensamento geral da célula). That’s one of the reasons why some of our 
activities haven’t had the response that we wished. We don’t have ideas collected 
from everyone.’
In each of the three cases given above, staff demonstrated an awareness of 
different kinds of division and differentiation. However in other situations the same 
staff would use the term ‘community’ entirely unselfconsciously. For example, 
Rodrigues told me on other occasions that the project para-vets had been ‘chosen by the 
community’. While conscious that not everyone was able to participate in ZADP 
activities, he and others would still informally speak is if it were ‘the community’ (not 
‘a community’) that attended meetings, made friends with the técnicos, and expressed 
their opinions. At times this would even be forcefully asserted, particularly if the 
individual felt him/herself to be criticised. For example the Project Anthropologist, 
quoted in full on page 166, emphasised that needs presented during PRA meetings 
really were representative of the needs of the whole community, ‘not ... one person in 
the community, b u t ... the community’.
In such situations a notion of a solidaristic, unified ‘community’ would re-emerge, 
creeping back into discussions about participation, representation, ownership or 
sustainability. It was as if staff knowledge and understanding of rural society (based on
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experience), and their understanding of ‘community’ (based on project literature and 
theory) were in different mental boxes. The fact that tacit knowledge about rural 
society could not be squared with the various definitions of ‘community’ that 
underpinned ZADP activities was not even noticed, and its implications were certainly 
not considered. The result was that ZADP técnicos and other staff, like staff of other 
projects, worked with a number of contradictory concepts, which had explanatory 
power in different arenas.
The fact that project staff were able to distinguish between groups who 
participated more and participated less indicates that they were aware of heterogeneity 
and differentiation within the rural areas where they worked. Yet all staff would at 
times insist that the project did indeed work with ‘communities’. This contradictory 
attitude stemmed from several factors, the most important of which was the sensitive 
issue of targeting policy. As discussed from page 157, ZADP’s original policy was to 
target poorer individuals, in particular women and widows, and staff were expected to 
encourage these groups to participate. However at the same time there were also 
numerical targets for the project. It was intended that ZADP should work with 130,000 
of the 225,000 residents in the intervention area,^^° which as Table 5.2 shows, was far 
from reality.
The Terms of Reference for the Mid-Term Review (Bias et al. 2001: Annex 10) stated that ‘7,027 
families are at present directly benefiting from the project by being members of agriculture groups, banks 
or beneficiaries of chicken vaccination or other programmes. At four people per household, this 
represents a population of 27,876. This is 12.5 percent of the population in ZADP target localidades 
(224,035 people) and 21.4 percent of the 130,000 people targeted to benefit from ZADP programmes (see 
project memorandum).’ In fact no population figures are given in the Project Memorandum.
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Table 5.2. Participants in ZADP agriculture component activities
Activity No. of 
Households
Percentage 
of target 
population
Source
Growing ZADP crop variety - - No estimate available
Received extension visit in last year 24,000 44 Baseline update
Member of ZADP Group 7,600 14 Baseline update
Member of seed multiplication group 7,000+
18,000*
13 Oct-Dee 2000 report 
Baseline update
Chicken Vaccination 4,730 9 Baseline update
7,000 13 Project reports
Member of marketing association 840 2 Oct-Dee 2000 Report
Member of goat group 730 +
ZADP (I) members
6,140*
1 ZADP reports 
Baseline update
Member of Farmer Field School 500+
3,900*
1 Quarterly reports 
Baseline update
Facilitators trained 220 <1 Verbal report
Honey producer 70 <1 Verbal report
Notes:
Population of ZADP localidades was taken as 225,000 (54,000 households 
with 4.2 members). It was assumed that only one household member 
participated in each type of group, although it was recognised that this 
would slightly overestimate the number of households involved.
Figures marked *, from the baseline update, were considered far too high. It 
was suggested that farmers responding to the survey might have been 
anticipating receiving seeds or goats, rather than reporting receipt.
Source: Adapted from Mid-Term Review Report, Annex Six ‘Beneficiary Numbers’ (Bias et al. 2(X)1)
Within the context of changing DFID policies (discussed in Chapter 2), which 
meant that a direct focus on the very poorest was no longer being prioritised, ZADP 
management needed to negotiate changes that would make activities more ‘successful’. 
Early reviews were intensely critical of high mortality rates for goats given on credit, 
and low pay-back rates for seeds, and questioned whether the project was going to reach 
its numerical targets ‘in any significant way’ (DFID 1999a: 8). In this context, project 
management was put under considerable pressure to change project practice. As the 
same report went on to add, ‘project management now accepts that substantial changes 
are required to the generation and dissemination of agricultural improvements if 
significant progress is to be achieved’ (8). Two changes were made to deal with these 
problems.
The first was a move away from communal and collaborative approaches to ones 
centred on the individual. The concern to work in a communal fashion stemmed from
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the desire to set up institutions that would collectively appropriate the increased 
production it was hoped the project would bring about, thus mitigating the potentially 
harmful effects of increased differentiation that were of concern to Social Development 
Advisers (Chapter 2). In the early years, many activities involved group work. In both 
Farmer Field Schools and Seed Multiplication Groups (page 32), people at first worked 
together on the same communal field, while goat restocking involved the provision of 
five goats to eight people, the animals being kept in a common corral by a collectively 
employed shepherd. However it was soon realised that these activities were not 
working. Many of the communally held goats died (from lack of attention, starvation, 
or strangling), and in other cases group members dropped out, leaving the animals in the 
possession of a single member (Pequenino 2000).^^^ This did not represent value for 
money for the project. It was also felt that some people were actually put off 
participating in ZADP activities because of their communal nature; many participants 
expressed their desire to multiply seeds on their own machambas, rather than with their 
neighbours. By the time I started my fieldwork ZADP had thus largely abandoned 
collaborative ways of working in favour of activities centred on the individual. Thus 
three goats were provided to each member of a ‘goat group’, to care for in their own 
corral at their homestead. Quantities of seed were lent to individual members of ‘seed 
groups’, for sowing on the individual’s own fields. And during the construction of 
bridges and stream crossings in the last year of the project, labourers were paid cash 
salaries for their work. Notably, although the activities were centred on the individual, 
the ‘group’ terminology was not dropped, and livestock ‘groups’, seed multiplication 
‘groups’ etc. continued to be counted and monitored.
The second solution to low levels of participation specifically focused on the 
problems with the original target group of ‘the poorest 25% of the population’ (DFID 
1998b: 5). Given the difficulties of working with ‘the poorest of the poor’, it was 
agreed in 1999 that the ‘economically active poor’ should become the main project 
target (DFID 1999b). In the areas of rural Zambézia where the project worked, where 
almost everyone identified themselves as ‘poor’, this essentially meant that all comers 
would be welcomed. In a situation where many were nervous about involvement with 
ZADP (a subject discussed further in Chapter 6), and labour-poverty precluded the
See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the problems this later caused; five goats were indivisible between 
eight members, but when the five goats had reproduced and credit been repaid, claims were made and 
problems arose.
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participation of others, this may have been a practical way of working. However it did 
not deal with the factors which meant that some people excluded themselves from 
project activities, the most important of which was political affiliation.
These changes meant that from 1999 ZADP staff worked with ‘groups’ made up 
of almost anyone who was interested. These were groups formed solely for the 
benefit of ZADP. This recalls Amit’s comment: ‘I suspect that the “cultures” and 
“communities” we attribute to the people amongst whom we have conducted our 
research are often less a matter of our own personal convictions than of conceptual 
convenience’ (Amit and Rapport 2002: 162). ZADP ‘groups’ were just lists of people, 
who had come together on one day for a specific reason. There were not necessarily 
any other more significant ties between them. Two review reports commented:
‘What is called a ‘group’ is a grouping of people who receive seed on the same day, 
and whose names are registered on a list o f activities. The same people can also 
belong to a goat group’ (Waterhouse and Cavane 2001, my translation).
‘At célula level there was little sign of groups being in fact considered much more 
than for administrative purposes, either as “lists” or as the means to access the 
resources the project is offering. No project groups ever appeared on Venn 
diagrams, at community, focus group or household level’ (Cavane et al. 2001).
ZADP functioned through these un-group-like groups, which in everyday parlance were
then also referred to as ‘the’ (cf. ‘a’) community’. Thus, whilst at one level the utopian
insistence on ‘community’ was being replaced by an awareness of the factors militating
in favour of individualised enterprise, at another level the insistence on ‘community’
was retained, for reasons of convenience and legitimation. This further masked the
political divides that I argue are crucial to an understanding of rural Zambézia. Both
técnicos and senior staff would, in everyday speech and informal conversation, refer to
individual and group-based work as ‘working with the community’; this disguised the
need for measures to make activities more inclusive, in particular more open to those
whose allegiances lay with Renamo.
Not concentrating on this important issue meant that opportunities to improve 
communication with Renamo were sometimes missed. I mentioned above that staff 
were aware of political differences, and were articulate when talking about divisions
The fact that it was political affiliation, and not just generalised suspicion of government distinguishes 
this case from that reported by Arce and Long (1992) in Mexico, in which the técnico, Roberto, had to 
deal with a generalised suspicion of government.
Teachers, health workers, and those who were only temporarily living in the localidade were excluded, 
although even here there were exceptions.
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and differences, about political turmoil and mistrust. Técnicos would refer to people 
‘belonging to the régula' (thus Renamo members) or ‘belonging to the secretaries' 
(Frelimo members), and were aware that all political leaders needed to be placated if 
project activities were to be successful. As a result attempts were made to involve both 
régulos and secretdrios in project meetings. However Renamo leaders would often not 
attend. Sometimes this was because messages to both the régulos and secretaries were 
passed via the localidade President, who, as I have explained above, was a staunch 
Frelimo member. One Renamo leader from Mutange told me that he never went 
along to meetings convoked by Frelimo (including the President), because they didn’t 
pay him anything, and he didn’t see why he should go wasting his time at their request. 
At the few meetings he had attended his point of view had not, he felt, been taken 
seriously.
In Mugaveia it appeared that Renamo leaders were frequently not invited at all, 
although their subsequent absence from meetings was nevertheless blamed on their 
confusao (confusion, dissent). When Rita and I first visited Mugaveia we felt that it 
was important to pay personal visits to the most important leaders, before moving to the 
area and starting our work. We did as colleagues suggested, and went first to the 
President, the overall leader of the localidade. He said that he would take a message to 
the régulo, so that we could come back and meet with everyone the next day. 
Demurring slightly, we suggested that he might instead take us to the régulo 's house, so 
that we could speak to him directly ourselves. He was not at home, so we left him a 
written message. Next day the régulo was waiting for us at the appointed time, flanked 
by his subordinates and looking deeply nervous. Much later he told us that it was the 
first time that the President had called on him in that way, a fact confirmed by our 
fieldwork. Estevao^^^ addressed this directly when I asked why he thought so few 
Renamo members attended meetings:
‘I don’t think it’s that people from Renamo aren’t interested. It’s probably partly the 
fault of people from World Vision. People always go to the same person. They go 
to the President, and he’s the one who explains things. You were different, because 
you insisted personally and went there yourselves. I think that if you’d just asked 
the President to invite the régulo, I am sure you would never have spoken to him.’
164 Other factors leading to non-participation are discussed in Chapter 6.
Estevao was a ZADP técnico who worked in Vehiua, another Gurué localidade. He and Agostinho 
(the Mugaveia técnico) had worked together, and when Agostinho became seriously ill towards the end of 
my fieldwork, Estevao took over in Mugaveia.
189
The fact that técnicos, with the approval of senior staff, generally relied on the President 
to communicate with members of both parties, implies that, at some level, they accepted 
what I have shown above (page 176) to have been the fiction of multi-party democracy. 
The point is a delicate one. It could be argued that técnicos who contacted only the 
localidade President were acting in an entirely correct fashion, operating through state 
structures, and not providing incentives outside formal institutions. At the national 
level Manning has argued that donors have been too willing to support Renamo in 
negotiating outside formal structures (Manning 2002), and that for democracy to 
become ‘embedded’, parties need to accept that they must operate solely through these 
structures. However in the case of ZADP, técnicos did make fairly regular contact with 
party (as opposed to state) structures, and a failure to contact the régulo is better 
attributed to laziness. Not addressing the non-separation of state and party thus 
contributed to the exclusion of many Renamo supporters from project activities. Some 
técnicos, like Estevao, were aware of this; however this knowledge did not affect the 
definition of ‘community’ they worked with. Even though they knew that many were 
excluded from activities, they would still refer to ‘community’ as if all were involved, 
and these differences and divisions melted away.
5.4 Sustainability and Participation
What was it then that the concept of ‘community’ did for the project? Why was it 
that in the face of considerable evidence that simple ‘communities’ did not exist, the 
concept was not dropped? I suggest here that ideas about ‘community’ that were known 
not to be helpful in describing the situation in project localidades were nevertheless 
maintained because they underpinned other fundamental concepts on which the project 
was based. Two other concepts, crucial to the rationale of 2LADP, had been defined in 
such a way as to rely on a notion of ‘community’.
The first of these was a particular notion of ‘community participation’ as a 
precondition for local ‘ownership’. Sometimes called comparticipaçâo, co­
participation, it was different from the PRA ‘participation’ I described above, which 
involved ‘participation’ in research and prioritisation. However, it was similar in that it 
also relied on the notion of a ‘community’, and likewise was blind to questions of class, 
differentiation, or conflict. Co-participation was used to refer to the involvement of 
‘local people’ in ZADP activities, and a certain degree of cost-sharing. It was believed
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that if a contribution were required, then not only would prioritisation be more careful, 
but the long-term sustainability of the intervention would be assured.
An example of this co-participation was the bridge building that was carried out in 
1999 as a result of ‘community prioritisation’ through PRAs.*^^ It was a condition of 
construction that labour and locally-available materials should be provided for free by 
‘communities’, while ZADP paid for iron, cement, tools and transport. However, when 
work began,
‘the community refused to put sand in the truck and refused to participate in any 
activity. They said that they would do everything, if the project paid a salary. But 
ZADP and the community had arrived at the agreement that COMMUNITY 
PARTICIPATION was necessary’ (Pequenino 2001, original capitals).
In order to get the work done, ZADP was obliged to pay labourers, despite arguing that 
the benefit from the road accrued to the ‘community’. However as Pequenino’s report 
observed, ‘They think that the road is ZADP’s {eles pensam que a estrada é do ZADP). 
For this reason ZADP had to pay them. The communities have still not dropped the 
ideas of the emergency’ (2001, my translation). ‘Emergency’ in this case referred to 
the expectation that World Vision would always provide hand-outs, a subject I return to 
in Chapter 6.
The attribution of the road’s ownership to ZADP arose from the clash between 
designers’ ideas about ownership and representation, and those espoused by many 
informants. Such a clash was also evident in the case of the ‘Community Extension 
Workers’ (CEWs, always referred to as ‘facilitators’), with whom it had been intended 
that the técnicos should work. In each project-defined ‘community’ (generally a célula, 
but see page 169) there were two project facilitators. They were said to have been 
chosen by ‘the community’ to be trained in techniques that they would then pass on to 
other ‘community members’. Facilitators tended to be younger men, often loosely 
linked to Frelimo, but without the leadership positions that were monopolised by their 
elders. In a few cases individuals had volunteered for the job; in others they had been 
nominated in some kind of a plenary meeting. In ZADP design they had been
‘Community priorities’ developed through PRA work proved hard to satisfy. Many fell outside the 
scope of an agricultural project (the rehabilitation of schools and hospitals), and others were rejected (e.g. 
the refinancing of shops). In many areas técnicos thus simply began to implement a more general project 
programme. In the early years this included on-farm research. Farmer Field Schools, and agricultural 
demonstrations.
I discuss the meanings of ‘emergency’ on page 90.
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conceived of as ‘community’ facilitators, responsible to their ‘communities’ and 
eventually receiving payment from them for their services. The Project Memorandum 
recounted that at an early training session facilitators defined their role as ‘both 
disseminators of new technology and facilitators of community initiated development 
programmes’ (DFID 1998b, Annex 2: 3). This fitted with the founding philosophy of 
the project, which was that interventions were to be locally owned, locally driven, and 
locally accountable. However it soon became clear that the facilitators identified far 
more strongly with the project itself. Thus far from pressing for payment from fellow 
villagers, their demands were aimed at ZADP. When it did not respond, some took 
retaliatory action, abandoning their jobs or refusing to pay back their goat credit.
The second and connected notion was sustainability. At the localidade level 
sustainability was believed to require effective ‘community participation’ in the 
prioritisation and implementation of activities. This would enthuse beneficiaries and 
reduce the chance of inappropriate externally-imposed activities, thus leading to 
‘community ownership’ and therefore to sustainability. Thus ‘activities that will 
increase the capacity of communities to manage programmes themselves and reduce 
dependence on outside institutions should be encouraged’ (DFID 2001). It was 
suggested by several reviewers of ZADP, who were generally western-educated, often 
white and frequently from the same social group as senior ZADP staff and DFID 
Advisers (see page 69 for details), that the project should develop stronger ‘community- 
level institutions’, specifically to ensure greater project efficacy and sustainability. 
Both the Participatory Impact Assessment and the Mid-Term Review blamed ZADP 
management and policies for the absence of such institutions, noting the project’s 
‘failure’ to:
‘develop a significant amount of new technology that was acceptable to farmers. It 
was considered that greater participation of farmers in the technology development 
process and in the management of agricultural programmes would have developed 
technology more relevant to farmers’ needs and institutions capable of continuing 
the ZADP programmes after ZADP had finished’ (ZADP 2001).
This also was the view of the final project evaluation, in which I was myself involved:
‘it proved very difficult to develop sustainable systems for disseminating 
agricultural knowledge, with a failure to develop active and sustainable community 
level institutions to link with the weak post-project government extension service’ 
(Whiteside, Wrangham, and Gudz 2003).
The object was to instil a sense of obligation and debt to others (to ‘the community’) so that 
institutions and infrastructure would be maintained ( ‘be sustainable’) after ZADP funding was withdrawn.
192
I return to the question of sustainability, and how a project conceptualised as an 
employer/provider can never be sustainable, in the next chapter.
Remarkably, the suggestion that it was the ‘fault’ of ZADP that ‘community-level 
institutions’ were not developed and ‘community participation’ was weak, was accepted 
by project management. But the ‘failure’, as it was seen, was not due to lack of effort. 
Just as I left the project (in mid 2002) there was a wave of enthusiasm for the creation of 
‘goat management committees’, which would be responsible for ensuring the continuity 
of the goat restocking programme after the project had ended. In the face of a great deal 
of evidence that almost all groups established by ZADP were groups in name alone, 
staff still continued to strive towards ‘community ownership’ expressed in the form of 
‘community institutions’. They continued to stress the importance of developing 
‘community-level structures’ even as they ‘failed’, time and again, to establish them.^^^ 
The analysis implied that the problem and the cure for it were to be found internally, 
within project management. As Li put it, ‘proponents and critics alike generally 
interpret ... failures as evidence that more resources and honest effort are needed to 
overcome the problems of backwardness’ (1999: 303). It can thus be argued that ZADP 
accepted blame for failing to bring ‘community’ into being. However staff did find 
something -  not the singular ‘community’ imagined in the Project Memorandum, to be 
sure -  but ‘communities of interest’, groups who were interested in involvement.
Given the arguments of Chapter 2 about relationships between ZADP, World 
Vision and DFID, the suggestion ZADP accepted blame when implementation did not 
go as hoped might seem surprising. Yet this is not contradictory. The point is that in 
the last paragraph I have reified ZADP in a way I have been careful to avoid in other 
parts of the thesis, thus writing that ‘it was the ‘fault’ of ZADP’ that community 
institutions were not established, and that ZADP accepted blame’ for this. By the time 
the project came to an end the most senior individuals responsible for the original 
design and early implementation had moved on, and while those who replaced them did 
not wish to blame their predecessors, they had few qualms about blaming ‘the project’.
After the problems with the CEW concept described above, the project experimented with Community 
Development Committees (CDCs) to ‘guarantee the sustainability of the project through people’s active 
participation’ (ZADP 1999a). Less than a year later it was evident that the committees were not 
functioning and the approach was abandoned. In 2000, a new approach to ‘community planning’ was 
piloted, and in 2001 a project paper proposed a new process of Community Development Planning (CDP) 
which would support an ‘Integrated Community Development Programme’. This was never implemented, 
but instead a process of ‘Participatory Planning with Communities’ (PPC) began in late 2001.
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Thus, in the same way that ‘community’ provided a way to gloss the existence of 
profound political tensions, blaming ‘ZADP’ for failing to find or make ‘community’ 
also provided a scapegoat -  a means to explain development ‘failure’. ‘Community’, in 
all its different contradictory definitions, and both in its presence and its absence, 
proved to be a convenient tool. It should again be recognised that what made it 
powerful was exactly its contestedness, not any overwhelming and irresistible power 
(c.f. Escobar 1995, Sachs 1992).
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked at the multiple ways in which vague and 
contradictory concepts of ‘community’ were mobilised and operationalised at different 
times. I asked why, when used so loosely, and to refer to so many different things, was 
the concept not abandoned? Not only did its very ambiguity gave it strength and 
malleability, it also underlay many of the founding principles of ZADP. A notion of 
‘conununity’ underpinned understandings of sustainability, participation, and ownership. 
Moreover, the term had a strong legitimating effect. Calling an activity a ‘community 
activity’ gave it a validity that it might not otherwise have had. An example of this was 
road repair, described in project documents as ‘conununity access’:
‘The communities in ...[four]... localidades of Gurué District have started collecting 
material using the ZADP tractor to rehabilitate a bridge... There has been a 
significant increase in participation by the target communities resulting in better 
facilitation of the programme. Construction costs have probably reduced since 
communities have been encouraged to utilise local resources, such as gravel, stones 
and wood’ (ZADP 2002, my italics).
This activity actually involved about thirty named labourers who received direct 
payment for their work, but appealing to ‘community’ gave the activity an inunediate 
legitimacy.
In addition to this, I have shown in the chapter that the concept was useful in 
glossing the existence of difficult-to-comprehend political tensions between Frelimo 
and Renamo. Although the everyday experience of staff constantly reminded them of 
the realities of localidade-\ewt\ political division, the rhetoric of ‘conununity’ meant 
that these tensions did not have to be dealt with in the course of project activities. 
Defined eventually as those who chose to turn up to meetings and participate in 
activities, ‘community’ worked to conceal significant and problematic areas of 
difference and division.
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However it must not be forgotten that others were also engaged in strategic 
manipulation of ‘community’. Villagers participating in project meetings would wave 
aside the concerns of some ZADP staff about the representative nature of the points of 
view expressed, insisting that ‘community’ was indeed represented by those attending. 
Political divisions were thus strategically downplayed by participants in project 
meetings, who themselves became involved in the co-constitution of a ‘community’ that 
matched what project staff were looking for. ‘Who is the community?’ asked the 
consultant employed to advise ZADP on bridge building. ‘It is us’ {somos nos) came 
the response from the small group of men -  from all parts of the localidade -  gathered 
in expectation of employment. The importance of relating activities to the notion of 
‘community’ was one potential participants grasped and acted upon. The next chapter 
looks at other ways in which potential beneficiaries attempted to adapt project activities 
to their own desires.
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Chapter 6. Pursuing Ownership, Pursuing Dependence
I spent a lot of my time in Mozambique in a state of confused culture shock. No 
doubt this is a usual part of fieldwork; still, I found it disconcerting that my feelings of 
displacement got stronger rather than weaker as I became more familiar with the 
different arenas in which I worked. As I explained at the outset of the thesis (page 26), 
my fieldwork did not occur within any kind of bounded social setting. A DFID 
employee, placed within an NGO, and also carrying out my own research, I wore many 
hats and moved with perplexing speed between what felt to me like different ‘worlds’. 
One day I would be sitting on a straw mat in Mutange, talking to someone about how 
they made their living; the next I might find myself in a smart Maputo hotel with sea 
view, attending a seminar on aid effectiveness and programme performance 
management. My diet switched chaotically between cassava leaves and xima (maize 
porridge), and the spiced prawns for which Mozambique is justly famous. I would 
spend one evening drinking gin and tonic, watching the sun set over the river in the 
company of a large group of development workers, the next straining my eyes to write 
my field diary by the light of a kerosene lamp in the midst of a large cloud of 
mosquitoes.
I got reasonably used to moving around, to the ‘jet-lag’ I suffered when travelling 
to my field sites (when bedtime moved from midnight to 6.30 pm or earlier). What I 
never got used to, what became more and not less of an issue, was the shift of focus. 
Each time I moved back from the Quelimane round of project meetings, workshops and 
office life to Mutange or Mugaveia, I became more aware of the mal-comprehension, 
the not-understanding each group had of the other, and the lack of purchase each 
group’s explanations had on the other’s lived reality. My growing sense of culture 
shock thus derived less from my own inability to comprehend each group’s ways of life 
than from my mounting awareness of their mutual incomprehension of each others’.
In this chapter I will look at two aspects of this not-understanding: how resources 
channelled through the project were conceptualised; and why they were then 
appropriated or rejected by different people in Mutange and Mugaveia at different times. 
I suggest the relationship between ZADP staff and beneficiaries can be viewed as a
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patron-client relationship, in which beneficiaries -  both individuals and groups -  
identified the project as patron and constituted themselves as its clients. I then argue 
that these client/beneficiaries conceived of their relationship with ZADP as one of 
exchange, and that the ‘gifts’ they received through the project were reciprocated in a 
variety of ways, within a strongly hierarchical and power-laden setting. I further 
suggest that the external attribution of ‘gift-ness’ to the exchanges helps to clarify and 
uncover what were otherwise unarticulated and hidden power relations between 
recipients and donors, at different levels. This builds on the analysis in Chapter 2, 
which examined the power-laden relationship between DFID, World Vision and 
ZADP.'™
For reasons connected to past experience and political allegiance, some people 
within Mutange and Mugaveia came to view ZADP as a patron. This conceptualisation 
‘anchored’ the project, paving the way both for legitimate exchange and for heated 
debate when the project was felt not to be fulfilling its patronly duties. Those who did 
not identify the project in this manner refused to become involved in its activities, even 
alleging that those who took advantage of apparent project generosity and accepted 
goats on credit would later find their own children required in exchange. This contrasts 
starkly with both the perceptions and intentions of ZADP staff. They intended that 
interventions should move towards ‘sustainability’, and that there should be indications 
of growing ‘community ownership’ of activities.
The chapter is an analysis of a historically and contextually specific ‘interface’, to 
use Long’s terminology (1989b). If context is not sufficiently taken into account, then 
it might appear to be premised on an implicit claim of difference and mutual 
incomprehension between the world views of villagers and project officials (cf. Hobart 
1993). However I do not intend to argue that ‘ways of seeing’ were necessarily 
mutually exclusive, or based on different philosophical underpinnings. Instead I 
suggest that the differences I outline here were due to contextual factors, including 
differing historical understanding, and also incorporated a significant aspect of 
manipulation. By attempting to draw ZADP staff into exchange relationships, 
beneficiaries (and in particular facilitators) attempted to force the project to behave in a 
particular acceptable way. Yet at the same time, a lack of understanding of each other’s
Although I carefully distinguished between World Vision and ZADP in Chapter 2, in this chapter I 
follow local usage so that the distinction is collapsed completely (see section 6.2 for further discussion).
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perspectives did also characterise relationships between ‘developers’ and beneficiaries. 
ZADP designers and implementers did not take earlier historical patterns of interaction 
with outsiders into account. Nor did villagers understand the degree to which ZADP 
was working according to terms not of its own staff’s choosing. The result was the mal- 
comprehension and not-understanding that I now describe.
6.1 Community-Owned Development
ZADP’s role in ‘communities’ was originally envisaged as facilitatory and 
collaborative. With a design ‘informed by PRA’ the project was to be ‘sufficiently 
flexible to meet community needs as they are identified’ and to ‘help communities to 
become self-reliant and strengthen capacity for management of their own development’ 
(DFID 1998b: 7, 11). The extension service was to be ‘managed through beneficiaries, 
giving ownership and drawing rights, to provide the basis for a demand driven, 
responsive service. This approach removes financial pressure from the government to 
provide such services, increasing chances of sustainability’ (DFID 1998b: 8).
Sustainability was a key aim for the project, and it was believed that it would be 
promoted by encouraging ‘ownership’ of activities by ‘communities’ (section 5.4). The 
move in project practice described in section 5.3, towards more individual activities, 
was intended to make the project more appropriate, and to give participants a greater 
sense of individual ‘ownership’ over activities. However although these changes 
undoubtedly meant that the activities concerned worked better (more goats survived, 
more seed was repaid), they did not necessarily mean that any ‘sense of ownership’ 
developed.
Consultants and DFID reviewers frequently commented on the lack of local 
‘ownership’ of project activities, raising concerns about effectiveness and whether true 
‘participation’ was really being encouraged (see, amongst others, DFID 1999b, DFID 
2001, Waterhouse and Cavane 2001, Bias et al. 2001). The 2001 Participatory Impact 
Assessment observed that
‘there is little sign of project participants and local organisations moving towards 
ownership and management of project activities. Many project interventions and 
decisions are poorly understood, even by facilitators, and this does not indicate 
farmer-led research and participatory technology development’ (Cavane et al. 2001).
The explanations given for this by reviewers and consultants were generally technical.
It was noted that the project had no professional Social Development Adviser, and was
198
not linking effectively to existing local-level organisations and groups. Management 
and training were identified as the problem areas.
ZADP staff themselves tended to look for explanations at another level. They 
focused mainly on the legacy of the 'emergência\ (emergency), briefly discussed on 
page 23. 'Emergencia' had two main meanings. First, it referred to the time of the war 
and the years immediately following it: a temporal definition. Second, it described a 
way of working distinct from desenvolvimento, development. In the regular plenary 
project meetings, staff repeatedly told villagers present that ‘the time of the emergency 
has past. Now it is the time of development. You should not expect any more 
donations (donativos) or presents (ofertasy. The distinction was repeatedly drawn. For 
many project staff the key defining feature of "desenvolvimento" was that it involved 
credit rather than hand-outs, even when the credit was not repaid. The dual definition 
meant that the move from "emergêncià* to "desenvolvimento’ was neither defined nor 
circumscribed by the transition from war to peace.
According to many project staff, the legacy of the ‘emergency’ was that World 
Vision was widely seen in rural areas as an organisation that handed goods out for free. 
This, they believed, was the main reason why many project activities proved so difficult, 
and why many villagers ‘failed to cooperate’. As two Mozambican members of staff 
put it:
‘There’s the issue of the style in which we entered. People think World Vision just 
gives. That destroyed a lot of our work, a lot of things. I think it had more influence 
in the south [e.g. Mutange] than the north [e.g. Mugaveia]. It created parasitism in 
people. This was a big problem for us in the beginning. It takes a long time to 
change. People think “Ah well, I’ll just eat this, and then either World Vision will 
come back, or another project, and they’ll see that I am poor”. . . ’
(Deputy Agriculture Manager)
‘The worst thing for this project -  and not just ZADP -  was not managing to 
differentiate between World Vision during the emergency and World Vision now...
This is creating a lot of confusion in the heads of the camponeses (villagers). They 
aren’t doing it on purpose, it’s just hard to change someone’s way of thinking.’
(ZADP Vet)
However this was a very development-centric analysis, focusing just on the recent past, 
and just on the development world. The rest of the chapter elaborates an alternative 
explanation of why villagers did not move towards ‘ownership’ of project activities 
with the speed and enthusiasm staff would have wished.
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6.2 Understanding W orld Vision
In this section I look at the range of associations ‘World Vision’ had in Mutange 
and Mugaveia. I show that understandings of World Vision were largely coloured by 
political allegiance, wartime experiences, and to some extent past experiences with 
outsiders. However considerable confusion was generated by the structure of World 
Vision itself. In Zambézia, World Vision implemented multiple projects funded by a 
wide variety of donors. These projects tended to be identified locally simply as ‘World 
Vision’ (and not as ZADP etc.), but had substantially differing aims, objectives, ways of 
working, and geographical spread. In Mutange and Mugaveia this meant that people 
who arrived in a car with a World Vision logo belonging to ZADP might state that 
‘World Vision’ could not provide money to improve the health post, as funds were 
available only for agricultural activities. A week later a team from the USAID-funded 
health project would visit, travelling in a vehicle with an identical World Vision logo, 
and carry out child vaccinations and ante-natal care. Both teams were identified and 
identified themselves as ‘World Vision’; the evident mismatch between words and 
action led to confusion and mistrust.
The ways in which people related to and understood ZADP in Mutange and 
Mugaveia were influenced by wartime experiences and their previous knowledge of 
World Vision. As described in Chapter 3, many people from Mugaveia and Mutange 
spent several years in the late 1980s and early 1990s living in campos dos deslocados 
run by the Frelimo government and different NGOs. Camp residents received regular 
supplies of food and other basic goods such as clothes, kitchen utensils and some tools. 
Depending on who was operating in a particular camp, different organisations were 
identified as the donors of these goods. In the Nicoadala camp, where many people 
from Mutange lived at some point during the war. World Vision had a high profile. 
They ran the hospital, ran supplementary feeding programmes for children, and 
distributed food and other goods. The organisation continued to provide limited support 
after the war ended and the camp closed.
Just as project staff thought. World Vision was indeed identified as a provider of 
‘hand-outs’ by those who had lived in camps. These people felt that ‘World Vision’ 
should continue to provide them with free inputs. Tio Daniel, our host in Mugaveia, 
explained this perspective:
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‘At Invacula [displacement camp] people received a lot of stuff for free, and now 
just expect organisations to bring things for them. If project staff try to sell things 
they are accused of being thieves, and people say you stole these things, the 
whites^^* would have given them to us (Voce roubou, aqueles brancos haviam-de 
dar).'
Although significant, as I explain later in the chapter, this point of view was far from 
universal.
Project staff, at the same time as emphasising the importance of the ‘emergency’ 
legacy, nevertheless believed that the identification of World Vision as a distributor of 
valuable resources was by this time historic (the temporal definition of "emergência\ 
page 199). However such a distinction between a past and present World Vision was 
not legible for most villagers for two reasons. First, World Vision itself continued with 
what could be described as ‘emergency’ practices. For example, the ‘Area 
Development Projects’ funded from Child Sponsorship funds involved hand-outs. In a 
private conversation a senior World Vision staff member told me, ADPs do work in a 
very different way, or at least in a very different way to how most of the projects think 
they work. They do just give things’. S e c o n d ,  there were intermittent responses to 
natural disasters. The floods of 2001 were declared an official 'emergência' (which 
meant that there was a local tax amnesty), and during the year I worked in Mutange 
three different 'donatives' were received, intended to alleviate the effects of flooding. 
The rhetoric about moving away from hand-outs was thus directly and regularly 
contradicted by people’s lived experience.
Whatever the practices of other NGOs, government departments and World 
Vision projects, ZADP staff held firm to the idea that ‘their’ project did represent a real 
move away from ‘emergency’ and towards ‘development’. Hand-outs were not part of 
the ZADP self-image. Nevertheless substantial resources were distributed. Seed was 
given out on credit, and was not always reclaimed, and was provided for free to 
Farmer Research Groups, Farmer Field Schools, and to those who had demonstrations
‘White’ in this context did not refer exclusively to the pale-skinned; see page 90.
ADPs worked with individual sponsored children (who received free health care, schooling and school 
materials, plus private gifts from their sponsor), and at the level o f the ‘community’ (building schools, 
hospitals, wells and bridges, improving roads, and carrying out a range of agricultural activities). Their 
community facilitators were paid.
CCM and ORAM distributed DEC-funded goods at the time of the floods, and rice seed was provided 
through the DDADR in September 2001.
Recipients often alleged that they had harvested too little to permit repayment, and this was not always 
checked. In Mugaveia another NGO provided sunflower seeds on credit after the planting time had 
passed, and then did not even bother to ask for repayment, assuming that harvest would have been poor.
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on their land. Demonstrations of new techniques involved the provision of equipment 
to facilitators, who were also given things like rucksacks, pens, pencils, raincoats and 
boots. Towards the end of the project, facilitators were also given bicycles.
A primary identifying feature of World Vision was thus as a distributor of 
resources. A second was that it was assumed to be closely associated with government, 
and hence also part of Frelimo. I only twice heard World Vision identified as an ONG 
(NGO) in Mutange and Mugaveia, a label that did not in any case distinguish the project 
from either state or party, being just a name. Hence a goat recipient in Mugaveia told 
me that he had repaid the goats he had received to ‘c? estado' (the State). On further 
questioning he said ‘to World Vision’. Various other informants from both Mutange 
and Mugaveia told me that they thanked the government for sending people ‘like us’ to 
their localidade. The conflation of World Vision with government was nothing special; 
all NGOs were identified with government. This was partly because NGO staff 
members often visited localidades with civil servants, and partly because civil servants 
at times claimed (positive) NGO achievements as their own. The manager of another 
World Vision project described how the governor of Zambézia had come to visit their 
intervention area.
‘He stood on the podium and said how they were giving out goats. There was no 
mention of [the project] or World Vision. He said, “In this area, we have done...”
By ‘we’ I think he probably meant government not Frelimo at that particular time, 
but government and Frelimo in [the area] were one and the same.’
In this case and the case of ZADP, such claims were not contested, as staff were keen to 
encourage government ‘ownership’ of their interventions (see Figure 6.1).
This highlights the corollary of the conflation of state/government and World 
Vision: that World Vision was also conflated with Frelimo. As discussed in Chapter 5 
(page 176), although Mozambique was formally a multi-party democracy, in rural 
Zambézia an equivalence was still made between party and state. When ZADP 
provided support to what it considered neutral district and provincial structures, in 
particular the DDADR, this was seen as a political choice, and as support for Frelimo. 
ZADP’s close association with state structures thus received a particular interpretation 
in rural Zambézia: that the project was a Frelimo project.
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Figure 6.1 Formal opening ceremony of bridge built by ZADP in Muximua, Gurué
&
The formal ceremony to open a bridge constructed by ZADP. The ribbon is being cut by the Gurué 
District Administrator, and behind him (in a red shirt) stands the Muximua localidade President. In the 
background stands Agostinho, the Mugaveia técnico, alongside a policeman. All three vehicles belong to 
W orld Vision (ZADP), but one has the logo of the DDADR, Gurué, painted on it. Source: John Steel
A third way in which ZADP was understood in the localidades was as a project 
associated with generally ‘white’ outsiders. Chapter 3 showed that outsiders were 
linked with some of the most traumatic moments of Zambézian history. Zambézia was 
raided heavily for slaves throughout the nineteenth century, and men were exported to 
Sao Tomé as late as the 1930s. Outsiders organised the capture and compulsion of men 
to work on Portuguese-owned plantations, and it was (Mozambican) outsiders who set 
up what are now perceived to have been the exploitative agricultural cooperatives of the 
early socialist period. Yet outsiders had also fulfilled the role of patron, and had 
provided employment in businesses recalled to me with nostalgia. ZADP was thus 
associated both with violence and exploitation, and at the same time with prosperity, 
protection, and the chance of self-advancement.
175 The attributes o f ‘w hiteness’ are discussed on page 90.
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I have here shown that for people from Mugaveia and Mutange World Vision had 
three identifying features: it was a provider of resources; it was associated with the 
government and hence with Frelimo; and it was associated with outsiders. Those who 
had known World Vision or similar organisations during the war saw it as a provider of 
resources, closely connected to the government and hence to Frelimo. For them the 
project was easily constituted as a somewhat capricious but at times munificent patron. 
Historically, relations with white outsiders and with government were relations of 
subordination, and it was therefore not surprising that villagers entered into a 
subordinate relationship with ZADP: such a relationship was entirely assumed and 
taken for granted. Indeed, as I now explore in greater detail, some people actually 
pursued subordination as a strategy for securing better access to valued resources.
6.3 Becoming a Client
When ZADP first arrived in Mutange and Mugaveia, by no means everyone 
wished to become involved in its activities. In Mugaveia there was considerable 
opposition to the project being allowed to operate at all, and many remained suspicious 
for several years. But in both localidades certain people were willing to work with 
ZADP from the outset. They tended to be Frelimo supporters, and those who had spent 
time in the government-run campos dos deslocados during the war years, groups which 
often overlapped. I argue that for these people ZADP was constituted as a patron. 
Constructing it in this manner made it into an understandable entity, with which people 
could enter into what would otherwise have been potentially risky credit relationships.
Patron-client relations are familiar in Zambézia. Hall and Young referred to 
Zambézia as ‘deeply socially divided’ (1997: 183), and noted that the patronato 
(patron-client) system had been resilient enough to absorb Frelimo officials. Here I 
argue that its resilience has been great enough also to absorb new NGO officials, 
themselves identified as part of the state/party. The word patrdo was regularly used to 
refer to white people, employers (actual and potential), important people, and traders 
(Wilson 1991b). The number of patrons had declined enormously since Independence, 
and regrets about the lack of a good patrdo to give one a hand up in life were regularly 
rehearsed. Técnicos were sometimes addressed as "patrdo\ fitting in to what Wilson 
saw as the long-term relationship between elite and peasantry, ‘the continuation of the 
long tradition of patronage whereby allegiance, praise and economic dependence was
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traded for protection and security in a kind of “moral economy’” (Wilson 1991c: 16, see 
also Scott 1976).
It was the new emphasis on credit, and credit administered directly by project staff, 
which made the relationship with ZADP different from the earlier relationship with 
World Vision in the camps. For example, in the Nicoadala camp World Vision ran the 
hospital and feeding programme, both of which were contained activities in which 
outside intervention was considered normal. By contrast a credit relationship was felt to 
be much more socially embedded; as Lewis et. al. have written for Bangladesh, ‘credit 
is not ... a single-stranded commercial transaction, but is part of an unequal patron- 
client relationship’ (1993: 189). Furthermore, interventions in agriculture had many 
resonances with the past (see Chapter 3), most of which were negative. Alongside the 
frequently-recalled exploitation and compulsory employment, the only positive role 
outsiders had fulfilled was that of the sporadically generous patron -  the employer, the 
trader who built roads, the shop-keeper who gave little extra gifts of sugar in addition to 
purchases. Patrons could often be bad, but even the worst ones provided some 
protection against hardship.
For villagers, there were two possible levels of involvement in ZADP. First were 
the facilitators, who were the most enrolled in the project. Though the project 
maintained that they were volunteers, working for their conununities with the support of 
ZADP, their own interpretation of the relationship was as one of employment by a 
deeply unsatisfactory employer. Second were other participants in project activities, 
who also saw themselves as clients, although the commitment on both sides of the 
relationship was less strong.
Frelimo Cooptation
Political allegiance framed participation, and many people interpreted project 
resources as Frelimo’s patronage goods. Project beneficiaries tended to be those who 
were on good terms with the Frelimo secretârios, rather than followers of the Renamo’s 
mambos, régulos and mwenes. It was generally known, if not exactly accepted, that the 
most people involved in the project came, as one Mugaveia facilitator put it, ‘from the 
President’s party’. In both Mutange and Mugaveia the régulo and his immediate 
subordinates (all Renamo supporters) did receive goats, but rank-and-file members were
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far less likely to be beneficiaries than equivalent Frelimo supporters. One elderly 
woman in Mutange explained why she and her family had not received goats:
‘We haven’t received goats because we weren’t included. People don’t think 
anything of this, because it’s the work of the government (as pessoas nao pensam  
nadaporque é trabalho do govem o)... The problem is that the goats are distributed 
in a hidden manner; the donors call the secretdrios, and the secretdrios give the 
names of people who can receive goats -  and they give the names of their 
acquaintances. And we are not friendly with the secretdrio'
There were a number of reasons why, despite the fact that the project claimed 
political neutrality and made attempts to work with people from both parties, Frelimo 
leaders nevertheless managed to capture project goods for their own patronage ends. 
The first was that there was a widespread prejudice against Renamo supporters. Those 
with almost any level of education tended to associate themselves with Frelimo, the 
self-proclaimed ‘modernising’ party (page 173). This group then attributed many of the 
intractable problems facing the project (in particular witchcraft) to the trouble-making 
of Renamo adherents. For example, rumours about what would happen to the recipients 
of project goats were labelled Renamo lies. Likewise, the problems I had in Mugaveia 
were blamed on Renamo rumour-mongering (see Chapter 7).
This tacit prejudice against Renamo by project técnicos and a substantial number 
of the more influential villagers was then exacerbated by other factors. I discussed 
above (page 177) the fact that no account was taken of the political interpretation that 
rural Zambézians made of the project’s funding of government departments. Not only 
was this funding (incorrectly) seen as neutral by project designers, this analysis did not 
change during the process of implementation, and the political implications of providing 
resources to the DDADRs were not acknowledged. The presumed connection with 
Frelimo was if anything further consolidated by the relationship which técnicos then 
established with the localidade President, formally the state representative, but 
universally identified with Frelimo. He was the project’s most important local 
collaborator. Invitations to project meetings were often made through him, and he 
would be requested to invite both Renamo and Frelimo leaders. As our experiences in 
Mugaveia showed (page 189), these requests were often not fully carried out, but when 
an uninvited Renamo leader failed to appear, he would still be blamed for confusao. 
ZADP’s unquestioning acceptance of the fiction of multi-party democracy, and the
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separation of state and party, thus contributed to the exclusion of many Renamo 
supporters from project activities. The result was that many Renamo supporters did not 
want to become involved with ZADP activities, because they did not identify Frelimo as 
a possible patron. The identification of ZADP with Frelimo was reinforced by the flow 
of resources to Frelimo-linked institutions, of information through Frelimo-linked 
leaders, and the involvement of a large number of Frelimo supporters at the level of the 
localidade.
Pursuing Dependence
The individuals most enrolled in ZADP activities were the project facilitators. 
They had been selected when the project first started work in their célula, either by the 
técnico or village leaders, or had nominated themselves. In Mutange, where there had 
been no competition for the job, they tended to be younger men who would have been 
children or adolescents in the war years. In Mugaveia they tended to be rather older, 
and unlike in Mutange, several held local Frelimo party positions. I do not pursue the 
difference further here, but I believe it to have derived from divergent historical 
experiences. As explained in Chapter 4, Mutange had been the site of a socialist 
agricultural cooperative, and the more senior Frelimo leaders devoted their energies 
more to the Association of Mutange Villagers that had replaced the co-operative, than to 
ZADP activities. This older group continued to pin their hopes on the rehabilitation of 
the irrigation scheme, while a younger group, who were excluded from Association 
leadership, were more closely involved with ZADP. The result was that although 
facilitators from both localidades were voluble in their complaints about lack of salary 
and recognition, the sense of betrayal was strongest for the older Mugaveia facilitators. 
They identified World Vision with Frelimo, and so their sense of injustice about non­
payment was not confined to non-payment for their work as facilitators. T have worked 
since 1984 as the head of a Frelimo Dynamising Group’, said one. T thought that as 
World Vision called me, I would at least receive MT 50,000 to pay my children’s 
school expenses.’
Facilitators self-consciously emphasised the relationship between themselves and 
the project, both by stressing the importance of their contribution to World Vision’s 
work, and their own dependence on it. When, after years of argument, a salary payment
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was finally made to them (details on page 215), a facilitator from Mutange commented 
that:
This money is to recognise (yalorizar) the work of the facilitators. The facilitator is 
a bridge. He collects data to give the extension worker, to then be given to the 
directorate. World Vision is now taking into account that they have their youngest 
children (ultimos filhos) in the villages.’
Using this idiom of kinship, certain people chose to describe themselves as dependent 
on World Vision. In a meeting in Vehuia (Gurué district) participants said that:
‘World Vision has provided many things, and without World Vision we feel lost.
There is nobody other than World Vision, we have no other support. We have no 
improved school, no improved health post or infrastructure. We feel forgotten. 
Sometimes teams (brigades) come, but then they disappear again.’
A Mutange facilitator underlined the dependence of villagers on World Vision: ‘We will 
be alright so long as the projects of the whites come. We need them to work with us, so 
that people can get things -  bicycles, radios.’
Dependence was underlined in the way facilitators frequently denied 
understanding the reasons for activities, but pointed out that they still did them out of 
loyalty. Facilitators highlighted their commitment to World Vision, pointing out that 
they had worked for many years without salaries for the good of the project. Many 
talked of their own generosity and goodwill towards the project, and how they were 
willing to do anything the técnico requested of them:
‘We did an experiment, it produced well, and now I am waiting to be told what to do 
with the seed. I am just looking after it now.’
Strategically denying their own agency, the facilitators emphasised their connection 
with the project.
Such docile and compliant behaviour was believed to bring further benefits to 
some individuals. Joao Mario and Isaquiel Anselmo were the two employees of the 
project nursery in Mutange, and both attributed their salaried employment to their long 
and unrewarded participation in a Farmer Field School:
‘World Vision came and needed villagers for a meeting. Villagers went and said 
that they wanted to form a field school group. We were chosen by Jacinta. I was 
then chosen to be head of the fruit trees. Later, there was another training of 
villagers, and we were asked to participate in that training. As I was the head of 
fruit trees I should be there to hold the pots... At the end I was asked to work on the 
nursery project... I got this work because I stayed a long time in the school [FFS] 
without earning anything, and the others desisted. And in this way I was asked to 
work.’
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This kind of example gave hope to other people who continued with what they 
considered to be profitless activities for the project in the expectation of later rewards. 
One of the younger facilitators talked about his wife’s dissatisfaction with his work:
‘My wife laments the [lack of] salary, because of the time I use for these activities.
But when I don’t go, the técnico gets angry. My wife says that I should give up, and 
I say that we should be patient, because nobody knows when it will rain (o dia que 
cat a chuva ninguém sabe).'
The facilitators were not alone in continuing with project activities in the absence 
of payment, to cement a relationship which they hoped would later prove valuable. 
Another facilitator from Mutange explained that although participation in Farmer Field 
Schools and demonstrations had fallen off, some continued to attend in the hope of 
future benefits:
‘People see that they don’t get much from their participation in project activities.
Last year there were a hundred of us, but when people saw that the project was not 
producing an income many ended up abandoning it, and just twenty-five of us were 
left. These people who left are waiting to see what will come in the future from the 
project. If they don’t get good results, they too will leave.’
Although facilitators called attention to their docility and their willingness to do
whatever World Vision wished, they did not necessarily think that they were being
asked to do sensible things. Indeed, their willingness to do activities that they saw little
point in was, to them, clear evidence of their goodwill and commitment. Facilitators
from both Mutange and Mugaveia continued planting seeds in lines for the project, even
though they would not do it in their own fields because they felt it took far too much
time.
Being a client of the project was expected to bring benefits in relation to one’s 
commitment, with rewards for facilitators being substantially greater than those given to 
‘ordinary’ beneficiaries. Both groups expected that their participation would guarantee 
them access to resources, in particular goats and seeds, and in general this was indeed 
the case. Facilitators had privileged access to goats (after a brief focus only on the 
‘poorest of the poor’); demonstrations of improved granaries or new storage methods 
provided them with the technologies; and they were always the first recipients of seeds.
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seedlings and cuttings, and the first to be chosen for training. They also benefited from 
a less official flow of favours, in particular in the form of lifts in project vehicles.
Beneficiaries, and in particular facilitators, expected that técnicos and/or senior 
staff would help them out when they were in difficulties, by taking children to hospital 
or employing family members during hungry periods. This did happen in the context of 
the personal relationships which the técnicos inevitably developed during the course of 
their work and residence in the villages. However it was a matter of access to 
individual networks and resources, rather than to the project as a whole, and had to be 
negotiated and renegotiated with each individual member of project staff.
The fact that project resources went mostly to Frelimo supporters served to 
strengthen both the sense that the project was a patron, and the identification of the 
project with Frelimo. It was to be expected that a patron would reward his clients, and 
thus the provision of resources to Frelimo supporters made sense. The provision of 
resources in itself also reinforced a sense of difference between project and recipients; 
as Stirrat and Henkel observed, gifts emphasise rather than disguise difference (1997).
6.4 Exchange and Reciprocation
I have so far discussed the nature of the relationship between a project constituted 
as ‘patron’ by individuals constituting themselves as ‘clients’, and the one-way flow of 
resources that this involved. But a closer examination of the relationship shows that 
resources flowed in the other direction as well, and that there was in fact exchange. 
Lying alongside the relatively uncontroversial flow of resources from project to 
beneficiaries was another much more hidden but still important flow of goods and 
services in the opposite direction. It is because this exchange was unsolicited that I 
believe it can be compared with gift exchange.
What, then, is gift exchange? A great many people have written about what makes 
a gift, how gift exchange relationships operate, and what distinguishes gifts from 
commodities (for example Mauss 1954, Osteen 2002, Godelier 1999, Carrier 1995,
World Vision rules stated that only employees could travel in World Vision cars. This was interpreted 
to include project facilitators, para-vets, local leaders and known participants. Others were fairly 
rigorously excluded. As both villages were more than 10 km from the nearest public transport, and 
Mugaveia was 70 km from Gurué, this was a very valuable perk.
The distinction is important because some areas saw significant técnico turnover, and relationships had 
to be renegotiated with each incoming técnico. Nor could senior staff be relied on for help.
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Gregory 1982, Weiner 1992). Zelizer (1998: 329) makes a useful distinction between a 
gift (a voluntary bestowal), an entitlement (right to a share) and compensation (direct 
exchange, generally in the form of a market transaction). Gifts occur within 
relationships, and both express and create moral and social bonds between giver and 
receiver. Gregory (1997, 1982) contrasted gifts and commodities, arguing that they 
create different kinds of debts and therefore different kinds of relationships between 
transactors. In particular, gifts are always interested, they always come with intentions 
-  the ‘free gift’ is almost never found. Gifts are also rarely unreciprocated, and a web 
of relations is thus both reflected and developed.
With ZADP there was often material reciprocation for project inputs. Colleagues 
who worked on livestock (the most popular activity) generally came back from their 
field visits laden with gifts -  cassava, sweet com, sugar cane, squashes, sometimes even 
chickens. The rest of us were also given presents, though rather less frequently, and in 
smaller amounts. Some of the project facilitators regularly gave staff little gifts of 
produce from their fields, and these individuals were known by name to most project 
staff. Reciprocation for the project ‘gift’ mirrored the more general exchanges that 
occurred as part of everyday life. Rita regularly exchanged gifts with our host family. 
She would bring clothes and little toys for Lita’s new baby (Figure 1.25), and leave 
laden with maize, eggs, beans. When I gave an informant a Christmas ‘gift’ of money, 
because his granary had just burnt down, he later insisted that I have a chicken in return. 
Project gifts were reciprocated in just the same way as other gifts.
It was not only material goods that flowed in both directions within the nexus of 
project-beneficiary relations. Beneficiaries saw their presence at project meetings and 
demonstrations as part of an exchange. Attending meetings or weeding demonstration 
crops was not only a prerequisite for receiving bigger benefits, as the example of Joao 
and Isaquiel above showed; it was also something that those who had already received 
such benefits felt obliged to continue doing.
But if, as I have argued, being a client involved reciprocation for ‘gifts’ and 
resources received, then why was it that such reciprocation was so small in scale and 
went so long unrecognised? The answer relates to the mis-recognition of World 
Vision’s position, that is, the mis-identification of the project with government and 
hence Frelimo. Since people confused World Vision with the state/Frelimo,
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reciprocation to the wrong organisation was equally plausible, so that people could 
repay World Vision with increased loyalty to Frelimo. The expressions of thanks to 
government that I have already cited would appear to be evidence for this, as well as 
substantial attendance at important localidade meetings.
Rejecting Exchange, Rejecting a Relationship
I noted above that only certain people were willing to accept ZADP as a patron at 
the outset of the project. They tended to be Frelimo supporters and people who had 
lived in the wartime campos dos deslocados, who had come into contact with 
organisations like World Vision before. I argue that those who did not fall into these 
categories were nervous about the implications of accepting ‘gifts’ from ZADP. Gifts 
coming from an organisation or individual that was neither known nor understood, were 
considered to be risky, as the form of pay-back was unclear.
The war-time displacement camps, though heavily populated, by no means housed 
everyone. A significant number of people from Mugaveia never moved to Invacula, the 
site of the local camp. Some went to Nauela, where they lived in a Renamo-occupied 
area, feeding themselves from machamhas on borrowed land, and moving from place to 
place. Others were even more peripatetic, fleeing from cave to cave in the mountains, 
afraid of being captured by either side. These people did not receive food, tools, or 
health care, and were given no support with resettlement. No NGOs had worked in 
Mugaveia before World Vision arrived with ZADP, and for people who had not spent 
time at Invacula, this was their first contact with an NGO.^^^
Consequently, in Mugaveia, and indeed across much of Gurué district, many 
project interventions were greeted with considerable suspicion. I was told that when a 
ZADP team first visited Mugaveia in 1997 (to do PRA work), people thought that the 
white men among the group had come to buy land, and perhaps to take children (see 
Chapter 7). The organisation was seen as both illegible and potentially malign, and 
many people wished to wait a while before entering into a close relationship with it. In 
Mutange, by contrast. World Vision was well-known because of its role in the 
Nicoadala camps.
As noted in Chapter 3, Mugaveia also differed from Mutange in not having experienced large-scale 
investment in an agricultural cooperative; outside intervention in agriculture was thus even stranger in 
Mugaveia.
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In Mugaveia suspicion was exacerbated by the strong village-level influence of 
Renamo (see section 5.2). As World Vision was assumed by both Frelimo and Renamo 
supporters to be intimately connected to the Frelimo government, few Renamo 
supporters in Mugaveia were keen on what they saw as a close relationship with an 
organ of the ‘wrong’ party.
The reasons given for refusing to become involved in project activities centred on 
the potentially dangerous implications of exchange with an illegible organisation. Fears 
about the implications of accepting unsolicited gifts which could not easily be 
reciprocated continued for several years in parts of Gurué district, particularly in 
connection with the goat restocking programme. Informants in Mugaveia almost 
always related their concerns about receiving goats to fears about exchange: given the 
high value of the animals it was presumed that large demands would be made in 
return. Numerous people refused goats, explaining that they were frightened that 
they might later be required to surrender their children in exchange. This was not a 
concern about debt, but about exchange; I heard no concerns that children might be 
taken if a person failed to repay credit. The story was current in all ZADP’s Gurué 
localidades, and was much debated. Facilitators, who like project staff laughed at these 
fears, said that people were unable to believe that they were getting something for free: 
‘People thought like this because it was new -  a project had never given a gift of a goat 
or anything, so people marvelled, and suspected’. These fears were less widespread by 
the time I started my fieldwork, although one Mugaveia facilitator told me that some 
people still thought that the project gave things in order to later take children: ‘they 
don’t think that the project is only there to help them’.
I have here argued that when people felt that the resources being offered by the 
project were ‘unanchored’ gifts -  by which I mean that they came from an illegible 
institution for incomprehensible reasons -  they were refused. Individuals and families 
came to understand and develop a relationship with the project and its staff at different
Concerns about the ‘real’ nature of World Vision’s work were not confined to villagers. Rita was 
stopped one day in the street in Gurué by a man who worked for the district administration. He cross­
questioned her at length, first about the political situation in Mugaveia (of which she denied any 
knowledge), and then about the real reason for World Vision’s projects. He said: ‘It’s not possible to 
receive all this help Just as a donation -  what is the real aim of the work?’ When she referred him to her 
World Vision superiors he said that he knew what they would say, but hoped that ‘people who are inside 
could perhaps find something out’.
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moments. From that point, gifts were no longer unanchored, and thus the particular 
risks associated with free-floating gifts no longer applied.
Contesting Patronage; Unseating Voluntarism
I considered above the ways in which project beneficiaries, especially facilitators, 
exaggerated their dependence on the project as part of a strategy to make the most of a 
subordinate position. In the last section I looked at the reasons why some people did 
not wish to enter into an exchange relationship with ZADP, and showed that they were 
connected to historical experience and political affiliation. I now look briefly at what 
happened when individuals from Mutange or Mugaveia did enter into what they 
identified as an exchange relationship with the project, but their expectations were 
disappointed when the project did not behave in the expected patron-like way. These 
were people who later felt that they had been deceived or lied to by ZADP, and that 
their participation had not brought them what they had envisaged.
I have already looked at some of the contestations over ZADP not providing 
sufficient benefits to its ‘clients’ ( ‘Pursuing Dependence’, above). Beneficiaries 
frequently said that World Vision should pay the people who ‘worked for it’, because 
they abandoned their household activities to do project activities without payment. 
Voluntarism was not recognised as a valid way of working. Writing of the national 
level, Christie and Hanlon commented that voluntarism ‘is seen as a hangover of the 
socialist era’ (2001: 7), while my informants repeatedly contested the validity of ‘doing 
things for free’ (see for example comments made by a Frelimo leader from Mutange, 
page 20). Contestation was particularly acute when beneficiaries compared their 
situation with that of the técnicos. One man from Mutange, who was at the time almost 
unique in receiving a small salary for his work on the project nursery, nevertheless 
criticised the differentiation between the treatment given to técnicos and to villagers:
‘The people who work with us are benefited -  they come on motorbikes -  and so 
people wonder whether those in charge are really saying good things? It’s better 
that I sit in my own house, getting on with my own household activities. If the 
project paid people, it would run well.’
Some speculated that the técnicos were profiting at their expense, and as a result 
stopped participating in project activities. As time went on, fewer people attended 
project meetings. One técnico told me that when people did not receive the magnifying
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glasses and hoes they had been promised, they ceased visiting the demonstration fields. 
Another ex-beneficiary in Mutange said that in the absence of a single hoe, or a single 
pair of boots to protect his feet from snakes, he had decided to abandon his work with 
the project.
As part of the contestation, the trustworthiness and truthfulness of the project was 
questioned. The legitimacy of providing inputs on credit rather than as donations was 
disputed, and the honesty of the técnicos called into question. When project policy 
changed, so that seeds once provided on credit were sold (at a subsidised price), it was 
widely suspected that this was actually a corrupt payment being demanded by the 
individual técnico. In a similar fashion it was believed that World Vision as an 
institution was not straightforwardly honest, due to confusion about the structure of the 
organisation and its projects (discussed above, page 200).
The most highly contested example of ‘betrayal’ concerned pay for project 
facilitators. The original intention had been that ZADP should pay facilitators for the 
first year, and that ‘communities’ should pay for their services thereafter (see Chapter 5). 
It almost immediately became clear that ‘communities’ would do no such thing, and so 
the project also held off giving any direct financial incentives, for fear of creating 
dependence. Instead, they were given various goods to help them with their work: 
rucksacks, waterproof jackets and trousers, boots, pens, notebooks, and sometimes 
scales and storage vessels. As described above, they were also the first recipients of any 
project inputs or training.
Although complaints about the lack of salary were constant, the situation 
remained fairly stable for several years. Then two things happened. First, in early 2000 
World Vision’s Child Sponsorship programme began to operate an Area Development 
Project (ADP) in Namacurra District, in one of the localidades where ZADP had 
already been operational for over three years. ‘World Vision’ (i.e. the ADP) recruited 
facilitators and immediately started to pay them an ‘allowance’ {gratificaçào) of MT 
200,000 per month (about US$ 12). This caused instant uproar amongst ‘World Vision’ 
(ZADP) facilitators who heard that the new collaborators were being paid whilst their 
own conunitment and hard work was ignored. Although the decisions had been taken 
by independent projects, funded by different donors and with different policies, in 
Namacurra this behaviour by ‘World Vision’ (singular) was seen as treacherous. Faced
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with the prospect of a total strike by facilitators, ZADP management ‘agreed to buy 
each [facilitator] a bicycle and pay them a small fee for work completed but will not pay 
them a salary’ (ZADP 2000). In Mutange and Mugaveia this did not entirely resolve 
the problems. The level of payment was extremely low (US$ 6^ ^  ^per agricultural year, 
for each seed or goat group formed or assisted). Money and bicycles were not available 
to all facilitators, and arrived many months late. There was also the added complication 
of further uproar caused by the rat-trapping component.
I discuss the rat-trapping component in much greater detail in Chapter 7, because 
the destabilisation it caused revealed tensions and problems that went right to the heart 
of ZADP. A research project intended to demonstrate that village-scale trapping was 
effective and viable, it required data to be collected on a daily basis in both Mutange 
and Mugaveia. This was carried out by rat data collectors, known locally as 
facilitadores de ratos, rat facilitators. They were paid US$ 1 per day, an extremely high 
salary in local terms. Técnicos were told not to choose project facilitators as rat data 
collectors, because the extra work might cause them to neglect their ZADP 
responsibilities. Their exclusion caused outrage. ZADP facilitators were bitter about 
the fact that the new recruits were being paid in preference to them. ‘World Vision’ 
was once again felt to have failed the people who had been most loyal to it, and to have 
privileged those with least commitment. A facilitator in Mutange said that,
‘There is no friendship with the people from the rat project, because we were the 
first and yet we have no salary, while the rat people were the last and yet they have 
salaries and their lives are improving. And we don’t know why there is this 
difference.’
This dispute demonstrates the depth of the difference between what ZADP wished 
the facilitators to be, and how they imagined themselves. As James found in South 
Africa, involvement with an NGO was a way of ‘acquiring distance from, rather than 
being embedded more deeply in, an undifferentiated “community”’ (James 2002: 
183).^^^ Pigg’s analysis of traditional medical practitioners in Nepal found the same 
distinction: ‘every time a person with the “local perspective” is enlisted in development
I denominate these payments in US$ following ZADP practice. The project ran dollar budgets, and all 
Mozambican (as well as expatriate) staff salaries were quoted in dollars in order to inflation-proof them. 
Although payments to facilitators were quoted in dollars they were paid in (a fluctuating number of) 
meticais, causing considerable confusion and suspicion that money had been stolen.
This was equally true of técnicos and senior Mozambican staff. Técnicos were insistent in their 
demands for car driving lessons and English lessons -  neither of which were skills they required in their 
jobs -  that would take them further from fieldwork (cf. Black 1991: 168).
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work that person switches sides’ (Pigg 1997: 259). But for 21ADP facilitators the 
difference went still deeper, as they did not see themselves merely ‘involved’ or 
‘enlisted’ in ZADP, but employed by it. In the past, much of the work done for or 
organised by ‘outsiders’ was paid at least at a nominal rate (Chapter 3). This payment 
had made a key contribution to the multiple livelihoods described in Chapter 4, which 
were ignored by agencies such as ZADP.
In the dispute over the rat component, ‘World Vision’ was felt to have 
transgressed, and not to have acted as a ‘good’ patron. A number of facilitators stopped 
working, preferring to get on with their own lives rather than waste more time investing 
in a relationship which was so unproductive. Others continued work until the bicycles 
they negotiated in 2000 arrived in late 2001; they promptly sold them and left for 
Maputo in search of jobs. But the great majority continued as before, still hoping that 
their investment would pay off, and unwilling to take the much greater risk of leaving to 
look for work elsewhere. These people continued to attend sporadic village meetings, 
complaining on every possible occasion about lack of recognition and remuneration, 
and continuing to demand ZADP support for school and hospital buildings.
6.5 Debating Interpretations
I have here chosen to look at the relationship between ZADP staff and 
beneficiaries through a lens that would probably have been surprising to many project 
staff, had I discussed this interpretation with them. I did not because at the time I was, 
like them, unable to see it. Patron-ship and client-ship went directly against the 
founding principles of the project and for this reason the criticism made by Keith Mason, 
a DFID Adviser, during the Mid-Term Review (see Chapter 2) was devastating:
‘It won’t be surprising anybody if I use terms that have been thrown out during the 
last few days, and these words are top-down, handout, prescriptive and effectively a 
patronage system in the way that it operates.’
As I have shown here, there was indeed a relationship of exchange (of favours and 
resources) operating between a project constituted as patron, and individuals who 
constituted themselves as its clients. But although the relationship was one in which 
project staff -  especially técnicos -  constantly participated, they remained largely
Owing to time and language constraints, and to the fact that my ideas developed considerably during 
writing up, when I had already left Mozambique, I discussed these ideas with only a small number of 
former colleagues.
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unaware of its significance to beneficiaries. They attempted to refute the ‘oppressively 
mendicant’ attitude they found amongst many beneficiaries, and disputed their 
identification as the ‘mere conduits for relief items’ they were widely perceived to be 
(Allen 2000: 165). They therefore identified exchanges and gifts very differently.
First, although it was common knowledge that gifts were given to staff by 
recipients of project inputs, this was seen as simple courtesy and generosity, not 
exchange. ‘How can people be so generous when they have so little?’ said one 
expatriate member of staff. Gifts, always of food, were believed to be given to 
individuals, rather than to ‘the project’, further obscuring any idea of institutionalised 
and formal exchange.
Second, as I discussed earlier, ZADP técnicos and senior staff associated ‘gifts’ 
with ‘emergency’ work, from which ZADP was believed to be distinct. ‘The time of 
desenvolvimento' was said to mean that gifts/hand-outs/donations were all in the past, 
and that now was the time of co-participation, comparticipaçào (i.e. provision of 
materials or labour), and credit.
Third, distinctions were drawn between different kinds of goods. The pencils, 
bicycles and boots given to facilitators were seen as an estimulo (stimulus) or 
gratificaçào (tip), rather than gifts or donativos. Goods given to ‘the community’ on 
credit -  even if the credit was never repaid -  were believed to be qualitatively different 
to the donativo or oferta provided during an ‘emergency’, for which no payment at all 
was required. The provision of improved forms of seed, or the materials to do 
agricultural demonstrations was further justified on ‘public good’ grounds. In response 
to analysis in my own final report to the project (Wrangham 2002), one World Vision 
staff member gave me a complex analysis of different kinds of goods, based on the 
work of Carney (1998):
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‘Goods are generally thought to have two properties. Non-excludable are those 
where it is difficult to exclude someone else from consuming the good. Non- 
subtractable are those where consumption by one individual does not reduce the 
availability of the good to other individuals. Thus there are four general categories:
• Public goods are non-excludable and non-subtractable.
• Private goods are excludable and subtractable.
•  Toll goods (e.g. toll roads) are non-subtractable but are excludable.
•  Common pool goods are subtractable but non-excludable.
Sweet potato and cassava^®  ^are generally considered common pool goods. It is 
difficult to exclude people from using [them] as they are very easily propagated. 
Thus the situation is a little more complicated here. The idea would be that the 
government research and extension would work on providing these to farmers in the 
future. A private sector firm or locally based person could in the future make some 
money by selling these in the first couple of years after release but then they would 
almost be freely available. Bicycles and rat-traps are considered private goods.’ (E- 
mail, 03.01.03)
Although the complexity of analysis varied, all project staff drew distinctions between 
the kinds of goods provided that were never mirrored in conversations I had with 
beneficiaries. Técnicos I knew well saw no contradiction between saying that the 
"emergência’ was over and the time of "desenvolvimento' had come, while continuing to 
distribute bicycles, pencils, improved cassava and rat-traps.
6.6 Conclusion
ZADP’s inability to see itself as villagers, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, 
saw it -  as a patron involved in a web of exchange relations -  both resulted from and 
contributed to its inability to analyse power relations. The blindness of project staff to 
the realities of exchange and the hierarchical power relations that structured it, was 
mirrored in the weak analysis of intra-conununity power relationships described in 
Chapter 5. ZADP staff were profoundly naïve about power relations between recipients, 
and how project resources were used to consolidate and structure relationships. As I 
showed in Chapter 5, it was not that staff were unaware of power relationships and 
hierarchy, but they were unable to make use of this awareness in their work.
ZADP staff were far from alone in their blindness to power, a blindness that it can 
be argued extends to ‘development’ itself. When I started to think about this chapter I 
looked for literature on patron-client relationships and gift exchange in aid, yet I found
New improved varieties provided by the project to individuals with no obligation to ‘pass on the gift’.
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that almost nothing had been written about either s u b j e c t / I t  would seem that this 
originally perplexing absence is itself associated with power. There has long been an 
ill-articulated unease amongst development professionals about what is perceived as the 
demeaning nature of ‘charity’. As a result, flows of money and resources have been 
gradually relabelled, with ‘aid’ renamed ‘development cooperation’ or ‘development 
assistance’, and ‘beneficiaries’ or ‘recipients’ called ‘partners’. The change in 
vocabulary mutes and disguises the relationship, but does not of itself alter its nature 
(Benthall 2001).
The implications of analysing aid as an exchange are disturbing to development 
professionals. Considerable work has been done on the extent to which foreign aid has 
been used to develop and retain control of geopolitical spheres of influence (e.g. Fowler 
1998, Lundborg 1998), a clear exchange of loyalty for funds. But a connection between 
development aid and either foreign policy objectives or trade (tied aid) is now widely 
seen as unacceptable (although it does of course continue). By implication, other forms 
of covert exchange are also problematic. In a relationship of ‘development cooperation’ 
between ‘partners’, even conditionality and the hierarchical relationships it highlights 
are uncomfortable (cf. Chapter 2). Inequalities of power are distasteful and alarming to 
many people working in aid, who are all too conscious of the potential for accusations 
of racism or even (covert) imperialism.
Both ‘gifts’ and ‘patronage’ are thus morally complex. Gifts are worrying 
because of the implications of partiality, of personal relationships and overtones of 
outdated ‘emergency’ work. Senior ZADP staff wished to see themselves as impartial 
professionals, unswayed by personal likes or dislikes, fulfilling their part in an 
organised and impersonal process of responding to ‘community needs’. ‘Gifts’ and 
‘patronage’, with their connotation of exchange, reciprocity, and a web of lasting -  
albeit unequal -  relationships, did not lie well with technical professionalism, with 
‘increasing community ownership’ or moves towards ‘sustainability’. This de- 
politicising and technicalising of what were at root issues connected to politics and 
power supports Ferguson’s argument that ‘development’ ‘is an “anti-politics machine”, 
depoliticising everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight’ 
(1990: xv).
Exceptions include Byben (2003b) Stirrat and Henkel (1997) and Werner (2000).
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Evaluators of ZADP did indeed focus on ‘technical fixes’ to the problems they 
identified. For example, concerns were raised in the FIA about the nature of 
interactions between project staff and ‘community members’:
‘Plans are not developed with local people in a way that they have a clear 
understanding of them, or use them as a reference point for discussing progress.
Research and demonstrations are not carried out with farmers as co-researchers and 
active managers of experiments. Facilitators are messengers (of technical and 
managerial matters) rather than facilitators of learning or active experimenters 
themselves’ (Cavane et al. 2001).
Yet the suggestions made for changes were all managerial or technical, and there was 
no serious consideration of the reasons for the situation, or the ways relationships were 
strategically exploited by participants. The conclusion of these consultants, that 
‘participation in the FLA demonstrated real interest and capacity to be more active 
partners...with ZADF’ (Cavane et al. 2001) is itself debatable. The argument I have 
made here would suggest that building up ‘real’ ownership of project activities was 
antithetical to what many beneficiaries saw as most valuable about their involvement: 
that it created a relationship with a powerful, and hopefully protective outside 
organisation. The intention of participants in the FLA was to strengthen and deepen 
their relationship with ZADF staff. They therefore made efforts to say what they 
believed project staff wanted to hear, efforts that were redoubled whenever more 
important (white-skinned or southern Mozambican) visitors attended project meetings 
(cf. Jackson 1997: 242).
This is not to say that some managerial and technical changes were not needed, in 
addition to a broader reconsideration of ZADF’s role. The image of World Vision as 
resource distributor was after all not confined to villagers, but shared by many staff. 
Although none of the senior staff (Mozambican or expatriate) had worked for World 
Vision during the ‘emergency’, many of the técnicos had started their careers in the late 
1980s, and had been involved in the distribution of ‘AgFaks’ (plastic buckets containing 
packets of seeds and basic tools). Encouraged by the fact that World Vision was itself a 
strongly hierarchical organisation, and that ZADF had a hierarchical relation with its 
donor (see Chapter 2) it was easy for staff to fall back into old patterns of behaviour, 
providing inputs and imparting knowledge to villagers conceived of as passive 
recipients. This was cemented by the fact that they were not only meant to establish 
‘sustainable community institutions’ (which required new ways of working), but also to
221
deliver services. ‘Ownership’ was not encouraged by a controlling attitude on the part 
of técnicos, one of whose main tasks was to monitor and check up on what people were 
doing with project-provided inputs. When a recipient who had repaid his credit decided 
to slaughter all his goats to pay hospital costs, técnicos were deeply disapproving: ‘He 
should have kept some’ said the livestock técnico. ‘That’s not what’s meant to happen. 
He should have kept some, for seed. If an evaluation team goes there, they won’t find 
those animals, and will think that we did nothing, while in fact the animals we gave 
have been killed.’
Casting ZADP as a patron allowed ‘beneficiaries’ a level of leverage over World 
Vision that would otherwise have been denied to them. Emphasising their dependence 
on the project, their gratefulness to it, and the power that staff had over them, 
beneficiaries in turn were trying to gain a level of control over ZADP, and to define a 
role for themselves in a situation in which their own agency was limited. Those who 
did not wish to get involved did not deny the identification of the project as patron; they 
were simply indicating their unwillingness to become involved with it. Ironically, it 
could even be argued that the suspicions of this group, and their tendency to fight shy of 
processes over which they had limited control was itself based on a desire for self 
sufficiency: ultimately, for the kind of ‘sustainability’ and non-dependence which 
ZADP was itself advocating.
Like the rest of the thesis so far, this chapter has dealt with both of my fieldwork 
localidades, and has argued that to a considerable extent the same processes 
characterised the two sites. However important differences have also emerged. 
Mutange was a less remote localidade, and one from which a higher proportion of 
people fled to displacement camps with an NGO presence. It had also been the site of 
substantial agricultural investment in the early 1980s. Political division was not evident 
on an everyday basis, and organisation around political parties was not central. I have 
also argued that the fact that long-serving Frelimo leaders tended to be involved with 
the Association of Mutange Villagers rather than with ZADP, meant that there was less 
of the sense of betrayal that characterised relations between Mugaveia 
leaders/facilitators and the project. The result was that suspicion of ZADP was less 
widespread in Mutange than in Mugaveia. In Mugaveia, a more remote localidade from 
which many people had fled in small groups to the mountains, both political parties had
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a strong everyday presence, and divisions coalesced around party politics. The next 
chapter focuses specifically on Mugaveia, and on questions of trust and envy in the 
context of project relationships.
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Chapter 7. Trust and Envy
At the start of August 2001, Rita and I returned to Mugaveia after several weeks’ 
absence. We had sent word that we would be coming, and Francisco Namatala, the 
Frelimo leader with whom we regularly worked, was waiting for us at our house. We 
clambered out of the Landrover, and were soon ready to set off for the interviews he had 
arranged, but as he continued to sit on our three-legged chair, twisting his threadbare hat 
and smiling at the floor, we realised something was up. The village President, said Sr. 
Namatala, had forbidden us to do any more work without first consulting him. Unable 
to worm any more details out of our friend we headed for the President’s house. A 
jumbled story greeted us. A report had reached the President that he, Rita, and I had 
been seen in the village cemetery, digging for bones in the dead of night. At the same 
time a rumour had started to circulate that the rat data collectors were undertaking some 
kind of ‘hidden work’ (trabalho escondido), and that the white ‘owners’ of the project -  
including me -  were secretly employing them to murder.
The rat data collectors were working as part of a trapping project, a new part of 
ZADP. In Nicoria two hundred households had each been provided with ten rat-traps, 
which they set each night, and the number of rats caught was recorded each morning by 
a local data collector. For three days in each month the rat corpses themselves were 
collected, to be weighed and sexed. On those three days thirty other households from 
Inhape were loaned ten traps, from which corpses were also collected.
For my informants, the purpose of these activities was deeply obscure. Although 
an introductory meeting had been held in Nicoria, few had attended, and local leaders 
had not been specifically invited. Nobody could explain why some had been lucky 
enough to receive the traps, or how traps would spread through the community. ‘Rat- 
traps don’t breed’, said one man, ‘it would have been better to have had a cat project’. 
The employment of the rat data collectors also caused concern as, against all previous 
project policy, they were paid a regular salary of US$ 30 per month. Why was it that 
the newest employees were being so richly rewarded, when the faithful facilitators 
continued essentially as volunteers?
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Figure 7.1 Rats in project-supplied traps
m m
Figure 7.2 Trapped rats being measured
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Moreover, the rat data collectors were given equipment and a uniform -  this in a 
place where matching clothes were almost unheard of. Their equipment included latex 
gloves and scales. Latex gloves were associated with hospital-based childbirth, and 
neither informants nor the data collectors themselves were able to explain why they 
were needed for handling dead rats.
The rumours that we first heard that day provided an explanation both for the 
exorbitant payments, and for the peculiar equipment. It was said that a woman had been 
attacked at night by one of the rat data collectors, who had intended to kill her. Had he 
succeeded, her heart would have been removed (using the medical gloves, which would 
mean that the murderer could not be detected by machines), weighed (using the scales), 
and then according to some accounts given to me to take to my home country to allow 
me to get rich. The bones from the cemetery were to be used for the same purpose: for 
the manufacture of droga (medicine) to bring wealth.
Figure 7.3 Eating roasted rat
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Rat data collector and another individual eating 
roasted rat. The rat data collector is wearing his 
uniform. (Source: Belmain 2002.)
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7.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on allegations of occult trading, both those made in the 
episode recounted above, and those which surfaced in various forms at different stages 
of the project. I explore the hidden arts that people associated with ZADP, and consider 
the situations in which accusations of involvement with the occult arose. The chapter 
follows directly from the last, which argued that ZADP was only able to establish 
legitimate exchange relationships with those who identified it as a patron. Here I go 
further, and look at how trust and confidence in ZADP as an institution was built up 
and/or fractured through the practical operation of project activities. This allows me to 
show that legitimation and recognition were ongoing processes, and were shaped by the 
choices and decisions that project staff and participants made.
I make two main arguments. The first is that talking about the occult proved to be 
a productive way for people to discuss relationships not only with ZADP, but with the 
state and with each other. What West called the ‘discursive terrain of sorcery 
accusations’ (West 1997b) was in Mugaveia used as a way of talking both about issues 
associated with the morality of accumulation, and also about the possibility and 
impossibility of entering into relationships with organisations where ‘trust’ was required. 
Second, although the chapter, like the thesis, is focused on ZADP, I suggest that the 
implications of these ways of talking extended further than the project itself. Attitudes 
towards the occult, as towards traditional leaders, were said to distinguish Renamo and 
Frelimo. Frelimo supporters and ZADP staff, identifying themselves as modernisers, 
tended to blame problems, confusao (confusion, dissent), and desinformaçâo 
(disinformation) on Renamo adherents. For them, talk of the occult was redolent of the 
destabilising agenda they associated with Renamo. By contrast, Renamo leaders 
rejected the suggestion that they alone made and believed accusations, a repudiation that 
my own research bore out. I show that members of both political parties were involved 
in accusations and counter-accusations relating to the hidden arts, and I explore how the 
occult realm became another arena of political struggle.
I also suggest that this realm was one in which villagers were able to assert some 
agency over ZADP staff, who were generally far more powerful than them. This was 
partly because the influence of the hidden arts on project implementation was -
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unsurprisingly -  not considered in project design. It was thus one area in which ZADP 
staff were very much not in control, and where they found themselves confronted by 
situations they had not expected. Moreover, as modernisers themselves, they were 
easily wrong-footed, especially as many of them were in fact deeply ambivalent in their 
attitudes towards the occult. Despite this ambivalence, a rationalising, evidence- 
demanding approach to accusations of occult trading prevented ZADP from developing 
an analysis which would have allowed them to see the realm of the occult as another 
contested sphere, with different parties manipulating strategically within it.
Analysing the occult as another arena of struggle widens the general argument 
that development projects of necessity operate within existing social structures. These 
structures are shaped by conflicts between social strata, gender, age, ethnic and religious 
groups, and as a result the benefits brought by a project -  which may be economic, 
social, or otherwise intangible -  are interpreted, shared out and struggled over in the 
context of these already-existing structures, riddled with vested interests and hidden 
agendas. I suggest here that accusations of occult practices were a manifestation of 
struggles that also occurred in other realms, about the distribution of benefits, and about 
the right ways of interacting and articulating with new and illegible outside 
organisations.
7.2 Hidden Arts
The rumour recounted at the outset of the chapter, that ZADP staff were involved 
in procuring body parts through murder and grave robbing, was by no means unique. 
Similar allegations dogged the project from the outset. I now outline the beliefs about 
occult trading and droga (medicine, sorcery) that these rumours drew on, and consider 
their connection to accumulation and wealth.
Over the life of ZADP, staff were accused of two different kinds of occult trading, 
though in neither case were World Vision employees the only people alleged to have 
been involved. Other NGO workers, village officials and visiting traders were also 
implicated. The first accusation was that facilitators and técnicos throughout Gurué 
district were ninjas. Ninjas were believed to be professional thieves, stealing
'Ninja' is not found in Portuguese dictionaries, though it was used as a Portuguese word in Zambézia. 
One person told me that it came from Chinese karate films, but there may well be other etymologies. I 
acknowledge the help of Fernando Pequenino in helping me understand this and other terms discussed in 
this paragraph.
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children and body parts as well as other goods. The term namaahita (Elomwé, pi, 
anamaahita) was also used, meaning a person who murdered with a machete (Elomwé: 
ohita). An internal project report noted that ‘In Incize, during the first years of ZADP, 
people said that World Vision, while giving many things on credit, would steal children. 
The facilitators were accused by the community of being anamaahita, that is murderers’ 
(Pequenino 2001).
At the outset of the project, staff were frequently accused of having designs on 
children, and throughout my time in Mugaveia I was treated with the gravest caution by 
all but the children I knew best. When I first visited the localidade in December 2000, 
my colleague Amancio stopped the car suddenly to point out a termite mound. Seeing 
the car halt without explanation, the women and young children who had been gathered 
by the mound scattered, running as fast as they could into the bush. Even in Lower 
Zambézia, where tales about child-stealing had less currency, fears were still latent, as I 
found when Jacinta once asked me to take her baby daughter back to Mutange with me, 
as she was travelling alone on her motorbike. Thinking nothing of it, I agreed. As the 
only woman in the car, and the person the child knew best, it was assumed to be my 
responsibility to sit in the back with Edith on my lap. But when we drove into 
Namacurra market to buy fish I realised that what I was doing was not alright at all: 
horrified faces stared at me through the windows; people shouted and pointed; a few ran 
after the car and hit it. Even in Lower Zambézia the sight of a white woman holding a 
small black child, sitting in a World Vision car, aroused grave concerns. When I gave 
Edith back to Jacinta and explained what had happened, she laughed. The reaction that 
had been caused was not unexpected, but it was one she refused to see as significant. 
The child of a senior worker at the Boror Company, and unusually well-educated for a 
Zambézian woman, her self image as a modem woman relied in part on distancing 
herself from occult rumours.
The second form of occult trading was in blood, procured by the chupa sangue, 
the blood sucker. When ZADP began to work in the more remote Gurué localidades, 
accusations that project staff were connected to the chupa sangue were common. Again, 
this was not unique: rumours about the chupa sangue surfaced soon after Independence 
and have recurred almost annually since (Bowen 2001: 329, Serra 1997: 68-9, 
Pequenino 1995). Though the chupa sangue is a relatively recent development in
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Mozambique, vampire beliefs are widely known in East A fr ic a /A ss o c ia te d  by some 
with the replacement of the escudo currency with the metical, others linked their 
appearance to Frelimo’s Dynamising Groups, the blood donation and vaccination 
campaigns of the late 1970s or conununal villages (Serra 1996). I heard no clear 
explanation of the purpose to which the blood was to be put. However all agreed that 
the sucking process was hi-tech: the chupa sangue, from outside the area, was believed 
to be guided by insiders, and to insert some kind of a sucking tube through a hole in a 
wall or door. As Bowen summarises:
'Chupa sangues are not witches. They are human agents assisted by local 
informants who receive compensation for their work and conduct concrete financial 
exchanges of blood for money. The means of doing so are more concealed. They 
attack at night and enter through the grass roofs of houses... A group of houses 
must join together, using drums to stay awake throughout the night. If one falls 
asleep, even a short distance away from the others, one is susceptible to attack’
(Bowen 2000b: 330).
I experienced no chupa sangue panics in Mugaveia. Although less prevalent at the time 
of my fieldwork than at the start of the project, they did not completely vanish.
The people with whom I discussed occult trading were all agreed that, while the 
purpose of these evil activities was obscure, it was connected to the search for wealth. 
The blood, organs and bones collected were, it was believed, going to be used to make 
droga (medicine) that would bring wealth -  in the case of the story recounted at the 
outset, ‘to take to my own country to allow me to get rich.’ Occult trading thus fed into 
a broader strand of beliefs about sorcery, and the connection between sorcery and 
accumulation.
Droga, usually purchased from curandeiros (traditional healers/witch doctors), 
could be used malevolently, or for legitimate and positive ends such as protection or 
attracting customers (Bowen 2000b: 233-7). Of itself droga is amoral, and moral 
judgement pertains primarily to its usage rather than to its existence. Mystical powers 
are used regularly in everyday life: tiny children are protected by amulets, curandeiros 
are consulted about peculiar ailments, and this is seen as normal and sensible. Droga 
can be made from many things, with some ingredients being more powerful than others.
See White (1990, 1993a, 1993b), Pels (1998), Jarosz (1994), Musambachime (1988) and Weiss (1998) 
for comparative discussions of vampire rumours in Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania and Madagascar.
It was suggested that Estevao, the técnico in Vehiua, was connected with the chupa sangue, because he 
rode a red motor-bike. At the end of the project, técnicos listed ‘witchcraft, rumour of blood suckers -  
“chupa sangues'” alongside health and robbery as significant risks encountered in their work (Queiroz de 
Souza 2002).
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The ingredients believed to be acquired through occult trade were thought to be 
particularly powerful, as were a number of other hard-to-come-by ingredients like the 
gall bladder of the crocodile. The fabrication of droga was done by curandeiros 
through what can be seen as sorcery:
‘The supernatural power to cause another person or that person’s possessions harm 
through the use of various substances or acts. The efficacy of sorcery depends upon 
the nature o f the acts performed rather than upon the moral character of the 
practitioner’ (Beidelman 1971: 131).
It was often suspected that curandeiros were also witches (feiticeiros^^^), but a user of 
droga was generally him/herself neither sorcerer nor witch.
Droga was often used in the illegitimate accumulation of wealth. For example, it 
could cause a person’s labour to be stolen. I heard of a magic that could make your 
sleeping body go and work at night on someone else’s machamba. In the morning you 
would wake exhausted. Alternatively, someone could appear to die and be buried, when 
in fact their body had been sent to South Africa to work in the mines, with their salary 
going to the person who killed them. This resembles the ekong witchcraft of Cameroon 
(Geschiere 1988), and the zombie-creation of the South Africa-Mozambique border 
(Golooba-Mutebi 2003, Niehaus 2001). Such magic could be discovered when a friend 
visited from the mines, bringing recent news and sometimes even gifts and photographs 
from the man believed to be dead. Droga could be used to conjure a person- 
animal,^^® which would then be used to steal. Snakes, rats or birds would be conjured, 
which, at harvest time, would go to people’s machambas, eat the crop, and take it to the 
house of their ‘owner’ who would therefore profit from the work of others.
It was also considered possible to suck the good from other people’s fields, using 
droga: this meant that the work the victim put into his/her field brought no results, but
Witchcraft,/etY/farifl, was also known: an inherent malevolent power, called okhwiri in both Echuabo 
and Elomwé (see also Brentari n.d., cf. Evans-Pritchard 1937: 21). A person who practised witchcraft 
was afeiticeiro  or mukhwiri, and had evil in his/her heart. Feitigaria was greatly feared and often talked 
about; but as it was neither discussed nor alleged in the context of ZADP I discuss it no further here.
Rita knew of a case involving the late supervisor of a World Vision health programme, said to have 
been killed by his uncle.
People-lions and people-snakes, known as ‘sent’ lions/snakes (leôes mandados or cobras mandadas, 
from mandar, to send), were most talked about. Visibly indistinguishable from a ‘real’ lion or snake, they 
were created through a process of magical transformation. As this kind of sorcery was never alleged in 
connection with ZADP, I did not enquire into the mechanisms and reasons for such transformations. For 
comparative accounts see West (1997a, 2001) for Cabo Delgado province, and Wyatt (1950) and 
Schneider (1962) for Tanzania. See also Roberts (1986), Taussig (1987), Jackson (1990), Niehaus (1995) 
and Kapferer (1997). In 2003 a case of deaths caused by suspected ‘people-lions’ appeared in the 
international media (Agence France Presse 2003).
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only served to increase the harvest of the bewitcher. This mirrors the beliefs of the 
Uluguru in Tanzania, who believed that unusual success in farming had little to do with 
hard work, correct spacing or the use of good seed or fertiliser. It might instead be 
ascribed to evil magic, which had sucked the good from other people’s fields and thus 
reduced their yields (Brain 1982, see also Sanders 1999). Not only was this considered 
morally unacceptable, but active attempts might be made to attack the perpetrator and 
reduce him to the level of everyone else.^^^
It is this last point that was most pertinent in the context of ZADP. Although 
those who worked most closely with ZADP were, as I described above, at times accused 
of procuring the ingredients for wealth-creating droga for their ‘patrons’, it was never 
suggested that they themselves had used droga themselves to get rich. Rather, they felt 
at particular risk from harm-doing by the envious poor,^^^ which could even take the 
form of direct poisoning. The President of Mugaveia said ‘Every person who works, 
the population calls a witch’. It is to the question of envy that I now turn, as jealousy 
associated with wealth, consumption and knowledge was involved in many of the cases 
where connection with the hidden arts was alleged.
7.3 Envy
Envy was considered an inevitable part of life: ‘envy will not end in this world’ 
said one Mugaveia facilitator. People had to deal with it when it arose, but tried to 
avoid creating it, as it was believed that the envious were ready users of droga. In cases 
where project resources were distributed only to the few, it was often alleged that droga 
was used, or might be used, against recipients. To some observers it appeared that 
jealous, better-off people were using the fear of droga as a means of strategically 
discouraging and manipulating the poorer individuals who were the project’s original 
target group. It was also observed that certain kinds of goods provoked more envy -  
and thus more sorcery -  than others. These tended to be things that were less shareable: 
metal roofing sheets; furniture; project goats. Furthermore, envy was not confined to 
the material. ‘Being in the know’ was greatly valued and even envied, and the
For a similar account from Kenya see Brantley (1979), and for a contradictory one (based on data from 
Uganda and Ghana) see Brokensha and Erasmus (1969: 95-96).
See Gable, (1997) Gluckman (1956), Ardener (1970: 147-8), Fisiy and Geschiere (1991: 253).
My experience mirrored that of Ferguson in Zambia (1999: 119-20), who found that poisoning was 
considered a form of witchcraft. When Maria Namuteca, one of our Mugaveia hosts, described how the 
family had lost several pigs as a result o f poisoning with DDT, she labelled this droga, and suggested that 
it had been done by an envious person.
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distribution of knowledge, like wealth, was contested. I now look in turn at the ways in 
which envy was connected not only to uneven distribution, but also to uneven 
consumption and sharing.
Distribution
Uneven distribution of limited resources was a primary cause of envy, as shown 
by the case of the rat-trapping component outlined at the start of the chapter. This 
activity was undertaken in collaboration with the Natural Resources Institute (NRI), and 
was developed by scientists who knew little about rural Zambézia. It was intended to 
address one of the severe problems of post-harvest storage that were such a problem for 
villagers (ZADP 1998). It was estimated that rats consumed about 150 kg of food per 
household per year -  a serious issue in less food-secure areas. Rats carry a range of 
dangerous diseases including plague, and often injure people with their bites (Belmain 
2002). The trapping project was intended to ‘develop a methodology for assessing the 
impact of rodents on household food security, and their potential impact on health and 
nutrition of rural families’ [Natural Resources Institute 1999: 2]. Rats were a valued 
foodstuff, so the project focused on trapping rather than poisoning, and thus developed 
the secondary justification of demonstrating that village-scale trapping by contiguous 
households was both viable and cost-effective in reducing the general rat population in 
an area (Steve Belmain, e-mail, 01.10.03).
Accordingly, a célula with approximately the target number of households was 
chosen as the ‘treatment area’ (Nicoria), and an attempt made to distribute traps to every 
household. As described in Chapter 6, data on the number of rats captured was 
collected each day by data collectors, and to avoid conflicts of interest, it was decided 
that existing ZADP facilitators should not do this work (page 216). Payment was 
provided in order to ensure dedication to the job -  it was recognised that a daily 
commitment of two or three hours could not go unpaid, particularly as the work was for 
the good of the project. But while the process of the selection of both data collectors 
and households to receive traps was logical to the scientist designers, it was obscure to 
my informants. Many were envious of the way in which the rat data collectors had, so 
swiftly and so incomprehensibly, been picked for jobs that turned out to be so profitable.
By contrast, facilitators were conceived of as working for the good of the ‘community’.
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The design meant that only a limited number of people in the localidade received 
traps, and this unfairness was further compounded by the fact that trap recipients were 
concentrated in one area. The problems caused, in the shape of the sorcery accusations 
related at the beginning of the chapter, were by no means unique: it was frequently the 
case that when a few gained a benefit denied to others this caused jealousy. In another 
Gurué localidade I heard of a case where a man had ended up looking after all the goats 
that had originally been intended for eight people. When the credit was repaid the man 
did not consider the other group members to have a call on the animals, as they had not 
contributed to their care. The other members disagreed, and took the case to the 
DDADR in Gurué, where it was decided that only one person had a claim on the goats. 
But the local técnico said it was a pyrrhic victory:
‘As people saw that he had repaid all the animals, they wanted to spite him (querem 
vingar). Some people are his relatives and there has been vengeance (yingança).
The owner says that some of his animals have been pregnant, yet they don’t 
conceive. There have been many problems.’
The concentration of benefits on a single person was contested, and informants 
suggested that sorcery provoked by envy could result.
In numerous cases the ill-luck of recipients of project inputs was attributed to the 
envy of non-recipients. Neighbours’ jealousy was often cited as the cause of goat death, 
although the explanation was not accepted by project management. In one case in 
Nicoadala district eight people received goats in 1997 (Phase I) and all the goats died.
‘Farmers said everybody in the community was jealous because of them and they 
sent sorcery and killed all the goats. This is popular belief in the area. Everybody in 
the group believes it was sorcery from jealous community members’ (Pequenino 
2000: 30) .^ ^
In some cases, as with micro-credit, fear of the consequences of jealousy could 
discourage potential recipients from accepting inputs:
‘One concern that the women raised was if a person (male or female) receives a loan, 
people were worried that someone else would be jealous and go to the curandeiro 
(witch doctor) to put a spell onto that person. This magic would then make the 
business fail. The recipient of the loan might then fall sick and be unable to repay 
their loan. The person would then be in a worse situation than before since they 
would have to pay medical fees to the doctor for treatment, in addition to their debt 
on the loan’ (ZADP 1999b).
195 The livestock technician attributed their death to the fact that the communally-held goats went unfed, 
as no member of the group wanted to take responsibility for their care.
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Some project staff suggested that these fears were actively encouraged by certain 
(unidentified) non-recipients, who intended to discourage and demotivate those who had 
received things in the hope of capturing the resources for themselves. In Mutange 
Jacinta observed that particular leaders were involved in spreading rumours about the 
abduction of children and the probable trickery involved in the goat restocking 
programme (see page 213). She thought that these leaders had tried to discourage the 
women on whom the programme was targeted,
‘so the women took the animals with fear, not knowing if the government would 
come and demand money. They wondered whether, if they didn’t pay, then the 
government would confiscate their things, or even send them to prison. And some 
women were too scared to receive things.’
Likewise in Gurué, Estevao commented that,
‘These stories start when there are resources. There are problems with envy, there 
are some people who can’t see another with a good social position. It’s a 
characteristic of people in villages. I think that these stories about the person who 
gets a goat having a child taken are to demoralise the people who received them. It 
is not possible to get something without paying.’
Estevao’s explanation was functionalist, positing a definite intent on the part of 
the rumour-spreaders to dispirit those who had received what were seen as valuable 
goods. Further weight is given to this account by the fact that some of those who spread 
rumours later became involved in project activities. One Mugaveia facilitator 
commented that
‘those who spoke ill of the project are now those who are within the groups, as they 
are convinced that they do no ill, but rather help. People were just envious because 
the facilitators received bikes; they had thought that the projects were just short-term 
passing things (eram passajeiros de pouco tempo).'
When it turned out that the projects were longer-lasting and real benefits derived from 
them, some of those who were not originally participants attempted to join, at times by 
attempting to displace earlier participants by demoralising them.
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Consumption and Sharing: Goods and Knowledge
The last section was concerned with envy resulting from the uneven and possibly 
unfair distribution of limited resources. In other situations envy could be associated 
with contested consumption and sharing. Although people were suspicious of those 
who became rich with great speed, it was not always accumulation itself that was the 
problem. In rural Zambézia, as in Dedza, Malawi, profit-making was seen as natural:
‘Dedza villagers do not view participation in commodity production, transactions 
and consumption as inherently problematic and dangerous. The market economy is, 
rather, a taken-for-granted feature of their lived-in world, and virtually every 
villager is thought to have a desire to prosper in it. In such a context, witchcraft 
represents an argument about how that prosperity is to be achieved’ (Englund 1996:
260).'^
In Mugaveia conflicts were generally associated not simply with accumulation, but with 
a failure to distribute wealth and benefits appropriately. It was not so much that 
accumulation, or commercial transactions, or commerce were intrinsically dangerous; it 
was the way in which assets were consumed or shared that led to moral evaluation, 
often in terms of witchcraft (Bowen 2(XX)b: 232). Bowen goes on to say that ‘as long as 
relationships are visible, through gifts and through helping, the spending of money 
shows one’s worth and importance and insulates one from accusations of illegitimately 
acquired wealth’.
Ordinary accumulation could thus be legitimate, so long as the source of wealth 
was clear, and so long as the person continued to participate in relations of reciprocity 
and helping. ‘What is particularly unfathomable is the sudden discrepancy in wealth, 
the rapid accumulation by those who one once knew and recognised as economic and 
social equals’ (Bowen 20(X)b: 234). Raul Muanavola (page 151), the carpenter who had 
only recently returned to live in Mugaveia, and who was much better off than anyone 
else around, once told me that despite his wealth he was not afraid of being assailed by 
the envious. ‘My friends will not envy me, and ask where I got my things, because they 
know that I am working, and going from one place to another to get something.’ Raul 
was known for his generosity, and he took particular trouble to cultivate good relations 
with neighbours, colleagues, and leaders. In Mutange, Henriques Francisco (page 145), 
although he did not make the same efforts as Raul, was also well aware of the risks of 
unusual prosperity, and tried to protect himself by avoiding conspicuous consumption.
Compare Green (1995), Lan (1989), Shipton (1989), and Masquelier (1993, 1997), who argue that in 
other parts of the world commodities and the market economy are sometimes seen as evil.
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However, not all goods were equally shareable, something that particularly 
affected those who worked with ZADP. Unlike goods acquired through trade, or meat 
from hunting, money, bicycles, rat-traps and clothing were hard to share around (cf. 
West 2001). As in Mueda, Cabo Delgado, so too in Mugaveia were some kinds of 
wealth more problematic and prone to causing problems than others. West suggests that 
‘the discursive terrain of sorcery accusations and counteraccusations provided a fertile 
substrate on which ... residents could express profound ambivalence about the new 
forms of power these objects represented and constituted’ (2001: 128). This was 
particularly important as the people on whom the benefits were concentrated were not 
always those who had traditionally been powerful. Rat data collectors were not leaders, 
nor did they necessarily come from important families. Similarly the goat restocking 
programme ran into problem after problem until leaders were provided with livestock.
I do not intend to suggest that it was only goods provided by ZADP that were 
difficult to share out and that were therefore risky. Many things from outside the area 
were seen as having the potential to attract harm. One example was the zinc roofing 
sheets with which many people aspired to cover their houses. Though people liked the 
idea of having a watertight house, and one that they could be proud of, they were very 
aware of the risks involved. Many believed that death was likely to follow rapidly after 
the re-roofing of a house.
Envy was not confined to material goods. In the case of the rat-trapping 
component, village leaders felt that they had been excluded from knowledge about the 
nature of the project at the outset. The village President said that since ‘no 
introductions’ had been made, he was not going to help when problems arose.
‘The President said that the day when the traps were brought he and other leaders 
were in a meeting about goats. Three World Vision cars came, and when they 
arrived they asked Agostinho to go with them to Nicoria and the traps were then 
distributed just in Nicoria. Those who were in the [goat] meeting didn’t know about 
anything, they just went home and only heard afterwards that rat-traps had been 
distributed. People complained, asking how it was possible just to give traps to 
Nicoria and not here [Intuba], but though there was much talk, nothing changed.
The President said that at least they should have informed him so that he knew, in 
that all who arrive are introduced by his hands. And as he wasn ’t informed, he takes 
no responsibility fo r the problems that have arisen.' (Rita’s field journal, my italics)
Those who were able to afford the zinc sheeting were usually individuals who had migrated, either to 
the mines or within 2^mbézia. Miners tended to die young from lung disease, and HIV/AIDS had started 
to take a toll. Migrants often only returned home when they were already weak, possibly leading to the 
observed connection between roofing and death.
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In the case of the other rumour in which I was involved -  digging in the cemetery -  the 
opposite happened. The President had known about our work from the outset, and had 
been in charge of channelling information about it within the localidade. Moreover he 
was implicated in the rumour, and as a result of these two factors it was rapidly quashed. 
The same thing happened when ZADP project facilitators were accused of stealing 
children using their newly acquired bicycles: leaders of both parties, who had been told 
what was happening and who had received project benefits (such as goats), were quick 
to reject the tales.
In the case of the rat-trapping, it can be argued that leaders and project facilitators 
felt that their trust had been betrayed. They were the ones who had, at some risk to 
themselves, been the project’s primary collaborators in the difficult early years. 
However when a new and lucrative activity came along not only were they excluded 
from benefits, they were also excluded from knowledge of it. It is to the question of 
trust -  how it was developed, on what it was based, and how it could be fractured -  to 
which I now turn.
7.4 Trusting ZADP
The last chapter looked at how the identification of ZADP with Frelimo and the 
state coloured the ways in which different people chose to interact with it. Here I look 
at how people came to make choices about involvement, how those choices changed 
over the life of the project, and how they were evaluated through the lens of ‘trust’. The 
word used in Portuguese in these cases was confiança. Like trust, confiança is a 
polysémie word, which translates into English as confidence, trust, faith, belief, reliance, 
self-reliance; intimacy, familiarity; boldness, impudence, pertness (Porto Bditora 1998). 
As such, it does not map precisely onto the English concept of trust which, as Harriss 
points out, is in important ways distinct from both faith and confidence (2003: 757). 
Nevertheless, Harriss’s definition of trust as pertaining to ‘circumstances in which an 
actor chooses to believe in the good will of another whilst having no reliable knowledge 
that she or he will behave in the way that is expected’ is equally applicable to confiança. 
For Hart, trust is ‘the negotiation of risk occasioned by the freedom of others, who we 
know personally, to act against our interest in the relative absence of constraint imposed 
by kinship identity and legal contract’ (2001: 111). Both writers emphasise the gamble 
and uncertainty that trust involves.
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When ZADP first started to operate in the more remote parts of Gurué District 
like Mugaveia, staff found it very hard to persuade people to work with them and trust 
them. This was not only because of fears of sorcery, but also due to wartime 
experiences. A government agriculture official explained that,
‘Working with the community wasn’t easy, because as the people had only just 
come out of the war, when they received visits, they thought that the técnicos were 
also guerrillas. It was even worse when they saw coopérantes; they thought that 
they had come to support the war, not to resolve the problems of war.’
Previous experiences with outsiders had often involved violence and exploitation, and
vulnerability to abduction or at the very least the expropriation of household labour
resources had been a feature of Zambézian life for many decades.
Literature shows that fears about the stealing of people are ancient in Zambézia. 
Isaacman and Isaacman wrote of the class of thieves known by Sena people as mupanga 
who, in the nineteenth century, would steal young children at the time when the grass 
was high and they could therefore approach villages undetected (1977:109). Pequenino 
referred to similar fears in Mugeba (Mocuba District), terming the thieves amapanka 
(1995: 79-82). These concerns were linked to folk memories of the slave trade, to the 
idea that régulos got their positions under the Portuguese colonial government in return 
for giving up a nephew or other r e l a t i v e , t o  forced labour on colonial plantations, and 
to wartime recruitment by both Renamo and Frelimo. This further substantiates the 
point made in Chapter 3, that people interpret ‘development’ interventions in the light 
of earlier outsiders’ interferences.
The materiality of people’s concern that real ZADP staff would abduct their real 
children chimes with Harry West’s suggestion that interpreting such beliefs 
metaphorically is unsatisfactory. When he presented his work on the symbolism of 
‘people lions’ in Cabo Delgado to a local audience, listeners vehemently protested that 
the lions were not symbolic, but a real and material danger: they were actual lions. The 
point can be well made in the Zambézian context. When people spoke of their fears that 
their children would be taken, they were expressing a real worry that a son or daughter
Informants in Mugaveia said that the régulos got their positions following the ‘sale’ o f a nephew or a 
brother to the colonial authorities. This resonates with rather different beliefs about the ‘sale’ o f children 
for witchcraft. An Intuba church leader was suspected this on the death of his epileptic daughter. She 
was the third child to die within six months, and it was suspected that he had been ‘selling’ his children in 
order to enrich himself. The exchange of offspring or bodily force for wealth is a common theme in 
Africa (see de Boeck 1998: 789, Kindness 1996: 14).
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might disappear, not some intangible concern about the generalised expropriation of 
African labour:
‘The traffic in people, body parts and body fluids moves beyond immediate 
concerns of state legitimacy on the part of an ‘alienated’ peasantry. It responds to 
larger scale historical processes and the recent experiences of the war, but also 
reflects the biomedical, modernised world of medicine and hospitals, the 
vulnerability of bodies, and allows for debates on shifts in regional 
entrepreneurship’ (Bowen 2000b: 335).
Bowen’s analysis emphasises the unpredictability of processes and practices external to
people’s everyday worlds.
Given these fears, a great many people in the more remote Gurué localidades 
were predisposed to mistrust the project when it first appeared in 1997. The situation 
was unwittingly worsened by the behaviour of ZADP staff undertaking PRAs, which 
confirmed people’s lurking suspicions that the project and its workers were associated 
with dangerous and illegitimate sorcery. A técnico told me what had happened:
‘World Vision arrived and started to talk to people. They asked a lot of questions.
At that time people were just coming out of the war and they didn’t have confiança 
in anyone. And the big problem that day was when a mapping process was done.
People at that time associated mapping with an attack: people came to do mapping, 
people came to attack (yinham fazer a mapiamento, vinham fazer ataque de guerra).
And when the staff talked of mapping, people had doubts, they thought of war, 
because others who had mapped the area had been guerrillas. And people thought 
that “Ah, the first ones who did mapping were guerrillas, and so there’s a problem 
with these ones too”.
And it got worse then they said: “Where is the cemetery?”, as a reference mark.
And that was where all confiança was really broken (alt fica quebrada a confiança 
toda), and people said: this is not a project, this is war which is coming once again...
In the African tradition, people value the cemetery because it is a sacred place, very 
sacred. And anyone who comes to a community and asks where the cemetery is -  
well, the population will read lots of things into it. There are many things that are 
done traditionally, based in cemeteries:/e/rifaria, droga. It’s always dangerous for 
someone’s first question to be about a cemetery!’
In one Mugaveia célula the PRA had to be abandoned entirely, and in other células in
the district it proved impossible to draw maps or carry out any exercise which required
farmers to be named (ZADP 1997: 10). The people organising the PRA were, quite
correctly, seen as exceptionally successful, exceptionally rich. Such wealth and
recognition was deemed most likely to have been obtained at the expense of others, and
World Vision’s assertions that they were there to ‘help’ {ajudar) convinced few in the
early years.
The PRA report attributed problems to the ‘sharp conflict between political parties in the District’, and 
to the fact that communities in both Mugaveia and Nipive localidades ‘thought that the research team
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According to project técnicos, the trust of villagers was built up very gradually. 
They attributed increasing trust to growing experience, and to the example of a few 
brave pioneers who showed the risk of involvement with ZADP was worth taking. 
These pioneers tended to be leaders, those who had worked for many years outside the 
localidade, or those who had previously worked with foreigners. This pattern was most 
clearly demonstrated in the area of goat restocking. When goats were first offered, 
many people refused them, alleging that payment would later be required for this 
ostensible gift, probably in the form of children (page 235). This fear affected all the 
Gurué localidades and many in Namacurra and Nicoadala. However a small number of 
people, often leaders, did accept goats. Rodrigues explained that ‘as time passed, 
people saw that no children died, and that no children were taken by World Vision, and 
realised that it was all disinformation from within the community.’ As a result demands 
for goats grew: ‘Now we can’t satisfy all the people who want them.’
During my fieldwork I was frequently told this story by informants explaining 
how their relationship with the project had changed. They would tell me just how 
frightened they had been when ZADP first arrived, offering goats on credit, and how 
they had thought that there must have been a ‘hidden motive’. They would then 
describe how they gradually realised that the rumours they had believed were untrue, 
and how they had come heartily to regret not taking up the opportunity to own livestock 
when it was offered to them. They would ruefully compare their own goat-less state to 
that of people who had taken the gamble of involvement (cf. Hart 2001, Harriss 2003), 
which in this case had paid such dividends. Yet although I heard this story often, not 
everyone came to trust ZADP. Many of those living within project localidades had 
little to do with técnicos or other staff, and as Estevao explained, their ideas often 
remained the same:
‘The project doesn’t have the human capacity to touch everyone. And other people 
in the areas where we don’t go have perturbed ideas. They don’t hear what we do.
No, they hear stories about things we don’t do, but people tell them we do. And 
people who get these messed-up messages don’t change their way of thinking.’
Right up until the end of the project, a substantial number of people had no desire to get 
involved with ZADP activities, and remained concerned about the ‘real’ reason for 
intervention.
would conspire to take their land from them and that they would all be sold into slavery’ (ZADP 1997: 
10).
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While a gradually more trusting atmosphere developed between project staff and 
ordinary beneficiaries, though with the caveats already mentioned, the situation was 
rather different in the case of leaders and facilitators. ZADP depended on leaders of 
both parties to mobilise their members to participate in activities, and made sure that 
leaders were early beneficiaries of most activities. The facilitators were the people with 
whom the técnicos worked most closely, and on whom they relied. It should be 
remembered that relations between them and the project were by no means without 
difficulties, and involved constant contestation about the appropriate level of reward for 
the work they did (see page 215). Many facilitators abandoned their jobs, some near the 
outset of the project, others after several years of work. This was generally due to a 
perceived lack of appreciation by the project, or sometimes due to new and preferable 
opportunities. Those facilitators who remained active acted as channels of information 
between the project and the population at large, and were regularly visited by well- 
dressed people travelling in prestigious vehicles. Prior to the advent of the rat-trapping 
component, although there were tensions in the relationship between project and 
facilitators, there was a reasonable equilibrium.
As already described, the rat-trapping component did not work through the 
structures that ZADP had developed over the preceding three years. Existing 
facilitators were not offered jobs as rat data collectors, nor were they automatically 
offered traps. Village leaders were not informed about the new intervention, nor were 
they all given traps. The relationship between ZADP and the leaders and facilitators 
was then further shaken by the revelation that the data collectors were to be paid. Both 
leaders, who had not been kept informed, and facilitators, who had not been offered jobs, 
felt that their trust had been betrayed, and that to use Harriss’s earlier definition, their 
gamble in trusting an unknown project had, after all, proved ill-advised (2003). 
Although there is no evidence to suggest that any of the rumours started with them, they 
did little to quash them.
7.5 Manipulating Accusations
This chapter has looked at how the complicated relationships between villagers 
and project were articulated and explored through the idiom of the hidden arts. I have 
suggested that this idiom highlighted currents of envy and of trust, which in turn ran 
through and affected much of what ZADP did. This begs other questions. What was it
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about the occult that made it an appropriate idiom for the expression of relations of envy 
and trust? How was the project able to take cognizance of and react to concerns 
expressed through this -  to them -  highly exotic idiom?
The second question needs answering first, for it was only because project staff 
and facilitators were able to hear and respond to accusations concerning the occult that 
the accusations had any power. Though the project was designed by English-speaking 
foreigners, and the influence of the occult was not considered at the outset, nevertheless 
most of the field-level implementers shared a common cultural background. Facilitators 
came from the very células where they worked, and the técnicos were all Zambézian. 
Agostinho and Estevao had been brought up in Gurué district, and Jacinta was bom in 
Namacurra. Although many senior staff were either foreign or from southern 
Mozambique (see page 69 for a discussion of senior staff backgrounds), by the end of 
the project a number of Zambézians had also been employed. When thinking about 
how the hidden arts affected the implementation of ZADP it must therefore be borne in 
mind that none of those engaged in village work were fully external to these ideas.
Although project field staff may have laughed at the rumours which circulated, 
most of them believed that the tales were, at some level, true. Rita told me quite 
seriously that child stealing still continued. She knew someone whose sister’s child had 
disappeared, and it was only by chance that he was found in a car with two ‘whites’. 
The car had a puncture on the outskirts of Gurué city, and bystanders watching the 
wheel being changed saw movement under the tarpaulin securing luggage, which turned 
out to be the awakening child. She said that people did not know quite why children 
were taken, though it was said that it was for their eyes, genitals and hearts, which were 
perhaps used to fabricate wealth-bringing droga?^^ In a similar fashion, técnicos had an 
ambivalent attitude towards the chupa sangue. Some were not entirely sure that the 
chupa sangue did not actually exist. Agostinho, the Mugaveia técnico once said that he 
knew for certain that the chupa sangue existed, as he knew someone whose blood had 
been sucked.
These were opinions that I heard in informal conversations with my research 
assistants, técnicos and other colleagues. ZADP staff were not unaware of the influence
200 See footnote 95.
Much more recently (February-March 2004) there was a widespread panic in Mozambique about 
child-stealing, indicating that such tales have wide currency and the potential to instil fear.
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of the occult on their activities and the people who participated in them. While partly 
convinced of the backwardness, traditionalism and obscurantismo that such rumours 
represented, at the same time they were personally unable to dismiss them completely, 
and indeed took entirely for granted the existence of some kind of a ‘hidden realm’ 
Yet these were not beliefs that were reflected in project reports, which reported 
occasionally on what were designated ‘traditional’ beliefs.
Formally, tales of sorcery or the trade in blood and body parts were dismissed. 
Amongst técnicos, facilitators and village leaders such dismissal was generally made 
with reference to a modernising and rational discourse which had no place for 
‘traditional’ beliefs. When Agostinho recounted the story of the woman whose blood 
had been sucked, his colleagues dismissed the tale, pointing to the lack of concrete 
evidence. ‘How can it be, will they test the blood types right there then? They’d have 
to travel with a laboratory!’, they said. ‘How about AIDS then?’
These rhetorical demands for evidential proof were characteristic. As one 
facilitator in Mugaveia put it,
‘We said, “you have told these stories from 1997 to the present day, and where is the
child that has disappeared?” And there was no answer.’
When the rat data collectors were accused of attacking people, leaders said that the 
accusers should go and take a photograph of the place where an attack took place, so it 
could be investigated. After Rita, the President and I were accused of digging in the 
cemetery, a public meeting was held at which anyone who had seen this digging was 
asked to identify themselves. When nobody did, and when the leaders could also find 
no evidence of illicit activity (no holes in the ground), the matter was considered settled. 
This pattern -  rumour and accusation, followed by unmet demands for evidence, 
followed by the widespread dismissal of the story -  occurred again and again.
Witchcraft was familiar to my Mozambican colleagues. An expatriate employee of World Vision 
noted that when one of his staff had a car accident, he blamed it on something occult: ‘He said afterwards 
that he saw these little pools of water in his office, and that must have been a sign. The accident was not 
really his fault. This man has a degree, he lives in Maputo usually -  and yet he is convinced that this 
happened...’ The same employee later had his motorcycle stolen from outside a bar, and again blamed 
this on ‘somebody doing something’: ‘When his motorbike gets stolen, what does he say? “I’ve been 
working for X years since leaving university, and nothing like this has ever happened before... Someone 
is doing it to me, and it’s probably a member of staff, because I’m a southerner and they don’t like, they 
don’t respect me.’”
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Técnicos would dismiss the backwardness of those who believed such stories, and 
suggested that those who believed in the more outlandish explanations of what the 
project was ‘really’ up to were ignorant and backward. This mirrored the terms of 
Frelimo’s earlier campaigns against obscurantismo, traditional leaders, and so-called 
superstitious beliefs. Although they might, in a private context, believe in phenomena 
similar to the chupa sangue, within the professional context of a modernising project 
such phenomena were implausible and thus could not be acknowledged. In addition, 
what was entirely unbelievable was the suggestion that people like themselves should be 
involved in occult trading. What was not dismissed was the suggestion that such a trade 
existed, or that droga was indeed made and used for a variety of nefarious purposes.
A similar argument can be made for the facilitators, though they were even more 
absorbed into local society than the técnicos. In Chapter 6 I explained that for all 
recipients, but in particular the facilitators, the project’s greatest value was not inputs or 
activities, but the relationship itself. The most active facilitators consciously 
emphasised and worked to strengthen the link between themselves and the project, some 
visiting or talking to the técnico on an almost daily basis. They would ask for his/her 
advice on the most basic of issues, and resisted carrying out any tasks unsupervised. In 
a similar fashion, facilitators identified themselves with the project, rather than ‘the 
community’ when it came to discussions of the occult (see page 216). In discussions of 
the occult, facilitators were keen to identify themselves with modernising discourses 
which had no place for the trade in blood or body parts.
I return now to the question I posed at the start of the section: why relations of 
envy and trust were explored and expressed through the hidden arts. The answer recalls 
once again the political divisions between Renamo and Frelimo to which the thesis has 
repeatedly referred. Accusations made in the realm of the ‘traditional’ were difficult for 
Frelimo to handle, given their historic dismissal of such beliefs. When tales about 
occult trading arose, both técnicos and local Frelimo officials would habitually blame 
Renamo supporters for inventing and propagating such stories. Frelimo officials would 
blame Renamo for confusao (confusion, dissent), for desinformaçâo, for having 
complicado (complicated) adherents. The identification of Renamo with ‘traditional’ or 
superstitious beliefs has long been a feature of Frelimo’s modernist agenda, and Frelimo 
did not have a way of dealing with such beliefs when expressed by members of their
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own party. In this they mirrored the attitude of the técnicos described above: private 
beliefs, however dearly held, did not find a public place.
However, although técnicos and ‘official’ (i.e. Frelimo) leaders generally 
suggested that Renamo supporters were behind the rumours described, my research 
suggests that a party identification was not accurate. I found supporters of both parties 
who believed in or repeated these tales. Feelings of doubt and concern were widespread, 
but could not easily be expressed by ‘rational’ ‘modem’ Frelimo supporters. It was thus 
easier to identify what were actually widely-held beliefs with the opposition party, 
which allowed them to be discussed in a suitably ‘othered’ fashion, than to suggest that 
Frelimo supporters also shared the same ideas. This argument is given credence by the 
fact that it was not just Renamo supporters who were afraid of receiving project inputs, 
and that in Mutange it was in fact a Frelimo official who spread the most alarming 
rumours about the consequences of participation.
7.6 Conclusion
Allegations of occult practice, such as those described at the outset, formed part of 
ongoing debates about accumulation and knowledge, and a way of articulating doubts 
about relationships with illegible and potentially untmstworthy outsiders. ZADP was 
just one such illegible outsider, and in the thesis I have considered the various ways in 
which people attempted to position it and to imbue it with responsibilities. Chapter 6 
looked at how those who participated in project activities constructed ZADP as a patron, 
and were thus able to enter into an exchange relationship with it. In that discussion I 
noted that by no means everyone felt themselves able or willing to involve themselves 
with the project. The most important determinant of involvement was political 
allegiance, which this chapter also shows to have been critical -  less in determining who 
was likely to make accusations against the project, but much more in identifying who 
would be blamed for any rumours that did emerge.
It might be thought that allegations of occult practice by the project and its staff 
signified that it was unsuccessful, that it was not working well, that it was unwelcome. 
This would not be right. Rather, the resources brought by ZADP were strongly desired 
by many, even by those who wished that they had been brought by a different 
organisation. Debates about the occult were debates about the morality of differential 
accumulation, and centred on the distribution and not the existence of wealth. Modem
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goods were nothing new to the people of Mugaveia; the problem with them was that 
there were not enough to go around.
The occult realm was one in which ZADP had little power. When the project was 
first set up it was not envisaged that it would have to have a ‘witchcraft strategy’, 
alongside its targeting strategies and extension action plans -  and of course no such 
strategy was ever developed. Responses to accusations were ad hoc and individual; the 
problem was not one that was ever institutionally comprehended. This is significant. 
ZADP was able to reduce the impact of potentially serious accusations by relegating 
them to the world of the obscure, the archaic, the irrelevant. But at the same time, by 
operating in a realm of which project staff had little knowledge, in which they had 
neither strategy nor power, villagers were able to assert some control and influence over 
activities which was otherwise denied them. However, as the concluding chapter now 
elaborates, although villagers were able to exert a certain level of influence over project 
practices, in the end internationally-driven imperatives were of much greater 
significance in labelling ZADP, and in redefining the nature of DFID interventions.
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Chapter 8. Muddled Fashions: Anti-Politics and Aid Effectiveness
After what has been a detailed examination of a single development intervention, 
I return to some of the central questions I have sought to address in the thesis. What 
was the significance of working hand-in-hand with state structures in Renamo-voting 
localidades where the state was synonymous with Frelimo? Ten years on from 
Hanlon’s devastating criticisms of donors and NGOs in Mozambique, in what ways 
have things changed? And how did a rapidly changing policy environment affect a 
project that finished in a self-consciously different era to that in which it was designed?
Running through my argument has been a constant emphasis on the need to 
contextualise and historicise. I have spumed grand categories, and looked instead at 
negotiations and contestations over labels and practices. My conclusions are on the 
same canvas, and I do not attempt to draw out wide-ranging inferences. Instead I look 
at two sets of themes that mn through the thesis: questions relating to the state, politics 
and anti-politics; and debates about development effectiveness.
8.1 Anti-Politics, Politics and the State
In examining political contestation at many different levels, I have interrogated 
some of the arguments made by Ferguson in The Anti-Politics Machine (1990). He 
argued that ‘development’ interventions have regular consequences, including ‘the 
expansion and entrenchment of bureaucratic state power, side by side with the 
projection of a representation of economic and social life which denies “politics” and, to 
the extent that it is successful, suspends its effects’ (xiv-v). He suggested that while 
development interventions were only sporadically successful in reducing poverty, they 
appeared to have systematic effects in terms of depoliticisation and the propagation of 
state power. He argued that there might be some justification for speaking of ‘a kind of 
logic or intelligibility to what happens when the “development” apparatus is deployed -  
a logic that transcends the question of planners’ intentions’ (Ferguson 1990: 255). In a 
similar manner, Escobar wrote that the result of the development encounter was that 
‘states, dominant institutions, and mainstream ways are strengthened and the domain of 
their action is inexorably expanded’ (1991: 667).
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This begs the question of what the state is and should be. Implicit in Ferguson 
and Escobar’s arguments is the assumption that the state, loosely conceived of as the 
bureaucratic public sector, is a ‘bad thing’. Both writers espouse an inherently populist 
approach in which the increasing reach of state bureaucracies, said to be an inevitable 
consequence of ‘development’, is deplored (cf. Robertson 1984). Yet rational 
bureaucracies (in the Weberian sense) are surely a prerequisite for economic growth, 
improvements in health outcomes or other indicators of social progress. At least that is 
what the historical evidence suggests. It is worth bearing in mind that many other 
economic anthropologists have recognised this. For Keith Hart, for example, the 
informal sector is itself a product of a lack of development. It is ‘non-rationaT labour in 
that it is not regulated (and workers are not protected) by state institutions (Hart 1973). 
Even most neo-liberal economists now accept that a strong state is essential to poverty- 
reducing growth and the proper functioning of markets. They would see this as distinct 
from corrupt, inefficient and inflated governmental sectors of the kind that the IFIs have 
attempted to target (cf. Edelman 1999: 8)
The question of the ‘appropriate’ role for the state in ‘development’ is one to 
which this thesis has frequently returned, and which I examine in more detail here. First, 
has the effect of projects like ZADP been, as Ferguson might argue, to entrench the 
state, however conceived? Or might a more helpful way of conceptualising the 
relationship be to consider the extent to which non-state organisations can produce what 
have been termed ‘state effects’? Second, what was the relationship between the 
neutrality espoused by ZADP and DFID staff, and the party political colouring 
attributed to them by beneficiaries? Third, to what extent has the older neo-liberal 
agenda of ‘rolling back the state’ been overturned by more recent imperatives to ‘work 
with government’? How did attitudes towards relationships between the state and non- 
state actors themselves become an area of contestation?
State Effects
Much of the thesis has dealt with questions relating to the role of the state, the 
ways in which it was perceived, and the ways in which non-state institutions produced 
state effects. The ‘state effects’ I am concerned with are those that Trouillot (2001) 
calls legibility effects, by which a language and a knowledge for classifying and 
regulating collectivities is developed. Development organisations are adept at this kind
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of classification; as Scott pointed out, it is not only governments that ‘see like states’ 
(1998), and as a result the production of ‘state effects’ is not confined to them. 
Trouillot suggests that ‘state effects’ can be produced by organisations as diverse as 
NGOs, separatist movements, multinational companies or multilateral bodies (126), 
particularly where the correspondence between the state system and ‘ideological state 
apparatuses’ has declined, so that it reflects rather than deflects social tensions (130). 
He argues that the national state ‘no longer functions as the primary social, political and 
ideological container of the populations living within its borders’ (2001: 130). 
Ironically, this can mean that even in weak nation states, individual citizens may find 
themselves ‘more than ever before ... [living] in the shadow of the state’ (Miliband 
(1969), quoted in Trouillot (2001: 125)).
Thinking in terms of ‘state effects’ produced by a range of different institutions 
helps to go beyond some of Hanlon’s (1991) arguments about the pernicious effects of 
development organisations on Mozambique. Fundamental to Hanlon’s argument that 
the sovereign Mozambican state was being undermined by NGO activities was a belief 
about an ‘appropriate’ role for the state as sole provider of basic services.^^^ At the time 
when he wrote Who Calls the Shots?, there was only one political party in Mozambique, 
which claimed to stand for the entire Mozambican population, and of which Hanlon was 
a strong defender. Hanlon saw no valid space in which INGOs could operate, or in 
which they could elaborate alternative development models.
Yet in a province like Zambézia, what actually was the state? Chapter 3 provided 
evidence that the colonial state, although theoretically long-established, actually rested 
very lightly on the province until the end of the nineteenth century. From then on, 
plantation companies, supported by and supportive of the state, were the most dominant 
organisations in the lives of my informants and their parents. Recruitment to these 
private companies was organised by the state, with the help of local native police 
(cipaios) and the régulos, and at the end of six-month contracts, deferred salary 
payments were made through the local administration. Social services and education 
were provided to (some) workers and their families by the companies. All in all, the 
distinction between state and company was far from clear. In the early years of the
In his later work (in particular 2001, 2002a, 2002c, 2002b), he has been much more critical of the 
(largely Frelimo) elite. It is no longer tenable to see Frelimo as the defenders of ‘all Mozambicans’, 
particularly not all Zambézians, and his analysis has changed to reflect this.
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Frelimo government, the same confusion was rife. A fragmented but all-powerful state 
was involved in activities as disparate as reforming previously privately-owned 
companies, restructuring agricultural marketing and forming agricultural cooperatives 
and aldeias comunais. By the time the war hit Mutange and Mugaveia, NGOs were 
already involved in running the camps for displaced people, and providing services to 
them. Where, then, was the all-powerful state in Zambézia, the role of which Hanlon 
felt NGOs were taking over? For my informants, it had never existed; rather, services 
had always been provided by a patchwork of different providers.
Against Hanlon, who argued that NGOs were intentionally paralleling the state, I 
have also shown that this paralleling was not always deliberate. I found that even when 
ZADP técnicos consciously attempted to emphasise the difference between themselves 
and the state, they were still widely identified with it, and -  even more problematically 
-  with Frelimo. The fact that the project had been designed to work hand-in-hand with 
state structures and to capacitate district and provincial level government meant that 
ZADP activities were frequently attributed to -  and at times claimed by -  government. 
These claims would sometimes be made with ZADP’s overt approval, as they were seen 
as a sign of ‘ownership’. At the level of district government, Frelimo government 
officials were only too happy for World Vision to build schools and bridges, or give out 
goats, particularly when they were then invited to come along to opening ceremonies 
(Figure 6.1). Such occasions were invariably used to talk about the government 
programme for the development of an area, and the ways in which the intervention at 
issue fitted in with government development plans. As Bratton pointed out (1989: 572- 
3), in some cases when NGOs are able to deliver services to which the government is 
publicly committed, but which it does not have the capacity to provide, then it might 
prove in the public interest for the government to mobilise NGOs. In such cases 
‘political leaders might stand to gain if NGOs can mobilize resources and deliver 
benefits to regions and communities that are otherwise unreachable’ {512)?^ In just 
this way, district (Frelimo) officials claimed and co-opted NGO achievements.
There were also significant fractures within the state, which could result in what at 
first seem like perverse alliances. This can be seen in the case of the 1997 Land Law, a 
progressive piece of legislation passed following a prolonged consultation process, and
He also pointed out that the converse could be true, and that better service provision by NGOs might 
be seen to reflect poorly on government performance.
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which is still highly regarded. However since 1997 there has been a gradual process of 
back-pedalling by government officials at all levels, and according to a report from the 
ZADP land component, district authorities tended to perceive the Land Law as ‘a 
potential blockage to the national project of development and a hindrance to the 
attraction of outside capital’ (Norfolk and Soberano 2000: 42):
‘The District Director of Agriculture in Gurué ... state[d] that the idea of 
partnerships is a very dangerous concept to broach with local communities since it 
would lead them to think that they have a role in the issuing of concessions and 
licences to investors, a role which he clearly indicated he believed should be the 
exclusive prerogative of the state’ (43).
The ZADP land component, as part of a donor-funded project implemented by an
international NGO, thus found itself in the unusual position of defending peasant
interests against recalcitrant sections of a state bureaucracy, using the state’s own
legislation. This is not an incident that can be comprehended using Hanlon’s vision of
parallel systems, and rather demonstrates that alliances are formed and broken
depending on context.
I also showed that ‘development’ was at times explicitly and overtly ‘claimed’ by 
Frelimo supporters in both localidades, while Renamo supporters remained much more 
cautious in their attitude towards modernity, development and change. The attribution 
of NGO activities to the state, and the claim of NGO activities by state officials, was not 
the simple substitution that Hanlon described, but a more complex form of paralleling. 
These claims and attributions mean that it is difficult to identify a stark and clear line 
between ‘state’ and NGO. It is not plausible to see NGOs and IFIs lining up on one side 
of an ideological debate, with a unified sovereign government on the other. Reality was 
much more complex and contested. For that reason it is more fruitful to talk in terms of 
the production of ‘state effects’ by different institutions than to castigate non-national- 
govemment institutions for usurping the state’s role.
Neutrality and Party Politics
Neutrality, particularly as regards party politics, is one of the central tenets of 
NGOs’ work. Necessary for funding reasons, it also fits with their own motivation and 
beliefs. Yet this thesis has shown that project activities were nevertheless understood 
within a local political framework, and that mere denial of allegiance by ZADP staff did 
not change this. Indeed, denial had the effect of muting a process that it would have
252
been better to try to examine and understand. As it was, ZADP remained largely blind 
to silent non-participants, and was unaware of the quiet processes of opting-out that 
went on. Participatory rhetoric, often criticised for its lack of substance, was thus less 
appropriate here than ever, as a substantial group of potential beneficiaries felt 
themselves unable to negotiate involvement.
Behind the backs of project staff, ZADP resources and interventions were at times 
adopted and used for party political ends. At other times a party political inclination 
was ascribed to the organisation. Although ZADP attempted -  and believed itself -  to 
be apolitical in terms of party politics. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 demonstrated that it was 
frequently understood in just such terms, and its activities were widely associated with 
Frelimo.
The division between Renamo and Frelimo is fundamental to any understanding 
of Zambézia, and to an understanding of what ‘happened’ in ZADP. Frelimo, since 
Independence the governing party of Mozambique, had a very limited constituency in 
my two fieldwork sites. Nevertheless, the national dominance of the party, coupled 
with its self-proclaimed association with ‘development’ and modernity, meant that 
Frelimo adherents were most prominent in ZADP activities. Renamo supporters, 
though not defining themselves as backward (a caricature regularly made of them by 
their opponents), were cautious about embracing activities they associated with Frelimo. 
This meant that although in elections Renamo was overwhelmingly more popular than 
Frelimo (Table 5.1), Frelimo members were at the forefront of ZADP activities, and it 
was their definitions, analysis and priorities that were ‘heard’ by the project and 
identified as the ‘community’ voice.
ZADP staff, well aware as they were of the existence of the two parties, did not 
fully appreciate the implications of political affiliation. Ignoring political division was 
made easy by a focus on an unproblematised, ill-defined and ever-changing 
‘community’. The lens through which rural Zambézia was viewed was one that blurred 
division and difference, and emphasised cohesion and communality. Although in 
practice communal activities were soon abandoned by ZADP as too difficult and 
unsuccessful, activities based purely around individuals -  sometimes even involving 
payment of those individuals -  continued to be labelled ‘community-based’. As
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Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 showed, these activities were not only not ‘community-based’, 
in some cases unequal distribution actually fuelled jealousies and tensions.
For most técnicos, political affiliation was only one of several ways of 
categorising rural people, and was not always the most significant. They tended to give 
priority to distinguishing between rural, ill-educated and generally backward people, 
and an urban-based, mobile and forward-looking group of which they themselves 
formed part. Blurring the clear division between the two, they acknowledged that a 
small number of rural-dwelling people were members of or aspirants to their group. 
These might include teachers and health workers, some traders, certain leaders (Frelimo 
and more seldom, Renamo), and a number of the more mobile. Unlike local 
government officials and Frelimo party workers who would claim that it was Renamo 
supporters that were backward, técnicos would say that ‘the villager’ (o camponês) was 
traditionally-minded, conservative, and unwilling to change. They thus tended to 
differentiate rural dwellers according to wealth and open-mindedness, rather than party 
membership. Of course, there was an element of truth to this. It was not that Renamo 
supporters so much tended to be poor, as that Frelimo supporters were over-represented 
amongst the better-off. Those who had some engagement in the world outside the 
localidade, were they teachers, traders, or leaders, tended to identify themselves with 
the party of progress and of modernity: Frelimo. Nonetheless, the way in which 
técnicos characterised people omitted a factor that I have shown to have been important.
As I discussed in Chapter 6, those whose sympathies were not with Frelimo often 
felt themselves constrained from participating in ZADP activities. Although it is true 
that a considerable number of Renamo leaders were given project goats, rank-and-file 
members were rarely in evidence as beneficiaries. This may have been partly due to the 
frequent caricaturing of Renamo supporters as complicado by certain project facilitators 
and by the Frelimo leaders involved in the project. It is also probable that Frelimo 
supporters were more willing to be involved in unprofitable activities than Renamo 
members. Frelimo supporters were more likely to identify the project with their own 
party, and thus both view it as a ‘patron’, and as deserving of loyalty. They also tended 
to value the more intangible benefits consequent on involvement with a what was seen 
as a modem project.
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The political divide lay at the root of individual and household decisions either to 
participate or not participate in project activities. Political allegiance meant that some 
people who might have found project activities personally beneficial chose not to take 
part. But as Chapter 7 demonstrated, the decision not to get involved did not mean that 
non-participants viewed any increases in wealth on the part of participants as benign. 
Rather, the very fact that they were denied access to what had in some cases proved to 
be effective wealth-creation activities, on the basis of already piquant political divisions, 
stirred up envies and jealousies.
This makes for a complication of the widely emphasised point (see amongst 
others Dey 1982, Crehan and von Oppen 1988, Harrison 1995b, de Vries 1996), that 
beneficiaries will adopt and adapt those parts of a development intervention that are 
most beneficial to them, whilst repudiating those they do not favour. I have argued that 
the choices made in Mutange and Mugaveia were not merely those of individual actors, 
but were also connected to structural factors in Zambézian society. Rejection of ZADP 
activities was seen as the rejection of the long-unpopular Frelimo state/government and 
hence was initially a common tactic; however it became ever more problematic as 
project activities improved and participants started to feel their benefits.
I have argued that patronage characterised not only the relationship between 
(many) ZADP participants and project staff, but also the relationship between donor and 
project. One of the points at issue here is intentionality. Who is it that intends or 
initiates patron-client relationships? It is not so unusual to say that state institutions 
may be used as vehicles of political patronage (Farrington et al. 1993: 6), that NGOs 
may be, consciously or unconsciously, the ‘new patrons’, or indeed that the state may be 
viewed by some as ‘patron of last resort, thus securing micro-level patron-client 
relations which contribute to the reproduction of poverty’ (McGregor, cited in Lewis 
forthcoming-b). But I have written about something very different: the ways in which a 
project, linked to but not part of the ‘state’, was constructed as a political patron in a 
way it neither understood, recognised or intended. ZADP did not intend to act as a 
patron, and as I discussed on page 217, the DFID accusation that it was ‘top-down, 
handout, prescriptive and effectively a patronage system’ was taken extremely seriously. 
Nor did DFID intend that ZADP should act as its client. Yet in both cases a certain
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room for manoeuvre was consequent on the client’s designation of its donor as ‘patron’, 
and this designation -  uncontested because it was rarely recognised -  thus proved useful.
I have argued throughout that different kinds of equivalences were made between 
Frelimo, the state and the government; between the state/Frelimo and NGOs; and 
between the colonial and post-colonial state. That the division between state and party 
remains murky is undisputed, but the other two claims are more novel, and therefore 
more open to question. In particular, the similarities that my informants noted between 
the state/Frelimo and NGOs do not appear to be universal in Mozambique. That 
villagers saw World Vision as part of some amorphous state/party entity was recognised 
by all ZADP técnicos, who knew very well that their activities were strongly associated 
with the government despite their attempts to assert an individual i d e n t i t y . Y e t  in 
Nampula, the situation reported by other researchers is apparently different:
‘The fieldwork revealed considerable confidence and trust in NGOs, in particular, as 
a vehicle of communication between local people and governmental authorities.
This is at least partly due to the way in which communities perceive the working 
methods of government employees. As some poor community members in Nampula 
put it: ''The government just gives orders, this is their way o f working... they say... 
this year we want this, that and the other..." ...Communities’ positive perceptions 
of NGOs relate, at least in part, to the absolute control that the post-colonial state (as 
well as the colonial state) exercised until fairly recently’ (Kanji, Braga, and Mitullah 
2002: 18, authors' italics).
These authors argued that ‘communities’ distinguished between NGOs and the state in a 
way I did not find to be the case in Mutange and Mugaveia. This may reflect the 
distinctness of the Zambézian historical experience when compared with Nampula, or it 
might be the result of a less in-depth study than the one reported here.
Contestation
Finally, at the time of my fieldwork there was no agreement about what the ‘state’ 
was or what an ‘appropriate’ role for it or for NGOs might be; these were subjects for 
contestation and negotiation. Actors positioned themselves in relation to these debates, 
and their positions were moveable.
These attempts tended to remain at the level o f assertion, as actual practice often involved close 
collaboration with state structures. So, for example, the ZADP team in Gurué always used a vehicle with 
the DDADR logo on it, a vehicle that had been ‘given’ to the Gurué District Director of Agriculture, but 
to which ZADP maintained almost exclusive access rights. DDADR staff were often carried in World 
Vision vehicles, and they attended a number of exit meetings from project localidades in 2002, where 
they were identified as ‘the people who will be carrying on the activities’.
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Contestation about the ‘appropriate’ role for NGOs had profound effects on 
ZADP. In 2000-2002, although the plethora of NGOs, donors, UN bodies and Bretton 
Woods institutions Hanlon had described in 1991 still remained, relations between them 
had altered. NGOs like World Vision came to prominence in Mozambique in the 1980s 
and early 1990s as service providers. On the one hand criticised (for setting up 
unnecessary parallel systems), on the other hand encouraged (through substantial and 
continuing financial support), during the 1990s NGOs like World Vision sought to 
placate their critics by working more closely with the government institutions they had 
once been accused of trying to replace. This was what it was originally intended that 
ZADP should do.
In Chapter 2 I discussed the policy changes that took place over the five year life 
of ZADP. Donors like DFID moved away from attempting to deliver poverty reduction 
themselves. They withdrew much of their support from INGOs, and turned their 
attention to encouraging national policy reform. They justified the change by citing the 
poor performance of INGO projects, and the need to reinvigorate and recapacitate a 
state that only a decade before was being explicitly by-passed. ZADP happened at the 
same time as these deep-seated attitudinal changes were unfolding. Designed at a time 
when it was still considered justifiable for an NGO to be providing services, it was 
implemented while DFID was becoming more ‘statist’. Criticism of INGOs like World 
Vision sharpened, and pressure to link with government institutions became ever 
stronger.
ZADP managers were well aware of the need to respond to these new policy 
directions. They maintained that they collaborated effectively with district-level 
agriculture staff, and provided valued support to poorly-resourced departments. Yet this 
was not what DFID Advisers were really concerned about. They were interested in 
national policy initiatives, and the strengthening of government systems. ZADP 
activities could, they believed, only be sustainable if they were ‘owned’ by government, 
and for that reason they constantly urged ZADP managers to link more effectively with 
government. ZADP staff were not only resistant to what had in the past proved to be 
time-wasting exercises (see page 78), they strongly contested the value of DFID’s wider 
focus on purely national-level institutions and policies. Several argued that national- 
level corruption and a tendency for state resources to be concentrated on Frelimo-voting
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provinces meant that DFID’s change in policy effectively meant the withdrawal of 
resources from Zambézia.
There was thus mutual contestation over the ‘right’ way to engage with 
government. Neither ZADP nor DFID accepted that the other was engaging in a way 
that could bring about positive and poverty-reducing change. For DFID staff, ZADP 
was out-dated, traditional, ‘dodgy’, expatriate-dominated and expensive. For ZADP 
staff, DFID was out of touch, expatriate-dominated, ideological, and extravagant. It is 
to such debates about the ‘right’ way to do ‘development’ that I now turn.
8.2 Development Effectiveness
This thesis has considered some of the practical effects of the rapidly spinning 
whirligig of development fashion. Here I look briefly at a key area where policies and 
ideas changed -  debates about development effectiveness -  and consider how the 
changes affected ZADP.
ZADP coincided with important shifts in debates on development effectiveness. 
Following a long period in which economists were fairly pessimistic about the 
effectiveness of aid (discussed by Hudson 2004: 185), work by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000, see also World Bank 1998) took a much more optimistic view. They argued that 
aid had ‘a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, 
and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies’. I  am not 
competent to comment on the validity of the economic arguments presented, which 
have been challenged by Dalgaard and Hansen, (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001) and 
Easterly et. al. (2003); however for my purposes what was noteworthy was the 
enthusiasm with which this academic paper was taken up by aid agencies (see Easterly 
2003: 23-26 for a full discussion). The second DFID White Paper (2000a) argued, for 
example, that ‘development assistance can contribute to poverty reduction in countries 
pursuing sound policies’.
As a country already defined as a Good Performer ‘pursuing sound policies’ (see 
Chapter 4), Mozambique benefited from the new analysis, becoming eligible for new 
forms and increased flows of aid. With a PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) in
^  Easterly (2004: 13-15) has commented on the peculiarity of calling countries ‘developing’ when there 
is precious little evidence that they actually are.
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place, it qualified for increased debt r e l i e f , a n d  a number of donors, including DFID, 
committed themselves to providing Direct Budget Support. In this new context, DFID 
practices and policies changed in three key ways.
First, there was a move away from ‘projects’ towards macro-level policy reform. 
‘Delivering development’ through service-delivery projects like ZADP was not part of 
the new agenda. DFID’s new priority was to ‘try to change the systems that leave 
people poor, both at the international and the national level’ (Anderson, Head of Office), 
an aim which involved working almost exclusively at the level of national policy. This 
involved a concentration on ‘changing processes, not ... outputs’ (Jackson, Livelihoods 
Adviser). The change in emphasis was of great importance for projects like ZADP, 
which, it was argued, could no longer be justified under the new aid regime. Area- 
based interventions were deemed ineffective and unfair. Even leaving moral 
judgements about inclusion and exclusion aside, it is clear that area-based inputs will 
rarely show up in macro statistics against which performance is to be measured under 
the new regime. This means that, unless a secondary form of evaluation is used, 
investments made through area-based projects such as ZADP cannot be justified as their 
impact cannot be assessed. Measurement thus skews choice of intervention.
Second, the move to Direct Budget Support led to the increased concentration of 
DFID efforts in Maputo. As projects like ZADP were no longer considered valid, and 
as providing support to lower levels of government was defined as ‘undermining’ rather 
than ‘strengthening’, DFID officials had fewer and fewer incentives ever to visit 
provincial Mozambique. Their work took place almost entirely in Maputo, and 
increasingly involved high-level policy negotiations with government (Frelimo) 
officials. What actually went on in a province like Zambézia was no longer of much 
significance, so long as the ‘policy dialogue’ continued in Maputo, and so long as the 
macro-level measures continue to show (unattributable) improvement. As Anderson, 
the DFID Head of Office put it, ‘we’re not responsible for poverty reduction. 
Mozambique has got to be responsible for its poverty reduction’.
Hanlon points out that the PRSP, which involved significant short-term cuts in health and education 
budgets, was opposed by several Mozambican civil society groups, but was nevertheless passed because 
the World Bank and other donors were under significant pressure from campaigners to grant enhanced 
debt relief to more countries (Hanlon 2002a: 10).
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Anderson’s comments highlight the third significant change, that under the new 
regime it was ‘no longer possible to justify a programme on the basis of the number of 
people it helps directly’ (Jackson). This marked a move away from the ‘poorest’ 
towards a more abstract concern with ‘poverty’. For ZADP, although there were 
debates about ways, means and targets, the actual day-to-day situation of the rural poor, 
in particular ‘the poorest’, was at the centre of the picture. Leaving behind the focus on 
contact farmers (advanced peasants) that had pertained during ZADP (I), the project 
concentrated on family farmers, attempting to identify and overcome constraints on 
production and income generation. Although the land tenure component was concerned 
with some macro-level issues, such as the allocation of land and negotiation with 
investors, in the main ZADP activities were targeted directly at poor farmers. Such a 
micro focus, which was in line with the analysis of Social Development Advisers at the 
start of the project (see Chapter 4), did not fit well with the increasingly macro-level 
DFID approach. In a world in which macro statistics count, the actual situation of 
particular farmers is of very little interest. If GDP per capita continues to grow, the fact 
that inequality is rising can be masked.
Two significant points should be made about these changes. The first deals with 
labels. Changes in donor policy towards Mozambique consolidated its definition as a 
Satisfactory Reformer. Any change in its classification would endanger the whole aid 
enterprise in Mozambique, and as such would be difficult to consider. Hanlon argued 
that a desire not to rock the boat led donors to close their eyes to clear evidence of 
increasing poverty and corruption, with the full cooperation of what he termed 
Mozambique’s ‘predatory elite’:
‘The Mozambican elite has become highly skilled at giving the donors what they 
want. Thus management of donor money is transparent and clear. The predatory 
elite do not steal donors’ fiinds; instead they rob banks, skim public works contracts, 
demand shares in investments, and smuggle drugs and other goods -  and they ensure 
that the justice system does not work so they cannot be caught.
Similarly, donors see rapid GDP growth, growing exports, increasing enclave 
foreign investments, growth in the areas of Maputo that they frequent, and a 
government which does the bidding of the international financial institutions (IFIs) 
and can manage donor projects. They choose not to see that poverty is worsening in 
rural areas’ (Hanlon 2002a: 3).
Projects like ZADP, which continued to present evidence that all was not well at the 
district and local level, became more and more difficult for DFID Advisers to 
comprehend. As I recounted at the outset (page 54), this incomprehension affected me
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personally during my research, and I never found effective ways of communicating with 
many of the DFID Advisers.
This ‘intentional ignorance’, as Chomsky (1999) has termed it, may be explained 
by the mutual dependence of donors and the Mozambican elite, an interdependence that 
at first seems counter-intuitive, given Mozambique’s heavy reliance on external aid (see 
Table 4.1). However while donors are important for Mozambique, Mozambique is also 
important for the donors. There are so few ‘poster children’ in Africa that damaging the 
glowing reputation of Mozambique would be a tacit admission of the failure of aid 
policies over the last decade. As Hanlon has written, ‘a symbiotic relationship has 
grown up between the Mozambican predatory elite and the donors to maintain the myth 
of the Mozambican success story’ (Hanlon 2002a: 13). Manning’s book (2002), 
discussed in Chapter 5, looked at a non-aid area where the same perverse symbiosis 
held true. She argued that at the national level Renamo has managed to continue 
negotiating outside formal political institutions by exploiting donor desires for 
Mozambique to remain a multiparty democracy. Here too the presentation of a 
particular façade justified potentially detrimental ‘backstage’ practices.
The second important conclusion has a somewhat smaller, though equally 
significant canvas. Policy debates within DFID had practical consequences for the 
beneficiaries of project like ZADP. The move to Direct Budget Support, and the 
consequent end to the financial support of district and provincial level government 
departments, and to service-delivery by NGOs, effectively involved the withdrawal of 
DFID funding to the entire agriculture sector in Zambézia. Although some of my 
informants in Mugaveia and Mutange had been able to turn many ZADP activities to 
their own advantage (cf. Hill 1986: 1), their ability to negotiate and manoeuvre and 
make the best of a bad job broke down when funding was completely withdrawn. The 
new DFID policy gave no chance for the ‘poor’ to speak or comment on the change. 
For them, the result of the move towards govemment-to-govemment aid was the ending 
of services. The técnicos who left the localidades when their ZADP contracts expired 
were not replaced. Nor was there really much likelihood that funding going in ‘at the 
top of the hopper’, as the Economic Adviser termed it, would find its way down through 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development into interventions at the localidade 
level. Thus, whilst we must allow for the agency of the less powerful (Scott’s (1985)
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‘weapons of the weak’), it would be inaccurate to sound too optimistic a note about 
their room for manoeuvre. As the example of ZADP shows, the final decisions about 
whether the project would continue or not were taken without consultation with the 
relatively powerless; their compass of action was thus circumscribed.
8.3 Conclusion
‘Development’, it can be argued, is a modernist project, teleological, and reliant 
on an underlying idea of progress. Rostow’s ‘stages of development’ theory 
exemplifies this, confidently outlining the steps needed for traditional low-income 
societies to move towards ‘take-off (Rostow 1960). ‘Development’ today still 
envisages such a positive progression (Easterly 2003: 30-33), though talk is currently 
phrased in terms of ‘pro-poor growth’, and the role of the state has been significantly 
downplayed. The agricultural component of ZADP can also be seen to have conformed 
to this modernising paradigm, with its (largely fruitless) search for appropriate 
technologies and technological solutions to transform the lives of peasant farmers.
ZADP had ambitious goals (see Table 1.1): increasing food security for the 
poorest groups in Zambézia, through crop production and marketing increases, a fifty 
percent increase in the range of income-generating activities, and a fall in levels of child 
malnourishment. There is no evidence that the project itself achieved these goals: 
although there were substantial improvements in project baseline indicators from 1998 
to 2002 (Collins 1998, 2000, 2002), attribution of change is problematic, and ZADP 
reached only a small proportion of the target population (see Table 5.2). Given that the 
estimated population of the intervention area was approximately 225,000 (Bias et al. 
2001), the project’s lack of impact was unsurprising. Simple division of the project 
budget (£7,753,000) by the population gives a figure of £34.50 per person, just £8.60 
per project year. Compare this to Easterly’s admittedly polemic assertion -  based on 
World Bank figures -  that it takes US$ 3521 in aid to raise a poor person’s income by 
US$ 3.65 per year (Easterly 2002: 41). As Moynihan wrote thirty five years ago, ‘we 
constantly underestimate difficulties, overpromise results, and avoid any appearance of 
incompatibility and conflict, thus repeatedly creating the conditions of failure out of a 
desperate desire for success’ (Moynihan 1969: xii-xiii).
It was intended that the changes in British aid to Mozambique described in the last 
section would overcome these problems, which were identified as being associated with
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the ‘project approach’. The novelty of DFID’s radical new agenda was emphasised to 
me time and again by its strongest supporters, who would suggest that now problems 
were really understood, and were being tackled at source, ‘development’ would really 
start to show results. Yet could it not be argued that, far from being novel and 
innovative, DFID’s new approach actually represented a return to a belief in the 
Weberian legal/rational state, and a move away from the populism of the past thirty-odd 
years?
This continuity with older patterns of thought was not recognised, but even more 
importantly, nor were the very serious obstacles to the development of a legal/rational 
state taken seriously. Hanlon’s comments on the predatory nature of the Mozambican 
elite have been echoed in other parts of Africa (Bayart 1993, Bayait, Ellis, and Hibou 
1999), and the legacy of the one-party state, in terms of the party politicisation of state 
institutions, has been noted throughout this thesis. The changes needed if DFID’s state- 
channelled aid is to achieve what has been promised, which include the reduction of the 
power of more powerful elites and the redistribution of resources, have not been seen as 
the fiendishly complex tasks they undoubtedly were. As Moynihan noted many years 
ago, it could appear that ‘socially concerned intellectuals never took seriously enough 
their talk about the “power structure”. Certainly, they seemed repeatedly to assume that 
those who had power would let it be taken away a lot easier than could be possibly be 
the case if what was involved was power' (1969: 135, original italics).
These changes in aid policy occurred far from my local setting, in which an 
‘unsuccessful’ ‘traditional’ project, ‘of the type we don’t now do’ was being 
implemented. But they did impinge on my field sites. I started the thesis with the 
taunts reported by ‘unemployed’ project facilitators: ‘your patron has left you now’. 
ZADP may not have achieved much with its £7.8 million, according to its funders, and 
as I have demonstrated (in particular in Chapter 7) some of its activities were deeply 
problematic. Yet the project did provide a certain amount of outside investment and 
resources to extremely remote areas. Yellow-fleshed sweet potato may not have been as 
widely grown as its promoters had hoped it would be, but those who grew it in small 
quantities liked both its taste, and the fact that it was said to be good for children. The 
research on varieties of cassava resistant to Brown Streak virus may not have paid great
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dividends over the life of ZADP, but as the disease spreads further through 
Mozambique (IRIN 2004), it has started to show its value.
The point is that fads and fashions at the international level have a real effect on 
poor people, on the poor people that ZADP tried to target. Conflicting fashions meant 
that the project was designed both to encourage economic growth, and to focus on 
poverty alleviation for the very poorest. As policies changed, DFID staff attempted to 
persuade ZADP into or out of activities; although they were not always successful, and 
changes and new policies were sometimes resisted (page 94), their efforts had a 
seriously destabilising effect. The failure of ‘projects’ to achieve either of the original 
goals (economic growth or alleviation of the poverty of the poorest) led to the 
withdrawal of direct funding for activities in rural Zambézia, in the long-term national 
interest.
A great deal of effort, much by anthropologists, has been devoted to examining 
why projects like ZADP ‘fail’ (see, for example, Barnett 1977, Porter, Allen, and 
Thompson 1991, Mamdani 1972). Yet, as Ferguson (1990) showed over a decade ago, 
development clearly ‘works’ for some. Perhaps even more importantly, the labelling 
that Wood showed to be so important in allowing or prohibiting peasant access to 
interventions (1985a) is equally significant in designating and defining interventions 
themselves. Once again the question is 'which labels are created, and whose labels 
prevail to define a whole situation or policy area, under what conditions and with what 
effects’ (7)? The attribution of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ is political; a claimed ‘failure’ 
needs to be set within a broader context, one which comprehends the possibility of 
‘hidden transcripts’ of success (cf. Scott 1990). It is not surprising that as fashions 
change, interventions should come to be labelled ‘unsuccessful’; success is, after all, 
dependent on the measures used to evaluate it.
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Appendix A: Terms of Reference
The post holder will be attached to the World Vision International Zambezia 
Agricultural Development Project. She will be based in Quelimane, Zambezia Province, 
Mozambique and will report on a day-to-day basis to the Project Manager, Zambezia 
Agricultural Development Project. Professional social development support will also be 
provided by the DFID Social Development Adviser based in Harare.
The APO will develop an approach to social ethnographic research that can 
produce findings to assess emerging project impacts, and feed this into the on-going 
implementation of the project. The APO will work closely with the Mozambican 
anthropologist to conduct in-depth research at the project/district and conununity level. 
They will each cover two field sites. The research will focus on a total of four 
communities {células) where ZADP has been working for more than two years, 
probably consisting of two in Gurué District (highland zone) and two in Nicoadala or 
Namacurra District (lowland coastal zones). The in-depth research will enable the 
project to understand the perceptions of primary stakeholders, both beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries, regarding the nature and extent of project impacts, and will 
complement more quantitative data emerging from the base-line survey.
The Social Development APO will also work closely alongside other World 
Vision staff, particularly the Rural Sociologist and Monitoring and Evaluation Unit to 
help ensure that research findings influence the scope and direction of the project. She 
will work with one or two research assistants.
The attachment will be for one year, which will commence after an intensive 
Portuguese language training course.
1. Purpose of Attachment
To conduct research that will help ZADP understand the impact of project 
activities on those living within the project area, in particular the rural poor, and to 
provide recommendations on how future activities can be modified to enhance project 
impact. In particular the research will illuminate:
• How project interventions are perceived by different groups in the project area
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• Which socio-economic groups benefit from or are affected by project activities, and 
how this has changed
• What factors affect people’s willingness or ability to participate in project activities
• What community-level institutions exist, and how the project can build on them
• What factors outside the project’s control (e.g. more general social and economic 
changes etc.) are impacting on the project, and how
The research will need to be of sufficient academic rigour to form the basis of a 
Ph.D. thesis to be completed on return to the UK
2. Scope of Work
2.1 Project/District level familiarisation
At a project/district level the Social Development Associate Professional Officer 
will review secondary documentation (including design stage participatory rural 
assessment work), and conduct interviews with key project stakeholders and other 
officials, aiming to:
•  Obtain an overall picture of the project area including its ethnic, economic and 
physical diversity
•  Understand how the project goals and interventions have been developed, including 
strategies for targeting and promoting community participation
•  Explore the methods and objectives of other governmental and non-governmental 
projects and programmes affecting the project area and how ZADP fits in with them
• Explore the wider social and economic changes taking place within the project area 
which may not be attributable to specific projects
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2.2 Field Level Research
The Social Development APO will carry out qualitative research in two 
communities to:
Investigate the socio-economic profile of participants in different project activities, 
and how this has changed.
Interview both participants and non-participants about their perceptions of ZADP 
and the effects (direct and indirect) that the project has had on different groups and 
individuals within the area.
Investigate how participants and non-participants feel ZADP has had these effects, 
in particular considering forms of information-sharing and the role of community 
level institutions.
Examine the extent to which project activities bring about unintended negative 
impacts on poor people and how these might be mitigated.
Examine local perceptions of the ZADP project activities, staff, CEWs and credit 
promoters, and what adjustments are suggested. Explore understandings and 
concerns about outsider involvement at the village level.
Explore the extent to which primary stakeholders in the project area are also 
engaged in non-project agricultural/credit/commercial institutions and how these 
compare to project institutions.
Investigate factors, including power relations and gender relations, which affect 
people’s ability to participate in project activities, and reasons why people choose 
not to become involved in project activities.
Investigate ongoing processes of change at the village level, and how these are 
perceived, e.g. the effects of conflict, changing patterns of employment and 
agriculture etc.
Investigate existing power structures, gender relations, community level institutions 
and how these influence community level participation and group formation.
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3. Outputs
3.1 A work plan within one month of commencing work in Zambezia Province
3.2 Thematic quarterly reports to be shared and discussed by the wider project team. 
Topics will be agreed with the Project Manager but could include ‘community level 
institutions’, gender impacts of project activities’, and ‘forms and patterns of 
participation’
3.3 A report summarising key findings from qualitative research for circulation to 
feed into the Mid Term Review (February 2001). Preparatory work for the review may 
also require additional social development consultancy inputs to be determined by the 
Project Manager in discussion with DFID.
3.4 Present a (draft) final research report before completing the attachment to 
ZADP/DFID Harare with clear recommendations on future directions.
The Social Development APO will undertake to submit all reports and papers 
produced during the period of the attachment to DFID Central Africa and the Project 
Manager and World Vision International for comment before publication, and to 
acknowledge project support in all publications.
4. Reporting responsibilities
The Social Development APO will report on a day to day basis to the ZADP 
Project Manager. The Social Development Adviser based in Harare will also provide 
intermittent support during six-monthly and annual reviews. She will also receive 
professional support from the project’s Rural Sociologist.
The officer will attend monthly project management meetings to report on 
progress made during the past month and plans for the next month, feeding back 
research findings, situating them in the wider project experience and making 
suggestions for on-going changes.
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Appendix B: Interview Details 
1. Taped Interviews
Date No. Interviewee
28.11.00 01 Stephen Barnes, ZADP Project Manager
30.11.00 T1 Meeting in Mutange
07.12.00 G1 Meeting in Intuba
14.12.00 0 2 Meeting in Pida
14.12.00 03 Meeting in Pidâ
21.02.01 T2 Carlos Gomes, (late) President of Mutange
21.02.01 T2 Veronica Cipriano, Wife of secretario do circula
23.02.01 T3 Vuia Mutange, (late) régula
23.02.01 T3 Lemes Cuaré, Secretâria da circula
05.03.01 G2 Group of leaders. Intuba
15.03.01 T4 Sidonio Sortane, Lider camunitaria
16.03.01 T5 Joao Mario and Banco Joaguinte, workers on ZADP nursery
16.03.01 T6 Joana Fernando
23.03.01 0 4  & 5 DFID Presentation
28.03.01 G3 Mugaveia village leaders
05.04.01 T7 Henriques Francisco, Frelimo chefe de zana
05.04.01 T8 Joana Veloso
05.04.01 T8 Abflio Mussa
06.04.01 T8 Mau Tempo and family
06.04.01 T9 Eusebio Costa Carafage, Facilitator
06.04.01 TIO Pordina Ernesto
09.04.01 TIO Horacio Tomas
10.04.01 T i l Virginia Barbosa and Rosa Orapa
10.04.01 T12 Vuia Mutange and Sissino Anselmo
10.04.01 T13 Antonio Amuza Tatula
11.04.01 T14 Emasia José, member of Land Committee
11.04.01 T15 Lemes Cuaré, Secretâria da circula
12.04.01 T16 Victorino Pedro
12.04.01 T17 Violina Costa
12.04.01 T17 Isabel José, Member of Land Committee
17.04.01 G4 Rafael Manuel and Ricardo Manuel
18.04.01 G5 Gonçalves Maluwaia, Deacon of Baptist Union Cburcb
19.04.01 G 4 & 5 Meeting in Nicoria
19.04.01 G6 Rodrigues Naquele, Secretâria of Inlixe
21.04.01 G7 Virgflio Muanariri
23.04.01 G8 Meeting with leaders, Mugaveia
23.04.01 G9 Domingos Antonio
24.04.01 GIO Nikomo, Renamo leader
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24.04.01 G ll Andre Nshima and Gilda Maluwaia
24.04.01 G12 Frederica Abele
25.04.01 G13 Ramos Mucuapa and Marta Mussumahiva
25.04.01 G14 Junior Pareua
25.04.01
G15
Romao Francisco and Lucia Albino, President of Mugaveia 
and wife
26.04.01 G16 Juliao Mauinto and Maria Naquele,
26.04.01 G17 Maria Botomane
07.05.01 T18 Rosalina José
08.05.01 T19 Rafael Daniel
08.05.01 T19 Costa de Sousa
08.05.01 T20 Group of rat data collectors
09.05.01 T21 Ricarda Vinho
09.05.01 T21 Hilaria Paulino
16.05.01 G18 Vasco Paulino and Berlinda Sevene (R)
16.05.01 G19 Rosa Matxua, Widow of late régulo (R)
16.05.01 G20 Joana Sevene, Daughter of late régulo (R)
16.05.01 G20 Rosalina Sevene, Daughter of late régulo (R)
16.05.01 T22 Nunes Olimpio and Alves Agostinho
16.05.01 T23 & 24 Zachariah Fonseca
17.05.01 G21 Silvestre Andrassone Nipahawaca (R)
17.05.01 T25 Felizardo Lemeia
17.05.01 T25 Inacia Benjame
17.05.01 T26 Grigorio Olimpio
18.05.01 T26 José Albino and Belita Virgflio
18.05.01 G22 José Alves Macompa and Lidia Sevene (R)
18.05.01 G22 Joao Albino and Belita Virgflio
18.05.01 G23 Tomas Mangrasse (R)
23.05.01 G24 Amélia Paulo (R)
23.05.01 G24 Hortensia Kanamareya (R)
23.05.01 G25 Nunes Alberto (R)
23.05.01 G25 Fernando Xavier (R)
29.05.01 T27 Lina Davide and Rosa Escrever
29.05.01 T28 Headmaster of Mutange EPl school
29.05.01 T29 Sidonio Sortane
29.05.01 T29 & 30 Zachariah Surash
30.05.01 T31 Josefa Castina
30.05.01 T32 Jurfina Inrawe
30.05.01 T33 Antonio Borame
31.05.01 T34 Zebelino Caixe and Daniel Eduardo
31.05.01 T35 Julia José and Rasido
31.05.01 T36 Judith Manuel, wife of health worker
30.06.01 0 6 Bernard Chidzero and Rui Afonso, consultants
18.07.01 G26 Tiago Armando and Laurentina Maluwaya (R)
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18.07.01 G26 Lidia Maluwaya (R)
18.07.01 G ll Tomas Nacuvene and Lucia Sevene (R)
18.07.01 028 Baptista Oermias and Julieta Farias (R)
19.07.01 029 Muisira Yowaniwa (R)
19.07.01 030 Fonsina Maluaya (R)
19.07.01 031 Amelia Armando (R)
25.08.01 0 7 Stephen Barnes, ZADP Project Manager
26.09.01 T37 André Meio Dia
26.09.01 T38 Elda Essalamo
27.09.01 T39 Lucas Jonas
27.09.01 T4 0& 4 1 Lemes Lemeia
27.09.01 T41 Castinha Nemes
02.10.01 T42 Abflio Catorze
02.10.01 T 4 3 & 4 4 Arminda Sambique
03.10.01 T45 Amalique Froi
03.10.01 T46 Aida Ismael
04.10.01 T47 Diviguana Ofmar
10.10.01 032 Namuteko Mwiweha
10.10.01 032 Muhonopi Nipapaya
11.10.01 033 Oroup of elderly men
11.10.01 034 Muisira Yowaniwa
11.10.01 035 Amelia Nalalaca
12.10.01 036 Agostinho Austen
12.10.01 037 Claudino Austen
12.10.01 038 Pedro Virgflio
15.10.01 039 Ouilherme Muhona
15.10.01 040 Raul Murria, Deputy President
15.10.01 041 Nahemo Nvalo
16.10.01 042 Joana Campa
17.10.01 043 Ropate Mukwarane
17.10.01 043 Marina Epuiri
17.10.01 044 Antonio Muhiwa
17.10.01 045 Kinhanuemane
18.10.01 046 Antonio Mutxaca
18.10.01 046 Pedro Macumanha
19.10.01 047 Vasco Mucheya
26.10.01 T48 Adolfo and Maria Mbudiga
30.10.01 T49 Antonio Joao Manhinda
30.10.01 T50 Luis Chico Pezula, Health Worker
05.12.01 048 Tomas Mangrasse, Facilitator
05.12.01 049 Carlitos Martinho, Facilitator
05.12.01 049 Tomas Muanavohua, Facilitator
06.12.01 050 Arlindo Alberto, Facilitator
07.12.01 051 Eugenio Antonio, Facilitator
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07.12.01 G51 Inoc Alberto, Facilitator
07.12.01 G52 Bemadino Haria, Facilitator
12.12.01 T51 Hilario Tiogo, Facilitator
12.12.01 T52 Belito Daniel, Facilitator
12.12.01 T53 Antonio Congo, Facilitator
13.12.01 T54 Hortencia Jafar, Facilitator
13.12.01 T54 Maria José, Facilitator
13.12.01 T55 Agusto Joao, Facilitator
13.12.01 T56 Felizardo Dourinho, Facilitator
13.12.01 T57 Gonçalves Rafael, Rat data collector
14.12.01 T58 Eugenio Nhacorrente, Facilitator
14.12.01 T58 Casquero Marque, Facilitator
08.01.02 T59 Abflo Masaude, Rat data collector
08.01.02 T59 Tomé Mutange, Rat data collector, brother of régulo
08.01.02 T60 Hilaria José, Facilitator
09.01.02 T61 Joaquim Albino (A)
09.01.02 T61 & 62 Sousa Dhuvumele (A)
09.01.02 T62 David Liguene (A)
10.01.02 T63 Paulo Dias (A)
10.01.02 T64 & 65 Bento Obre (A)
11.01.02 T65 Violinda Arage (A)
15.01.02 T66 Aristima Ronco (A)
15.01.02 T66 & 67 Julia Custema (A)
15.01.02 T67 Helena Baladjane (A)
15.01.02 T73 Luzia Armazia (A)
16.01.02 07A Hendrik Petersen, Acçâo Agrâria Alemâ
16.01.02 T68 Madrinha Made (A)
16.01.02 T69 Sidinha Munhanhia and Dandinha Abucara (A)
17.01.02 T70 Abema Jussar (A)
17.01.02 T71 Bernadette Armazia (A)
17.01.02 T72 Fernando Aliz (A)
18.01.02 T74 Jacinto Lavaio (A)
22.01.02 T75 Paulina Rubate, Curandeiro
22.01.02 T76 Moisés Paulo, Church leader
23.01.02 T77 Henriques Francisco, Frelimo chefe de zona
24.01.02 T78 Estofem Henriques
28.01.02 T79 Jordao Estevao
29.01.02 T80 Francisco Baptista, Baptist church leader
29.01.02 T81 Octano Ricardo
29.01.02 T82 Odete José
30.01.02 T83 Isaquiel Anselmo
30.01.02 T84 Nonito Agostinho
30.01.02 T85 Carlota Amilai
31.01.02 T86 Mariamo Sambique
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31.01.02 T87 Sufriana Alves and Moisinho Dramuz
13.02.02 G53 Joaquim Benedito Natxeco
13.02.02 G54 Marcelina Raul and Jorge Felizardo
14.02.02 G55 Juliana Muhoma
14.02.02 G56 Sopra Napiri
14.02.02 G57 Daniel Namuteca
15.02.02 G58 Felizardo Waxiroma, Frelimo chefe de zona
15.02.02 G59 Agnesse Mahwa, Church elder
15.02.02 G60 Agosto Pitra, Health worker
15.02.02 G60 Maria Parua, Church elder
16.02.02 O 8 & 0 9 Padre Elias Ciscato
18.02.02 G61 & 62 Albino Sampara
19.02.02 G63 & 64 Focus Group, Renamo Leaders
20.02.02 G65 Timitorio Sergio
20.02.02 G66 Eriasse Cozinheiro
20.02.02 G67 Galhardo Horacio
20.02.02 G68 & 69 José Lourenço Guruvate, Teacher
21.02.02 G70 Lucia Forma
21.02.02 G70 Vicente Munawova
22.02.02 G71 Sarconda Namatala, Secretâria of Frelimo
22.02.02 G72 & 73 Focus group of Frelimo leaders
25.02.02 T88 & 89 Focus group of Renamo leaders
04.03.02 T90&91 Joao Matraia Nangura
05.03.02 T92 & 93 Focus group of young people from Namuinho B
06.03.02 T94 & 95 Focus group of Frelimo leaders
06.03.02 T96 Focus group of women
14.03.02 G74 Director of Intuba School
14.03.02 G75 Cravalho Narson, Health Worker
15.03.02 G76 Alberto Rafael, First secretario of Nicoria
15.03.02 G ll Gasten Mussaraua, Curandeiro
15.03.02 G78 Director of Nicoria School
21.03.02 G79 Chefe de Posta in Mepuaguia
26.03.02 T97 & 98 Focus group of Association members
26.03.02 T99 Focus group of facilitators
26.03.02 TlOO Belito Daniel, Facilitator
27.03.02 TlOl & 2 President of Mutange
27.03.02 T103 Zachariah Fonseca
01.04.02 O il Cipriano Amelia
04.04.02 T103A ZADP meeting about goats, Naminane
04.04.02 T104 ZADP meeting about goats, Mapiazua
06.04.02 T105 Final goodbye meeting in Mutange
08.04.02 G 80 &8 1 Focus group of male project participants
08.04.02 G 8 1 & 8 2 Focus group of project participants
09.04.02 G83 Focus group of facilitators and most active participants
273
09.04.02 084 Raul Muanavola
09.04.02 085 & 86 Focus group of COM Facilitators
10.04.02 087 & 88 Focus group of goat recipients
10.04.02 088 Focus group of leaders from Mugaveia
10.04.02 089 Focus group of rat data collectors
11.04.02 090  & 91 Focus group of CLUSA group members
12.04.02 CIO Rodrigues Alberto, ZADP livestock técnico
12.04.02 012 André Cigarro, ZADP técnico
20.11.02 013 Jim Cope, ZADP Project Manager
22.11.02 014 Lourenço Piri Piri, ZADP livestock técnico
22.11.02 015 Barbara Johnson, ZADP rural sociologist
23.11.02 016 Joaquim Tomas, ZADP research agronomist
24.11.02 017 Richard Dove, Manager of World Vision agriculture project
25.11.02 018 Oil Fonseca , Concession bolder in Mutange
25.11.02 019 Ana Bela Cambaza, ZADP veterinarian
26.11.02 020 Fernando Marrime, ZADP extension supervisor
27.11.02 021 & 22 Roberto Cassiano, ZADP livestock technician
28.11.02 022 & 23 Estevao André, ZADP técnico
28.11.02 023 Alberto Jaime, CCM técnico
28.11.02 024 Adriâo José, Ex-manager of tea plantation
29.11.02 025 Fibpa Oouveia, ZADP anthropologist
29.11.02 026 Oemusse Manuel, CCM extension supervisor
29.11.02 026 Ana Maria Jacinto, ZADP técnico
01.12.02 027 Antonio Tcheco, ZADP extension supervisor
02.12.02 028 Horacio Joao Rubalaine, ZADP bridge technician
02.12.02 029 Jacinta Lopes, ZADP técnico
02.12.02 030 Alberto Chirindza, ORAM worker
03.12.02 019 & 28 Rafael Valoi, ZADP deputy project manager
03.12.02 031 Jemusse Jordao, District Director of Agriculture, Namacurra
03.12.02 032 Brian Hilton, Manager of World Vision agriculture project
08.12.02 033 Claire Lloyd, Deputy Director of Agriculture, World Vision
08.12.02 034 Neil Holmes, DFID Economic Adviser
09.12.02 035 Patrick Anderson, DFID Head of Office
10.12.02 036 Gary Bayer, Director of Agriculture, World Vision
10.12.02 037 Rebecca Jackson, DFID Rural Livelihoods Adviser
10.12.02 038 Ruth Hobson, Country Director, World Vision
10.12.02 039 Stephen Barnes, ZADP Project Manager
11.12.02 040 Emidio Oliveira, DFID rural livelihoods programme officer
Key:
T = Mutange, G = Mugaveia, O = Other 
(R) = interview carried out by Rita 
(A) = interview carried out by Arcanjo
NB Interviewees who bave been quoted bave been given pseudonyms
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2. Key meetings
DFID review of ZADP, 15-19 May 2000 
DFID strategy meeting, Maputo, 19-21 November 2000 
DFID visit to ZADP, 21-23 November 2000 
DFID ‘in-week’, Harare, 22-26 January 2001
ZADP training workshop. Participatory Impact Assessment, 5-9 February 2001 
ZADP Mid-Term Review final workshop, 19-23 March 2001 
DFID regional social development advisers’ conference, Dar es Salaam 4-8 June 2001 
ZADP vision and strategy workshop, 25-30 June 2001 
ZADP workshop on participatory planning with communities, 16 August 2001 
DFID social development advisers’ global gathering, Cambridge, 11-14 September 
2001
ZADP experience sharing workshop, 17-18 December 2001
DFID aid effectiveness and performance management workshop, Maputo, 13-14
February 2002
DFID review of ZADP, 13-16 May 2002
DFID social development and governance advisers’ workshop, Oxfordshire, 22-28 
September 2002
Final Review of ZADP, 5-16 May 2003
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Glossary
agricultor
aldeia comunal
ajuda mutua
azungu (sing, muzungu)
bairro
branco
catxaço
camponês
canteiro
célula
chefe de dez casas 
chefe de zona 
chibalo 
Chuabo
chupa sangue
cipaio
comunidade
comparticipaçào
confiança
confusâo
conselho executivo
coopérante
curandeiro/a
desenvolvimento
deslocado
devoçôes
distrito
donativo
droga
Echuabo
Elomwé
large-scale farmer; in colonial times a 
classification giving exemption from forced labour
communal village
mutued help
white people (Elomwé)
neighbourhood
white person
distilled spirit, usually from sugar cane 
villager, peasant 
field ridge
cell, administrative subdivision of a localidade 
head of ten households 
zone chief
colonial-era unpaid forced labour
name given to people living in and around 
Quelimane; also the local name for Quelimane
blood sucker, blood thief
colonial-era police
community
co-participation, cost-sharing 
trust
confusion, dissent
localidade-\QWQ\ executive council
white worker for the Mozambican government
healer, witchdoctor
development
displaced person
devotions
district
donation
drugs (meaning sorcery)
Chuabo language 
Lomwé language
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emergencia
Estado Novo
facilitador
feiticeiro
feitiçaria
Frelimo
ganho-ganho
Lomwé
localidade
machamba
mambo
metical
mukhwiri
mussoco
mwene
obscurantismo
oferta
okhwiri
patrâo
prazo
posto administrativo 
regadio 
regedoria 
régulo
Renamo
saljema
samassua
secretârio
técnico
trabalhar muacuante 
Visâo Mundial
emergency, used to refer to the war and immediate 
post-war period
New State, name for Salazar’s regime 
facilitator, local collaborator with ZADP 
witch 
witchcraft
ruling ex-socialist party
casual labour, paid in cash and/or kind
name given to the people of Upper Zambézia
locality, administrative subdivision of an 
administrative post
field
chief (for Renamo) (Elomwé)
Mozambican currency 
witch (Elomwé) 
colonial tax 
chief (Elomwé) 
obscurantist behaviour 
present, gift
witchcraft, malevolent power (Elomwé) 
patron
colonial era crown estate 
administrative post 
irrigation scheme
land under control of a colonial régulo
chief during the colonial era; now used of 
‘traditional’ leaders, often Renamo supporters
opposition party
salt substitute, made from burnt maize husks 
(Elomwé)
deputy régulo in colonial times 
Frelimo party secretary 
agricultural extension worker 
colonial-era unpaid forced labour 
World Vision
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Acronyms
ADP Area Development Project
APO(S) Associate Professional Officer (Scheme), 
run by DFID
BDDCA British Division for Development, Central Africa
CCM Conselho Cristào de Moçambique, 
Christian Council of Mozambique
CDC Community Development Committee
CEA Centre for African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane 
University
CEW Community Extension Worker
CLUSA Cooperative League of the USA
DDADR District Department for Agriculture and Rural 
Development
DINAGECA Direcçâo Nacional de Geografia e Cadastro, 
National Directorate for Geography and Cadastre
DFID Department for International Development, UK
EP 1 Escola Primdria 1; Primary School, classes 1-5
EU European Union
PAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
FES Farmer Field School
FRO Farmer Research Group
GoM Government of Mozambique
HDI Human Development Index
IDA International Development Association
IFI International Financial Institution
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
INDER Instituto de Desenvolvimento Rural, Institute of 
Rural Development
INGO International NGO
MADER Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development
MISAU Ministry of Health
MT meticais, Mozambican currency
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NRI Natural Resources Institute
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ODA Overseas Development Administration, now 
DFID. Also official development assistance
ORAM Organizaçâo Rural de Ajuda Mutua, 
Rural Association of Mutual Help
PAAG Provincial Budget and Activity Plan
PARPA Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PIA Participatory Impact Assessment
PIDE Colonial secret police
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRE Economic Rehabilitation Programme
Proagri Sector Investment Programme for Agriculture
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
Promiza ZADP micro-credit component
PY Project Year
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SPGC Servigo Provincial de Geografia e Cadastra, 
Provincial Cadastral Service
SWAp Sector-wide Approach
WV(I) World Vision (International)
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USAID United States Agency for International 
Development
ZADP Zambézia Agricultural Development Project
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